Posted on 09/30/2003 12:19:22 PM PDT by sheltonmac
"Virginia," says Judge Story, "on the 29th of June, 1776 (five days before the Declaration of Independence), declared the government of the country as formerly exercised under the crown of Great Britain, totally dissolved, and proceeded to form a new constitution."2 Nay, she had already formed a new Constitution, in pursuance of her resolution of the 15th of the preceding month, and she adopted it on the 29th of June 1776. Yet Virginia has never been regarded as tainted with treason , or rebellion, against the people of America, because she thus proclaimed her own separate independence, and established her own constitution.[Note 2] Vol. 1, book ii, chap. i, p. 197
SOURCE: Albert Taylor Bledsoe, The War Between the States, p. 98
Come now. You're better than that. Of course, your modus operandi to to take things out of context and post half-truths.
Let's take the case of the Bouvier Law Dictionary definition of "videlicet." As I recall, you posted the first part of the definition, which supported you "point." On the other hand, I posted, from the same source, the whole definition, which used the exact verbiage I suggested. And furthermore, it really didn't matter which synonym you used, because my observation was completely correct.
And you had the gall to call me "intellectually dishonest." Sort of the pot calling the kettle black, wouldn't you say?
Considering herself to be the supplanter of British soverieignty, she declared as follows: "All power whatever therein, [i. e. in the state of New York] hath reverted to the people thereof; and this convention hath, by their suffrages and free choice, been appointed and authorized to institute and establish a government, * * calculated to secure the rights and liberties of the good people of this state. * *1st. This convention, therefore, in the name, and by the authority of the good people of this state, doth ordain, determine, and declare: that "no authority shall, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the people or members of this state, but such as shall be derived from, or granted by them."
"The people of this state, in their right of sovereignty, are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in, and to, all lands within the jurisidiction of this state; and all lands, the title of which shall fail from a defect of heirs, shall revert or escheat to the people." [Const'n N. Y., Art. I., Sec. 2]
FEDERAL SITES.
Massachusetts and New York grant to the united states (not to the nation or government, but to the said states,) sites for arsenals, forts, navy yards, light-houses, post-offices, etc., relying on their solemnly plighted faith, not only to guaranty and secure the states, in being and acting as republics, or absolutely self-governing peoples, but to use the said sites solely for the defense "and welfare" of said states. The sites of forts Warren, Lafayette, Delaware, Monroe, Moultrie, and others, are acquired and held by the united states from the respective states, in which they are situtated, on conditions such as the following, in the act ceding the use and jurisdiction of the site of the Brooklyn Navy-yard: "The unites states are to retain such use and jurisdiction so long as said tract shall be applied to the defence and safety of the city and port of New York, and no longer, ["defence and safety of the said state, and no longer," are the words in the Watervleit arsenal cession.] * * But the jurisdiction hereby ceded, and the exemption from taxation herein granted, shall continue in respect to said property and to each portion thereof, so long as the same shall remain the property of the united states , and be used for the purposes aforesaid, and no longer;" [see also statutes of Mass., June 17, 1800; June 20, 1816; April 23, 1847; April 21, 1848; May 4, 1853; Stat. Pa., April 18, 1795; Feb 1, 1796; Stat: Va., March 1, 1821; and Stat. S.C., December 19, 1805. There are over 50 of these acts in the statutes of Massachusetts, and over 150 in those of New York.
SOURCE: Bernard Janin Sage, The Republic of Republics, 1878, pp. 65-7.
You're like a broken record. Your posts on this thread are a house of cards. It's going to crumble under its own weight of mistruths, misquotes, and misrepresentations.
Let's take your "13 sovereign, independent states." The Treaty of Paris was finalized in 1783, about two years after the States had entered in to "perpetual union" under the Articles of Confederation. The "United States" had been recognized diplomatically by several European powers. Tell me, in 1784 who was Georgia's ambassador to Spain? Or New Jersey's Foreign Minister to France? Who was France's Minister to New jersey? Who commanded Maryland's national navy? Let me save you the time - there weren't any.
These "13 sovereign, independent states" had already formed a confederal government, under the Articles. They had willingly entered into an agreement in which they ceded a degree of sovereignty ("self-rule") to the national government (the Congress) for the purpose of mutual defence, the conduct of foreign affairs, the operation of a national postal service, etc. These states were not truly independent, they were interdependent. The Articles created more than a "league of friendship."
In the context of the American revolution and its aftermath, it is not surprising that the States would act to create a weak national government. But they did not propagate thirteen national governments after 1783.
The Annals of Congress, formally known as The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, cover the 1st Congress through the first session of the 18th Congress, from 1789 to 1824.
Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 25 March 1, 1788-December 31, 1789
Charles Thomson to the States
Sr. Circular to the other states(1) [May 3, 1788]
I have the honor to transmit to yr. Excy herewith enclosed to be laid before yr Legislature a state of the representation in Congress for the Months of March & April(2), & am With the greatest respect yr Exy's &c
LB (DNA: PCC, item 18B).
1 That is, other than Rhode Island and North Carolina. To his letters to the governors of those states, Thomson added the following opening sentences acknowledging letters that he had recently received from them. To Gov. John Collins of Rhode Island he wrote: "I have the honor to inform you that your Letter of the 5 of April with the papers enclosed has been rec'd & communicated to Congress." To Gov. Samuel Johnston of North Carolina: "I have rec'd. & communicated to Congress the Letters you did me the honor to write to me on the 19 of March last." And to both he lamented that he was "sorry to observe that during the course of the present federal year your State has hitherto been unrepresented." PCC, item 18B, fol. 145.
Page 87
May 3, 1788
Page 436
October 20, 1788
As it will be but a Short time before a New form of government will take place in the United States, and as the State which I have the Honour to represent have not thought proper to adopt that Form of Government, I Submit whether it is not Expedient for the State to take the Propos'd Constitution under Consideration and make their objections to the particular parts that are Incompatible to a good System of Government, and make Known To the States in the Union on what terms the State would Join them. This is a Subject on which I have Contemplated for a Considerable Time and it appears of Such Importance as to require United wisdom and mature Deliberation to enable the State to pursue Prudent Measures.(3)
The Federal Lands in the Western Country which on principles of g[o]od Policy must be appropriated as a fund for Sinking the National Debt, are Selling and preparing for Sale for that purpose. The Geographer is now in that Country Surveying, and measures have been taken to hold a Genel. Treaty with the Different Tribes of Indians Inhabiting those Lands in order (if Possible) to Establish a Perm[an]ent Peace and Extinguish their Claims to them.
I am under the Necessity of Informing That my Situation renders it Expedient for the State to make further Provision for my Support. Such Matters as are unfinish'd at the end of this Year, and others that concern the Union will be taken into Consideration by the Congress which are to assemble to [i.e. the] first Monday in Novr. Next. If it is the Desire of the Honle. assembly that I Should represent the State the next Year, I hope they will give Direction for one of my Colleagues to take his Seat.
With Sentements of Esteem I am Your Excellencys most obdt. and most Humble Servt, Peleg Arnold
RC (R--;Ar: Letters to Governors).
1 Actually 20th August, for which see JCC, 34:442; and Charles Thomson to the States, August 25.
2 See Charles Thomson to the Accounts Commissioners, September 13.
3 For discussion of Rhode Island's struggle over whether to join the new federal government that was about to be implemented, see Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, pp. 201--;18.
First Inaugural Address Monday, March 4, 1861
Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to form a more perfect Union." 14
The Articles of Association which Lincoln claims formed the Union. Apparently, Lincoln's Union was formed by "We, his majesty's most loyal subjects ... avowing our allegiance to his majesty...."
July 4, 1861
We, his majesty's most loyal subjects, the delegates of the several colonies of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, the three lower counties of Newcastle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South-Carolina, deputed to represent them in a continental Congress, held in the city of Philadelphia, on the 5th day of September, 1774, avowing our allegiance to his majesty, our affection and regard for our fellow-subjects in Great-Britain and elsewhere, affected with the deepest anxiety, and most alarming apprehensions, at those grievances and distresses, with which his Majesty's American subjects are oppressed; and having taken under our most serious deliberation, the state of the whole continent, find, that the present unhappy situation of our affairs is occasioned by a ruinous system of colony administration, adopted by the British ministry about the year 1763, evidently calculated for enslaving these colonies, and, with them, the British Empire. In prosecution of which system, various acts of parliament have been passed, for raising a revenue in America, for depriving the American subjects, in many instances, of the constitutional trial by jury, exposing their lives to danger, by directing a new and illegal trial beyond the seas, for crimes alleged to have been committed in America: And in prosecution of the same system, several late, cruel, and oppressive acts have been passed, respecting the town of Boston and the Massachusetts-Bay, and also an act for extending the province of Quebec, so as to border on the western frontiers of these colonies, establishing an arbitrary government therein, and discouraging the settlement of British subjects in that wide extended country; thus, by the influence of civil principles and ancient prejudices, to dispose the inhabitants to act with hostility against the free Protestant colonies, whenever a wicked ministry shall chuse so to direct them.
To obtain redress of these grievances, which threaten destruction to the lives liberty, and property of his majesty's subjects, in North-America, we are of opinion, that a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable measure: And, therefore, we do, for ourselves, and the inhabitants of the several colonies, whom we represent, firmly agree and associate, under the sacred ties of virtue, honour and love of our country, as follows:
1. That from and after the first day of December next, we will not import, into British America, from Great-Britain or Ireland, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatsoever, or from any other place, any such goods, wares, or merchandise, as shall have been exported from Great-Britain or Ireland; nor will we, after that day, import any East-India tea from any part of the world; nor any molasses, syrups, paneles, coffee, or pimento, from the British plantations or from Dominica; nor wines from Madeira, or the Western Islands; nor foreign indigo.
2. We will neither import nor purchase, any slave imported after the first day of December next; after which time, we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it.
3. As a non-consumption agreement, strictly adhered to, will be an effectual security for the observation of the non-importation, we, as above, solemnly agree and associate, that from this day, we will not purchase or use any tea, imported on account of the East-India company, or any on which a duty bath been or shall be paid; and from and after the first day of March next, we will not purchase or use any East-India tea whatever; nor will we, nor shall any person for or under us, purchase or use any of those goods, wares, or merchandise, we have agreed not to import, which we shall know, or have cause to suspect, were imported after the first day of December, except such as come under the rules and directions of the tenth article hereafter mentioned.
4. The earnest desire we have not to injure our fellow-subjects in Great-Britain, Ireland, or the West-Indies, induces us to suspend a non-exportation, until the tenth day of September, 1775; at which time, if the said acts and parts of acts of the British parliament herein after mentioned, ate not repealed, we will not directly or indirectly, export any merchandise or commodity whatsoever to Great-Britain, Ireland, or the West-Indies, except rice to Europe.
5. Such as are merchants, and use the British and Irish trade, will give orders, as soon as possible, to their factors, agents and correspondents, in Great-Britain and Ireland, not to ship any goods to them, on any pretence whatsoever, as they cannot be received in America; and if any merchant, residing in Great-Britain or Ireland, shall directly or indirectly ship any goods, wares or merchandize, for America, in order to break the said non-importation agreement, or in any manner contravene the same, on such unworthy conduct being well attested, it ought to be made public; and, on the same being so done, we will not, from thenceforth, have any commercial connexion with such merchant.
6. That such as are owners of vessels will give positive orders to their captains, or masters, not to receive on board their vessels any goods prohibited by the said non-importation agreement, on pain of immediate dismission from their service.
7. We will use our utmost endeavours to improve the breed of sheep, and increase their number to the greatest extent; and to that end, we will kill them as seldom as may be, especially those of the most profitable kind; nor will we export any to the West-Indies or elsewhere; and those of us, who are or may become overstocked with, or can conveniently spare any sheep, will dispose of them to our neighbours, especially to the poorer sort, on moderate terms.
8. We will, in our several stations, encourage frugality, economy, and industry, and promote agriculture, arts and the manufactures of this country, especially that of wool; and will discountenance and discourage every species of extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse-racing, and all kinds of games, cock fighting, exhibitions of shews, plays, and other expensive diversions and entertainments; and on the death of any relation or friend, none of us, or any of our families will go into any further mourning-dress, than a black crepe or ribbon on the arm or hat, for gentlemen, and a black ribbon and necklace for ladies, and we will discontinue the giving of gloves and scarves at funerals.
9. Such as are venders of goods or merchandize will not take advantage of the scarcity of goods, that may be occasioned by this association, but will sell the same at the rates we have been respectively accustomed to do, for twelve months last past. -And if any vender of goods or merchandise shall sell such goods on higher terms, or shall, in any manner, or by any device whatsoever, violate or depart from this agreement, no person ought, nor will any of us deal with any such person, or his or her factor or agent, at any time thereafter, for any commodity whatever.
10. In case any merchant, trader, or other person, shall import any goods or merchandize, after the first day of December, and before the first day of February next, the same ought forthwith, at the election of the owner, to be either re-shipped or delivered up to the committee of the country or town, wherein they shall be imported, to be stored at the risque of the importer, until the non-importation agreement shall cease, or be sold under the direction of the committee aforesaid; and in the last-mentioned case, the owner or owners of such goods shall be reimbursed out of the sales, the first cost and charges, the profit, if any, to be applied towards relieving and employing such poor inhabitants of the town of Boston, as are immediate sufferers by the Boston port-bill; and a particular account of all goods so returned, stored, or sold, to be inserted in the public papers; and if any goods or merchandizes shall be imported after the said first day of February, the same ought forthwith to be sent back again, without breaking any of the packages thereof.
11. That a committee be chosen in every county, city, and town, by those who are qualified to vote for representatives in the legislature, whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this association; and when it shall be made to appear, to the satisfaction of a majority of any such committee, that any person within the limits of their appointment has violated this association, that such majority do forthwith cause the truth of the case to be published in the gazette; to the end, that all such foes to the rights of British-America may be publicly known, and universally contemned as the enemies of American liberty; and thenceforth we respectively will break off all dealings with him or her.
12. That the committee of correspondence, in the respective colonies, do frequently inspect the entries of their customhouses, and inform each other, from time to time, of the true state thereof, and of every other material circumstance that may occur relative to this association.
13. That all manufactures of this country be sold at reasonable prices, so- that no undue advantage be taken of a future scarcity of goods.
14. And we do further agree and resolve that we will have no trade, commerce, dealings or intercourse whatsoever, with any colony or province, in North-America, which shall not accede to, or which shall hereafter violate this association, but will hold them as unworthy of the rights of freemen, and as inimical to the liberties of their country.
And we do solemnly bind ourselves and our constituents, under the ties aforesaid, to adhere to this association, until such parts of the several acts of parliament passed since the close of the last war, as impose or continue duties on tea, wine, molasses, syrups paneles, coffee, sugar, pimento, indigo, foreign paper, glass, and painters' colours, imported into America, and extend the powers of the admiralty courts beyond their ancient limits, deprive the American subject of trial by jury, authorize the judge's certificate to indemnify the prosecutor from damages, that he might otherwise be liable to from a trial by his peers, require oppressive security from a claimant of ships or goods seized, before he shall be allowed to defend his property, are repealed.-And until that part of the act of the 12 G. 3. ch. 24, entitled "An act for the better securing his majesty's dock-yards magazines, ships, ammunition, and stores," by which any persons charged with committing any of the offenses therein described, in America, may be tried in any shire or county within the realm, is repealed-and until the four acts, passed the last session of parliament, viz. that for stopping the port and blocking up the harbour of Boston-that for altering the charter and government of the Massachusetts-Bay-and that which is entitled "An act for the better administration of justice, &c."-and that "for extending the limits of Quebec, &c." are repealed. And we recommend it to the provincial conventions, and to the committees in the respective colonies, to establish such farther regulations as they may think proper, for carrying into execution this association.
The foregoing association being determined upon by the Congress, was ordered to be subscribed by the several members thereof; and thereupon, we have hereunto set our respective names accordingly.
IN CONGRESS, PHILADELPHIA, October 20, 1774.
PEYTON RANDOLPH, President.
Source:
Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1779
Edited from the original records in the Library of Congress
by Worthington Chauncey Ford; Chief, Division of Manuscripts.
Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1905.
You may divert, spew, and blather all you want. 11 DOES NOT EQUAL 13.
To the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the eleven United States of America in Congress assembled:
We are induced to hope that we shall not be altogether considered as foreigners having no particular affinity or connection with the United States; but that trade and commerce, upon which the properity of this State much depends, will be preservved as free and open between this State and the United States, as our different situations at present can possibly admit....
We feel ourselves attached by the strongest ties of friendship, kindred, and interest, to our sister States; and we can not, without the greatest reluctance, look to any other quarter for those advantages of commercial intercourse which we conceive to be more natural and reciprocal between them and us.
I am, at the request and in behalf of the General Assembly, your most obedient, humble servant.
(Signed) John Collins, Governor.
His Excellency, the President of the United States.
[American State Papers, Vol I, Miscellaneous.]
SOURCE: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Jefferson Davis, Vol I, pp. 112-3.
The Supreme Court on the status of the states before the Constitution: As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution, which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true.
SOURCE: U.S. Supreme Court, GIBBONS v. OGDEN , 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
Opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall
[CapnR to Gianni #1426]Salmon Chase's majority opinion in the Texas vs White case carries the weight of law. The typical "neo-confederate" argument that secession is a right implied by the 10th Amendment, is trumped by Chase's ruling.
Clearly, by CapnR standards, Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden carries the weight of law, and your unsupported argument to the contrary is trumped by Marshall's ruling.
[CapnR to Gianni #1426]Chief Justice Chase did not alter one word of the Constitution. He ruled that the original intent of the framers was that the Union was paramount and that unilateral secession was, is, and will remain illegal.
Clearly, by CapnR standards, Chief Justice Marshall's ruling decided what was and what is and will remain the final word.
But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear, underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in [22 U.S. 1, 188] the constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support or some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects [22 U.S. 1, 189] for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred.
The words are, 'Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial [22 U.S. 1, 190] intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.
If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.
If the opinion that 'commerce,' as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends navigation [22 U.S. 1, 191] also, requires any additional confirmation, that additional confirmation is, we think, furnished by the words of the instrument itself.
It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted power, that which was not granted- that which the words of the grant could not comprehend. If, then, there are in the constitution plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof that those who made these exceptions, and prescribed these inhibitions, understood the power to which they applied as being granted.
The 9th section of the 1st article declares, that 'no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another.' This clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which are passed for the purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to commercial regulations; and the most obvious preference which can be given to one port over another, in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent part of the sentence is still more exphicit. It is, 'nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another.' These words have a direct reference to navigation.
The universally acknowledged power of the government to impose embargoes, must also be considered as showing, that all America is united [22 U.S. 1, 192] in that construction which comprehends navigation in the word commerce. Gentlemen have said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war-making power, and that an embargo is an instrument of war, not a regulation of trade.
That it may be, and often is, used as an instrument of war, cannot be denied. An embargo may be imposed for the purpose of facilitating the equipment or manning of a fleet, or for the purpose of concealing the progress of an expedition preparing to sail from a particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a military instrument, and partakes of the nature of war. But all embargoes are not of this description. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with a single view to commerce. In such case, an embargo is no more a war measure, than a merchantman is a ship of war, because both are vessels which navigate the ocean with sails and seamen.
When Congress imposed that embargo which, for a time, engaged the attention of every man in the United States, the avowed object of the law was, the protection of commerce, and the avoiding of war. By its friends and its enemies it was treated as a commercial, not as a war measure. The persevering earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a part of our country which supposed its interests to be vitally affected by the act, cannot be forgotten. A want of acuteness in discovering objections to a measure to which they felt the most deep rooted hostility, will not be imputed to those who were arrayed in opposition [22 U.S. 1, 193] to this. Yet they never suspected that navigation was no branch of trade, and was, therefore, not comprehended in the power to regulate commerce. They did, indeed, contest the constitutionality of the act, but, on a principle which admits the construction for which the appellant contends. They denied that the particular law in question was made in pursuance of the constitution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual embargo was the annihilation, and not the regulation of commerce. In terms, they admitted the applicability of the words used in the constitution to vessels; and that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent of excitement, calculated to draw forth every principle on which legitimate resistance could be sustained. No example could more strongly illustrate the universal understanding of the American people on this subject.
The word used in the constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce.'
To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce 'with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be [22 U.S. 1, 194] carried on between this country and any other, to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said, that commerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term.
If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it.
The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce 'among the several States.' The word 'among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not have been made, had the intention [22 U.S. 1, 195] been to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.
But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a State.
This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when [22 U.S. 1, 196] applied to commerce 'among the several States.' They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other States lie between them. What is commerce 'among' them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States, commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among the States must, of necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. The sense of the nation on this subject, is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting goods, by land, between Baltimore and Providence, between New- York and Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore.
We are now arrived at the inquiry-What is this power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the [22 U.S. 1, 197] questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often they solely, in all representative governments.
The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.
But it has been urged with great earnestness, that, although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, be co-extensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the constitution, yet the States may severally [22 U.S. 1, 198] exercise the same power, within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this argument, it is said, that they possessed it as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty, before the formation of the constitution, and still retain it, except so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the tenth amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that this is not of that description.
SOURCE: U.S. Supreme Court, GIBBONS v. OGDEN , 22 U.S. 1 (1824)
"Clearly, by CapnR standards, Chief Justice Marshall's ruling decided what was and what is and will remain the final word."
You really need to get a grip. Secession will remain illegal in the United States until, (1) Congress passes a law creating a framework for unilateral secession, (2) there is a amendment to the Constitution allowing for unilateral secession, or (3) some State tries to secede again, takes their cause to court, and the USSC eventually over-rules the principles in Texas v White.
Your quotation from Gibbons v Ogden (1824) is fine and good, but as usual, you have taken it out of context and missed the main point of the case altogether. Marshall's passing historical reference to the nature of governance under the Articles was not the point of the case.
"The case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), decided 35 years after the ratification of the Constitution, was a key turning point for the expansion of federal power to address national problems.
"Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government was virtually powerless to enact policies to rationalize the actions of states. One problem that emerged during this time was the way in which state policies tended to restrict commerce within and beyond their borders, making market exchanges inefficient and costly. In the Constitution, the framers included the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 to address this issue. The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . ." The hope was that giving Congress such a power would help to unify commerce policies thereby making market exchanges more efficient and less costly.
"Though the clause clearly gave Congress some power over commerce, it was unclear just how much. It was also unclear what constituted commerce. The Gibbons case clarified some of these issues under a decision issued by Chief Justice John Marshall, who had nationalist intentions.
"In 1808, Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston acquired a monopoly from the New York state legislature to operate steamboats on the state's waters. This monopoly extended to interstate waterways, those areas of water that stretch between states. Aaron Ogden held a Fulton-Livingston license to operate steamboats under this monopoly. However, Thomas Gibbons held a federal coasting license, granted under a 1793 Act of Congress, and operated steamboats between New Jersey and New York that competed with Ogden's."
In the unanimous decision, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
". . . Rivers and bays, in many cases, form the divisions between States; and thence it was obvious, that if the States should make regulations for the navigation of these waters, and such regulations should be repugnant and hostile, embarrassment would necessarily happen to the general intercourse of the community. Such events had actually occurred, and had created the existing state of things.
"By the law of New-York, no one can navigate the bay of New-York, the North River, the Sound, the lakes, or any of the waters of that State, by steam vessels, without a license from the grantees of New-York, under penalty of forfeiture of the vessel.
"By the law of the neighbouring State of Connecticut, no one can enter her waters with a steam vessel having such license.
"By the law of New-Jersey, if any citizen of that State shall be restrained, under the New-York law, from using steam boats between the ancient shores of New-Jersey and New-York, he shall be entitled to an action for damages, in New-Jersey, with treble costs against the party who thus restrains or impedes him under the law of New-York!
"It would hardly be contended, that all these acts were consistent with the laws and constitution of the United States. If there were no power in the general government, to control this extreme belligerent legislation of the States, the powers of the government were essentially deficient. . . .
"Few things were better known, than the immediate causes which led to the adoption of the present constitution . . . that the prevailing motive was to regulate commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law.
". . . The entire purpose for which the delegates assembled at Annapolis, was to devise means for the uniform regulation of trade. They found no means, but in a general government.
"We do not find, in the history of the formation and adoption of the constitution, that any man speaks of a general concurrent power, in the regulation of foreign and domestic trade, as still residing in the States. The very object intended, more than any other, was to take away such power. If it had not so provided, the constitution would not have been worth accepting.
". . . What is it that is to be regulated? Not the commerce of the several States, respectively, but the commerce of the United States. Henceforth, the commerce of the States was to be an unit; and the system by which it was to exist and be governed, must necessarily be complete, entire, and uniform. Its character was to be described in the flag which waved over it, E PLURIBUS UNUM.
"The subject to be regulated is commerce; . . . it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. . . . Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. . . . The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation. . . .
"The subject to which the power is . . . applied, is to commerce "among the several States." The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word among is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose. . . . The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself."
From Gibbons v Ogden, LandmarkCases.org
The case was about the supremecy of federal and Constitutional law over State laws regards issues of interstate commerce. It wasn't about forms of government. It did not negate any laws passed by the Congresses of the Confederation (1781-1789). In fact, several of these "pre-Constitutional" laws are still on the books. Marshall's characterization of the Confederation as a "league" was a common point of view - you might call it the conventional wisdom of the day. However, Marshall's historical characterization was not germane to the main issue and is not, in itself, precendent-setting. It's background.
By analogy, do you consider each of the Major League Baseball teams to be "completely independent" businesses? Of course not. They are connected by contracts, play by the same set of rules, share player drafts, are governed by a common commissioner, share televison revenues, etc. Certainly there is a degree of autonomy in running their individual programs, but the supreme entity is MLB, not the individual teams.
That much is obvious, but I'm still a bit curious as to what properties a "neo-confederate" would have. Sounds to me like the term is applicable to those who wish to form a modern-day confederacy and break with the present day union. Perhaps that would be more 'neo-secessionist' which I've also seen thrown around quite a bit on these threads.
Following that logic, then a 'neo-confederate' has some association of states in mind (apart from our current one)?
Another Nolu Chan misrepresentation and mischaracterization. I never said, "... it cannot be challenged and will remain the law for all time to come." I speculated that Texas v White, on the issue of secession, will never be revisited and over-turned.
But hey, if you are an aggrieved citizen you have the right to petition Congress. You have the right to bring suit. I'd like to see you put your money, time, and effort where your mouth is and rectify this alleged wrong! (This ought to be good - progress reports, please.)
The heart of the argument, in a single paragraph:
(1) Congress cannot pass a law which alters the Constitution - such can only happen by amendment.
(2) The constitution is silent on unilateral secession - an amendment allowing for something on which the Constitution is silent would be redundant with BOR #10.
(3) The supreme court cannot modify the terms of the Constitution any more than the legislature could in (1).
there has been LITTLE freedom since the lincoln regime and FAR less since the fdr regime.
free dixie,sw
Our "confederate" on these threads, 4ConservativeJustices, is very wise in the ways of deciphering the anti-constitutionalists. So, 4CJ, what constitutes a neo-confederate? Is it having grown up drooling over Daisy Duke and fantasizing about having an orange Dodge Charger? Is it specified by the type of barbeque sauce one prefers? Is it the firm belief that sour mash is appropriate for any occasion? Or is it a firm belief in the Constitution of the United States as written by our Founders? What say you, oh wise one who is surely the reincarnation of William Byrd II?
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