Posted on 07/14/2005 7:19:28 PM PDT by Leo Carpathian
POLAND AND RUSSIA HAVE CONFLICTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE SOONER BRUSSELS UNDERSTANDS IT, THE BETTER (Ukraine)
Russia wants to keep Ukraine in its exclusive zone of influence and Poland perceives Ukraine as a EU member in the near future. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
COMMENTARY: By Joanna Strzelczyk Chief of Staff of Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski Former Foreign Ministry Official (1990-1996) Article published in Rzeczpospolita Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Wed, Jul 13, 2005
Since 1989, with a short break in the late 1990s, the Russian question has been one of the most important ones in Poland's foreign policy, writes Joanna Strzelczyk, chief of staff of Warsaw mayor Lech Kaczynski, former foreign ministry official (1990-1996), in Rzeczpospolita.
Today, the question's significance has been rapidly growing, due chiefly to mounting Polish-Russian disputes and conflicts. That has been a result, on the one hand, of the neo-imperialism of Vladimir Putin, who has exploited historical issues to make short-term political gains, and, on the other, of controversies, present since the early 1990s, in Polish-Russian relations.
In the recent years, those controversies had been hushed for various reasons, so as soon as they became public knowledge, the situation intensified.
That was reflected in historical disputes, stimulated by the Moscow celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of world war II, which brought back into the spotlight issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Katyn massacre, or Poland's post-war enslavement. Those are hot media topics, but also issues important for Poland's image in Europe. They are not, however, first-rate issues.
The anniversary celebrations are over and the real problem has now emerged, hidden so far under the historical and hysterical rhetoric: are we doomed to conflict in Polish-Russian relations? The answer is affirmative, and the issue is not new.
It is a consequence of the processes occurring in Europe following the collapse of the bipolar world. This means that Poland and Russia have increasingly divergent interests, and that this process will continue.
What are Poland's interests in Russia? In principle, there are only THREE: [1] regulating the historical issues, [2] access to the Russian markets, and [3] supplies of Russian energy commodities.
And what are Russia's interests in Poland? Only ONE: dominating Poland's energy and fuel markets.
A strategic goal inconsistent with Poland's national interests. And vice versa, as Poland's interests in Russia, with the exception of fuel imports, are inconvenient for Russia.
What are the controversial issues between the two countries? There are several, and all of fundamental significance for Poland and Russia.
The FIRST issue, Ukraine today and Belarus in the future. Russia wants to keep those countries in its exclusive zone of influence.
Poland, in turn, perceives Ukraine as an EU member in a relatively near future, and the other post-Soviet states Georgia, perhaps with time Moldova, and certainly post-Lukashenka Belarus in close relations with Europe. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
The SECOND issue: energy commodities and the Polish fuel market. Russia is interested in monopolising supplies and promoting Russian investment in the broadly meant energy sector. Russian companies are an instrument of Moscow's foreign policy. That policy concerns all of Europe, but Poland in particular.
Given the above, it has to be admitted that Russia has reasons to feel irritated. The prospect of the moderate right winning the upcoming elections means that the controversial issues will further intensify.
The PO-PiS coalition, if it is successfully formed, will certainly attach great significance to close and friendly relations with Ukraine. It will also try to diversify oil and gas supplies, partly with transit through Ukraine something that Russia has so far managed to prevent.
The new government will also subject the Polish fuel market and all the related issues to closer scrutiny. The parliamentary committee of inquiry into PKN Orlen has already revealed such a strong involvement of official and unofficial Russian factors in this area that new regulations will need to be urgently passed. The very exposing of the mechanisms used by Russia to gain influence has to be irritating enough for the Kremlin.
In this situation, the various Russian secret services can be expected to carry out operations aimed at discrediting the centre-right parties, such as the PO and the PiS, to strengthen the position of not only leftwing formations but also those rightwing ones that Russia perceives as friendly.
Using historical issues to tarnish Poland's image in the EU is an even more tangible threat. As a result of such efforts, Poland appears as an irrational, quarrelsome country that lives in the past and thus attacks all its neighbours.
It is impossible, writes Strzelczyk, to talk about history in an honest and adequate way without remembering the Russians and the Germans who started world war II, who was its victim, and what are the moral and political consequences of that.
This, however, again puts Poland in the face of a propaganda war with two enemies. And weakens its position in the EU. For while it is clear that Poland's eastern policy should be part of the EU's policy towards Russia, respecting Poland's interests in the EU policy is a different matter altogether. Warsaw has few arguments convincing for Brussels and formulating them is what it should focus on.
The anniversaries pass and very well, let the atmosphere around them calm down. This does not mean that we should forget about history, but rather that we should look at it anew.
The shifting of stress in presenting historical issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact or Katyn should consist in remembering what has already been achieved and going forward, rather than stubbornly returning to the starting point.
And quite a lot has been achieved: Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, admitted officially that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact had been invalid from the point of view of international law. It also admitted that Katyn was a work of the Russians. Discussing those issues anew could tempt Russia to backtrack on its earlier statements. Poland should adopt the principle that issues once agreed will not be discussed again.
An issue that needs to be taken up are war reparations, especially compensations for Poles sent to forced labour and exile in the Soviet Union. The issue, present in Polish-Russian talks for a decade now, has been progressing at a very slow pace. Efforts must be made to bring it to completion, Forced labour compensations already have a precedent, and it is time they became a European standard.
Russia has been loathe to pay the compensations, and has deliberately kept the dispute at an early stage, arguing that it lacks the funds and its own victims of Stalinism were paid only pennies.
Those are unacceptable arguments. As the Soviet Union's continuator, Russia has been paying the Soviet debts without protest. It is therefore time it started paying out compensations. It is the only historical issue that should be Poland's priority today. Warsaw should make all it can for the Polish claims to be understood and supported by Brussels.
As far as economic issues are concerned, the first-rate issue is the planned Baltic gas pipeline linking Russian gas deposits with western Europe. The pipeline will be an alternative for the Yamal pipeline crossing through Poland.
Perhaps it would be worth reminding the Russians that they are bound by a contract under which two lines of the Yamal were supposed to be developed, whereas only one has been developed and that is supposed to be it.
For that reason, Poland will incur substantial financial losses, and it would make sense to demand damages or start talks on alternative solutions offsetting them. Contracts should be kept. Russia does not stand above the law.
The Polish-Russian conflict, political, not historical, is therefore a fact. It cannot be avoided. Too much sets the two countries apart.
In fact, those divisions are inevitable if Poland is to retain its identity and not return from the European and euroatlantic path it has chosen. In its own interest, but also in Europe's. It is worth making sure that Brussels understands this.
[The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
All right. Please give me examples of Ukrainians (living in Ukraine) being in conflict with Russia. Over what?
Ukraine's problems are solely of Ukraine's making, do you want it or not.
Of course we can. China has no legitimacy as a nation and no claim over it's own territory, much less Taiwan or Tibet. Separatists should not be supported in free nations which have a right to protect their borders, but China is a tyrannical communist empire, so separatists against China should be supported.
There is a difference: a concentration camp or a POW camp. We should be careful about definitions.
"Wherever there is a definite territory, and we can make a plebiscite on this territory, and ask the people who live there, if the want to be an independent nation or not, then, if the answer is yes, they should have an independent state, no matter what. That's what I think.
Chechens want it? Let them have it. Taiwan wants it? Let them have it."
Sounds nice, but utopian. What if some ethnic groups consider their borders unjust and want piece of their neighbors ? I.e. once Chechnya and Dagestan were united under Imam Shamil in 19th century during a war against Russian Empire. Chechnya in its present borders was drawn by Stalin and then redrawn by Kruschev. What if some Chechen Nationalists will demand return to Chechnya "historic borders". What if Islamists in Chechnya will say that Chechnya is only the first step of the "Jihad" against Russia and will call for "liberation" (read Islamic revolution) of the entire North Caucasus and beyond ?
What about American Southwest that is increasingly Hispanic ? Some Mexicans and their supporters who are illegally entering US through US-Mexico border are claiming that they are settling on the "historic Mexican homeland" that was "stolen" during Mexican-American war of 1848-1849.
What happens if Germans will demand return to previously German lands in Western Poland from which they or their ancestors were expelled at the end or after World War II ?
What if they want to secede from Poland and reunite with Germany ?
Who will determine which claims to which land are more valid ? On what basis ?
You see what happens when respect to currently internationally recognized borders (no matter how they came to be previously) is completely substituted by emotions about history and sympathies to this or that ethnic or national group? We may open Pandorra box of historical claims and counterclaims.
What do you think, why do they (Germans and others) want to get Russian oil through the Baltic Sea?
"support of the Chechens"? By whom?
Looks to me like standard business practice - you buy at lower price than you sell.
"Let's learn from the past but look toward future -:)))"Thank you"sergey1973"TRN -
"I'm afraid it might be too late; though nothing is too late: it depends on people actions and their motives as how far they want to push this. This is political cluster rollercoaster in its own sense. Neither side wants to let it go: either fore they are stick into old mentality of projecting power without hesitation according to their self absorb mentality. Please keep in mind all of you this has nothing to do with Russian or Polish people; this is strictly political impasse or strictly business; let God be a judge not us as who did what. I can't emphasize enough importance of being able to succeed you need to humble yourself and you need to let certain things go. Debate continues for it has receivers; how this debate ends is by decision of recipients to put on end and get to one point of conclusion. Once again all of you Putin neither Kwasniewski represent people desires. Facts are facts and none can be denied; history can be denied and manipulated for they are not written in stone: either fore nothing is but memories are; learn from mistakes."thank you all
And Taiwan was the seat of nationalist Chinese government after the Communist takover of the mainland. So in a sense Taiwan is MORE Chinese than the mainland.
Considering that Basayev himself fought alongside Russians in support of Abkhaz separatists, Russia should have learned a lesson about the foolishness of such a course of action and the potential for blowback.
Did he? Could you elaborate?
I know that Georgians have a hard time sympathizing with the Russians about their Chechens problem since they supported Basayev's beheading of Georgian Christians in Abkhazia in 1992 and 1993. Now Russia has "UN peacekeepers" in Abkhazia, and they complain about the UN and Nato in the Balkans!
Although Basayev is hated by a lot of Chechens, there is a widespread belief that he owes his freedom to the loyalty of a network of supporters that stretches across the whole region and dates back to his involvement in the coalition that joined the Abkhaz fighting against Georgia in 1992-3.Ruslan, a former fighter who was with Basayev in that conflict, told IWPR, “He’s kept a lot of old friends in the North Caucasus since the war in Abkhazia.”
In Abkhazia, Basayev led a battalion and was commander of the army troops of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples, a group formed in 1991 to unite the nations of the North and South Caucasus. Its president was Musa Shanibov, now a lecturer at the Kabardino-Balkar State University in Nalchik. Basayev later became the deputy defence minister of Abkhazia.
Ruslan believes that Basayev spends a lot of time outside Chechnya, moving constantly around the North Caucasus and relying on old comrades.
“There were people fighting in Abkhazia from practically all of the nationalities in the North Caucasus: Kabardinians, Cherkess, Balkars, even whole units of Cossacks,” Ruslan said. “And naturally, Basayev, being the deputy defence minister, had contact with all of them and continues to have contacts now.” - LINK
On October 2, 1992, Chechen and other North Caucasian volunteers blasted their way into the Abkhaz city of Gagra, on the frontline in Georgia's burgeoning civil war. Basayev was at their lead and, indeed, was soon de facto commander of the volunteer army of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus, the ideological brainchild of intellectual Musa Shanibov. Forces under Basayev's control soon outnumbered even the Abkhaz. The volunteers saw action in nearly every major battle in the Abkhaz War, hardened into what Basayev called his "Abkhaz Battalion." The troops would later make up the nucleus of the Chechen armed forces. - LINK
What you presented demonstrates that he "fought alongside Russians" only in a sense that Chechens or other Islamists are Russian. You could say as well that Basayev is Russian himself.
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