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Posted on 05/21/2004 12:01:08 AM PDT by snippy_about_it
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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 George H. Gay, Jr. was born in Waco, Texas, on 8 March 1917. He entered the Navy in 1941. After completing flight training and receiving his commission in September 1941, Ensign Gay was assigned to Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8). On 4 June 1942, while operating from USS Hornet (CV-8) during the Battle of Midway, his squadron was wiped out while making an unsupported torpedo attack on the Japanese carrier force. Gay was the only survivor of the thirty pilots and radiomen in that attack. While swimming after his plane went down, he observed the dive bombing attack that destroyed three of the four Japanese carriers present. Ensign Gay was rescued by a seaplane the following day. After recovering from his injuries, he served in Torpedo Squadron Eleven (VT-11) during the Guadalcanal Campaign, and was later a flight instructor. He was also active making public appearances in support of the war effort. Following the end of World War II, he remained in the Naval Reserve into the 1950s and was a pilot with Trans-World Airlines for thirty years. George Gay died on 21 October 1994.  Recollections of Lieutenant George Gay, USNR -- sole survivor of Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8) -- describing his experiences during the Battle of Midway. He was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross and the Presidential Unit Citation for his actions in the battle. Adapted from Ensign George Gay, USNR, interview in box 11 of World War II Interviews, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center. Lt. Gay: Well, as you know Torpedo [Squadron] 8 was organized in Norfolk [Virginia] and I think you know the history of the [aircraft carrier USS] Hornet [CV-8] and where we went and what we did. I won't go into that but I will say a little bit about Torpedo 8 and the things that they did before the Battle of Midway and before we lost the half of it that was in that battle, stationed aboard ship. One thing we'd like to clear up right to begin with, Lt. Larson and his half of Torpedo 8 stayed in Norfolk when we left there in order to get TBF's [single-engine "Avenger" torpedo bombers] and get the bugs out of them and get them fixed up for combat and they were to bring them out and join us aboard ship. However, it happened that we were in the Battle of Midway, he came out on the [aircraft carrier USS] Saratoga [CV-3] and they requested six planes from him to go to the Island of Midway and they participated in the battle that day, however, the bulk of the TBF's attached to Torpedo 8 at that time were in Honolulu [Hawaii] and missed the Battle of Midway. They later went to Guadalcanal and I came home on sick leave. I might just as well start down. Well, Torpedo 8 had a difficult problem, we had old planes and we were new in the organization. We had a dual job of not only training a squadron of boot [inexperienced] Ensigns, of which I was one of course, we also had to fight the war at the same time, and when we finally got up to the Battle of Midway it was the first time I had ever carried a torpedo on an aircraft and was the first time I had ever had taken a torpedo off of a ship, had never even seen it done. None of the other Ensigns in the squadron had either.  Quite a few of us were a little bit skeptical and leery but we'd seen [Lieutenant Colonel James H.] Doolittle [USA] and his boys when they hadn't even seen a carrier before and they took the B-25s [twin-engine "Mitchell" bombers] off, we figured by golly if they could do it, well we could too. It turned out the TBD [Douglas "Devastator" Torpedo Bomber] could pick up the weight, so it was easy. We learned everything that we knew about Japanese tactics and our own tactics from Commander Waldron and Lt. Moore and Lieutenant Owens as they gave it to us on the blackboards and in talks and lectures. We had school everyday and although we didn't like it at the time, it turned out that was the only way in the world we could learn the things we had to know, and we exercised on the flight deck, did all kinds of things that we'd have to do artificially because we couldn't do our flying most of the time. In the Coral Sea Battle we tried to get there and missed out on most of it but we were able along about that time to get in some bombing practice and to do some submarine patrol. However, the squadron didn't get to fly near as much as we should have. In the actual battle do you want me to say anything about the actual Battle at Midway and what we had there? As I said, we had had no previous combat flying. We'd never been against the enemy, our only scrap with them had been in taking Doolittle to as close to Tokyo as we went and in trying to get into the Coral Sea Battle, but when we finally got into the air on the morning of June the 4th, we had our tactics down cold and we knew organization and what we should do. We could almost look at the back of Comdr. [Commander] Waldron's head and know what he was thinking, because he had told us so many times over and over just what we should do under all conditions.  I didn't get much sleep the night of June the 3rd, the stories of the battle were coming in, midnight torpedo attack by the [twin-engine patrol bomber seaplane, known as "Catalina] and all kinds of things, and we were a little bit nervous, kind of, like before a football game. We knew that the Japs were trying to come in and take something away from us and we also knew that we were at a disadvantage because we had old aircraft and could not climb the altitude with the dive bombers or fighters and we expected to be on our own. We didn't expect to run into the trouble that we found of course, but we knew that if we had any trouble we'd probably have to fight our way out of it ourselves. Before we left the ship, Lt. Comdr. Waldron told us that he thought the Japanese Task Forces would swing together when they found out that our Navy was there and that they would either make a retirement in just far enough so that they could again retrieve their planes that went in on the attack and he did not think that they'd go on into the Island of Midway as most of the Squadron commanders, and air group commanders, figured and he told us when he left not to worry about our navigation but to follow him as he knew where he was going. And it turned out just exactly that way. He went just as straight to the Jap Fleet as if he'd had a string tied to them and we though that morning, at least I did when I first saw the Japanese carriers, one of them that was afire and another ship that had a fire aboard and I thought that there was a battle in progress and we were late. I was a little bit impatient that we didn't get right on in there then and when it finally turned out that we got close enough in that we could make a contact report and describe what we could see the Zeros [Japanese fighter-bomber planes] jumped on us and it was too late. They turned out against us in full strength and I figured that there was about 35 of them, I understand, that is I found out later that they operated Fighter Squadrons in numbers of about 32 and I guess it was one of those 32-plane squadrons that got us. Its been a very general opinion that the anti-aircraft fire shot our boys down and that's not true. I don't think that any of our planes were damaged, even touched by anti-aircraft fire, the fighters, the Zeros, shot down everyone of them, and by the time we got in to where the anti-aircraft fire began to get hot, the fighters all left us and I was the only one close enough to get any real hot anti-aircraft fire, and I don't think it even touched me and I went right through it, right over the ship.  I think we made a couple of grave mistakes. In the first place, if we'd only had one fighter with us I think our troubles would have been very much less. We picked up on the way in a cruiser plane, a Japanese scout from one of their cruisers, and it fell in behind us and tracked us and I know gave away our position and course, and speed. We changed after he left but then I know that they knew we were coming. If we'd had one fighter to go back and knock that guy down, catch him before he could have gotten that report off, I believe the Japs might have been fooled some, quite sometime longer on the fact that our fleet was there. I think that might have been one of their first contacts warning them that we had a fleet in the vicinity and that got us into trouble, I'm sure. Also, we went in to a scouting line out there when we were still trying to find them and didn't and the skipper [commanding officer] put us in a long scouting line which I thought was a mistake at the time. I didn't ever question Comdr. Waldron, of course, he had his reason for it and I know that he expected to find them but he wanted to be sure that we did and that is the reason that we were well trained, and when he gave the join-up signal we joined up immediately. I was only afraid that in the scouting line in those old planes we would be caught by Zeros spread out and it would be much worse. As it turned out, it didn't make a whole lot of difference anyway, but we joined up quickly and we got organized to make our attack, the Zeros got after us. I remember the first one that came down got one of the airplanes that was over to the left. Comdr. Waldron on his air phone asked Dobbs and came out over the air if that was a Zero or if it was one of our planes and I didn't know whether Dobbs answered him or not, but I came out on the air and told him that it was a TBD. He also called Stanholpe Ring from "John E. One, answer" and we received no answer from the air groups. I don't know whether they even heard us or not, but I've always had a feeling that they did hear us and that was one of the things that caused them to turn north as I think the squadron deserves quite a bit of credit for the work that they did.  LCDR John C. Waldron, Torpedo Eight's CO, and Horace F. Dobbs, CRMP on the flight deck of Hornet in the Coral Sea. Personally, I was just lucky. I've never understood why I was the only one that came back, but it turned out that way, and I want to be sure that the men that didn't come back get the credit for the work that they did. They followed Comdr. Waldron without batting an eye and I don't feel like a lot of people have felt that we made mistakes and that Comdr. Waldron got us into trouble. I don't feel that way at all. I know that if I had it all to do over again, even knowing that the odds were going to be like they were, knowing him like I did know him, I'd follow him again through exactly the same thing because I trusted him very well. We did things that he wanted us to do not because he was our boss, but because we felt that if we did the things he wanted us to do then it was the right thing to do. The Zeros that day just caught us off balance. We were at a disadvantage all the way around. Interviewer: All right. Don't you think those Zeros would have been up there even if they hadn't run into that cruiser plane? Lt. Gay: I do, yes, but in our particular case I think they would have been at that altitude after the dive bombers, which I think also was one thing Torpedo 8 and the other Torpedo Squadrons should be credited for, I mean given credit for doing. They sucked those fighters down so that when the dive bombers did get there, as I was in the water, I watched them and if they didn't like to dive they were able to pull out and circle around a little bit and come on down later and if they felt like kind of individual bombing practice it was, it turned out to be beautiful bombing, because the fighters were not--I don't say that there weren't any fighters up there to get after them, there weren't nearly as many as there would have been if they hadn't come down to get us. So I think that is one thing that helped save the day as far as the battle was concerned. It was pretty rugged on the Torpedo Squadrons, there were two other ones out there that day, Three and Six, and they were shot up, one of them almost a bad as Torpedo 8, only they just didn't get the publicity, but they do deserve the credit. Interviewer: Year, well, it's in the O.N.I. [Office of Naval Intelligence] report. Of course wasn't one of the very bad breaks, the fact that the dive bombers didn't get there about the same time you did? Lt. Gay: Well, yes, of course. If it could have been a co-ordinated attack the fact that the fighters wouldn't have come down against us in strength, of course, there would have been just that many more airplanes around for them to take care of and they couldn't have concentrated on us as well as they did. Naturally, a concentrated, I mean an organized raid, if we'd been able to all get there and co-ordinate the thing we'd have come out a whole lot better. Definitely that's a fact that we, well, it's just known that co-ordinated attacks, torpedo planes always come out better if you've got that much help. It's the same way with anti-aircraft fire. The more planes you have to shoot at the better chance each one has. Interviewer: Do you think that the attack would have been any more successful if the planes had been more or less spread out. Wasn't Torpedo 8 rather close together as they went into the attack?  Lt. Gay: Well, that might be true had it been that we were being shot down by anti-aircraft fire, but being jumped, as we were, by a squadron of Zeros, our beliefs were, and I think they were very well founded, that our only protection would be to stick together and let each plane's gun try and help the other plane. In other words, in a TBD, with as few guns as they've got, the idea was to let, to stay together as a formation and fight them off as a pack rather than to try and spread out. We could have spread out all right, but they could have spread out too, and it would have been just that much worse on us. I never have understood why it's been the general opinion in designing torpedo planes that it is not an offensive weapon. They don't seem to feel like they ought to put guns in it, and I disagree with that very thoroughly, and I can give my reasons for that.  When the Zeros attacked us that day, I was able, with my one fixed gun, to hit one; I know because I saw the tracers going into him. Of course, it couldn't hurt him with one 30 caliber [machine gun], but in fighting us since in the TBF's, I've seen them get in front of me and I've wanted in the worst way to be able to have something to shoot at them with, and I had nothing to shoot at them with. In other words, we go out and get in trouble and we have to just hope that there'll be fighters around to take care of us; whereas, if we had a way of fighting our way out, we not only would go out with a little more of an aggressive spirit, we'd get the job done a little better. That day, I got a chance to shoot at other airplanes that just got in my way. It wouldn't have been that I would go out of my way to try and act as a fighter plane, it was just that the targets were there and they will be there every time a torpedo plane makes an attack, those targets will get in his way and he ought to have something to shoot at them with. I had to fly right over destroyers that were shooting at me. If I had machine guns forward and plenty of them, I'd have been able to give them a little trouble. Then as I got in close enough to drop my torpedo, I could see everything on the port side shooting at me. If I had had some machine guns to shoot back them, I might not have been able to silence those guns, but I could have made the gunners a little nervous. As it was, they were just sitting there shooting at me and I wasn't shooting back at them. Then after I pulled up over the ship and did a flipper turn, I dove down right at the fantail of this big carriers where they were rearming and regassing the planes. Gas hoses were scattered all over the place out there, and I know they were full of gasoline. If I'd had forward guns, I could have set that ship afire right there myself.  I had no guns to shoot with except that one little pea shooter, the 30 caliber putt-putt and by the time I got there it jammed, it either jammed or was shot up. Then after I went out, I flew over another destroyer and every time there was a target and every time I had no guns to work on it. They seem to feel that they don't put the guns in the torpedo planes because we'll go off and fool around and get ourselves in trouble. I don't think they'll have that trouble with the pilots because I do think that they should have fire power forward and also aft to take care of themselves so that when the targets get in the way you can at least have the self satisfaction, if nothing else, of shooting at them. I really strongly recommend them forward. I find a lot of people who disagree with that, but that's my personal opinion on it. I found out a couple of things about the Battle of Midway in talking to a few people that were aboard the ship other than some of the pilots that I've known. Of course, I talked to the pilots that came into the hospital at Midway and I was very much worried and wondered why, when I was in the water there and there were so many ships around me that were dead in the water, either damaged or picking up personnel, I've wondered why they didn't come in for a clean up. I mean our forces, why they didn't and I found out that unfortunate events had taken place.  The torpedo squadron hadn't come back to the Hornet, of course, the fighter pilots were unfortunate and ran out of gas before they got back and I think most of them landed in the water, and the dive bombers went to the Island of Midway, to land, so the ship was back there with no aircraft whatever, except their combat patrol of which there were just a few fighters, and they were worried sick and I know, I've talked to them about that afternoon, and I can imagine a ship sitting there with her air group gone and way overdue to return and nobody's come back yet. That's one of the reasons why the Task Force was leery about coming on into clean up and I think the [aircraft carrier USS] Enterprise [CV-6] and the [aircraft carrier USS] Yorktown [CV-5] probably had the same trouble and that's one way [reason] that the 60 ships that were there got away from us because we sure could have gotten some more of them. Any other questions?       |
Thanks snopercod for sharing the picture of you dad with us. That's a great photo.
"W" Flag-o-gram!
Thanks PE. How's the PE household doing?
Morning Samwise. You're in early or I'm really late. LOL.
Good morning feather.
Thanks Snopercod. Looks like a carrier deck and an Avenger.
AHHH! Normalcy returns ;-)
Heads up Snippy! Thread idea.
I know we were very lucky at Midway, but I do think some of that luck was earned. Like Commander Waldron, Adm. Nimitz had a pretty good idea of where the Japanese carriers would be and placed our forces perfectly. Also, I didn't realize just how much bad luck we had before the dive bomber attack that worked. There were repeated land based attacks on the Japanese landing fleet and repeated torpedo attacks on the carriers that all misfired before we finally got lucky and caught them refueling and rearming with our dive bombers. We were due!
We also benefited from the Japanese characteristic of dividing their forces in overly complex plans. Two of the six Pearl Harbor carriers were up in the Aleutians carrying on the "diversion" that fooled nobody. The main surface fleet under Yamamoto on board the Yamato was days behind the carriers and the invasion fleet. Had Yamamoto been up with his carriers he could have done some damage since we had so few escorts and had lost Yorktown.
Heck, if the Japanese had wanted to, they could have landed and taken Midway if they had the surface fleet to chase our carriers away, but they didn't and also didn't realize how badly they had beat up our land based aircraft.
I read a couple of things about Torpedo 8's John C. Waldron (I believe it was in Incredible Victory, by Walter Lord).
“Waldron proudly claimed to be one-eighth Sioux. Whenever he solved a problem by a flash of intuition, he attributed it to his Indian blood." Some have said that this is how he sniffed out the Japanese carriers.
There's another story about the brashness of Waldron: Asked about what his squadron would do if they ran low on gas while looking for the Japanese, Waldron is said to have replied - 'If we run out of gas, we'll p*ss in the tanks'.
Salty, but my kind of guy. :-)
Great post, snippy! Thanx!
We are scooting out the door when DK gets home for the camp grounds.
Cool thread today!
Awesome!
MY pleasure miss Feather.
I took the picture from our family album.
Obvious choice for today's Plane. *wink*
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Air Power |
The XTBD-1 first flew on April 15, 1935 and nine days later was delivered to Navy for testing. It was designed to a specification for aircraft operating from a new class of carriers the Navy was launching, the first of which was the USS Ranger. On June 25, 1937 Douglas began delivery of 114 TBD-1s and by 1938 the type had proved very successful in trials and combat exercises. There was an additional order for 15 aircraft in 1938 to replenish operational losses.
Upon its introduction, the Devastator was the most modern and effective torpedo bomber perhaps in the world, the design often referred to as "radical". There were a number of "firsts" associated with the TBD; the "Devastator" was the first monoplane design ordered for service with the US Navy; it was the first with hydraulic (as opposed to "manual") folding wings; it was the first "all metal" aircraft ordered by the Navy. The carriers Saratoga, Enterprise, Lexington, Wasp, Hornet, Yorktown and Ranger were all equipped with the Devastator as the standard torpedo bomber. And, although Devastator production totaled only 129 aircraft, it achieved a notoriety completely out of proportion to its numbers (as we shall see).
It had a crew of three; a pilot, a gunner facing aft and a bombardier who sat in between. In combat, the bombardier lay prone just behind the engine, peering through a window in the bottom of the fuselage to release the torpedo or bomb. The Devastator was furnished with one forward firing Colt/Browning .30 caliber machine gun operated by the pilot. Depending on the circumstances (and the CO) the forward gun was replaced with a .50 caliber. Exterior indications of which gun was mounted could be determined by the presence of a blister behind the air intake on the starboard side. This blister was a breech fairing for the Colt/Browning .50 caliber M2. Another .30 caliber Colt/Browning was mounted in the rear gunners position. The engine was the Pratt-Whitney 1830-64 Twin Wasp rated at 850 hp. (634 kW). It’s wings spanned 50 feet (15.24 m), taking up a lot of room in the cramped innards of a carrier. So, Douglas designed them to fold upwards reducing the space to 26 feet (7.92 m). The wheels folded backwards into the wing, though they were designed to protrude about 10" (254 mm) below the wing just in case the TBD had to make a wheels-up landing. The sleek 35’ (10.67 m) fuselage was covered with a "greenhouse" canopy reaching over halfway to the tail.
Near the beginning of the new decade (1940), naval intelligence indicated the TBD might be losing its combat edge to foreign designs and wheels were set in (slow) motion to find a replacement. There seemed to be no rush in spite of the wars heating up in Asia and Europe. A mere 3 years earlier, the Devastator had been state-of-the-art and it couldn’t have become totally obsolete in that short of period, or so the thinking went.
Two years later the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. At that time the Navy still had a hundred TBDs on the rosters, spread out among the aircraft carriers. By chance, the aircraft carriers were not in Pearl Harbor and escaped destruction when the Japanese assaulted "Battleship Row" on December 7, 1941.
But the Navy’s squadron commanders were beginning to worry about some of the planes their men would take into battle, particularly the TBD with its top speed of 206 mph (332 km/h). Intelligence reports on the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen (Zero) indicated its top speed was well over 325 mph (523 km/h). The fact Japan had such a fast and nimble aircraft came as a great shock to American military planners who had been led to believe the Japanese had only inferior copies of European designs. The Devastator was scheduled to be replaced by the Grumman TBF Avenger. The question was; when? During this initial phase of WWII, the development and delivery of new aircraft was agonizingly slow.
During the first five months of 1942, the TBD seemed to lead a charmed life. By February 1942, the carriers were making raids on island bastions in the Marshalls and Gilberts held by the Japanese which were largely successful and the Devastator gave a good account of itself during these battles. On May 7, TBDs were instrumental in the sinking of the Japanese carrier "Shoho" in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
It was during this time when defects were first noted in the Mark XIII torpedo used by the TBD. Many of these torpedoes were seen to strike the target yet fail to explode. Submariners were having the same problems with the Mark XIV Field ordinance men attempted to modify the weapon until the Navy Bureau of Ordinance in Washington sent a direct order forbidding any modifications and assuring everyone the Mk XIII torpedo was faultless. BurOrd stuck with this position in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It seems the carrier groups took it at face value and looked for solutions in the maintenance and delivery of the weapon. Fortunately, the submariners persisted. Several problems with the torpedoes were eventually located. One problem was incredibly similar to the recent Mars Space Vehicle which "landed" 20 feet (6.1 m) after it impacted the surface due to a failure of technicians to convert altitude to metric units in the guidance computer programming.
The torpedoes had been tested with dummy warheads, that is, the space for the warhead had been filled with water when the torpedo was tested. No one apparently thought to ask how heavy the actual warhead would be, and the cost of the torpedoes entered the picture as a reason to curtail further testing of the torpedo. Due to the difference in weight of the dummy warhead and the actual warhead, the torpedo ran eleven to 14 feet below set depth. Several other problems prevented the weapon from working properly. These problems persisted for over two years because of the bone-headed attitude of BurOrd. Eventually, the top man in the Navy, Admiral Ernest King ordered BurOrd to get off its butt and test live torpedoes.
However, long before the torpedo problem could be solved, operational problems doomed the TBD on the basis of a single mission. The mission began on June 4, 1942 when the TBDs were sent to attack the Japanese Imperial Fleet north of Midway Island and quite suddenly, the worst suspicions of Navy squadron commanders were confirmed.
At 0700 hrs., Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8) of the aircraft carrier Hornet launched 15 TBDs, VT-6 of the Enterprise launched 14. VT-3 on the Yorktown launched 12. Due to cloudy weather they lost their fighter escort and arrived at the scene of the battle without "top cover". Japanese A6M "Zeros" immediately attacked from the rear while the Imperial Fleet ships put up a wall of anti-aircraft fire from the front. The Zeros attacked while the TBDs were still more than 12 miles from the Imperial Fleet boats and one by one the TBDs splashed in. Not a single torpedo from these planes found a target. Of the 41 Devastators launched by the US Navy aircraft carriers, 37 failed to return to their ships. A loss rate of over 90%! After the Battle of Midway, the Navy struck the Douglas TBD "Devastator" from combat roles and it was relegated to training and communications roles.
Specifications:
Manufacturer: Douglas Aircraft
Type: Three seat naval torpedo bomber
Accommodation: Pilot, bombardier and radioman/rear gunner in enclosed greenhouse canopy
Date deployed 1936
Number built: 130
Dimensions:
Wing span: 50 ft 0 in (15.24 m)
Length: 35 ft 0 in (10.69 m)
Height: 15 ft 1 in (4.59 m)
Weights:
Empty: 6,182 lbs (2,804 kg)
Gross: 9,862 lbs (4,473 kg)
Max T/O: 10,194 lbs (4,623 kg)
Performance:
Maximum Speed: 206 mph (331 km/hr) @ 8,000 ft (2,438 m)
Cruising Speed: 128 mph (205 km/hr)
Landing Speed: 68 mph (109 km/hr)
Service Ceiling: 19,700 ft (6004 m)
Range: 435 mi (700 km) with Mk XIII Torpedo 716 mi (1,152 km) with 1,000 lbs (453 kg) bombs
Powerplant: Pratt-Whitney R-1830-64 "Double Wasp" air-cooled radial. 900 hp (671 kW) take-off 850 hp (634 kW) at 8,000 ft. (2,438 m)
Armament:
1 Mk XIII Torpedo - Diameter: 21 in (533 mm), Length: 15 ft. (4.57 m) - Weight: 1,200 lb (544 kg) or 1,000 lbs. (453 kg) bombs
Two 7.62mm machine gun
_landing_on_carrier.jpg)
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A couple of dead white guys:
Meriwether Lewis. (Oil (1807) by Charles Willson Peale. Independence National Historical Park (Pa.) Collection.)
William Clark. (Oil (1810) by Charles Willson Peale. Independence National Historical Park (Pa.) Collection.)
Sent by this dead white guy:
President Thomas Jefferson, progenitor of the Lewis and Clark Expedition and architect of U.S. westward expansion. (Copy of the original oil (1791) by Charles Willson Peale. Independence National Historical Park (Pa.) Collection.)
To exploit and conquer this empty wasteland.
Four hours of sleep, and I'm thriving!
Msdrby and Kidlette are doing very well. Mom was able to get out and do a bit of driving today. I may be able to turn in my school bus driver hat next week.
Good morning Mayor. It's a little chilly today. Probably upper 50's or low 60's.
Lot's of "what ifs" in war. Good morning bandleader.
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