“Excellent. Shame on me for not thinking of this. God IS: “I AM”. That we even exist, or can know it, is fully dependent on God existing first.”
Almost. What Blessed Thomas is saying is just what The Fathers said. God “is” or God “defines” existence. He is not saying that God “exists”, thus, “...because it is proper to God alone that His substance is none other than His existence.”
“”Almost. What Blessed Thomas is saying is just what The Fathers said. God “is” or God “defines” existence. He is not saying that God “exists”, thus, “...because it is proper to God alone that His substance is none other than His existence.”””
That in God Existence and Essence is the same*
IT has been shown above (Chap. XV, n. 4) that there is an Existence which of itself necessarily is; and that is God. If this existence, which necessarily is, is contained in some essence not identical with it, then either it is dissonant and at variance with that essence, as subsistent existence is at variance with the essence of whiteness; or it is consonant with and akin to that essence, as existence in something other than itself is consonant with whiteness. In the former case, the existence which of itself necessarily is will not attach to that essence, any more than subsistent existence will attach to whiteness. In the latter case, either such existence must depend on the essence, or both existence and essence depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the existence. The former two suppositions are against the idea of a being which of itself necessarily is; because, if it depends on another thing, it no longer is necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that that essence is accidental and adventitious to the thing which of itself necessarily is; because all that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it; and thus the supposed essence will not be the essence at all. God therefore has no essence that is not His existence.
2. Everything is by its own existence. Whatever then is not its own existence does not of itself necessarily exist. But God does of Himself necessarily exist: therefore God is His own existence.
4. ‘Existence’ denotes a certain actuality: for a thing is not said to ‘be’ for what it is potentially, but for what it is actually. But everything to which there attaches an actuality, existing as something different from it, stands to the same as potentiality to actuality. If then the divine essence is something else than its own existence, it follows that essence and existence in God stand to one another as potentiality and actuality. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing of potentiality (Chap. XVI), but that He is pure actuality. Therefore God’s essence is not anything else but His existence.*
5. Everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of several things is compound. But nothing in which essence is one thing, and existence another, can be except by the concurrence of several things, to wit, essence and existence. Therefore everything in which essence is one thing, and existence another, is compound. But God is not compound, as has been shown (Chap. XVIII). Therefore the very existence of God is His essence. This sublime truth was taught by the Lord to Moses (Exod. iii, 13, 14) If they say to me, What is his name? what shall I say to them? Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you: showing this to be His proper name, He who is. But every name is given to show the nature or essence of some thing. Hence it remains that the very existence or being of God is His essence or nature.
A few More..
That God is His own Essence*
IN everything that is not its own essence, quiddity, or nature, there must be some composition. For since in everything its own essence is contained, — if in anything there were contained nothing but its essence, the whole of that thing would be its essence, and so itself would be its own essence. If then anything is not its own essence, there must be something in that thing besides its essence, and so there must be in it composition. Hence also the essence in compound things is spoken of as a part, as humanity in man. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. God therefore is His own essence.
2. That alone is reckoned to be beyond the essence of a thing, which does not enter into its definition: for the definition declares what the thing essentially is. But the accidents of a thing are the only points about it which fall not within the definition: therefore the accidents are the only points about a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown (Chap. XXIII): therefore there is nothing in Him besides His essence.
3. The forms that are not predicable of subsistent things, whether in the universal or in the singular, are forms that do not of themselves subsist singly, individualised in themselves. It is not said that Socrates or man or animal is whiteness; because whiteness is not anything subsisting singly in itself, but is individualised by the substance in which it exists. Also the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualised according to the definite matter of this or that individual, although the generic or specific quiddity includes form and matter in general: hence it is not said that Socrates or man is humanity. But the Divine Essence is something existing singly by itself, and individualised in itself, as will be shown (Chap. XLII). The Divine Essence therefore is predicated of God in such a way that it can be said: ‘God is His own essence.’*
That in God there is no Composition
IN every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of things cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being in a manner tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus got together are in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, after having been potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: therefore there is not in Him any composition.*
3. Every compound is potentially soluble in respect of its being compound, although in some cases there may be some other fact that stands in the way of dissolution. But what is soluble is in potentiality not to be, which cannot be said of God, seeing that He is of Himself a necessary Being.
The phrase "exists first", viewed etymologically, has an internal contradiction.
Though English is a remarkable rich and supple language, sometimes we get tripped up by our poverty of words. The best example is "love" where the nice distinctions of storge, philia, eros, and agape would be handy.
But I am thinking here of the differences between "esse" and "stare" which endure into contemporary Spanish and Italian. Soy estupido - I am stupid, and that cannot be fixed. Estoy cansado, I am tired, right now, but a nap will take care of it. "Come stai?" we say to our Italian homies, "How do you stand"? French would depersonalize it with a verb of motion, "Comment ça va?"— How goes it? English goes an entirely different way and incorporates an action verb with, "How ya doin'?" or the interestingly redundant, "How do you do?"
But I digress - and what else is new?
Existo = ek+sisto and incorporates the "stand" verb and the preposition (hosepipe's favorite) "out from". The first whatchamcallit can't "stand out" because there is nothing from which to stand out, no background. It would have to be the second whatchamacallit OR background and foreground would have to, what, "arise" (let's say) simultaneously. That's the internal contradiction I asserted in my second paragraph.
This may seem a kind of philosophical techno-babble — heck it may BE a philosophical techno-babble! — but when we approach the subject (heads up: subject = cast under, interestingly different from hypostasis = stands under) of "being" and "existence" we have to proceed carefully, with the nicest tools we have in our armamentarium.
My point, and I do have one, is that "exist" suggests a background "out from" which an existent "stands". "Be" does not.
One could say, if my distinction is granted, that to say "God exists" could imply a kind of ontological Manicheanism, a dualism of God and "background", and so it fails the monotheism test.
... God “defines” existence."
God is kind of like "background" rather than something which stands out from the background. And the way to rescue that from dualism is to say the "foreground" is the existents, the creatures.
I understand at least part of the excellence of Calvinism (and I think, despite his grievous IMHO errors, Calvin has some excellences) to be his emphasis on the radical otherness of God. The flip I put on that, with my innerleckshual background and sloppy Platonism, is to say that God is radically "same" and creatures are "other", but the point is the "difference".
Since we have called "being" and "existing" words before the dock, we have no words with which to examine them. but whatever it is that God does, we can count on His doing it so very differently from the way anything else does anything, that we must be careful if we want to attribute either being or existence to Him in the same way we attribute either to creatures.
Wow, this is good coffee!