Actually, that is not universal. It is the Nominalist idea of free will. Another view, held by those some call Scholastic Realists, is the free will is the ability to chose the good and to act on the choice.
It is one of the most interesting discussions in the whole thing. It's a shame that you probably won't want to read it, but Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, one of the most challenging books I've read recently presents an exhaustive, even magisterial discussion of this question.
With all due respect, this doesn't address the problem. The "ability to choose the good and act on the choice." is meaningless as a definition of free will if you actually mean, "As long as God enables a man to do so". It is the "free" portion of the term that has to mean "without any outside influence whatsoever" or it really is nothing more than a definition of "conditioned" will. And, that is precisely my point. Our wills are conditioned, not free.
Thanks for the recommendation of Servais Pinckars. I'll see if I can fit it in. But, the musings of folks about ways to mitigate the digital nature of this problem don't interest me. It is like, "There is sort of a God." "There is a little bit of both being saved and not saved." "She is kind of pregnant".