Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25, 2024
French authorities arrested Telegram founder Pavel Durov on August 24, prompting concern among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about their ability to report freely on the war in Ukraine. ISW has not observed any direct evidence indicating that Durov’s arrest will affect Telegram operations in the near term, however. Western media reported citing sources in French law enforcement that French authorities arrested Durov (who has French citizenship) at the Le Bourget Airport near Paris as part of a preliminary investigation into multiple crimes involving inadequate Telegram moderation and lack of Telegram’s cooperation with law enforcement.[17] The Russian Embassy in France claimed that it immediately demanded that French authorities explain the reasons for Durov’s arrest but that French authorities have not responded.[18] Russian milbloggers broadly reacted by expressing fear about their continued ability to communicate on Telegram, with some worried about Telegram’s ability to continue operating without its head, while others expressed concern that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor will block domestic access to Telegram.[19] Some milbloggers advertised newly-created or existing pages on Kremlin-controlled social media site Vkontakte (VK) as an alternative method to access their war reporting if Telegram suddenly stopped functioning or if Roskomnadzor suddenly blocked Telegram.[20] The Kremlin has long sought to compel Durov and Telegram into complying with Russian censorship efforts and to strengthen its control over Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Durov were both in Baku, Azerbaijan on August 20, and Putin reportedly refused an invitation to meet with Durov for unspecified reasons.[22] Durov’s arrest does not necessarily portend significant changes to Telegram’s content moderation or access to Telegram in Russia and Ukraine, and ISW has not yet observed any changes in how Russian sources use Telegram to report on the war in Ukraine following Durov’s arrest.
The potential loss of Telegram within Russia would further hamper Russian milbloggers’ ability to speak relatively freely under the Putin regime. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and other groups have routinely used Telegram to levy complaints about the Russian conduct of the war in Ukraine, Russian government policies, and even specific officials without being subject to direct censorship on Telegram.[23] Russian authorities have resorted to public arrests of prominent information space figures, quietly fostering a culture of self-censorship, and creating a group of Kremlin-loyal milbloggers to exert control over the ultranationalist information space on Telegram.[24] An exodus of Russian milbloggers and other groups from Telegram to VK would allow the Kremlin more direct control to censor such voices on the platform itself, as VK – though founded by Durov – is currently headed by Vladimir Kiriyenko, son of Presidential Office Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[25]
Russian milbloggers reacted to Durov’s arrest by focusing on how Russian soldiers rely on ad-hoc communications, including Telegram, for organizing operations in Ukraine and called on the Russian military command to establish an adequate official communication system. Milbloggers widely characterized Telegram as the main alternative to official communications for Russian military personnel in Ukraine and argued that it is now vital for the Russian military command to establish an official communications system.[26] The Russian milbloggers could not agree, however, whether the Russian military command has already created such a centralized communications system and that it is just poorly implemented or if there is no such system.[27] Russian forces have broadly struggled with effective communications throughout the war. Russian milbloggers have previously described official communications systems as overcentralized to the point of inhibiting Russian indirect fire operations, and more recently Russian forces have failed to establish adequate command and control (C2) structures to support their offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast and defense in Kursk Oblast.[28] Russian forces have largely compensated for this lack of adequate official communications by relying on their insecure personal devices to organize frontline C2, logistics, and combat operations, and the Kremlin has recently temporarily sought to criminalize Russian forces’ use of these devices without offering a meaningful alternative.[29] The sudden uncertainty around Telegram’s continued ability to operate within Russia and any falter in Telegram operations will likely impact Russian frontline operations, and if blocked completely, degrade these operations in the near term. Russian military Telegram users may start migrating from Telegram, anyway, out of fear of the system being compromised while Durov is under arrest, and Russian forces may start decoupling from Telegram communications even if Telegram’s operations are not ostensibly or actually impacted by Durov’s arrest.[30]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2024
Russian blogger:
Putin has ordered the creation of a fully Russian analogue of Telegram. He expects results in a month.
The president gave this order in connection with the arrest of Pavel Durov in France, which could create serious problems for us. In particular, the army (we wrote about what exactly these problems are).
According to our sources in the Kremlin, all officials, military personnel, and special services employees will have to switch to the new messenger. A number of ministries and departments have received the order to develop it, in particular, the Ministry of Digital Development, the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, Roskomnadzor, and the FSO Special Communications Service.
Vladimir Vladimirovich expects the first results in a month. “We need to work quickly. Develop and launch everything, and if there are any problems, we will fix them along the way. The situation with communications could become critical in the near future,” one of the interlocutors in the Kremlin explained.
The current Belarusian build-up along the Ukrainian border is likely intended to divert and stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider frontline, as ISW continues to assess that Belarusian forces remain unlikely to invade Ukraine due to constraints facing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. An analysis by Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting suggests that Belarusian combat units typically operate at only 30 to 40 percent of their total end strength and rely on mobilization to staff units, indicating that serious preparations for a major Belarusian invasion of Ukraine would be more apparent as Belarus has not announced general mobilization.[15] The Fronttelligence investigation stated the scale of a hypothetical Belarusian attack into Ukraine would likely be limited and suggested that the Belarusian forces could be conducting this operation to distract Ukrainian forces from their efforts elsewhere along the frontline, consequently supporting Russian forces committed throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. Andriy Demchenko reported on August 26 that the current number of Russian forces in Belarus is insufficient for a significant coordinated invasion of Ukraine from the Gomel Oblast border.[16] A Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, or even Belarus’ military involvement in the war, would degrade Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko‘s ability to defend his regime (and be very unpopular domestically), and ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko is extremely unlikely to risk combat with Ukraine that could weaken his regime or drastically increase Belarusian domestic discontent.[17]
Belarusian presidential elections are approaching in February 2025, and Lukashenko likely desires to retain control over public sentiment, as well as access to his military to crack down on any protests surrounding the elections, as he did in late 2020. Lukashenko leveraged his military to crack down against previous mass protests against Lukashenko’s staged presidential elections in 2020, and a loss of capabilities among the Belarusian military that could result from combat operations in Ukraine would degrade Lukashenko’s ability to crush future protests. Lukashenko likely also seeks to avoid being dragged into Russia's war with Ukraine to avoid the domestic political costs that such involvement would incur. Possible Belarusian mobilization expected battlefield casualties, Belarus’ further international isolation, and negative economic ramifications would likely increase public discontent and undo Lukashenko’s efforts to restore his regime's stability since 2020.
Additionally, Lukashenko has worked to maintain some level of Belarusian autonomy and sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia while portraying Belarus as Russia‘s equal partner in order to safeguard his power from the Kremlin's increased desire to subordinate Belarus to Moscow through the Union State.[18] Belarus directly joining Russia's war would indicate that Moscow has succeeded in eliminating Lukashenko’s maneuvering space and established suzerainty over Belarus. ISW has previously observed Belarus deploy personnel to the Ukrainian border at the end of 2022 and early 2023 in a similar manner to current deployments and assessed that these efforts served primarily to stretch Ukrainian forces along the theater of war and disrupt their operations thereby supporting Russian operations.[19] Belarus may be once again conducting such activity to fix Ukraine's limited forces near Ukraine's international border with Belarus in support of a Russian campaign design that seeks to stretch Ukrainian forces thin throughout the theater. Belarus’ support of Russian efforts is a strong indicator of the extent to which the Kremlin has been consolidating its control over Belarus since 2020.
more info + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024