In a sense, yes. It doesn't necessitate the event though, and you will note that the subject of these two chapters from Elements of Divinity has been free agency contrasted with necessity.
You would agree that, prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each (including the differing Choices which Men will make in logically-dependent response to differing Elections of Divine Action), wouldn't you?
What exactly do you mean by 'logically-dependent'?
Therefore, since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
Of course God's foreknowledge includes Possibilities. Read your Bible.
You missed my point. If God's foreknowledge equals pre-ordination/predestination, then each of God's foreknown possibilities is really an actuality, which means that there are multiple actualities, despite the fact that we are aware of only one reality--not to mention that we would "statistically" find that several of these multiple actualities contradicted. (I.E., God foreknows the potentiality that Mary will marry Joseph; God also foreknows the 'potentiality' that Mary will die before meeting Joseph. Because God's foreknowledge preordains what is, and God foreknows that both are potentialities, then both are realities. Mary marries Joseph, and Mary dies before meeting Joseph.)
Prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each.
Well, at least we agree that the events are contingent. Of course, if they are contingent, then they are not necessary; and if they are not necessary, then man is a free moral agent, which seems to be (if I remember correctly--it's been so long since we were on the actual subject and not a tangent ;P) what this and the other recent thread that I started were about.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
Sure. However, God's prescience and omnipotent action do not necessitate these events (you've already admitted that they are contingent and not necessary), which leaves it with man's free agency as to the reactions man makes to God's actions.
Here, think of it this way: 1.) God's Pre-Creative Foreknowledge = God's knowledge of all possible Potentialities of Divine Action (including the differing choices which created Men will choose in logically-dependent response to differing Divine Elections).
Okay.
2.) God's Election = God decides which Foreknown Potentiality (i.e., to NOT perform the salvific Miracles in Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom) He ordains to create, thereby predestining the foreknown Result of that foreknown Potentiality (that these cities will NOT Repent).
In a sense, you could say that. At the same time, God's choice to "create" an actuality from a potentiality is not the necessitating cause of man's actions. Man may still freely choose to do opposite of what God foresees as reality based upon His actions; he won't, however, because he freely chooses to do what God foresaw him doing in the event that God would choose to 'create' an event. (Wow, that sounds convoluted. Nonetheless, the brief of it is that man's moral free agency is still intact. Fine, God chose to do something; however, he did not 'efficiently cause' man to act as the man did in response to God's action. Man chose freely, and despite the fact that God foresaw man choosing as he did, man still had the liberty to choose otherwise as he did. God foresaw, but did not effectively cause, man's choice.)
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
I'll concede that. Even so, God's choices do not effectively cause man's responses in such a way as to make man not a free moral agent.
In Matthew 11:20-27, the Decision of the Men of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom whether or not to Repent does not, in a statistically-causative sense, determine whether or not God will Elect perform the salvific Miracles therein. Rather, God's Election whether or not to perform the Miracles therein, in a statistically-causative sense, determines whether or not the Men of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom will Repent.
This, the Decisions of Men are logically-dependent subsequents of God's prior creative Election, not logically-conditionalizing antecedents of God's prior creative Election.
God's Election = God decides which Foreknown Potentiality (i.e., to NOT perform the salvific Miracles in Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom) He ordains to create, thereby predestining the foreknown Result of that foreknown Potentiality (that these cities will NOT Repent). ~~ In a sense, you could say that. At the same time, God's choice to "create" an actuality from a potentiality is not the necessitating cause of man's actions. Man may still freely choose to do opposite of what God foresees as reality based upon His actions; he won't, however, because he freely chooses to do what God foresaw him doing in the event that God would choose to 'create' an event. (Wow, that sounds convoluted. Nonetheless, the brief of it is that man's moral free agency is still intact. Fine, God chose to do something; however, he did not 'efficiently cause' man to act as the man did in response to God's action. Man chose freely, and despite the fact that God foresaw man choosing as he did, man still had the liberty to choose otherwise as he did. God foresaw, but did not effectively cause, man's choice.)
Good. You understand Matthew 11:20-27 well enough, then. Calvinists never saw Matthew 11:20-27 in the sense of God "irresistibly compelling" these people to not repent in the first place. If you think so, then your Teachers have not taught you very clearly concerning the beliefs of Calvinists.
There are still some technical issues relating to Total Depravity to work out (Wesleyans really don't believe in the Biblical Doctrine of Total Depravity), but the Passage's main point concerning God's Sovereignty over the Eternal Destinies of Men is established well enough.
To wit:
Ergo:
We must correctly say that prior to Creation, these Men "being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil", God's Election as to the Creation of Events absolutely predestined them, as a 100% statistically-certainty, to NOT REPENT and be eternally damned.
And if God's prior and logically-antecedent Creative Election as to the Ordination of Events absolutely predestined these Men, as a 100% statistically-certainty, to NOT REPENT and be eternally damned, then we have just proved the doctrine of Absolute Unconditional Double Predestination.
After all, we've now established that God ordains the arrangement of Events in a manner which certainly brings about the Repentance of those whom He pre-Creatively elects, and we've established that God ordains the arrangement of Events in a manner which certainly brings about the NON-Repentance of those whom He pre-Creatively reprobates.
Thus, we have proven the FACT of Absolute Unconditional Double Predestination; now we're merely arguing about the mechanics of its operation.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE. ~~ I'll concede that. Even so, God's choices do not effectively cause man's responses in such a way as to make man not a free moral agent.
Calvinists never said in the first place that Man is "not a free moral agent". We have been saying ALL ALONG that Man IS a free moral agent. As I said, if you think otherwise, then your Teachers have not taught you very clearly concerning the beliefs of Calvinists.
But while we believe that Man is a free moral agent, we likewise believe in Absolute Unconditional Double Predestination. And if it is true that:
...Then, as I said above, we have just proved the doctrine of Absolute Unconditional Double Predestination.
After all, we've now established that God ordains the arrangement of Events in a manner which certainly brings about the Repentance of those whom He pre-Creatively elects, and we've established that God ordains the arrangement of Events in a manner which certainly brings about the NON-Repentance of those whom He pre-Creatively reprobates.
Thus, we have proven the FACT of Absolute Unconditional Double Predestination; now we're merely arguing about the mechanics of its operation.