Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
"Blow Jogs"
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated on October 11 that Russia has no genuine interest in ending the war in Ukraine until Ukraine capitulates and abandons its NATO membership aspirations.[92]
Russian officials continue to lean on narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of using chemical weapons in an effort to discredit Ukrainian forces and undermine international support for Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to Argentina Dmitry Feoktistov claimed on October 10 that Russia is carefully monitoring Ukraine's alleged violations of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[93] Feoktistov claimed that Ukrainian forces use chemical weapons not only in combat but also against civilians and that Ukrainian forces, in collaboration with NATO, are preparing false-flag provocations on the frontline with the aim of accusing Russia of violating the CWC. Russia has repeatedly conducted similar information and false-flag operations blaming Ukraine, NATO, and the West of war crimes that Russia itself has committed. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported in October 2024 that Russian chemical agents use has been systematic since February 2023 and that Ukraine has recorded Russian forces using munitions equipped with chemical agents 4,228 times as of September 24.[94]
The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on October 12 that Russian media is increasingly attempting to discredit mobilization efforts in Ukraine.[95] The Center reported an increase in the number of publications in Russian media and social networks promoting narratives criticizing Ukrainian mobilization efforts as lawless and unjust. The Center noted that Russian propagandists remain silent about issues surrounding mobilization efforts in Russia, however. ISW has extensively reported on issues related to mobilization in Russia and the Kremlin's fear of repeating another partial mobilization.[96]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2024
Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project reported on October 13 that Russian forces executed nine Ukrainian POWs near the village of Zeleny Shlyakh, Kursk Oblast on October 10.[11] Ukrainian drone operators reportedly unexpectedly encountered Russian forces in what they likely perceived to be a near rear area and came under Russian fire. The Ukrainian drone operators, facing limited ammunition, were compelled to surrender and Russian forces took them as POWs. An image of the aftermath of the execution suggests that Russian forces disarmed, lined, stripped, and shot the Ukrainian POWs — a clear indication of the premeditated nature of the executions.[12] Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets condemned the executions on October 13 as a serious violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs and stated that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the case.[13] The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[14] The Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office also announced on October 13 that it launched an investigation into the reports of the execution of the nine Ukrainian POWs in Kursk Oblast.[15]
ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater, and Russian commanders are likely writ large condoning, encouraging, or directly ordering the execution of Ukrainian POWs. Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.[16] The largest single-instance of execution of Ukrainian POWs occurred on October 1 when Russian forces executed 16 Ukrainian POWs in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] ISW continues to track footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and has observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appear to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders.[18] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office recently noted that Russian commanders directly ordered the execution of four Ukrainian POWs at the Vovchansk aggregate plant in Summer 2024.[19]
Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian ultranationalist community. Many Russian milbloggers not only justified but celebrated the Russian execution of the POWs in Kursk Oblast by claiming that the executions were deserved or that such executions are a common aspect of war.[20] Other Russian milbloggers specifically called on the Russian military to increase the execution of Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater.[21] Many of these Russian milbloggers have very large followings and are affiliated with the Kremlin, providing them with a sense of authority in establishing and reinforcing the accepted cultural norms within the Russian ultranationalist community. The Rybar Telegram channel, which celebrated the execution of POWs, has received awards from the Kremlin and has a following of roughly 1.3 million subscribers as of this publication, and Rybar founder Mikhail Zvinchuk regularly appears on Russian state television to comment on the war in Ukraine.[22] Other prominent ultranationalist milbloggers who praised and justified the October 10 execution include: RVvoenkor with about 1.62 million Telegram subscribers, Dva Mayora with roughly 1.17 million subscribers, Starshe Edy with about 627,000 subscribers, and Zapisky Veterana with about 357,000 subscribers as of this publication.[23] Many of these subscribers are Russian military personnel and volunteers currently fighting in the war, and Russian soldiers routinely interact with these channels through correspondences and crowdfunding efforts. Russian milbloggers have often glorified Russian atrocities and brutality in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, and this glorification underscores a broader culture that is likely encouraging the systemic execution of Ukrainian POWs.[24]
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2024
It was actually ~$6 million in the homes of two regional officials appointed by the government in Kiev.
These were not elected positions.
The two officials were a mother & son team gaining wealth through bribery and influence peddling.
In 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky's Servant of the People party ran on a platform of anti-corruption good government.
Since coming to office, Zelensky's government has investigated and prosecuted dozens of corrupt officials, some at very high levels.
It's one reason why Ukraine's Corruption Perception Index score improved from near the bottom with Russia to levels now approaching standards of western democracies.
Stronk response/s
You'll notice it has hit 100 rubles per dollar in the past, then falling back to lower levels (meaning higher ruble values) afterwards.
In March 2022 the ruble's value fell to 117 per dollar, but by June 2022 it improved to only 53 -- suggesting that effective Russian government actions can have quick and dramatic effects on the ruble's value.
Last week the ruble again hit 98 per dollar, but today has fallen back to 96.
These numbers are up from a low of 85 rubles per dollar as recently as last August.
So, it's easy to guess that circa 100 rubles per dollar is the point when Russia's government steps in to provide ruble support by selling whatever assets it can, including gold.
What did they sell, and how much, of course we don't know, nor do we know how low Russia's various reserves have grown since February 2022.
Regardless, no doubt, at some point Russia will reach its financial "crunch" time, but I doubt if we will see that coming before it actually happens.
I think this falls under the “things happen slow till they happen fast” category
When one controls all aspects of the economy and reporting on the economy there is little data to support any conclusions and ultimately events will just have to play out
Much like reports of Russian “recruitment “, Russian reserves of equipment, and production capabilities, the west can only guess, but there are indicators out there.
For instance imports of munitions and equipment from third parties, use of systems like golf carts, arcs, turtles tanks, and motorcycles on the front. Maybe it means the Russians find them useful, or it means they don’t have the levels of proper equipment to supply the front.
What I think is certain is that Russian revenues are down, expenses are way up and advances on the front are slow esp compared to loses.
Additionally hits on infrastructure within Russia are continuing and increasing causing more strain on the economy and the populace.
An important parameter is the volume of the trade in rubles. It is likely that today it is only a fraction of what it was before and the smaller it is, the easier (cheaper) it is for the Russian central bank to maintain a certain exchange rate. It would be great if someone finds a good link showing the volume of trade.
Another large source on State income to consider:
—
Kremlin snuff box, 10/14/24
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
After the introduction of the childlessness tax, there will be another tax and an important decision on abortion
A source in the Kremlin told us about this. “The tax on childlessness, as you correctly wrote [ https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4762 ], will be somewhere in the first half of next year. A few months after it, we will consider the introduction of another very important tax - on SVO,” he noted.
Plans to introduce a special tax on SVO [ https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/570 ], necessary to improve funding for the army and defense industry, have existed since the summer of 2022. Here we wrote in detail what it could be like [ https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/1675 ]. Note that the tax on SVO was introduced temporarily and in pilot mode in several regions of the country. But there has not yet been a decision on extending it to all of Russia; it has been postponed several times.
“The good thing about the SVO tax is that everyone will pay it - from large businessmen to state employees and pensioners. He will unite society, everyone will understand that they are bringing our Victory closer. That’s why I personally consider this tax very important,” said another Kremlin source.
According to his forecast, the new tax will be introduced approximately 2-3 months after the childlessness tax.
In addition, after the introduction of a tax on childlessness, a decision may be made to completely ban abortion in Russia.
“Currently, trial bans are being carried out in a number of regions of the country [ https://t.me/ejdailyru/272919 ]. Next year we will understand what the all-Russian procedure will be. And a childlessness tax will help prepare people for such changes,” Alexander Dugin, one of the initiators of the abortion ban, said in a commentary to our channel.
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
Reporting From Ukraine Uncensored Combat Footage (from this and past Reports) is found on Telegram:
https://t.me/RFUEnglish or @RFUEnglish
[ You need to have the Telegram app to view the larger videos. ]
The complete transcript.
—
[ Ukrainian Forces Snapping Narrow Russian Corridor ]
—
Today [ Oct 14 ], there are a lot of updates from the Kursk direction.
Here, after over a month of accumulating additional forces, since the last counterattack, Russians once again decided to assault Ukrainian positions, penetrating the western flank by 10 kilometers. The Ukrainian command, understanding the danger of a potential Russian breakthrough in Kursk, immediately initiated counterattacks to destroy overextended Russian forces, shaving off more than 5 kilometers already.
After retaking control of Snagost and nearby areas, the element of surprise faded, prompting Russian assault units to reinforce for a 2nd counteroffensive wave. To support this, Russian command increased troop numbers in the region from 30,000 to 50,000.
This significant boost to their counteroffensive will shift the dynamics of the fighting in Kursk, where Russian forces now outnumber Ukrainians by at least 3 to 1. These reinforcements were made possible by redeploying troops from Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and other areas, weakening Russia’s offensive efforts there.
With many forces redeployed, the Russians concentrated their offensive in Kursk, deploying armored columns along the Korenevo-Sudzha highway toward Zeleni Shlyakh. This settlement sits at a vital road intersection, key to Ukrainian supply routes for the nearby villages of Lyubimovka, Tolstyi Lug, and Novoivanovka. Securing both the village and intersection would enable Russian forces to either assault the semi-encircled Ukrainian positions in these villages or force them to retreat.
Russian forces chose to advance directly along the highway, as the frontline in this area was undefined. Ukrainian troops primarily concentrated their defenses within towns rather than open terrain, where trenches and fortifications were not built for sustained defense. Combat footage shows a Russian column of over 30 armored vehicles advancing along the highway unopposed.
They swiftly entered and captured Zeleni Shlyakh and the key road intersection. However, this success came at a cost, as Ukrainian officers confirmed that 15 of the 30 Russian armored vehicles were destroyed during the assault.
Worsening the situation, the Russian ten-kilometer advance bypassed the main Ukrainian defenses, reaching the rear near the intersection where Ukrainian drone operators were stationed. This allowed Russian stormtroopers to capture 9 operators who were unaware of the enemy’s approach. Ultimately, Russian forces reclaimed a large portion of the Korenevo-Sudzha highway, along with Zeleni Shlyakh, Novoivanivka, and half of Leonidovo.
Despite advancing ten kilometers, the Russians stretched their lines over nearly 30 kilometers, placing them in a precarious position. This advance created a cauldron, with Ukrainian forces positioned in Olgovka and Matveevka to the north and Liubymovka to the south, forming a trap resembling dragon jaws.
From these favorable positions, Ukrainian troops launched counterattacks aimed at cutting off Russian forces along the highway, attempting to encircle and destroy the assault group at Zeleni Shlyakh by closing the dragon jaws around them.
Immediately after the Russian breakthrough, Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack, retaking Leonidovo and Novoivanivka, reclaiming nearly 5 kilometers of Russian gains. This demonstrated that Ukrainian forces retained their offensive capability, despite the heavy Russian assault, while the Russians, having suffered significant losses, struggled to hold their positions.
With 50% of their vehicles and troops lost, the Russian assault group is unlikely to recover, due to their vulnerable positioning. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces in Olgovka, Matveevka, and Lyubimovka, which endured minimal damage, can target the highway supplying Russian troops in Zeleni Shlyakh. With no reinforcements yet for their losses, the Russian forces are at risk of encirclement, destruction, and collapse unless they intensify assaults on their flanks.
Overall, Ukrainian forces successfully stalled Russian offensives in Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and other key fronts by forcing the redeployment of over 50,000 Russian troops to Kursk.
Notably, Ukrainian soldiers had estimated they could hold Chasiv Yar, only until the end of
summer, but the Kursk operation stopped Russian advances completely there for over 3 months.
While Russia’s recent gains in Kursk are significant they have overextended, leaving themselves vulnerable to a coordinated Ukrainian counterattack that could push them back and close the dragon jaws. Future developments will hinge on Russia’s ability to stabilize their flanks and replenish losses, while Ukraine must secure its supply lines to the towns north and south of the Russian advance, to prepare for further counterattacks.
It was actually ~$6 million in the homes of two regional officials appointed by the government in Kiev.
These were not elected positions.
The two officials were a mother & son team gaining wealth through bribery and influence peddling.
In 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky's Servant of the People party ran on a platform of anti-corruption good government.
Since coming to office, Zelensky's government has investigated and prosecuted dozens of corrupt officials, some at very high levels.
It's one reason why Ukraine's Corruption Perception Index score improved from near the bottom with Russia to levels now approaching standards of western democracies.
Just a month later, he found himself in Kursk, where his commander sent him into a meat assault. He regretted his decision, but it was too late—and by September 14th, he was dead.
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1845585839746613439
Sad.
It's OVER. Go home to Mommy.
Ukraine 'considering' major U-turn on peace policy as key date approaches
Ukraine is considering ceding territory to Russia to bring the war to an end, it has been claimed.
German newspaper Der Spiegel cited officials close to the government in Kyiv, who claimed Ukraine is now holding "serious discussions" about changing its goal to end the war only after regaining all the territories seized by Russia.
Trump has also branded Zelensky a "salesman" and added that he has no "appetite for further Ukraine funding."
The Ukrainian official told Der Spiegel that they believe that regardless of who wins the US election, Washington will look to withdraw its support for Kyiv.
Jon boy! you look so cute in that hat! And your mother country’s flag in the background. Killer!
Moscow's willingness to use hybrid and covert measures has reached a “level previously unseen,” said Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, or BND, while also warning that “direct military confrontation with NATO has become an option for Moscow.”
The Kremlin's goal is to divide the West in order to hinder Europe's ability to defend itself while bolstering the Russian military in preparation for a potential attack, Kahl told parliamentarians.
“Putin will continue to test the West's red lines and further escalate the confrontation,” he said. “The Russian armed forces will probably be in a position, in terms of personnel and material, to launch an attack against NATO by the end of this decade at the latest.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin's ultimate aim, he said, is to “push the U.S. out of Europe” and to restore NATO boundaries of the late 1990s, according to Kahl, thereby creating a “Russian sphere of influence” and establishing a “new world order.”
Thomas Haldewang, the head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution — Germany's domestic intelligence agency — said his agency is observing “aggressive behavior by the Russian intelligence services,” and that espionage and sabotage by Russian actors in Germany had increased “both quantitatively and qualitatively” with Russia even willing to “put human lives at risk.”
Earlier this year, CNN reported that U.S. and German intelligence authorities had foiled a Russian plot to assassinate the CEO of arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, which has been manufacturing weapons that German authorities have sent to Ukraine.
The Russian armed forces will probably be in a position, in terms of personnel and material, to launch an attack against NATO by the end of this decade at the latest.
—
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
Must be the hidden 300,000 reserve troops with the attached 30,000 tanks and assorted armor.
In my day, German Intelligence was a total joke. I see it has not improved since.
Jon boy must be desperate, spamming this thread. Makes me smile
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