[Mad Dawg]

Your definition is lacking. Try again?

That there is a disagreement between my definition and that of others does not in itself prove that my definition is the one that is lacking.

It is based on the notion that no one freely chooses evil, knowing it to be evil. Just as the vices are not "existents" in themselves but defects in virtue, so a choice to do evil is not a choice but a defect in choosing.

It is the nominalist view that the will sort of stands back from the choice between good and evil and mutters, "Hmm, what to do, what to do?" (I don't mean that because it's nominalist it's wrong. I'm just distinguishing.)

A nominalist would say God is not free to do evil. A Realist would say God is utterly free and therefore he does the good.

[Christian_Capitalist]

That there is a disagreement between my definition and that of others does not in itself prove that my definition is the one that is lacking. It is based on the notion that no one freely chooses evil, knowing it to be evil.

Call it a "defective choice" if you want; it's still an irrelevant distinction. I will repeat (and re-phrase) my prior question:

Can those who have Free Will, choose to do Evil?