Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
6 bunker busters through the same hole.
“Insane precision.
According to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, the first MOP was used to remove a concrete cover, then the remaining 5 mops entered the same hole. The two other holses suspected to be impacts, are actually just part of the ventilation.”
https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1938278013445054531
The pilot hit one of the shells on the guide package with the strike drone. The munition detonated and pierced the cockpit.
https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1938597027819995544
Since there is no crater surrounding the entry hole, all MOPs exploded well below ground.
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1938590081599914034
Holodomor
The Ukrainian Genocide
Ukraine, with its history of resistance to the Soviet rule, was a threat to the Soviet regime. Fearing that opposition to his policies in Ukraine could intensify and possibly lead to Ukraine’s secession from the Soviet Union, Stalin set unrealistically high grain procurement quotas. Those quotas were accompanied by other Draconian measures intended to wipe out a significant part of the Ukrainian nation.
In August of 1932, the decree of “Five Stalks of Grain,” stated that anyone, even a child, caught taking any produce from a collective field, could be shot or imprisoned for stealing “socialist property.” At the beginning of 1933, about 54,645 people were tried and sentenced; of those, 2,000 were executed.
As famine escalated, growing numbers of farmers left their villages in search of food outside of Ukraine. Directives sent by Stalin and Molotov (Stalin’s closest collaborator) in January of 1933 prevented them from leaving, effectively sealing the borders of Ukraine.
To further ensure that Ukrainian farmers did not leave their villages to seek food in the cities, the Soviet government started a system of internal passports, which were denied to farmers so they could not travel or obtain a train ticket without official permission. These same restrictions applied to the Kuban region of Russia, which borders Ukraine, and in which Ukrainians made up the largest portion of the Kuban population - 67 percent.
At the time of the Holodomor, over one-third of the villages in Ukraine were put on “blacklists” for failing to meet grain quotas. Blacklisted villages were encircled by troops and residents were blockaded from leaving or receiving any supplies; it was essentially a collective death sentence.
more text:
https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor
The Massacre at Babyn Yar
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/kiev-and-babi-yar
—
“Babi Yar” by Yevgeny Yevtushenko
No monument stands over Babi Yar.
A drop sheer as a crude gravestone.
I am afraid.
Today I am as old in years
as all the Jewish people.
Now I seem to be
a Jew.
Here I plod through ancient Egypt.
Here I perish crucified on the cross,
and to this day I bear the scars of nails.
I seem to be
Dreyfus.
The Philistine
is both informer and judge.
I am behind bars.
Beset on every side.
Hounded,
spat on,
slandered.
Squealing, dainty ladies in flounced Brussels lace
stick their parasols into my face.
I seem to be then
a young boy in Byelostok.
Blood runs, spilling over the floors.
The barroom rabble-rousers
give off a stench of vodka and onion.
A boot kicks me aside, helpless.
In vain I plead with these pogrom bullies.
While they jeer and shout,
‘Beat the Yids. Save Russia!’
Some grain-marketer beats up my mother.
O my Russian people!
I know
you
are international to the core.
But those with unclean hands
have often made a jingle of your purest name.
I know the goodness of my land.
How vile these antisemites -
without a qualm
they pompously called themselves
the Union of the Russian People!
I seem to be
Anne Frank
transparent
as a branch in April.
And I love.
And have no need of phrases.
My need
is that we gaze into each other.
How little we can see
or smell!
We are denied the leaves,
we are denied the sky.
Yet we can do so much -
tenderly
embrace each other in a darkened room.
They’re coming here?
Be not afraid. Those are the booming
sounds of spring:
spring is coming here.
Come then to me.
Quick, give me your lips.
Are they smashing down the door?
No, it’s the ice breaking ...
The wild grasses rustle over Babi Yar.
The trees look ominous,
like judges.
Here all things scream silently,
and, baring my head,
slowly I feel myself
turning grey.
And I myself
am one massive, soundless scream
above the thousand thousand buried here.
I am
each old man
here shot dead.
I am
every child
here shot dead.
Nothing in me
shall ever forget!
The ‘Internationale,’ let it
when the last antisemite on earth
is buried for ever.
In my blood there is no Jewish blood.
In their callous rage, all antisemites
must hate me now as a Jew.
For that reason
thunder
I am a true Russian!
“Partisans?”
They’re everywhere...
Ukraine SOFs destroyed 4 Russian Su-34s last night at Marinovka Airfield in Volgagrad.
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript:
—
[ Battle for Kupiansk. Russian Encirclement Becomes Brutal Meat Grinder! ]
Today [ June 23 ], there are interesting updates from the Kupiansk direction. Here, the strategic Battle for Kupiansk is unfolding as Russian forces intensify efforts to cross the Oskil River and encircle the city, hoping to shift momentum in their favor. Yet, despite repeated assaults and tactical shifts, their advance remains stalled - trapped in a deadly fire pocket, crippled by logistics, and methodically dismantled by a patient and lethal Ukrainian defense.
The Battle for Kupiansk is characterized by persistent Russian pressure along two key axes. Primarily via the Pischane funnel, a narrow corridor extending westward toward the Oskil River. Here, Russian units attempt to widen their area of control, aiming to solidify positions near the riverbanks and save themselves from the deadly Ukrainian fire from 3 sides.
However, because of the fire pocket, Russian forces in this sector are severely undermanned, undersupplied, and critically lack armored support. Their presence largely consists of scattered infantry groups operating without meaningful logistical backing, rendering them particularly vulnerable to precise, small-scale raids by Ukrainian Special Forces.
Ukrainian forces, employing a robust active defense, maintain continuous pressure in an active defense, conducting raids with Special Forces teams to take prisoners, obtain mission-critical intelligence, and disrupt Russian force gathering efforts. Thus, Russian elements within the funnel remain strategically insignificant. Given ongoing, high-stakes battles elsewhere, particularly around Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Sumy, allocating substantial Ukrainian resources to decisively eliminate this minor Russian penetration, would be impractical.
Additionally, pushing Russian forces back here would inadvertently shorten their overextended supply lines, unintentionally improving their logistical conditions. Therefore, Ukraine’s current strategy of containment and attrition effectively drains Russian manpower, without compromising Ukrainian resources.
Meanwhile, Russian command persistently attempts to close the pocket around the Pischane funnel, striving to transform it into a platform for a more substantial advance, directly toward Kupiansk and the strategically important Oskil River. Despite frequent offensive attempts, Russian progress remains negligible. Various tactics have been employed, including infantry-only assaults, motorcycle-mounted rushes, and even limited armor-supported pushes. Each of these efforts has consistently failed, due to relentless and highly effective Ukrainian resistance.
Over several months, Russian forces have sought to widen the funnel’s eastern flank to alleviate the concentrated Ukrainian fire pocket. Despite their efforts, Russians have managed to widen only half the funnel, achieving little practical advantage. Consequently, this maintains the position that the Russian funnel itself, presents no immediate strategic threat, as Russian forces continue to scatter valuable combat resources, without achieving any real operational breakthrough toward Kupiansk.
Another critical element of Russian operations in the Kupiansk direction is their presence around the Dvorichna bridgehead. Here, Russian forces have managed to establish a precarious foothold across the Oskil River. However, their logistical situation is dire, relying exclusively on rubber boats traversing the river’s narrower stretches, which is an inherently unreliable method, susceptible to Ukrainian interdiction. Despite being advertised as possessing amphibious capabilities, geolocated footage shows that Russian armored vehicles have repeatedly proven inadequate for effective river crossings.
Consequently, Russian offensive potential from this bridgehead is severely handicapped, relying almost entirely on infantry groups that gradually cross the river, and then mass together for concentrated assaults. This predictable approach frequently backfires: Ukrainian forces tactically permit certain Russian units to penetrate slightly, quickly sealing the breach afterward. Thus, isolated and encircled, these Russian groups are systematically neutralized, amplifying enemy losses.
Additionally, the recent Ukrainian air assault, conducted deep behind Russian lines around the Dvorichna sector, has substantially disrupted Russian rear-area logistics and command structures. This also deepened the operational difficulties Russian forces faced at the bridgehead, creating significant confusion and limiting their offensive effectiveness. Consequently, Russian advances in the Dvorichna area remain stalled, their positions static, and their capability for meaningful offensive action severely degraded.
Overall, the Ukrainian defensive strategy in the battle for Kupiansk remains highly effective Ukrainian commanders have demonstrated an exceptional awareness of operational patience, intelligently managing limited resources to contain and systematically treat of Russian forces, without excessive commitments.
Ukrainian troops consistently exploit Russian weaknesses. such as: poor logistics. insufficient manpower, and ineffective tactics to inflict disproportionately high casualties. Instead of attempting costly counterattacks to eliminate strategically insignificant Russian penetrations, Ukrainian forces strategically capitalize on enemy mistakes, gradually eroding enemy combat potential. This approach is methodically draining Russian powers along the Kupansk front, ensuring that, despite the repeated efforts, the Russians failed to secure any meaningful operational advantage or threaten key Ukrainian held territory.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJ8NSENCmt0
TENSIONS RISE! Russians Gather Forces at NATO’S WEAKEST FRONT!
June 24th
Possible Russian battle plane to take the Suwalki corridor connecting Kaliningrad to Belarus.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkmSpsZr1L8
It was across the plains of Ukraine's "borderland" that Hitler's ally, Stalin's divisions swept west into Poland in 1939, bolstered by Ukrainian Communist troops claiming to "liberate" other Ukrainians in Poland.
ANKE69: "When the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, Bandera’s followers murdered 4,000 Jews in Lviv, a city in western Ukraine, in a few days, using weapons ranging from guns to metal poles."
When the Soviets invaded Poland in September 1939, they murdered 22,000 (Katyn Massacres) Poles and deported another 60,000 to Kazakhstan, of whom only a few ever returned to Poland.
Among those murdered were hundreds of Polish Jewish officers, professionals (i.e., doctors) & religious leaders.
ANKE69: "Today;
AZOV is not just some far right extremist group.
They have actually been integrated into the official state-sponsoed Ukrainian National Guard."
Today:
Russian fascists continue to invade neighboring countries (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, etc.), while murdering and deporting their populations in the name of "liberating" those regions.
While pretending to be "traditional values" capitalists, small-d democrats and Christians, in fact, Russians today far more closely resemble 1940s era socialists, fascists, Nazi, communists, imperialists, colonialist totalitarians.
As for Azov,
The 12th Special Forces Brigade was given the name "Azov" in honor of the courage of those who fought and died at Mariupol.
The 12th's personnel may include a few survivors from the original Azov Regiment destroyed at Mariupol.
I would put Centuria in the same category as GW Bush's Yale University "Skull and Bones" society -- a lot of secret mumbo-jumbo nonsense amounting to nothing serious.
ANKE69: "To claim that Zelensky, was proof of the Ukraine’s “transition to democracy” and disregard for fascism.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
There is little reference to the fact that Zelensky has enjoyed ample support from a highly influential billionaire businessman, Ihor Kolomoyskyi-who has quite a murky history and has been under investigation by the FBI over claims of “ordering contract killings” and “financial crimes”."
Several points need to be made here:
Kolomoyskyi was Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from 2014 to 2015.
After Russia's 2014 invasions, Kolomoyskyi helped organize national defense forces, including some regiments later charged with being "far right".
By the end of 2014, those units were all absorbed into Ukraine's national defense forces which imposed loyalty oaths and weeded out suspected "right-wing extremists".
ANKE69: "Zelinsky never gave a rats arse about being Jewish until he ran for President."
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript:
—
[ Battle for Kupiansk. Russian Encirclement Becomes Brutal Meat Grinder! ]
Today [ June 23 ], there are interesting updates from the Kupiansk direction. Here, the strategic Battle for Kupiansk is unfolding as Russian forces intensify efforts to cross the Oskil River and encircle the city, hoping to shift momentum in their favor. Yet, despite repeated assaults and tactical shifts, their advance remains stalled - trapped in a deadly fire pocket, crippled by logistics, and methodically dismantled by a patient and lethal Ukrainian defense.
The Battle for Kupiansk is characterized by persistent Russian pressure along two key axes. Primarily via the Pischane funnel, a narrow corridor extending westward toward the Oskil River. Here, Russian units attempt to widen their area of control, aiming to solidify positions near the riverbanks and save themselves from the deadly Ukrainian fire from 3 sides.
However, because of the fire pocket, Russian forces in this sector are severely undermanned, undersupplied, and critically lack armored support. Their presence largely consists of scattered infantry groups operating without meaningful logistical backing, rendering them particularly vulnerable to precise, small-scale raids by Ukrainian Special Forces.
Ukrainian forces, employing a robust active defense, maintain continuous pressure in an active defense, conducting raids with Special Forces teams to take prisoners, obtain mission-critical intelligence, and disrupt Russian force gathering efforts. Thus, Russian elements within the funnel remain strategically insignificant. Given ongoing, high-stakes battles elsewhere, particularly around Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Sumy, allocating substantial Ukrainian resources to decisively eliminate this minor Russian penetration, would be impractical.
Additionally, pushing Russian forces back here would inadvertently shorten their overextended supply lines, unintentionally improving their logistical conditions. Therefore, Ukraine’s current strategy of containment and attrition effectively drains Russian manpower, without compromising Ukrainian resources.
Meanwhile, Russian command persistently attempts to close the pocket around the Pischane funnel, striving to transform it into a platform for a more substantial advance, directly toward Kupiansk and the strategically important Oskil River. Despite frequent offensive attempts, Russian progress remains negligible. Various tactics have been employed, including infantry-only assaults, motorcycle-mounted rushes, and even limited armor-supported pushes. Each of these efforts has consistently failed, due to relentless and highly effective Ukrainian resistance.
Over several months, Russian forces have sought to widen the funnel’s eastern flank to alleviate the concentrated Ukrainian fire pocket. Despite their efforts, Russians have managed to widen only half the funnel, achieving little practical advantage. Consequently, this maintains the position that the Russian funnel itself, presents no immediate strategic threat, as Russian forces continue to scatter valuable combat resources, without achieving any real operational breakthrough toward Kupiansk.
Another critical element of Russian operations in the Kupiansk direction is their presence around the Dvorichna bridgehead. Here, Russian forces have managed to establish a precarious foothold across the Oskil River. However, their logistical situation is dire, relying exclusively on rubber boats traversing the river’s narrower stretches, which is an inherently unreliable method, susceptible to Ukrainian interdiction. Despite being advertised as possessing amphibious capabilities, geolocated footage shows that Russian armored vehicles have repeatedly proven inadequate for effective river crossings.
Consequently, Russian offensive potential from this bridgehead is severely handicapped, relying almost entirely on infantry groups that gradually cross the river, and then mass together for concentrated assaults. This predictable approach frequently backfires: Ukrainian forces tactically permit certain Russian units to penetrate slightly, quickly sealing the breach afterward. Thus, isolated and encircled, these Russian groups are systematically neutralized, amplifying enemy losses.
Additionally, the recent Ukrainian air assault, conducted deep behind Russian lines around the Dvorichna sector, has substantially disrupted Russian rear-area logistics and command structures. This also deepened the operational difficulties Russian forces faced at the bridgehead, creating significant confusion and limiting their offensive effectiveness. Consequently, Russian advances in the Dvorichna area remain stalled, their positions static, and their capability for meaningful offensive action severely degraded.
Overall, the Ukrainian defensive strategy in the battle for Kupiansk remains highly effective Ukrainian commanders have demonstrated an exceptional awareness of operational patience, intelligently managing limited resources to contain and systematically treat of Russian forces, without excessive commitments.
Ukrainian troops consistently exploit Russian weaknesses. such as: poor logistics. insufficient manpower, and ineffective tactics to inflict disproportionately high casualties. Instead of attempting costly counterattacks to eliminate strategically insignificant Russian penetrations, Ukrainian forces strategically capitalize on enemy mistakes, gradually eroding enemy combat potential. This approach is methodically draining Russian powers along the Kupiansk front, ensuring that, despite the repeated efforts, the Russians failed to secure any meaningful operational advantage or threaten key Ukrainian held territory.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJ8NSENCmt0
The complete transcript:
—
[ Iron Graveyard! Ukrainians Obliterate Russian Mechanized Assault! ]
Today [ June 25 ], there are interesting updates from the Kostiantynivka direction. Here, after facing repeated humiliating setbacks at Pokrovsk, the Russian command redirected their offensive toward Kostiantynivka, as they collided with the Ukrainian defense line. The Russians sent a massive assault group with dozens armored vehicles to break through, but were funneled into a devastating kill zone.
The goal of Russian forces west of Kostiantynivka is to achieve a decisive penetration through Ukrainian defensive lines, creating opportunities to outflank and encircle both Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka simultaneously. This would disrupt Ukrainian defenses across 2 crucial sectors, potentially destabilizing a massive portion of the frontline.
Following a relatively rapid Russian advance in this area last month, Ukrainian forces swiftly redeployed elite units to stall further gains, successfully buying time for reserves to reinforce secondary defense lines. Despite incremental Russian progress since the initial breakthrough, Ukrainian defenders succeeded in slowing down enemy momentum, preventing the frontline collapse that Russia urgently sought. Now, Russian forces find themselves confronting fortified Ukrainian positions to the southwest of Kostiantynivka, where they’ve been unable to advance further over the past two weeks.
The Russians currently hold one significant advantage, the establishment of a bridgehead across the important Bychok River. This allows them to transfer larger numbers of troops and equipment across the water barrier, increasing their offensive potential and the intensity of their attacks. The geographic position of the bridgehead offers flexibility for attacks against Kostiantynivka or Pokrovsk, but given limited resources, Russian commanders seem focused primarily on pushing toward Kostiantynivka. This tactical choice also threatens the nearby Ukrainian defense lines near Toretsk, increasing the reward of any successful maneuver for the Russians.
However, Ukrainian defenses around Kostiantynivka are robust and carefully designed, significantly shaping Ukrainian tactics and granting a decisive defensive advantage. Elaborate anti-tank ditches and natural terrain features effectively funnel Russian forces along the heavily fortified Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. Ukrainian engineers have constructed a sophisticated network of layered fortifications along this critical road, establishing a formidable defense in depth.
Additionally, rows of dragon teeth along the highway serve as concrete barriers to halt Russian armored assaults, while hidden Ukrainian positions in the fortifications deliver devastating fire. Ukrainian artillery and drone operators wait in concealed positions, ready to unleash intense fire on enemy formations entering these well-prepared kill zones.
Faced with mounting difficulties and aware of the increasingly reinforced Ukrainian positions, the Russian command opted for a desperate gamble. They planned to launch one large-scale mechanized assault, rather than their more typical smaller infiltration tactics they had been relying on recently. Hoping to surprise and overwhelm Ukrainian defenders, the Russians dispatched one of the largest mechanized columns seen in this sector for months, consisting of at least 23 armored vehicles and over a dozen motorcycles.
However, the column drove directly into a carefully prepared Ukrainian kill zone along the fortified highway. To avoid running into mines on the road itself, the Russians drove beside it, but the Ukrainian minefields extended into the fields, destroying several of their vehicles. The battle was brutal and chaotic, lasting over 3 hours, as Ukrainians obliterated this massive Russian assault part by part. Ukrainian FPV drone operators and artillery systematically dismantled the Russian formation as it struggled to advance due to the obstacles. The engineer vehicle destined to clear a path through the dragon’s teeth was destroyed, as were the soldiers on motorcycles that could have blown a path through them with explosives, causing the Russian armor to bunch up and be devastated by artillery.
Of the approximately 25 armored vehicles engaged, 18 were decisively destroyed. Some of them detonated on carefully placed anti-tank mines; others, attempting to escape Ukrainian fire, panicked and drove directly into anti-tank ditches, becoming stationary targets swiftly finished off by Ukrainian drones. Nearly 200 Russian troops were killed in the failed assault, underscoring the catastrophic nature of failing an attempted breakthrough.
Overall, while Russian forces initially achieved limited success southwest of Costantinfka, the newly improved and manned Ukrainian defensive setup decisively halted the recent ambitious mechanized assault. The scale of losses incurred in this latest attack represents another severe setback for Russian commanders, reflecting both poor operational planning, and underestimation of Ukrainian preparations. Nevertheless, previous patterns suggest that Russians will regroup and return, refusing to abandon their objective. Ukrainian commanders expect that Russia is already mobilizing additional units and equipment. preparing another offensive effort against the long coveted Costantinovka sector.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaf081QHv-s
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript:
—
[ Commanders Killed, Russian Troops Lay Down their Weapons En Masse! ]
Today [ June 26 ], there is a lot of news from the Sumy direction. Here, Russian forces charged forward through the open fields, expecting little resistance, only to find that Ukrainians had lured them right into a trap. Drawn out and exposed, their bodies fill up the fields, as Ukrainians launched a sudden counterstrike to shatter their lines, overrun command posts, and force dozens of demoralized soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender.
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently insisted that capturing the city of Sumy was not Russia’s primary goal, yet he provocatively claimed that: wherever Russian soldiers step, it becomes Russian territory.
These remarks follow direct threats made by Russian diplomats during recent Istanbul negotiations, where they explicitly warned Ukraine, it could lose both Sumy and Kharkiv regions, if it continued resisting Russian ultimatums and refused to lay down arms. Despite Putin’s bragging and threats, current developments on the ground starkly contradict his aggressive rhetoric, revealing that the battle for Sumy is far from going according to Russia’s plans.
The initial phase of the Russian offensive into the Sumy region met limited Ukrainian resistance in the open fields, as Ukrainian defenders strategically chose to conserve their strength. Ukrainian forces, among them highly experienced units that previously operated deep within the Kursk region, managed to safely withdraw under pressure, repositioning swiftly into the Sumy Oblast. These battle-hardened troops are now playing a critical role in decisively stalling Russia’s momentum, taking shelter in the forests, and biding their time to launch a decisive strike.
Ukrainian command anticipated that once Russian troops advanced beyond defensive cover into more exposed terrain, they would become highly vulnerable. Indeed, numerous geolocated videos from Sumy now vividly show fields littered with Russian casualties, after intense Ukrainian drone and artillery bombardments, illustrating the deadly effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive strategy.
As Russian units gradually depleted their strength during reckless assaults in open terrain, Ukrainian forces seized the opportunity to launch a decisive counterattack. The Ukrainian assault, spearheaded by the elite 225th Separate Assault Battalion, proved devastating for Russian forward elements.
During an intense battle near Andriivka, Ukrainian troops successfully overwhelmed Russian positions, retaking the village. Notably, Russians had severely underestimated the Ukrainians’ strength, as Ukrainians overran a Russian command post, situated extremely close to the frontlines, as Russians likely expected to keep advancing.
During the fighting, Ukrainian soldiers neutralized several important Russian positions used to launch assaults from, notably killing Andriy Vyacheslavovich Yartsev, a battalion commander of Russia’s 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment. This sudden blow significantly disrupted the Russian battalion’s tactical cohesion and ability to respond to the Ukrainian attacks, allowing Ukrainians to fully consolidate their gains.
Securing Andriivka provides Ukrainian defenders with 2 major operational advantages.
First, the battle for the village successfully diverted Russian resources from launching attacks elsewhere along the frontline, halting the enemy’s potential advance toward more strategic targets, such as Khotin and Pysarivka.
Secondly, the subsequent clearing operations allowed Ukrainian FPV drone operators to relentlessly pursue and eliminate dispersed Russian troops, further eroding their ability to mount an immediate counterattack, before Ukrainians could dig in. In the process, Ukrainian forces captured a significant number of Russian prisoners, 1 video showing 13 Russian soldiers surrendering to a reconnaissance drone, as Ukrainians inflicted serious damage to Russians’ manpower and morale.
The coming weeks will be critical for stabilizing the front in Sumy. Ukrainian forces have already re-entered several contested villages and are actively engaging in combat operations to solidify their gains, aiming to halt Russia’s offensive altogether and exploit their exhaustion. However, the Russians remain determined to continue their push toward Khotin, a crucial location from which their fiber-optic FPV drones could begin to be sustained, direct terror attacks against the city of Sumy itself. With Sumy being the regional capital, it is imperative for Ukrainian forces to maintain a strong, unwavering defense to prevent it from being destroyed by Russian revenge attacks.
Overall, Russian commanders are planning a significant offensive move in the direction of Sumy, attempting to be able to strike the city with drones, and create a buffer zone to prevent new Ukrainian incursions into Kursk and Belgorod. However, in their thirst to advance, Ukrainians have drawn their forces right out in the open, inflicting massive casualties in the open fields north of Sumy, with extensive forces emerging from the trees. Ukrainians effectively finish off the weakened Russian positions overrunning overzealous Russian officers causing Russian foot soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1cSdBhbbEo
Oh so excellent!!
Operation behind enemy lines.
It is amazing, but CNN not only says site wasn’t destroyed but by their time line Iran is closer to bomb then before😂😂😂😂😂
TDS, but since no one watches who care what they say. When they have lost mourning schmo….
Plan away, more dead Russians, North Koreans, Iranians… and lots of equipment 😎
The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia's economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia's economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia's economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia's military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.[2]
Putin's statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia's war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia's workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia's banking sector.[5] Russia's military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia's defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.
Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was “crudely deceived.”[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will “soon die” themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia's terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia's terms – the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]
Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a “sharp” increase in Russia's defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia's monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia's 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center's data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia's ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia's ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]
Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone's range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW’s observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia's defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]
Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]
Russia and Belarus are leveraging the Union State framework to further militarize their societies and indoctrinate youth into an anti-Western ideology, likely in preparation for a future conflict with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the plenary session of the 12th annual Russian and Belarusian regions forum on June 27 and highlighted the importance of youth “military-patriotic” programs.[92] Putin stated that Russia and Belarus dedicated the 12th forum to policies aimed at encouraging youth to participate in “spiritual, moral... and traditional” values, patriotism, and military service. Putin stated that the Union State is implementing a specialized “road map” for youth policy through 2027 and is developing a medium-term strategy for the development of youth policy. Several organizations currently oversee Russia's various youth military-patriotic programs, and the Russian federal government is attempting to centralize control over these efforts.[93]
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025
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