Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
Just waiting for some dumb ruzzian to post a video of the explosion.
I agree that Putin is highly unlikely to stop the fighting until he gets everything he has been telling his people he wants. Therefore, I suggest that for the June 12th event, Ukraine should send many drones carrying bundles of notes to be let loose at every even location to drift down and be picked up by the participants (the Russian People).
In simple terms these notes should state that Putin was an illegal invader of a free country. He has now killed or wounded over a million Russians. He does not return bodies to the families. To stop the war, no longer sign up for mobilization, and any other likely words to convince Russian civilians as to what they can do to persuade Putin to end this deadly foolishness.
Then emphasize: Ukraine will never give up, and will treat peaceful Russian speakers in Ukraine respectfully.
Also Ukraine will never surrender to the country and mindset that starved 3 million Ukrainians to death last century.
Russian authorities must have bitter memories of the explosive filled truck, driven by a probably suicide volunteer driver. It exploded out a chunk of the erryroadway bridge, which took months to repair, allowing only a 2 lane segment to carry passenger vehicles. It also set fire to a long train of oil carrying cars that was conveniently located directly above the exploding truck. Many oil cars burned a long time severely damaging the integrity of both rail lines on the rail bridge. Eventually they were able to run commuter rail cars, but decided heavy transport was to dangerous.
Since Ukraine has destroyed the large ferry boat system, trucks may now be the only way to get lots of stuff into Crimea. I suspect Ukraine will try to damage/destroy enough of the road bridge so that only passenger type vehicles will be able to use it for several months before heavier repairs can be made. This would allow civilians in their vehicles to continue to flee while preventing major supply of the Crimean Russian military segment. These most recent events confirm my thought that Crimea is now on the Ukraine attack map.
🫠 Traditions remain unchanged… Another stolen boiler was found in the Russian armored vehicle “Tiger”, which was blown up in the Kherson direction.
https://bsky.app/profile/theukrainianreview.bsky.social/post/3lqwj25usb227
15 s video
... trucks may now be the only way to get lots of stuff into Crimea ... Russian authorities must have bitter memories of the explosive filled truck
—
Train and truck routes are still open via Mariupol
Ukraine also use a remote drone in the 1st attack - it is visible on footage just prior to the explosion.
I had the impression that the two northern noads and 2 bridges into Crimea were either closed off or had serious problems making them subject to undesireability as a n orthern route into Crimea.
I spent a lot of time examining the film on that truck bombing both as it happened and also some activities as it was examined before being allowed to proceed. During multiple examinations of existing bombing tape, immediately before and after detonation, I never saw any sign of drones. Also, given the size of the explosion, I don’t know if drones in use at that time could have carried a heavy enough load of explosives. It really was a big explosion, dropping one whole lane of traffic of it’s pilings. Also passengers in 2 nearby vehicles going in the opposite direction were killed, and the effect on the oil train above was big. If I have a chance to see those tapes again. I will be interested to see if it was the lane the truck was in that fell, and whether it was to the far edge of the 4 lanes, or closer to the oil train area. If it was on the outside edge of the 4 highway lanes and that far away from the oil train, that would further suggest a very large explosive load. This combination of factors and the existing photo evidence need further examination for this drone hypothesis.
Putin sacrificing his 56th Airborne VDV Regiment in Tetkino in Kursk region.
The Russian Central Bank dropped its base interest rate from 21% to 20%, at today’s regularly scheduled meeting.
It is the first rate cut since September 2022.
It does mark a change in policy, shifting from controlling inflation, toward stimulating more growth.
This amount of change itself is unlikely to make a great impact on either inflation or growth, but it does signal a shift toward easing and stimulation, which is likely to accelerate through the rest of this year, as the economy is locking up, and the Government will need to borrow more from the Central Bank, as oil revenues and financial reserves decline.
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript.
—
[ Russia Collapses in COMPLETE DRONE HYSTERIA as Ukraine Targets Their Airbases Again ]
Today [ June 6 ], there is important news from the Russian Federation. Here, Ukraine exploited the chaos after its devastating Operation Spiderweb and targeted more Russian airfields with long-range drones, while the Russians were too busy to check every truck on their road network because of the paranoia that more Ukrainian drones may pop out at any moment.
As details continue to surface, it is clear that Ukraine executed Operation Spiderweb in spectacular fashion, destroying a 3rd of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet in a single coordinated drone strike on multiple airbases deep inside enemy territory. Satellite imagery continues to surface, raising the number of confirmed losses and solidifying the operation as an unparalleled success in modern military history, with some analysts drawing comparison to how nuclear bombs changed the way wars can play out.
But despite this tremendous success, Ukrainian forces were far from finished. Capitalizing swiftly on the chaos and panic gripping the Russian defense systems, Ukraine quickly unleashed further drone assaults on key Russian airfields.
Notably, overnight drone strikes targeted military airbases in Borisoglebsk and Tikhoretsk. In Tikhoretsk, newly constructed hangars were set ablaze, suggesting damage or destruction of aircraft concealed inside. Meanwhile, the Borisoglebsk airbase experienced a particularly heavy drone barrage, leading to confirmed fatalities among Russian Air Force personnel.
Though Russian officials hastily assured the public that no aircraft were harmed in the attack, the human casualties represent severe losses, as training pilots and air force personnel, particularly instructors, takes years and substantial resources, deepening Russia’s military setbacks.
The aftermath of Operation Spiderweb extended well beyond physical destruction, dramatically impacting Russian domestic logistics and economy, due to unprecedented paranoia about possible further truck-based drone attacks. Russian authorities, gripped by panic and desperate to prevent further humiliating strikes, now view nearly every truck as a potential threat.
Across Russia, widespread checkpoints and roadblocks have been hastily established, resulting in kilometers-long traffic jams of trucks awaiting rigorous inspections. Videos circulating online illustrate hundreds of immobilized trucks, indicating that Russia’s extensive and crucial domestic road transport network is grinding to a halt.
While the economic repercussions are difficult to predict precisely, the sheer scale of Russia and its heavy reliance on road transport suggests a prolonged paralysis that will almost certainly disrupt critical supply chains, harming economic productivity for weeks to come. This will also lead to delays in military logistics, which will hurt Russia’s summer offensive in Ukraine.
Amid this growing logistical chaos, Russia’s internal response has devolved into a frenzied search for scapegoats. Prominent Russian media figures and military analysts were humiliated by the effectiveness of the Ukrainian operation. Additionally, the blame and anger fell on the role ordinary citizens and conscripts played in documenting and circulating results and evidence of the attacks online by posting footage of the strikes.
These videos not only boosted Ukrainian morale, but also provided vital intelligence, allowing Ukraine to assess the precision and success of their strikes and to plan even more devastating future operations.
This frenzied climate has triggered widespread arrests, as Russian security services desperately detain anyone remotely connected to the strikes. Notably, a couple accused of housing one of the warehouses used to stage the drone attacks has already been arrested. Another individual, a truck driver involved in transporting a Ukrainian drone container, claimed ignorance, asserting he was simply instructed to meet someone at a location.
Panic and hysteria during the operation spiraled so much out of control that another truck driver was brutally killed by an angry mob, highlighting the volatile and dangerous situation rapidly unfolding within Russian society with each Ukrainian success.
Overall, though Operation Spiderweb formally concluded, it continues to profoundly destabilize Russia, creating further tactical and strategic opportunities for Ukraine. The initial operation ignited panic across Russia, which Ukrainian forces promptly exploited through timely follow-up drone strikes, delivering additional damage to Russian airfields. Meanwhile, Russia remains preoccupied, hunting feverishly for additional hidden threats in trucks spread across its vast territory.
With Russian society descending into paranoia and uncertainty it remains unclear when and where Ukraine’s next surprise attack will occur, ensuring that Russia’s strategic leadership remains in confusion and dread
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3aaC0TKeik
“Russia’s internal response (to Operation Spider Web) has devolved into a frenzied search for scapegoats.”
Maybe that is why Wagner Group gunmen are being withdrawn from Mali - to reinforce their faction, and their Patrons in Government from being scapegoated, or to use the opportunity to scapegoat and pounce on a rival.
Hopefully they are checking for nail clippers as well
Ukraine shot down Russian Su-35 in the Kursk direction.
Hints it was shot down by Ukrainian F-16s in a trap.
A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia's current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.
Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government's formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.[3]
It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine's defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]
Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine's international partners continue supporting Ukraine.
Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast’s administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia's withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia's ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]
A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia's manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia's reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]
The Russian military command's purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia's formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.
Russia's purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of “Novorossiya” – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as “Russian” cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]
Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the “return” of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is “fundamentally important” and an “absolute priority.”[13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland's border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine.[14] Palisa’s map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.
The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin's theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance.[15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022.[16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war.[17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military's ability to achieve its objectives.[18]
Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine.[19] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[20] Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025
Important to notice that Pres. Trump has repeatedly said the Russia-Ukraine war is killing 5,000 soldiers per week, which I always thought must be an exaggeration.
That's because, typically, the wounded-to-killed ratios in war have run in the 3 to 1 range -- though in Afghanistan & Iraq, the US ratios were more like 15 US wounded to every one killed.
However, if the ratio of Russian troops killed-to-wounded in Ukraine really is over 80%, then Pres. Trump's 5,000 per week killed number would be not an exaggeration, but an understatement, given that Russian casualties are often reported as over 8,000 per week.
Hopefully, Ukrainian Air Force will sanitize and publish the details of the attack.
Is it because he'd have to pay the families?
I bet that's it
Ukraine continues to refuse prisoner exchanges and the acceptance of their dead.
The Ukrainian regime is protecting their only leverage and preventing a horrible PR event when 6000 frozen Ukrainians are returned to Ukraine.
"Russia calls on Kyiv to strictly adhere to the…— ayden (@squatsons) June 7, 2025
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