Posted on 06/04/2009 1:13:48 PM PDT by franksolich
Okay, the professional civilian here, again.
While reading more about D-Day and its aftermath, I'm finding that it was policy to constantly infuse already-existing Army units with new people, the units having been worn down by "attrition."
I had always assumed that it was policy, once a unit was all torn up, battered up, decimated, that it was pulled back, and an entirely new unit was sent in.
And while being pulled out of action, two purposes were served; that of giving the survivors a chance to catch their breath, and giving commanders time to build them back up to full strength, to re-stock them.
I have no idea where I got that impression, but surely it's decades old, and apparently erroneous.
I am not questioning any determination to keep battle-weary men in action and sending new men to be with them; obviously what's done works.
But I'm left wondering; I suspect those guys who made it into Normandy on June 6, 1944.....well, there probably couldn't have been many of them left by May 6, 1945 still on their feet, still moving forward.
Is this still, generally, policy?
Have there been alternatives that have been tried?
Read Band of Brothers. You’ll see the high rate of attrition and how the new guys were looked at.
I wouldn’t use “Band of Brothers” as an example, because the airborne divisions WERE pulled back to England for a period before they were committed to Operation Market Garden (the jump on Holland). I think Frank is referring to other division size units which stayed at or near the front while drawing replacements from the rear area manpower pools.
Yes.
While some units (such as the 1st Infantry Division) were in constant combat during the war, individuals were not only rotated into, but also out of those units.
I don’t know about the Army, but I served with a China Marine who had fought in every battle thet the Marines were in during WW2. And then, he survived the march from the Chosin.
I guess it’s no rest for the weary. I hope that Lew Hirschman has finally found some rest.
I am under the impression one could get "rotated out" only by getting wounded or killed.
I have read several stories about men being transferred from the US Army Air Corp to infantry and armor units.
The whole USAAF unit wasn't disbanded, they were given new T-O & E's, which made them appear to have excess personnel.
The men were then transferred to Theater 'RepoDepo's', and subsequently to combat arms units. Not to say AAA wasn't considred a combat arm.
"Infantry Division'" in the Shoshonean linguistic group means 'meat grinder').
Obviously, I don’t have any personal experience, but my dad told there was a point system of sorts.
You pose an interesting question. I can only guess that it has to do with the Army studies on the individual psychological impact of combat and how that relates to unit effectiveness.
Pennsylvania’s National Guard was organized into the 28th Infantry Division. They landed shortly after D-Day, marched into Paris, then went into combat near the Heurtgen Forest. Basically they took so many casualties in this battle that they ceased to be “Pennsylvania” in character. The division got an infusion of manpower from all over the US. The division was shifted to a “quiet sector” in the Ardennes to rest & refit. Then it was shattered yet again during the opening phase of the Battle of the Bulge.
My father-in-law enlisted in the Marines in 1950 along with his buddies. His induction was held back a year for medical reasons. Lucky for him. Most of his buddies were at Chosin.
Really, any history of the war that I've read, though, talks about high attrition rates in the combat units.
In VN, in my experience, FNG’s were were considered liabilities until they got some experience, the stupidity factor. After the first couple of months, New Guy’s, were rated on ability.
Where'd you hear that?
I understand that the combat troops ended up with a pretty fatalistic air, they figured they'd have to grind on until they were either killed or wounded - or the war ended.
I don’t know if it’s current policy (I don’t think so), but read Stephen Ambrose’s “Citizen Soldiers” where he talks about exactly this policy. Divisions were kept in the line as long as possible and replacements were sent in as individuals. Four US infantry divisions in the European theater suffered over 200% casualties and many more suffered over 180%, with no net decrease in their strength because they kept absorbing individual replacements, who kept dying in droves due to a lack of experience.
By the end of 1944 it was said of the commander of the 29th Infantry Division that he was actually a corps commander because he had three divisions—one in the line, one in the hospital, and one in the cemetery. It wasn’t far off the truth.
}:-)4
Also called "Repple-depples."
I read a lot of criticism of that process as guys who were with one outfit who were wounded were sent to a new one on recovery and didn't fit in well.
History Channel had one guy who said the "Repple Depple" sent him a bunch of Sherman tank crews who were chosen because they were farm boys who could drive tractors. They fired three rounds at target practice and were sent into combat. He sent 19 tanks in counted 13 burning hulks along the road an hour later.
Another guy talked of a newbie who was riding on the back of a tank and when the crew panicked and jolt the tank, he was thrown off, run over and crushed by the retreating tank. Total time he was with the unit was something like 15 minutes.
Those vets I talked with said it was a lousy system.
Anyway, philosophies change at various times but at the time of WWII for the most part I think it was felt that new troops should join seasoned troops and fill out their units so they could "learn enough to stay alive" and become seasoned troops. The alternative is to reform decimated units to create new units of troops that have all been in theater about the same length of time and let the new troops form their own units.
The result would depend on a number of factors and a good commander might stay flexible in this regard. If the "old troops" were pretty beat and starting to "resent things" it might not be good to rely too heavily on them, especially if one had an ample supply of "young lions" to throw into the fight. So it might not automatically be best to spread the new guys around, especially if what they learned was a bad attitude.
In Korea all the troops were pretty fresh but the decision had been made in the interval that concentrating "elite troops" was a bad idea and so there were no Rangers and few Airborne. I suppose the commanders of the day felt that Mech. Infantry were all "shock troops" but in reality it didn't work. I would think a good commander would want an "Ace in the hole", a unit to throw at the enemy to knock him on his heels and so we have all these Rangers and Delta, etc.
No way, the guy was BS ing you. The Marines, and more so the Army, did hundreds of major landings, most now unremembered, from the Aleutians to near Australia. The Pacific was, geographically, larger by many times than any other theater.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.