If Lee had believed that a guerrilla campaign was winnable, he would not have awaited orders from Davis - he would have done what he had always done: made an executive decision right there on the spot, and hold himself accountable to dismissal or arrest if it went wrong. "
I much enjoy & appreciate your highly informed comments.
First:
By all reports, Lee was in the best sense "an officer and gentleman."
Indeed, he personified that ideal like no other military leader we know of, excepting of course another Virginian, George Washington.
This is in response to stande waite & others who suggested: somehow Lee COULD have, MIGHT have or SHOULD have lead a "guerrilla war," and so changed focus of military actions from ARMY vs ARMY to GUERILLAS vs CIVILIANS.
I'm saying, given his basic character, such a thing was impossible for Lee.
So fahgeddaboutit, COULD NOT happen.
It's been posted here that: the idea was even suggested to Lee and he turned it down.
But I would also note again that Lee was scrupulous in ordering his troops to behave themselves, and to pay for their requisitions in the Gettysburg campaign.
Let's see if I can nail this, by quoting Lee again, from Bowden & Ward (p 140).
[On June 21, 1863, Lee] "had issued strict orders outlining how his men would seize and pay for supplies while operating in enemy territory.
"The wanton destruction of Southern civilian property by Federals was a barbarity Lee was determined his soldiers would avoid.
"I cannot hope that Heaven will prosper our cause when we are violating its laws," Lee had informed [General] Trimble. "I shall therefore carry the war into Pennsylvania without offending the sanctions of a high civilization and of Christianity."
"General Order No. 72, promulgated on June 27, updated the Army of Northern Virginia's code of conduct.
"In addition to complimenting his men on their conduct, Lee admonished that they must remember, "that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain."
"There was more behind Lee's latest orders than a display of Christian charity. While his words do indeed reflect his strong character, integrity, and a sense of moral responsibility, they also demonstrate a realistic understanding of the current military and political realities he faced in Pennsylvania.
"Maintaining order and discipline while moving through enemy territory was absolutely vital because it kept every man in the ranks. This was especially important because Lee was already missing five valuable brigades of infantry.
"Avoiding a repeat of the widespread straggling and desertion that had so weakened the army during the Sharpsburg Campaign in the autumn of 1862 was critical to the success of the current Pennsylvania operation.
"Further, outrages against the locals would only serve to galvanize support for the Lincoln administration and fuel partisan operations against the invading southern army.
"Lee's latest general order was both militarily sound and politically astute."
Second:
On Lee's relationship to the Confederate government:
quoting from page 35 about a May 1863 conference:
"For four days Lee, Davis, and the Confederate cabinet officials were consumed with how to address the military situation facing their country.
"Eventually the choice boiled down to either dispatching reinforcements from the Army of Northern Virginia to Johnston in Mississippi [Vicksburg], or strengthening Lee for a new strike north.
"Although Lee's strategic sagacity was decidedly superior to either Davis' or Seddon's, he exhibited an almost limitless tact dealing with officials in Richmond. This verbal diplomacy put him in good stead with his president, but yielded intricatge circumlocutions during the Richmond conference.
"Still his theme and goals remained clear and consistent, and can be summarized as follows..."
Point is, Lee was expected to (and did) respectfully sell his ideas to the South's civilian government officials. They made the final approval.
When not in the presence of Davis and his cabinet, he wrote Davis very courteous letters and dispatches explaining with great deference that he would not be doing or was unable to do what Davis asked of him.
Lee also routinely made bold moves knowing that his initiatives would already be faits accompli by the time Richmond was apprised of them.
Lee was never, ever ill-mannered in doing these things - but he was not exactly obedient. At all, really.
I would also point out that what Lee wrote in his official orders to his troops and what Lee allowed to actually happen are two different things.
If you break into a Pennsylvania farmer's homestead and take all his stores, all his clothes, all his whisky and eat all his cattle and leave him an I.O.U. payable only in Confederate dollars at drastically below market prices - you're still basically doing the exact same thing as Union troops were doing in Virginia but adding some self-serving paperwork to the mix.
On June 27th, 1863 the "atrocities of our enemies" which Lee was decrying were basically the exact same things his troops were doing to Pennsylvanians at the very time he was writing.
Lee's General Order was basically a document wiping his hands clean of anything that might happen subsequently so it could be characterized as a violation of his orders.
Make no mistake: Lee was in Pennsylvania to resupply his army with clothing, shoes, meat, grain, drink, medicine, tools, horses, mules, wagons, various dry goods, harnesses, etc.
All of these supplies were obtained by seizure from the private citizens and business owners of Pennsylvania.
The Confederate army also made sure to burn down and destroy the home and the business properties of Thaddeus Stevens when they were in Pennsylvania - I believe that was done two or three days after that General Order.
In other words, Lee was not necessarily averse to terror. But he was wise enough to know that terror - as a strategy - could never win the war. He had fought enough Union soldiers and rode through enough Union towns as an invader to realize that the people of the Union would not bow to terror as a method.