Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2024

The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however. ISW assesses that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within range of ATACMS missiles that the United States has provided Ukraine. The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia, however, and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS. Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets.

US officials’ comments centered on Russia's redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions were lifted. Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases, communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, and permanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets from or rapidly harden. ISW has not collected open-source evidence of redeployments of military assets from the majority of Russia's rear areas. The mass redeployment of assets away from such facilities would present significant challenges to Russian logistics throughout the theater, and open sources and US officials have not indicated that Russian forces have engaged in such logistical upheavals. Such disruptions to Russian logistics throughout the deep rear would have also constrained ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout the frontline, and ISW has not observed evidence of such widespread logistical constraints. The 233 Russian military and paramilitary objects within ranges of ATACMS missiles that are not airfields support Russian command and control (C2), intelligence, reconnaissance, logistical, and repair support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast, and the assessment that there is no utility in granting Ukraine the ability to use ATACMS in Russia on the basis of limited redeployments of air assets from some airfields ignores these facilities. Any assessment that argues that there is no point in allowing Ukraine to strike targets in Russia on the exclusive basis of air asset redeployments is incomplete without also accounting for the hundreds of other facilities supporting Russia's war against Ukraine and would thus be incorrect.

ISW presents satellite imagery of some of these facilities below to illustrate the intrinsic difficulty in either adequately protecting or redeploying assets away from such facilities at scale.

pictures etc see https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2024

Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos

Reporting From Ukraine Uncensored Combat Footage (from this and past Reports) is found on Telegram:
https://t.me/RFUEnglish or @RFUEnglish
[ You need to have the Telegram app to view. ]

The complete transcript.

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[ Kornevo Front Collapses: Ukrainians Push Deep Behind Russian Lines ]

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Today [ Aug 25 ], there are a lot of updates from the Kursk direction.

Here, in a decisive maneuver, Ukrainian forces initiated a series of flank attacks around Korenevo, forcing Russian troops to scatter and weaken their defenses. Seizing the moment, they launched a sudden, powerful assault on Korenevo, catching the Russians off guard and breaking through into the town.

Following recent territorial gains near Korenevo, Ukrainian forces have been stalled on both the northern and southern flanks of the town. To the northeast, around the recently captured villages of Olgovka and Matveevka, Ukrainian troops faced obstacles due to the natural barrier posed by the Krepna River and its reservoirs.

This terrain advantage enabled Russian forces to strengthen their defensive positions, making it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to advance further north.

The village of Zhuravli, captured during earlier Ukrainian offensives, lies north of the Krepna River. This location offers a strategic advantage for the Ukrainians, as it allows them to maintain a bridgehead across the river, facilitating potential assaults that could bypass the main Russian defenses positioned near Olgovka.

However, the limited infrastructure of Zhuravli restricts the Ukrainian ability to support a large-scale assault force capable of overwhelming Russian defenses along the river. At the same time, Russian forces in the area lack sufficient troops to mount a counterattack against the Ukrainian bridgehead at Zhuravli.

Given the challenging circumstances, the Ukrainian objective in this area is to outflank the Russian defenses along the Krepna River and break through their positions in the villages of Durovka, Zhebolovka, and Vetreno.

The area between these villages consists of wide open fields with no significant Russian defenses, leaving the town as the last organized line of resistance. By securing these villages, Ukrainian forces could execute a flanking maneuver to the north, advancing toward the town and bringing the battle directly to Korenevo.

To achieve this, Ukrainian forces must expand their bridgehead north of the Krepna River, which requires intensifying their offensive efforts toward the town of Kauchuk. The Ukrainians are targeting the villages south of Kauchuk to stretch Russian defenses along the Krepna River and link up with the bridgehead at Zhuravli. By doing so, Ukrainian command could reinforce the bridgehead with additional troops, paving the way for a final push north toward Korenevo.

Unlike Korenevo and its flanks, the area around Kauchuk is less heavily defended by Russian forces due to a shortage of combat-ready troops in Kursk, with most of their focus concentrated on Korenevo. In the Kauchuk region, the Russians are relying on a limited number of naval infantry units, which are spread thin across the area to engage in skirmishes with Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

Beyond these scattered marines, the Russians lack an organized line of defense in this sector, making it vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks and potential deep strikes into their rear.

Combat footage from the region, shows a group of Ukrainian fighters dismounting from a Stryker vehicle after successfully engaging Russian forces deep behind enemy lines. One of the fighters later shared footage of a neutralized Russian soldier inside an intact UAZ truck equipped with electronic warfare systems.

These systems are typically deployed in rear areas to protect frontline troops from drone strikes, confirming that Ukrainian forces managed to penetrate deep into Russian-held territory.

By exploiting these Russian vulnerabilities and deploying assault units strategically, Ukrainian forces successfully captured the village of Semyonovka. Controlling Semyonovka has effectively encircled the settlement of Sheptukhovka, putting it in a precarious position.

The fall of Sheptukhovka would enable Ukrainian forces to link up with the fighters at the Zhuravli bridgehead, reinforcing their position and supporting further offensive operations.

On the southern flank of Korenevo, Russian defenses were as weak as on the Northern flank ,due to the concentration of most troops within the town itself.

Exploiting these vulnerabilities Ukrainian forces captured the villages of ?Aanova? and ?Tritksa? while consolidating control over ?Krasnoovobosye? Securing ?Aanova?and ?Tritksa? allowed the Ukrainian to fortify their southern flank and advance from ?Krasnoovobosye? into the forest south of Korenevo.

Due to the growing threat on the town’s flanks the Russian command decided to redeploy troops from Korenevo to reinforce these vulnerable positions and hold the Ukrainian advance.

Believing that the main Ukrainian assault front against Korenevo had lost its combat effectiveness after days of stalemate, the Russian command assessed it was safe to shift forces away from the town.

Unfortunately for the Russian Ukrainian fighters in front of Korenevo took the circumstances to their advantage and launched a powerful assault directly into the town. Geolocated footage shows that the Ukrainians entered the eastern part of the town initiating the battle for Korenevo.

Overall, the Ukrainians took notice of Russian weak spots on the flanks of Korenevo and carefully exploited them to shatter Russian defenses.

As a result the Russian command weakened the town’s defenses to bolster the flanks which allowed Ukrainian forces to launch an assault and enter Korenevo. The shortage of Russian reserves in the area proved decisive for the Ukrainian tactical gains, consequently Russian sources are now claiming that under these circumstances the loss of Korenevo is inevitable.

Kremlin snuff box, 08/25/24

Gerasimov spoke with Putin about the Kursk region and mobilization. We found out what the President responded

During a recent report to Vladimir Putin [ see above ], Valery Gerasimov was unable to give accurate forecasts about when it would be possible to liberate the Kursk region from the Ukrainian occupiers.

“It’s difficult to make forecasts; the situation is very dynamic and ambiguous. The enemy is pressing and seriously digging in, we are attacking, we are trying,” a source close to him quoted the Chief of the General Staff as saying.

The President responded by saying that “we need clear planning.” And that he is waiting for forecasts about the cleansing of the Kursk region and “greater successes of our troops than now.”

According to a source in the Kremlin, after Gerasimov’s report, Vladimir Vladimirovich “looked disappointed.”

In addition, according to the interlocutor, the head of the General Staff expressed to Putin his opinion that we need to carry out a new large-scale wave of mobilization ( we wrote in detail about Gerasimov’s position on this issue here: https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4527 ).

“I heard you. And I took your opinion into account,” answered Vladimir Vladimirovich. The source found it difficult to say what this means.

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