Indeed, I completely agree with Dr. Williams on this: "It is the irreducibility of the autopoietic hierarchy that provides the compelling evidence for design. That is, none of the levels of the hierarchy can be explained in terms of the properties of the level below it. Higher levels are not ‘emergent properties’ of the lower levels." I'd thought the article was pretty clear about this. But I guess not clear enough.
Regarding Dr. Williams' second point — "the lowest level of the hierarchy is not ‘pure elements’, as Jean Drew says, but molecules—the homochiral proteins and sugars (and thus DNA and RNA) and the other pure molecular components, in contrast to the dirty mixtures of the natural environment" — I appreciate his elaboration. Indeed, the remarks regarding homochirality in his article strongly suggest that such molecules are already "prepped" in a special way for life. But from his own statements, I'd thought to "catalog" homochiral proteins and sugars at Level (ii) of his model. So for good or ill, I left the "slot" of Level (i) to be "populated" by the atomic elements and laws of physics. For it seems to me that all life forms have a "physical basis." So the model should be able to reflect this.
It is true that Shannon information theory is indifferent to the meaning of messages. All it claims to be is a model for successful communication in all domains — which would include biology. It envisions successful communication of information as an action (similar to the action principle of physics) that moves a biological organism from a "before" to an "after" state, thus reducing uncertainty in the state of the receiver of the communication (i.e., the biological organism).
I hate to have to say this, but I think it's true nonetheless: Strictly speaking, science isn't interested in the "meaning" of things, but in how things "work."
This is not to denigrate, let alone abolish the concept of inversely-causal meta-information. It is merely to say that, at the level of action, biological processing may "reduce" to the statistics of codes.
Yet this does not appear to affect the teleological status of meta-information: Because it points to purposes, goals, in nature, we can speak of it as meaningful. Yet as already pointed out, in general "meaning" is not a problem for science. This seems to be a case of Stephen Jay Gould's niftily separated magisteria bumping up hard against one another.
In any case, it still remains a mystery from the perspective of science what the source of this inversely-causal meta-information is, and by what means it's conducted or translated into the physical and biological domains. It seems not to arise "in" nature, as we currently understand nature; it is not an "evolutionary development," rather it may well be the pre-eminent guide to evolution. But then, problems of "origin" seem to be devilishly difficult for science....
In any case, it seems to me we have to be careful about "mixing our metaphors": speculations about meaning belong to philosophy and theology, not to science. Science can only give us what is observable and experimentally replicable. The meaning and purpose of life, and the origin of meta-information, falls entirely outside its method.
At least that is my understanding, FWIW.
Thanks ever so much for writing, GGG! If you hear from Dr. Williams again, please thank him from me for his kindness in writing!
Excellent reply, BB. I meant to PM it as an FYI because Williams said he couldn’t participate.
==In any case, it seems to me we have to be careful about “mixing our metaphors”: speculations about meaning belong to philosophy and theology, not to science.
I think the autopoietic hierarchy has implications for all three. Science is more than just information gathering. In fact, I would argue that the most important aspect of science involves the interpretation of the same. If the various constituents of life are designed, then part of the job of science will be to discover the purpose of said designs. To my mind, such an endeavor overlaps with the concept of meaning.
All the best—GGG
2. Origin of inertia.
3. Origin of life.
b. Origin of Semiosis
5. Origin of consciousness.
6. Origin of conscience.
[[Indeed, the remarks regarding homochirality in his article strongly suggest that such molecules are already “prepped” in a special way for life.]]
The origins of life macroevolutionists will deny this, claiming it still ‘could have happened’ by chance (and we;ll get soem long-winded drawn out ‘explanation’ of how al lthe right elements ‘could have’ aligned themselves and seperated themselves from the wrong types, so that nature could ‘do it’s magic’
Of course, we’ll not get an ‘explanation’ as to how these molecules were purified before they miraculously aligned themselves, and seperated themselves before the whole ‘natural process’ began
[[Yet this does not appear to affect the teleological status of meta-information: Because it points to purposes, goals, in nature, we can speak of it as meaningful.]]
I can appreciate scientists wishing to opine strictly with scientific responses, but my goodness- when enough information points to intent, design, and intelligent assembly, it simply becomes silly trying to further the arguement on a purely scientific/Naturalistic level.
For instance, if I and several peopel were to uncover 1000 intricately carved urns which had symbols and wording on them in a consistent maner fro mvase to vase, two lines of forensic hypothesising could be taken- one natural including causation, the other intelligent causation.
I could argue that naturem given enough time, ‘could have’ formed these urns in a purely natural manner- making hte case for just one urn- I could hsow that tremendous winds worked the clay into hollowed out vessels, while at hte same time the clay was rolling around, it somehow managed to result in ‘primitive’ symbols markings, and that bird droppings hitting hte vessels, resulted in ‘primitive’ look-alike symbols on the outside of the urn. I could then argue that a cataclysmic heating event solified the clay, and the result was a ‘proto urn’. I could point to events in nature that ‘under hte right circumstances’ produce ‘similiar looking’ hollowed out vessels of clay, and clai mthat since lower levels of ‘information and ‘assembly’ exist, then it can’t be argued that hogher levels of informaiton and examples of IC in 1000 uncovered urns are infact IC.
However, since there is an abundance of ID and IC invovled in the 1000 urns, it would be silly to try to argue that nature did all this by some uncontrolled forces of nature, so we MUST then argue both the scientific evidence AND the implications, just as forensic science must argue for intelligent causation vs unintelligent causation when examining a crime scene or scene of investigation.
Of course we’re not talking static objects, but dynamic living systems which are subject to manipulation via mutaitons, however, once again, it all breaks down into the base points of informaiton, and whether this can arise naturally, and if not, then there is only one other alternative, intelligent causation- so again, it is not a case of ‘going beyond science’ to argue intelligent causation, but rather it is a mandatory arguement for intelligent causation when there is enough evidence to suggest this, and I beleive the evidence of informaiton, especially metainformation, is a very strong arguemtn for hte need for intelligent causation, and should NOT be excluded, and that doing so would infact be as unscientific as my argument that the 1000 clay urns must be naturally caused. Arguing from a purely naturalistic viewpoint in such matters renders the arguement, in the face of overwhelming evidnece to the contrary, unscientific. It makes such arguemtns pure apologetics.