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Posted on 11/18/2003 12:02:05 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT While the Utah Beach Invasion Force was still approaching the Transport Area, the first blows had already struck the enemy from the air. The intensive air bombardment of the invasion area had started about midnight, 5 June. At that time RAF bombers made intensive attacks on the known enemy batteries along the entire invasion coast. Shortly before H Hour medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped several hundred tons of bombs on enemy defenses at Utah Beach in support of the seaborne assault. Between these bombings, however, came the still more telling attacks by airborne infantry.  Allied Air Assault Routes It was the largest use of airborne troops up to that time. Paratroop elements of the 82d and 101st Divisions, comprising 6 regiments, with the normal complement of parachute field artillery and engineers, numbering more than 13,000 men, were flown from bases in southern England to the Cotentin Peninsula in approximately 925 C-47's. An additional 4,000 men, consisting of glider infantry with supporting weapons and medical and signal units, were to arrive in 500 gliders later on D Day and on D plus 1 to reinforce the paratroops. Seaborne echelons were to join the divisions on D plus 1. To the parachute troops was assigned what was probably the most difficult task of the initial operation-a night jump behind enemy lines five hours before the coastal landings. At 2215 on D minus 1, 432 C-47's began taking off from 7 departure airdromes in England, with 6,600 paratroops of the 101st Airborne Division. They were scheduled to begin dropping at H minus s hours. At dawn (H minus 2 hours) they were to be reinforced by approximately 150 glider troops from 51 gliders, and at dusk (H plus 15 hours) by an additional 165 in 32 gliders. Preceding the main echelons of paratroops by half an hour were 20 pathfinder aircraft which had the mission of marking six drop zones (for both divisions) and one landing zone. Marking of the zones was not entirely successful, but all of the pathfinder teams carried out at least part of their missions.  Paratroop echelons approached the Cotentin from the west and made their landfall in the vicinity of les Pieux. Formations were tight until reaching the coast, but from the coast to the Merderet cloud banks loosened the formations, and east of the Merderet flak scattered them further. In general the division did not have a good drop, although better than that of the 82d Airborne Division. About 1,500 troops were either killed or captured and approximately 60 percent of the equipment dropped was lost when the bundles fell into swamps or into fields covered by enemy fire. Only a fraction of the division's organized strength could initially be employed on the planned missions, and many of the missions carried out were undertaken by mixed groups which did not correspond with original assignments. The fifty-one Waco gliders, carrying command personnel and antitank weapons, came in early on D-Day morning. This type of landing had never been attempted before in darkness. Many gliders were wrecked as they landed in the small Normandy fields and there as damage to equipment and loss of personnel, one of the casualties being Brig. Gen. Don F. Pratt (Assistant Commander, 101st Airborne Division), who was killed in landing. In general, however, losses were not excessive and the mission was a success. Later in the day, at 2100, the serial of thirty-two Horsa gliders-carrying command, communications, and medical personnel and equipment-suffered heavier losses in personnel and gliders because of the unsuitability of the small landing fields. Equipment suffered relatively little damage. A seaborne echelon of the division, including the 3 27th Glider Infantry, joined the division on D plus 1. The initial widespread dispersion of the 101st Division was not an unmixed evil. The Germans appear to have been confused by the scattered drops. For some time they were unable to estimate the magnitude of the invasion and, in consequence, reaction was slow and uncertain. The war diary of the German Seventh Army noted at 0130, 6 June, reports of Allied paratroop landings east and northwest of Caen, at St. Maricove, at Montebourg, on both sides of the Vire River, and on the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Fighting was reported at le Ham. For several hours the German command was uncertain whether the landings represented a major action. At 0400 it was estimated that the American plan seemed to be to "tie off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest point."  Uncertainty at the enemy command level seemed to have been duplicated among the subordinate units. It was generally the experience of the 101st Airborne Division, at least, that although the enemy defended freely with fire he was initially reluctant to move out of his prepared defenses to attack. When attacks were launched they were seldom pushed vigorously. Thus in some measure the enemy's confusion tended to offset that of the invaders and, by dint of considerable improvisation, the 101st was able to accomplish most of its initial missions. The plan of the 101st Airborne Division called for the seizure of the four inland exits-the western ends of causeways-from the inundated area west of Utah Beach between St. Martin-de-Varreville and Pouppeville. In the southern part of the division's sector two bridges across the Douve River, on the main highway northwest of Carentan and the railroad bridge to the west, were to be destroyed. In addition, the division was to seize and hold the la Barquette lock and establish two bridgeheads over the Douve at le Port northeast of Carentan. The sum of these missions thus provided for the clearing of the enemy's secondary beach defenses and the organization of the Corps' southern flank for defense and further exploitation. After being relieved in the beachhead area by the 4th Division, the 101st was to seize Carentan and establish contact with V Corps, fusing the Utah and Omaha beachheads. Thereafter the 101st Airborne Division was ordered to protect the southern flank of VII Corps east of the Merderet River. The division would be reinforced by the attachment of a company of tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, the 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and a troop of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron when these were landed by sea. The task of securing the two northern beach exits was assigned to the 502d Parachute Infantry, with the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. The 502d was to drop immediately to the west of Exits 3 and 4 in Drop Zone A. The 2d Battalion was to capture and destroy the coastal battery at St. Martin-de-Varreville as quickly as possible. The 3d Battalion was to support this operation, if necessary, and then secure Exits 3 and 4 so that the 4th Division could come up the causeways at H Hour. The 2d Battalion was to remain on the gun position as regimental reserve and establish contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry on its right. The 1st Battalion was to clean up a group of buildings, thought to be the German artillery garrison quarters, just west of St. Martin- de-Varreville. It was also to cover the northern flank of the regiment, establish contact with the 82d Airborne Division on the left, and cover the emplacing of the 377th Glider Field Artillery Battalion guns.  General Eisenhower addressing the 101st Airborne in England before the Normandy Invasion, 1944 The four serials of the 502d Parachute Infantry came in ten minutes apart. The 2d Battalion led with regimental headquarters, followed by the 3d, the 1st, and the artillery battalion. The 2d Battalion failed to land in Drop Zone A as planned. A large percentage of the men came down on the southern edge of Drop Zone C. Assembly, without landmarks and far from the designated assembly points, consumed most of the day, and the battalion as a unit took no part in the D-Day fighting. Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, commanding the 3d Battalion, landed several hundred yards east of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Unable to orient himself, he moved toward Ste. Mere-Eglise, collecting a miscellaneous group of about thirty men from regimental headquarters, Company G of the 506th Parachute Infantry, and a few from the 82d Airborne Division. From Ste. Mere-Eglise the men back-tracked north and then northeast, heading for the two northern exits of the beach. On the way the group snowballed to about seventy-five men and made contact with a small enemy convoy. Several of the enemy were killed and ten taken prisoner. This was the only incident of the march.  Airborne Paratroopers beside their C-47 transport plane on the eve the D-Day invasion. Before the sun set on Normandy Beaches on D-Day only four men were still alive of the nineteen that parachuted onto hostile German held france. On nearing St. Martin-de-Varreville, a reconnaissance party was sent to the enemy coastal battery. It found that the position had been destroyed by bombing and was deserted. No heavy guns were found, although there was ammunition in the pits and, antiaircraft guns, including some multiple 20-mm. mounts. Colonel Cole then split his force to seize Exits 3 and 4 and dispatched a small group of men to seek contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry. At 0930, two hours after the defense was established at Exit 3, in the vicinity of Audouville-la-Hubert, the enemy began retreating across the causeway from the beach. Colonel Cole's men, without loss to themselves, killed 50 to 75 of the enemy, and at 1300 established contact with the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry (4th Division). By the end of the day 250 men had gathered under Colonel Cole. That night his battalion was ordered to assemble the next day in the vicinity of Blosville, south of Ste. Mere-Eglise, as regimental reserve. The 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Patrick J. Cassidy), had a much stiffer fight for its D-Day objectives. Colonel Cassidy landed near St. Germain-de-Varreville in the center of the battalion's drop one and a mile from the first objective-the artillery garrison buildings designated as "WXYZ" in the plan. He gradually collected a small force, mostly from his own battalion, and after discovery of a road sign began moving toward the objective. Objective W, the house at the crossroads west of St. Martin-de-Varreville, was unoccupied. Colonel Cassidy set up his command post in the house and then checked the enemy gun position across the road. There he found a dozen men under Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis (commander of the 2d Battalion); Colonel Chappuis, though injured in the jump, had been able to reach his objective. He had decided to wait at the gun position for more of his men. Colonel Cassidy proceeded with his own mission. His plan was, first, to establish defenses at the St. Martin-de-Varreville intersection to prevent the enemy from moving east into the beach area, and then to clean out the XYZ buildings and set up a defensive line to the north. A patrol sent to check Exit 4 found both it and the causeway clear. The 3d Battalion, in the meantime, reported Exit 3 covered, and Colonel Cassidy, after relaying this information to the 4th Division, turned his attention to consolidating the battalion position.  Several groups from Company A assembled north of St. Martin-de- Varreville during the morning. Forty-five men were collected by Lt. W. A. Swanson and ordered to move to Foucarville to establish the right anchor of the battalion line with a series of road blocks. Lieutenant Swanson set up four blocks shortly after noon and within half an hour he trapped and largely destroyed a 4-vehicle enemy troop convoy moving east from Beuzeville-au-Plain. Despite this success, Company A's positions were not secure as they were dominated by the enemy on the hill to the northwest. The Germans, however, made no determined effort to break through, although a fire fight continued most of the day as the enemy probed at the road blocks without discovering their essential weakness. Meanwhile the fight at XY was carried on most of the day by a mixed group of men under Sergeant Summers, while Company C was held in reserve. It was not an easy task. Not until 1530 were the Germans driven Out of the last building, after its roof was fired with bazooka rounds. More than one hundred were killed or taken prisoner as they tried to escape. Another fifty had been killed or captured earlier in the fight.  General Anthony MacAuliffe talks to glider pilots June 5, 1944 The establishment of the western end of the battalion line was facilitated by the arrival in the area of Lt. Col. John H. Michaelis, regimental commander, with two hundred men. This left Colonel Cassidy free to move the 1st Battalion north and complete his D-Day mission. Company C was ordered to Beuzeville-au-Plain, while Company B reassembled in the artillery barracks area. Actually Beuzeville-au-Plain was not reached that night. Company C moved in a body north to St. Germain-de-Varreville and then west along a stream bed toward its objective. A little more than halfway the company split into three "platoons," no more than combat patrols in strength. Each of these platoons became involved separately with small enemy forces at the hamlet of Fournel, which the leading group had mistaken for Beuzeville-au-Plain. At dark the paratroopers withdrew, and a company line was established south of Fournel, facing northwest.  82nd Airborne Shoulder patch During the night the line was subjected to continuing enemy pressure from the west. To cope with this threat, Colonel Cassidy put Company B, which had moved north after reassembling, into the line on the left flank. As there was still a dangerous gap between Company C and the battalion's right flank held by Company A, Colonel Cassidy filled it temporarily with a few spare riflemen and asked Regiment for help. Regiment, however, had already decided to pass the 2d Battalion through the 1st on the following day, and therefore ordered Colonel Cassidy to withdraw and consolidate. Shortly before midnight the principal enemy threat was unexpectedly removed when the Germans on the hill opposing Company A hoisted a white flag. Bluffed into overestimating Company A's strength, chiefly by the increasing volume of mortar and machine-gun fire laid down by Lieutenant Swanson's men, eighty-seven Germans marched into the American lines. Another fifty, attempting to escape north, were shot down by American prisoners who had been freed by the surrender.
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Off to see your other post to me now. :)
The public thinks everything military should go according to "plan." In this battle the troops succeeded even though almost nothing went according to plan!
I agree battle stories are understood much better if read with a map. The West Point Atlas of American Wars is commercially available and is a good basic reference. My wife got it for me years ago.
USS Delaware was scrapped per the Washington Naval Treaty. Ah yes, the disarmament treaty that prevented a WWII.
I like this one from BG Norm Cota on Omaha Beach: "I don't have to tell you the story. You all know it. Only two kinds of people are gonna stay on this beach: those that are already dead and those that are gonna die! Now get off your butts! You guys are the Fighting 29th!"
From what I've read, the movie version is pretty close to the truth, with Cota personally organizing and pushing those guys off the beach.
The squadron's history states: "Our flying tactics were fairly consistent with those handed down by our sister photo pilots from the 8th Air Force and the early Spitfire photo expertise adapted by the RAF. They were premised upon three principles: first, get the pix home; secondly, in order to accomplish this, fly above the 'ack-ack' (anti-aircraft fire), normally about 30,000 feet; and thirdly, whenever possible, stay above or below the contrail level to help avoid being spotted by the enemy ... the photo 'recce' mission was not a success until the 'product' was returned home and properly processed. Coldly and statistically speaking, the bomber pilot was successful as long as he laid his 'eggs' on his target, even if he didn't return. And as long as the fighter boys safely escorted the 'big babies' to their destination they were at least partially successful. But not so with the photo pilot.
"The first major job facing the 34th was to provide beach photography in the Normandy area to give planners a first-hand picture of what would be facing the invasion armada on D-Day. But the extent of the photography was expanded to include the southern Belgian coast and the entire French coast south to Cherbourg to help lessen the chances of the Germans possibly pinpointing an exact invasion location.
"To enhance the element of surprise," the history continues, "all missions would be flown just above water level from the British coast to target area, hence aircraft would be safely below all enemy radar surveillance and subject to minimum detection. The tradeoff achieved from cloudless conditions would more than make up for the amount of distortion which would be experienced from the oblique photography taken at such extreme low altitudes and speeds of 300-plus mph. Each plane was retrofitted with the installation of right and left side-looking oblique cameras equipped to run continuously with the nose camera, also installed in the oblique position. All missions were flown during time of low tide in order to photograph all underwater obstacles and consequently maximize overall beach photo coverage. Most of these missions were flown between May 6 and 20, 1944. D-Day was June 6."
The history continues: "Lt. Keith (1st Lt. A.R.) drew the very heavily defended coastline of LeHarve and vicinity. Small arms and coastal defenses caused him little or no trouble, but a seagull smashed into his canopy. Keeping his aircraft under control while covered with blood and feathers proved no easy task and left little margin of error at this (low) altitude. Nevertheless, he managed to bring both 'birds' as well as excellent photography home."
To 2nd Lt. G.A.York, the youngest of the original pilots in the squadron, went the plaudits of all. As the D-Day invasion unfolded, it became common knowledge that he had photographed the exact location of the Normandy beaches that the American forces landed on. He had photographed all of Omaha and most of Utah beaches. Like similar low-level missions flown up and down the coast, Garland had pinpointed the beach barriers, teller mines attached to imbedded posts under water during high-water conditions and other coastal defenses in minute detail as well as scattering his share of German soldiers working along the beaches.
In the Presidential Unit Citation and other commendations received by the squadron, it was stressed that the information provided by these aerial photographers saved countless allied ground and naval invasion personnel.
And due credit is also given the marvelous twin-engine, twin-boom P-38. The history states: "For our purpose, in its day, it met our every requirement. Even at the extreme altitudes when cracked magnetos and associated engine failure sometimes seemed more than common, we always had that second engine to bring us home. Our F-5s (a P-38 model) under all conditions really 'brought home the bacon.'"
Jack explained that as soon as an aircraft returned from a mission, it would park for refueling. The film was removed from the cameras and new film installed. (It took less than an hour to develop the film and process prints.) At the same time, Jack and the other flight-line men would check with the pilot for anything needing immediate attention and then give the plane a thorough checkover. "We'd first wash off all the oil" covering much of the aircraft, Jack explained, because the P-38 was notorious for "throwing oil." But that did not affect its performance.
There was a darker side, too. Although no pilots were lost to enemy action, the 34th lost four of its original 18 pilots, while based in England, to anoxia (oxygen deprivation) while flying high altitudes; another pilot was declared missing and three others died in accidents in Europe.
Joltin Joe...not a Photo Recon F-5
In fact, it helped them some of the time by confusing the enemy!
Thanks Light Speed. The importance of Photo Reconnaissance is another overlooked field. Maybe an idea for a thread Snippy.
Yep, this would make a great thread, thanks guys!
From what I've read, if the Utah landings hadn't been off target, resistance would have been heavier, not as much as Omaha, but they lucked out and landed on an area that wasn't heavily defended.
Although von Rundstedt and Rommel respected each other, the two men could not agree on how to defend the inevitable invasion. Rommel felt that the only way to fend off the Allies was to fight the invasion on the beaches, and deny the Allies a foothold anywhere. (Duffy 119) Rundstedt opted for permitting the Allies to gain beachhead from which they could not escape easily. He proposed to mass the panzers behind the invasion front so they could launch a counterattack against the invaders once the Germans knew the disposition of all the enemy forces. (Duffy 119) the panzers would push the Allies back into the sea, as Rundstedt saw it. Gerd von Rundstedt sought to re-create the conditions in Dunkirk four ears prior, when the British army had faced total destruction. Because he controlled all troop movements and made all decisions, it was left to Hitler to decide between the defenses. As in his typical style, Hitler refused to fully support either plan. He gave each man a little of what he wanted. (Duffy 119)
The end result was that neither defense could function properly because the defenses were spread out too thin. (Duffy 119) “Hitler arbitrated and arranged a compromise, telling Rommel to defeat the landings on the beaches with the help of some armored forces held nearby and let von Rundstedt retain a diluted central reserve for the main punch if the enemy was not checked on the shoreline.” (Duffy 119)
Some people say Eisenhower compromised too much to hold his coalition together, but look at the German squabbling - and they only had to deal with one nationality.
So is today your birthday?
LOL. Don't worry, I save the links and read all the threads and sometimes I have to ask SAM if we've covered such and such, he remembers, I don't. My mind is like a sieve.
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