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http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=112964

“2488 The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it.

Based on this, I am sure that all would agree that a suspect is not entitled to the truth. For one thing, if the truth was completely known, there would be little need to question the suspect.

Then the question comes is there ever a reason where deception is legitimate. For an easy answer, I’ll ask a rhetorical question.

It is well documented that during WWII, the Pope aided in the protection of Jews. Many times he told the Nazi’s that he wasn’t harboring or cooperating in the escape and protection of Jews. If he had told the “truth”, he, many Christians and many Jews would have been slaughtered.

The moral justification for the Pope’s “lie” is grounded in three realities:

1) The Nazi’s had no legitimate right to the truth as they intended to use the truth for immoral purposes- the genocide of Jews.
2) The effect of telling the truth would be a cooperation with knowledge and consent to the doing of evil.
3) One can never be forced to do evil against their will and under duress one can take any action necessary and appropriate (proporationate) to remove the the duress.

Now let’s go to the question at hand. As I said earlier, the suspect isn’t entitled to the truth (or whatever facts are known). But is there justification in using deception similar to the Pope’s active use of deception of the Nazi’s in an effort to gain truthful information from a suspect?

For an answer to this I’d like to introduce the Principle of the Double Effect: This principle aims to provide specific guidelines for determining when it is morally permissible to perform an action in pursuit of a good end in full knowledge that the action will also bring about bad results. The principle has its historical roots in the medieval natural law tradition, especially in the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), and has been refined both in its general formulation and in its application by generations of Catholic moral theologians.

Formulation of the Principle. Classical formulations of the principle of double effect require that four conditions be met if the action in question is to be morally permissible: first, that the action contemplated be in itself either morally good or morally indifferent; second, that the bad result not be directly intended; third, that the good result not be a direct causal result of the bad result; and fourth, that the good result be “proportionate to” the bad result. Supporters of the principle argue that, in situations of “double effect” where all these conditions are met, the action under consideration is morally permissible despite the bad result.

Another justification for this can be found in the Just War Theory. Like the Pope was engaged in legitimate war with the Nazi’s, a legitimate government has the right to protect itself and its citizens. From this right, certain exceptions from absolute prohibitions become morally permissable. For instance, innocent civilians can be killed so long as the action served a proportionate military purpose and proportionate action had been taken to mitigate the civilian deaths. Similarly, the police in the performance of their legitimate duty to protect the citizens are morally permitted to use “military” tactics that otherwise would be considered immoral by individuals.

Another concept that is applicable in this case (and potentially most persuasive) is the concept of legitimate self defense. Criminals place society under duress. The legitimate pursuit of protecting society allows for extra-ordinary actions that will relieve society of the duress. As the legitimate representative of society, the police are authorized to take proportionate action that will result in the removal of the duress (the incarceration of criminals). “