Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2025

Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing people familiar with the situation, that Russia considered accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes in order to mitigate the threat of secondary US sanctions.[8] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who often reiterates Kremlin rhetorical lines to support the Kremlin's objectives, claimed on August 1 that he recently told US representatives that Russia is interested in another long-range strikes moratorium.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal but did not specify the contents of the proposal.[10] Rubio stated that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump's preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[11]

Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[12] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia sustain its current pace of missile strikes against Ukraine.[13] Russia continues to heavily invest in its long-range drone and missile production capabilities, including by leaning on partners and allies like Belarus, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint production efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[14] Russia will only continue to invest in its drone and missile production capabilities and lean on its allies as it prepares for a prolonged war effort in Ukraine and potential future conflict against NATO. The size of Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will therefore likely only continue to increase, as will the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[15] Russia in 2025 has already conducted over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes in the war thus far and reportedly seeks to increase the size of its strike packages to contain up to 2,000 drones.[16] A temporary strikes moratorium would also degrade Ukraine's long-range strike campaign targeting Russia's defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[17] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands. Kremlin sources recently implied to Reuters that Putin remains committed to his demand that Russia occupy all four oblasts before he would be willing to establish a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin's June 2024 demand that he and other Kremlin officials have since publicly repeated.[18] A Kremlin source also told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will likely “crumble” in two to three months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely leaking this information to try to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.

Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has yet to seize roughly 6,500 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 percent of the region. Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks, but Russian forces have spent the last 18 months trying to seize an area of about 30 square kilometers.[19] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar (pre-war population of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[20] Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions are increasingly threatening the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[21] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities in the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war population of roughly 373,000. Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since mid-2022, and ISW continues to assess that the seizure of the fortress belt will be a difficult, multiyear effort.[22]

Future Russian operations to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will require significant river crossing operations that Russian forces have historically struggled to complete since 2022. Russian forces still have to seize roughly 7,200 square kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 percent of the region) and roughly 7,000 square kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 percent of the region). Russian gains in the Zaporizhia direction in the past two years have mostly consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have yet to seize Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia City). Russian forces appear to be trying to advance along the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the bank of the Dnipro River) northward toward Zaporizhzhia City but are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the city. Zaporizhzhia City had a pre-war population of 706,000 people, and the seizure of the city and the rest of the oblast will require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs through the city and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the rest of the region. Zaporizhzhia City is a heavily fortified city like those of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian military command would have to commit a significant contingent of Russian personnel and equipment to the seizure of these cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would also require operations to cross the Dnipro River, establish a lodgment on the west (right) bank of the river, and seize Kherson City (pre-war population of 275,000). Russian forces would also have to contend with significant defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area in 2022. Russian forces have not conducted a successful cross-river operation at scale across the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces attempted to rapidly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely struggle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, particularly considering the impacts of three years of war on Russian combat capabilities.

Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Statements from Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has more expansive territorial aims in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts.[23] Putin recently claimed that “all of Ukraine” is Russia's, Russian officials have called for Russia to seize Sumy City, and Kremlin officials routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as “Russian” cities, for example.[24] Russia is also committing significant forces and means to offensive operations beyond the four oblasts, further casting doubt on claims that Russia only seeks to occupy these four regions. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command has committed elements of its relatively more “elite” airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to fighting in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to seize Kupyansk in recent months.[25] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to these sectors suggest some level of prioritization within the Russian General Staff — prioritization that is incongruent with the claim that Russia is only concerned with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory. Kremlin statements continue to indicate that Putin remains committed to replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, reducing Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO's long-held Open Door Policy, and changing the Ukrainian constitution to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[26] Putin remains committed to destroying the Ukrainian state, identity, and culture and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[27] Russian efforts to conquer all of Ukraine through battlefield gains would take decades should the current rate of advance continue, but Putin's theory of victory is contingent on the hypothesis that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must.[28] Putin continues to believe that time is on Russia's side and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Economic measures coupled with Western military aid that enables Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remain critical to changing Putin's calculus and bringing him to the negotiating table willing to make compromises to end the war.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft law to the Belarusian House of Representatives on August 7 that proposes amending the criteria for adopting martial law in Belarus to include attacks on the Union State and CSTO member states.[128]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2025

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