It's been 40 years, or very nearly, since I went into this carefully. But God starts everything. Then it's like the will and grace are dance partners. That's how I'd put it.
"Scholastic realism" tends to think that freedom is NOT the ability to choose between good and evil, right and wrong, without any more attraction -- reasonable or otherwise -- to one or the other. Rather, freedom is the ability to know, to choose, and to do the good. And the proper exercise of freedom is good for one. It strengthens the will and the virtues.
But the will does not act alone in this. God starts everything and enables and assists and even prods and drives all the way through the process. Finally the very holy person is discerning enough to know that good has been done through him and his will and wise (and humble) enough to know that God did it. "The Lord has done great things for me ..."
In that connection, while Jesus is, of course, savior, we hold Mary as preeminent among the saved. By which I mean something like she is the exemplar of discipleship. So when she says, "The Lord has done great things for me," that is a model for us. Anyone, therefor, who says, "My one bazillion rosaries and novenas and clambering up and down stairs on my knees and all that is what has made me holy," that person would be considered ridiculous at best.
That's how I see it, anyway.
I hope that's at least clear.
If I understand Scholastic realism correctly it leaves reason unaffected by the fall. Aquinas taught that reason was something added to Adam even before the fall. In this sense then reason as an abstract power is something alongside God himself. It almost makes God a quadrinity(?).
If this analysis is correct, if man is affected by the Fall only in his will and emotions, it affects theology differently than if it affected his reason, will, and emotions.
So if grace interacts with just will and emotion versus reason, will, and emotions our understanding of how grace works will differ between these two anthropologies.
So in the Romanist schema can we say that Mary’s reason was exemplar and an example of the highest form of reason?