The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however. ISW assesses that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within range of ATACMS missiles that the United States has provided Ukraine. The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia, however, and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS. Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets.
US officials’ comments centered on Russia's redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions were lifted. Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases, communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, and permanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets from or rapidly harden. ISW has not collected open-source evidence of redeployments of military assets from the majority of Russia's rear areas. The mass redeployment of assets away from such facilities would present significant challenges to Russian logistics throughout the theater, and open sources and US officials have not indicated that Russian forces have engaged in such logistical upheavals. Such disruptions to Russian logistics throughout the deep rear would have also constrained ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout the frontline, and ISW has not observed evidence of such widespread logistical constraints. The 233 Russian military and paramilitary objects within ranges of ATACMS missiles that are not airfields support Russian command and control (C2), intelligence, reconnaissance, logistical, and repair support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast, and the assessment that there is no utility in granting Ukraine the ability to use ATACMS in Russia on the basis of limited redeployments of air assets from some airfields ignores these facilities. Any assessment that argues that there is no point in allowing Ukraine to strike targets in Russia on the exclusive basis of air asset redeployments is incomplete without also accounting for the hundreds of other facilities supporting Russia's war against Ukraine and would thus be incorrect.
ISW presents satellite imagery of some of these facilities below to illustrate the intrinsic difficulty in either adequately protecting or redeploying assets away from such facilities at scale.
pictures etc see https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25, 2024
French authorities arrested Telegram founder Pavel Durov on August 24, prompting concern among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about their ability to report freely on the war in Ukraine. ISW has not observed any direct evidence indicating that Durov’s arrest will affect Telegram operations in the near term, however. Western media reported citing sources in French law enforcement that French authorities arrested Durov (who has French citizenship) at the Le Bourget Airport near Paris as part of a preliminary investigation into multiple crimes involving inadequate Telegram moderation and lack of Telegram’s cooperation with law enforcement.[17] The Russian Embassy in France claimed that it immediately demanded that French authorities explain the reasons for Durov’s arrest but that French authorities have not responded.[18] Russian milbloggers broadly reacted by expressing fear about their continued ability to communicate on Telegram, with some worried about Telegram’s ability to continue operating without its head, while others expressed concern that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor will block domestic access to Telegram.[19] Some milbloggers advertised newly-created or existing pages on Kremlin-controlled social media site Vkontakte (VK) as an alternative method to access their war reporting if Telegram suddenly stopped functioning or if Roskomnadzor suddenly blocked Telegram.[20] The Kremlin has long sought to compel Durov and Telegram into complying with Russian censorship efforts and to strengthen its control over Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Durov were both in Baku, Azerbaijan on August 20, and Putin reportedly refused an invitation to meet with Durov for unspecified reasons.[22] Durov’s arrest does not necessarily portend significant changes to Telegram’s content moderation or access to Telegram in Russia and Ukraine, and ISW has not yet observed any changes in how Russian sources use Telegram to report on the war in Ukraine following Durov’s arrest.
The potential loss of Telegram within Russia would further hamper Russian milbloggers’ ability to speak relatively freely under the Putin regime. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and other groups have routinely used Telegram to levy complaints about the Russian conduct of the war in Ukraine, Russian government policies, and even specific officials without being subject to direct censorship on Telegram.[23] Russian authorities have resorted to public arrests of prominent information space figures, quietly fostering a culture of self-censorship, and creating a group of Kremlin-loyal milbloggers to exert control over the ultranationalist information space on Telegram.[24] An exodus of Russian milbloggers and other groups from Telegram to VK would allow the Kremlin more direct control to censor such voices on the platform itself, as VK – though founded by Durov – is currently headed by Vladimir Kiriyenko, son of Presidential Office Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[25]
Russian milbloggers reacted to Durov’s arrest by focusing on how Russian soldiers rely on ad-hoc communications, including Telegram, for organizing operations in Ukraine and called on the Russian military command to establish an adequate official communication system. Milbloggers widely characterized Telegram as the main alternative to official communications for Russian military personnel in Ukraine and argued that it is now vital for the Russian military command to establish an official communications system.[26] The Russian milbloggers could not agree, however, whether the Russian military command has already created such a centralized communications system and that it is just poorly implemented or if there is no such system.[27] Russian forces have broadly struggled with effective communications throughout the war. Russian milbloggers have previously described official communications systems as overcentralized to the point of inhibiting Russian indirect fire operations, and more recently Russian forces have failed to establish adequate command and control (C2) structures to support their offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast and defense in Kursk Oblast.[28] Russian forces have largely compensated for this lack of adequate official communications by relying on their insecure personal devices to organize frontline C2, logistics, and combat operations, and the Kremlin has recently temporarily sought to criminalize Russian forces’ use of these devices without offering a meaningful alternative.[29] The sudden uncertainty around Telegram’s continued ability to operate within Russia and any falter in Telegram operations will likely impact Russian frontline operations, and if blocked completely, degrade these operations in the near term. Russian military Telegram users may start migrating from Telegram, anyway, out of fear of the system being compromised while Durov is under arrest, and Russian forces may start decoupling from Telegram communications even if Telegram’s operations are not ostensibly or actually impacted by Durov’s arrest.[30]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2024