Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
“Up to 200 drones daily by the New Year” (long range drones into Russia)
Wow, that is going to be something Strategic in scale.
Russian Aviation, oil and energy are going to amass major losses as a result, that will shift the calculus further before Inauguration Day. Their old stockpiles and economy will be further depleted as well. A deal will be increasingly needed by Russia.
That drone surge is structural - it is built in by production contracts and facilities already funded. In July, Ukraine launched more drones overall than did Russia, and that new dominance is on track to widen significantly through the rest of this year.
It is a way that Ukraine can win.
It is advisable to have such apps in a separate computer.
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No problem; the way to sign on is so complex I gave up
Wow, that is going to be something Strategic in scale
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If it keeps up the Russians will be pumping their oil by hand and mining with pick axes.
“This could not have been discussed a year ago” (life after Putin)
A year from now, it will really be a popular topic.
Putin has to go to rehabilitate Russia. There is no way back for him, after all this bloodbath, and no one else could credibly take the blame.
Putin arrived in Mongolia today - no arrest under the ICC warrant.
Go where?
JUST IN: 🇪🇺 🇷🇺 European Union countries import more gas from Russia than from the United States for the first time in two years. pic.twitter.com/Qe4q6MsunA— BRICS News (@BRICSinfo) September 2, 2024
Russia’s Pipeline Natural Gas Exports to Europe Dropped in August
OilPrice.com reports:
“Russian natural gas pipeline exports to Europe declined by 2% in August compared to both August last year and July 2024, according to estimates by Reuters published on Monday.
Last month, gas giant Gazprom’s average daily pipeline shipments to Europe fell to 89.6 million cubic meters, down by 2% month-on-month and down by 2.3% from August 2023, per the Reuters calculations based on data from European gas transmission group Entsog and Gazprom’s daily reports on gas transit via Ukraine.
Natural gas flows from Russia to Europe via Ukraine continued last month despite clashes at the Russia-Ukraine border near the only gas metering station that still sends Russian gas west to Europe. The Ukrainian ground assault on the Russian region of Kursk across the border hasn’t affected supply via the Sudzha gas transfer and measuring stations in the Kursk region.
After the Sokhranivka entry point for Russian gas transit via Ukraine was closed, Gazprom had to divert all the gas it can send to the Sudzha entry point.
Gazprom’s pipeline exports via Ukraine accounted for nearly half of all pipeline shipments from Russia to the EU in August, according to Reuters’s calculations.
So far this year, Gazprom’s shipments to Europe have increased compared to the very low levels of 2023. Year to date in August, these have jumped by 19.2%, per the Reuters estimates.
Gazprom stopped reporting monthly export data at the beginning of 2023.
Russia has seen its gas exports to Europe significantly reduced since the invasion of Ukraine. The major drop in Gazprom’s gas deliveries was due to the halt of Russian pipeline gas exports to nearly all European countries.
Before the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia supplied around one-third of all the gas to Europe and was the single biggest supplier.
Norway has now replaced Russia and has become the top supplier of gas to Europe.”
“Putin has to go to rehabilitate Russia”
That is Russia’s problem - but legally, Ukraine could now help with it.
“Russia’s Pipeline Natural Gas Exports to Europe Dropped in August”
Big drop coming in a few months - transshipment of Russian gas through the Druzhba Pipeline ends at the end of this year.
The end of an era.
Because of Putin, the Doom of Russia.
Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[1] NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 2 ISW-CTP Iran Update. An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia “within a matter of days.”[2] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia.[3] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently in Iran training to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia's acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while preserving Russia's stockpiles of domestically-produced missiles, such as Iskanders, for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[4]
Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Investigative Committee suspects that Mumindzhanov accepted bribes worth over 20 million rubles (about $222,000) while he was the Resource Provision Head within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and oversaw contracts for the supply of Russian military uniforms.[11] A Russian insider source, who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD, claimed that Mumindzhanov was a direct subordinate of former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitry Bulgakov, whom Russian authorities arrested on corruption charges on July 26.[12] The insider source also claimed that Mumindzhanov had ties to current Russian Security Council Secretary and former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[13] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mumindzhanov's arrest indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to curtail current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s efforts to “cleanse” the Russian MoD and that arrests are not limited to several high-profile MoD officials but have been ongoing for five months.[14] The milblogger also claimed that continued investigations into high-ranking Russian MoD officials will satisfy the public's demand for justice and the fight against corruption.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2024
Iran is ready to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia, but there is a condition
The Western press has issued another sensation. Iran is allegedly preparing to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia. We are forced to comment.
Firstly, Iran has already transferred a lot of weapons to us, so expanding the range to ballistic missiles should not surprise anyone.
Secondly, the deal with Iran is indeed being prepared, but has not yet been completed. Iran is demanding that Russia supply it with even more air defense. And here is the catch, because the Ukrainian Armed Forces attack our oil refineries, oil depots, airfields and other military facilities almost on a daily basis. The recent attack seriously damaged the Moscow Oil Refinery. Against this background, the transfer of air defense to Iran does not inspire optimism among our military.
But Iran, as sources say, insists. It has a difficult situation with Israel, and Tehran wants to be as prepared as possible for the hour X.
And now about the most important thing. The Russian side insists on the transfer of Fateh-110 missiles (range up to 700 km), while Iran is inclined to transfer Fateh-360 (up to 120 km).
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4602
Russia really lacks everything.
According to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fateh-110 the range is 300 km not 700 km. The blogger has probably mixed up the missiles, it's probably Zolfaghar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolfaghar_(missile)
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
Reporting From Ukraine Uncensored Combat Footage (from this and past Reports) is found on Telegram:
https://t.me/RFUEnglish or @RFUEnglish
[ You need to have the Telegram app to view the large videos. ]
The complete transcript.
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[ Drone Warfare. Russian Friendly Fire Sparks Chaos ]
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Today [ Sept 3 ], there are a lot of updates from the Kursk direction.
Here, a new chapter in drone warfare is unfolding in the rapidly evolving battlefield of the Kursk incursion. Ukrainian forces are pushing the limits of innovation, deploying FPV drones to counter the persistent threat of Russian reconnaissance UAVs. The result is a tense and high-stakes clash in the skies that could redefine modern air defense tactics.
Ukrainian forces are making significant strides in the Kursk region, with a particular focus on the strategically important area around Sudzha. Sudzha has become a key logistical hub for Ukrainian operations in the region, central to their broader offensive strategy. Securing this area is essential, not only to sustain vital supply lines but also to keep the front line at a safe distance, reducing the threat of artillery, drone, and missile strikes from Russian forces.
In recent days, Ukrainian forces have maintained their southeastward push from Sudzha, though progress has slowed as they encounter increasingly fortified Russian defenses. Conflicting reports from both sides point to a highly fluid battlefront, with control of key positions frequently shifting.
Nevertheless, it is confirmed that Ukrainian forces have secured all settlements south of Sudzha up to the border and are advancing towards Belitsa and Giri along multiple fronts.
The geography of the region poses substantial challenges for advancing forces. The area north of the Psel River is densely wooded, with the river’s numerous meanders creating a complex and difficult terrain to navigate. Russian fortifications are entrenched along the edges of these forests, providing them with a strong defensive position that significantly impedes Ukrainian progress.
Compounding the difficulty, the primary road in this region runs along the Sudzha-Ulanok-Belitsa axis, just north of the forested area. Ukrainian advances along the southeastern front heavily depend on this road as the main supply route, making its control crucial for maintaining the momentum of the offensive.
Ukrainian forces are advancing on multiple fronts. One front is pushing eastward, north of the road from Ulanok, while another is progressing south of the Psel River, targeting the breach of Russian fortifications near Kanyshnoye.
A third axis of advance has been reported further south, near Ozerki. If successful, these coordinated maneuvers could encircle Russian forces, bringing the Belitsa and Giri areas under Ukrainian control. This would not only facilitate further advances from these strategic locations but also alleviate pressure on Sudzha, securing a stronger foothold in the region.
On the northern vector, Ukrainian forces are reportedly advancing beyond Ulanok, though full control of the locality has yet to be definitively confirmed. South of the Psel River, geolocated footage has verified Russian FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian positions in Plekhovo and Borki, confirming Ukrainian control of these settlements.
Similar attacks have been documented in Spalnoie, further validating Ukrainian presence there. The most intense fighting is currently reported near Krupets, just beyond Spalnoie.
The analysis of Russian drone strike footage underscores the widespread use of reconnaissance drones in coordinating their attack systems. The integration of these drones into Russian targeting operations has prompted Ukraine to intensify its efforts in developing innovative countermeasures.
In response to the increasing threat from Russian reconnaissance drones, Ukrainian forces have significantly accelerated their deployment of FPV drones within integrated systems designed to intercept and neutralize these aerial threats. The use of FPV drones for drone-on-drone interception has emerged as a cost-effective and practical approach to modern drone warfare.
Recent technological advancements, such as machine vision systems and lidar-triggered detonators, have been pivotal in enhancing the effectiveness of FPV drones as interceptors.
However, the success of these systems relies on the seamless integration of radar detection with FPV drone teams, presenting a complex, yet essential challenge for contemporary air defense. Despite these obstacles, Ukrainian forces have successfully begun utilizing FPV drones to intercept enemy UAVs, marking a significant evolution in drone warfare tactics.
FPV drone interceptors hold significant potential for protecting valuable assets from enemy reconnaissance UAVs, which often direct strikes against critical infrastructure. Although FPV drones offer a promising and cost-effective alternative to traditional air defense systems, their development is still in its early stages.
To fully realize their potential, these drones will need further integration with radar and other support systems, ensuring a more comprehensive and effective defense strategy.
Fortunately for Ukrainian forces, the disarray and fragmentation within Russian ranks on the Kursk front have unintentionally benefited Ukraine’s efforts to neutralize Russian reconnaissance drones. Russian soldiers, in their attempts to counter Ukrainian UAVs, have begun experimenting with FPV drones, which has led to instances of friendly fire, further complicating their own operations.
Reports have emerged on social media showing Russian soldiers celebrating after their Mavic 3 drone successfully downed what they believed to be an enemy UAV, only to later discover it was a valuable Russian Zala 421.
This incident highlights the ongoing dysfunction and lack of coordination among the disparate Russian forces attempting to contain the Ukrainian advance in the Kursk region.
Overall, Ukrainian forces continue to advance on multiple fronts in the Kursk region, with a key focus on the southeastern push toward capturing Belitsa and Giri.
Despite facing limited anti-aircraft support from Western allies, Ukraine is innovating by integrating FPV drones into systems designed to counter Russian reconnaissance drones.
Success in this area could significantly undermine Russian strike capabilities, many of which already suffer from precision limitations. Additionally, the ongoing disarray among Russian forces, compounded by their struggles in drone warfare, is creating opportunities for Ukraine to further advance and consolidate control over contested territories.
Kremlin snuff box, 09/03/24
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
The approximate date for the liberation of the Kursk region from the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been announced
It may be possible to drive the enemy army out of the occupied areas of the Kursk region early next year.
This forecast was given by Valery Gerasimov, a source close to him told us. “Now, to be honest, there are not always enough people; very tough fighting is going on in the DPR and on a number of other sectors of the front. By next year this problem will be solved. And then you can return what was lost,” he said.
The interlocutor refused to say exactly how the problem would be resolved so as not to “cause unnecessary speculation.”
Note that Gerasimov’s forecast differs from Andrei Belousov’s opinion on this matter [ https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4526 ]. The Minister of Defense believes that it will take several months to liberate the Kursk region. But he hopes that we will cope before the New Year.
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