[[Still it seems to me that questions regarding the “intelligent organizer”]]
Ragarding the intelligent designer Himself is perhaps beyond science, but regarding His work, how He worked, What methods He used, How He accomplished them is not beyond the scope of science i nthe least it seems to me- given that all forensics science needs to do is show the how, not hte who (DNA evidence not withstanding- that’s a different issue in forensics nowadays, but does not udnermine the reliability of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ conclusions of hte past- while some cases might be proven wrong by DNA today, the VAST VAST majority of cases based simpyl on forensic annaylisis of hte how stil lstand as viable beyond resonable doubt conclusions
Macroevolutionary science certainly has nothign akin to DNA forensics to disprove God was hte Creator, Heck, they haven’t even got litmus tests to prove mutaitons were capable of violating scientifi laws- let alone address the Creator Hismelf- butr science does have hte tools and hte means to investigate the how
Or to me either, CottShop. Indeed, science deals with the "how" of things, not the "why" of things. The universe manifests the "how." It can be profitably studied without regard to its "why."
I very much appreciated the following insight from Robert Rosen, in Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of Life (p. 183). This is in Chapter 7, and he's not yet speaking directly of living systems, but of those material systems in Nature that we call machines. But the same observation holds for living systems as well:
But what, exactly, is a machine? What is the intrinsic, distinguishing characteristic that separates machines from material systems that are not machines? The most obvious distinction, e.g., between a machine and a stone, is that the former is fabricated and the latter is not, but this is worse than useless for the machine metaphor. For one thing, it involves the history of a thing, rather than any intrinsic characteristic; for another, it invokes aspects of intentionality that are simply unacceptable in this context.To avoid these difficulties, and yet retain the machine metaphor, there is nothing to fall back on except the organization to which I have already referred, something that Descartes could already notice. What distinguishes a material system as a machine, as distinct from a stone or a crystal, must somehow reflect its intrinsic organization. Where the organization has come from is now irrelevant; fabrication, and history in general, do not enter the matter at all. Such concepts pertain to a different order of question; an order that we must not invoke in characterizing machineness per se, but that we must not forget, either. [I added the boldface for emphasis; italics in the original.]