Posted on 06/04/2012 7:56:37 AM PDT by C19fan
On June 4, 1942, a battle off Midway Island marked the dawn of the United States Navy as the most powerful sea force in the world. Seventy years later, a civilian “battle” may doom its reach and power for good. Then the enemy was imperial Japan. Today, it’s the administration and Congress, who seem unable or unwilling to stop defense cuts that will leave America vulnerable and the world more dangerous. We’re fast approaching the point where the US Navy can no longer guarantee the safety of the world’s sea lanes, on which our economic future depends.
(Excerpt) Read more at nypost.com ...
The Japanese lost the pride of their fleet at Midway. Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu.
We lost the carrier Yorktown and one destroyer, the USS Hammann which was towing her. Interestingly, Yorktown survived the battle and was being towed back to Pearl Harbor for repairs when it encountered a Japanese submarine I-168 which sank the crippled Yorktown and her tow.
Japanese naval protocol viewed submarines as extensions of warships and considered our far more effective employment of them against merchant vessels rather than other warships as cowardly.
And today there is another attempt to revive the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”, only this time, it’s China doing it.
USS Hammann was guarding the Yorktown when it was torpedoed along with the carrier. In a tragic irony, many of the Hammann’s crew were killed in the water when the sunken destroyer’s depth charges exploded.
IJN Mogami and Mikuma are an interesting contrast. Wary to the threat of further air attack, the Mogami’s damage control officer had ordered the cruiser’s torpedoes jettisoned, over the angry objection of the ship’s torpedo officer. When the next wave of bombers hit, both cruisers were attacked...and the Mikuma took a hit amidships that detonated its torpedoes, fatally crippling the cruiser.
The Japanese Navy had an interesting (and strict) protocol of priorities for torpedo use...IIRC cargo ships were to be attacked only if no warships (i.e. a more worthy target) were in the vicinity, and then only one torpedo was to be expended on a cargo ship. Even with that, like you noted, many (but not all) Japanese sub skippers passed up easy merchant shipping targets in anticipation that they might find a “worthy” warship later on.
Mostly, the Japanese lost the pilots - who were irreplaceable.
In addition, a destroyer rated one torpedo, a cruiser two, and no more than three for a battleship or carrier.
That part I remember. And given the quality of Japanese torpedoes (especially the Type 93 “Long Lance” design mounted on destroyers and cruisers) and the documented successes they had in action, I doubt more would have been necessary!
Yes. Even the Japanese recognized this later on...one Japanese admiral (I want to say either Kurita or Ugaki) likened the aerial disaster of Saipan—which went down in American history as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot—to throwing eggs against a stone wall.
The Imperial Japanese Navy believed in washing out 90% of pilot trainees. All well and good for a short war, but murder in a long war. Paired with the callous lack of concern for pilot safety in aircraft design, the results were disaster.
The Japanese lost the pride of their fleet at Midway. Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu.
On my desk is a copy of “Joe Rochefort’s War”, by Elliot Carlson.
Fabulous story of the Naval officer who broke the IJN code and set the trap at Midway..a true hero.
I also recommend “A Dawn Like Thunder”..the story of Torpedo 8..Gallant men.
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