The current Belarusian build-up along the Ukrainian border is likely intended to divert and stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider frontline, as ISW continues to assess that Belarusian forces remain unlikely to invade Ukraine due to constraints facing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. An analysis by Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting suggests that Belarusian combat units typically operate at only 30 to 40 percent of their total end strength and rely on mobilization to staff units, indicating that serious preparations for a major Belarusian invasion of Ukraine would be more apparent as Belarus has not announced general mobilization.[15] The Fronttelligence investigation stated the scale of a hypothetical Belarusian attack into Ukraine would likely be limited and suggested that the Belarusian forces could be conducting this operation to distract Ukrainian forces from their efforts elsewhere along the frontline, consequently supporting Russian forces committed throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. Andriy Demchenko reported on August 26 that the current number of Russian forces in Belarus is insufficient for a significant coordinated invasion of Ukraine from the Gomel Oblast border.[16] A Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, or even Belarus’ military involvement in the war, would degrade Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko‘s ability to defend his regime (and be very unpopular domestically), and ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko is extremely unlikely to risk combat with Ukraine that could weaken his regime or drastically increase Belarusian domestic discontent.[17]
Belarusian presidential elections are approaching in February 2025, and Lukashenko likely desires to retain control over public sentiment, as well as access to his military to crack down on any protests surrounding the elections, as he did in late 2020. Lukashenko leveraged his military to crack down against previous mass protests against Lukashenko’s staged presidential elections in 2020, and a loss of capabilities among the Belarusian military that could result from combat operations in Ukraine would degrade Lukashenko’s ability to crush future protests. Lukashenko likely also seeks to avoid being dragged into Russia's war with Ukraine to avoid the domestic political costs that such involvement would incur. Possible Belarusian mobilization expected battlefield casualties, Belarus’ further international isolation, and negative economic ramifications would likely increase public discontent and undo Lukashenko’s efforts to restore his regime's stability since 2020.
Additionally, Lukashenko has worked to maintain some level of Belarusian autonomy and sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia while portraying Belarus as Russia‘s equal partner in order to safeguard his power from the Kremlin's increased desire to subordinate Belarus to Moscow through the Union State.[18] Belarus directly joining Russia's war would indicate that Moscow has succeeded in eliminating Lukashenko’s maneuvering space and established suzerainty over Belarus. ISW has previously observed Belarus deploy personnel to the Ukrainian border at the end of 2022 and early 2023 in a similar manner to current deployments and assessed that these efforts served primarily to stretch Ukrainian forces along the theater of war and disrupt their operations thereby supporting Russian operations.[19] Belarus may be once again conducting such activity to fix Ukraine's limited forces near Ukraine's international border with Belarus in support of a Russian campaign design that seeks to stretch Ukrainian forces thin throughout the theater. Belarus’ support of Russian efforts is a strong indicator of the extent to which the Kremlin has been consolidating its control over Belarus since 2020.
more info + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2024
Russian officials attempted to use International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to falsely portray Ukraine as threatening a radiological incident, likely to undermine Western support for Ukraine by stoking unfounded fears about Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. Grossi stated on X (formerly Twitter) on August 27 that the situation at the KNPP is “serious” and that “attacking any NPP is unacceptable, no matter the location.”[19] Grossi reportedly stated that the KNPP is particularly vulnerable because its reactor has no containment vessel and is located in an “ordinary building,” leaving it vulnerable to shelling or drone strikes.[20] Russian government-affiliated news outlets claimed that Grossi stated that he saw evidence of “nearby” combat operations including drones and drone debris.[21] Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev claimed that Russian authorities presented evidence of Ukrainian strikes against the KNPP and claimed that “there can be no ambiguity about who conducted these strikes.”[22] Kremlin newswire TASS also purposefully misrepresented Grossi’s previous statement about his plans to visit the KNPP, claiming that Grossi stated that Ukrainian forces’ actions endangered the KNPP.[23] The IAEA acknowledged that Russia informed the IAEA that it found drone debris at the KNPP, but the IAEA did not provide any assessments from where the drone came or verifications of Russia’s claim.[24] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces have consistently demonstrated capabilities to conduct rear area strikes within Russia and occupied Ukraine at distances exceeding the roughly 60 kilometers between the KNPP and the international border or the roughly 30-40 kilometers from the current Ukrainian FLOT within Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Ukrainian military command has deliberatively avoided striking the KNPP.[25]
The Kremlin routinely attempts to portray Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and extended this information operation to the KNPP shortly after Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[26] Russian government-affiliated media has also purposefully misrepresented IAEA statements to cohere with Russian information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as threatening the ZNPP and legitimizing Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP.[27] The Kremlin likely also attempting to obfuscate its own routine endangerment of the Russian-occupied ZNPP - through its routine militarization of the ZNPP - by drawing focus onto Ukraine’s alleged endangerment of the KNPP. Russian forces fired at the ZNPP during their seizure of the ZNPP in March 2022 and have since stored and operated military equipment within the territory of the plant.[28]
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024