Would granting an annulment be sufficient? That is done by a tribunal, of course, and the SSPX has established one to do just that.It seems to me they already have established a permanent parallel structure, and do not plan on ever coming back. I don't know what else they need to establish to stay away forever.I think they would need to establish a formal curial and diocesan structure, complete with congregations and tribunals, before we could conclude that. Right now, all they have is the usual setup of a religious order.
As to the usual setup of a religious order, I have to disagree. The SSPX is supposed to be a priestly fraternity. Nowhere does it have the authority to start setting up the tribunals it has set up, the various other orders, which it has done. Nowhere does it have the authority to establish parishes in various dioceses without the permission of the local ordinary. Do you see the Dominicans, Jesuits, etc. acting like this?
patent +AMDG
It's certainly evidence of an intent to build a separate church. Negotiating an apsotolic administration with Rome is evidence pointing away from that. If all talk of reunion ceases, even as a pious wish, that would be the most ominous sign of all.
You clearly are unable to make certain basic -- and critical -- distinctions. Either that, or you will use any falsehood to bash and attack the Traditionalist movement and the SSPX. Here is the Society's explanation of their actions regarding annulments:
V. THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF JUDGING MARRIAGE CASES
Since our jurisdiction is only a supplied jurisdiction, it has the following properties:
1.It is not habitual, but is exercised ad casum, per modum actus. Consequently, our tribunals do not sit in a habitual manner and their members are not named ad universas causas, but only each time that it is necessary ad hoc casum. This is the case even if, for ease of function and to maintain competency and consistency, these are usually or always the same defenders of the bond and the same judges who are named.
2.It is not territorial, but personal.
3.It depends on the necessity of the faithful, and, consequently, only lasts for as long as the common necessity lasts. It will continue if the impossible were to happen and we could find one or other tribunal to judge marriage cases uniquely according to traditional norms. For in this case, the common necessity would remain.
4.It is a true jurisdiction, and not an exemption from the obligation to receive a judgment from the Church. Consequently, we have the power and the duty to pronounce true sentences, which have the potestatem ligandi vel solvendi. They, consequently, are imposed obligatorily on the faithful who request them. The proximate reason for this is that we must be able to tell the faithful what they must do to save their souls -quod debent servare.
Our judgments are, consequently, not simply private opinions, for these could not possible suffice when the public good is involved, as it is with every case in which the matrimonial bond is examined. In order to remove the doubt, our tribunals must have authority in the external forum.
5.This supplied jurisdiction does not usurp any Papal authority of divine right. This question could only arise when our judgments in third instance replace the judgments of the Roman Rota, which acts in the name of the Pope when it judges as a tribunal of third instance. However, this is not an usurpation of the Pope’s power of divine right, since the reservation of this third instance to the Pope is but an ecclesiastical law. 6.Finally, our judgments, as all our acts of supplied jurisdiction, and the episcopal consecrations of 1988 themselves, will one day have to be confirmed by the Holy See.