Posted on 09/12/2003 8:56:23 AM PDT by tdadams
YOU FOLKS HAD BETTER BE PAYING ATTENTION TO THIS
I'm going to revisit the eminent domain issue again for a few minutes here so that I can share with you an incredible display of arrogance from an elected official.
As you know, I've been talking about a situation in Alabaster, Alabama where the city council of this community of 24,000 is trying to seize the property of about ten homeowners so that a shopping center featuring a Wal-Mart can be built there. The politicians say that it is perfectly OK to condemn and seize this property for a privately owned shopping center because, after all, the shopping center will generate more tax money than these private homes do.
We are seeing the evolution of a new standard for government seizure of private property. Its very simple. If some politician decides that your property would generate more tax revenue for government if it was owned by someone else, the politician can seize that property from you and turn it over to the government-preferred owner.
For our example of obscene government arrogance we turn our attention to Duncanville, Texas. Duncanville calls itself "A warm community of friends," and "A wonderful place to raise a family." Well, Duncanville may be a wonderful place to raise your family, just so long as some politician doesn't decide that the city could get more tax revenue if your home were to become a Costco.
Deborah Hodge has been living in her Duncanville home for 13 years. The Hodge property has a four bedroom house, a bar, pasture and swimming pool. It has been a family gathering place for over a decade. Just like the city motto says, "A wonderful place to raise your family."
A few months ago the city told Deborah to sell her property. They didn't ask her if she wanted to sell. They told her that she would sell. She would either sell, or they would just take it. The city, you see, wants a Costco store to be built on her land. The Costco would, after all, generate a lot more tax revenue than her little house and barn. So ... Duncanville is using its right of eminent domain to seize the property.
Now ... listen to this. These are the words of Duncanville city manager Kent Cagle. This is what Kent Cagle thinks about private property rights in America. Cagle told the Dallas Morning News "They don't have the option to say no to us. We have made it clear we want that property. The only thing that will be settled in court is how much we have to pay for it."
There is no freedom without property rights. What is it going to take to get Americans upset about this latest craze in local government revenue raising. You just identify the properties that could produce more taxes, seize those properties, and turn them over to developers.
I do have roots. But what happens when you cannot win against an Eminent Domain enactment? Barracade your house? Shoot at the wrecking ball crew? Man, here's what I get for being realistic. I have had friends who had to move for highway widenings, train tracks, malls, airports, and highways. It sucks. But getting 200% of the value of your home makes it a little less painful.
Look I agree it sucks big time. But millions of people have had to be relocated or displaced over the last two centuries for railroads, highways, pipelines and commerical developments.
That should end the city managers interest in Costco.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain proceedings are set against a constitutional framework that imposes certain limits on the procedures. The most important constitutional limitation is derived from the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the state and its instrumentalities through the fourteenth amendment,1 which prohibits deprivations of property without due process of law.2 In 1897, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state could exercise its power of eminent domain only for a public use, and the owner of property "taken" had to be compensated for his loss.3
Traditionally, municipal agencies have followed a general pattern to acquire property.4 Initially, a public project is administratively proposed or legislatively established. The appropriate property is physically located and the financial requirements are ascertained. Funding from federal and other sources is then sought. After several years, portions of the necessary funding may be received and the actual acquisition of the property begins.5 In the event the municipal agency is unable to gain title through a negotiated purchase, a lawsuit may be initiated to acquire the property through the power of eminent domain.6 A judicial hearing is held to determine the necessity of and the compensation for taking by condemnation.7 Depending on the appropriate court's docket, the trial may not be concluded for several years. This time-consuming process, although once acceptable, has gradually become an inadequate means to meet the requirements of many contemporary public projects.8
Municipal agencies have countered the inadequacies of the traditional method by employing an alternative "quick-take" statute which permits the acquiring agency to take possession of the private property prior to a final determination of compensation for the property.9 This statutorily enforced transfer of not only title but possession of the property prior to a final adjudication of the respective rights arguably constitutes a deprivation of private property without due process of law.10 This article is intended to review the validity of such statutes under the due process clause and to suggest certain alternatives which reflect a more appropriate reconciliation of governmental needs and constitutional requirements.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The 1850 and 1908 Michigan Constitutions provided for a board of commissioners to be the triers of both necessity and just compensation11 as well as fact and law.12 Inasmuch as the commission determined the necessity and just compensation issues simultaneously, possession and title to the property passed upon payment of just compensation.13 Under the 1963 Constitution,14 and General Court Rule 1963, 516.5,15 a condemnation case is tried in the same manner as any other civil action.16
Michigan municipal urban renewal agencies have employed the Urban Renewal Act (Act)17 in condemning residential property under the traditional method.18 The Act requires the jury to decide both necessity for the project and the compensation issue.19 An agency has no right to possession absent a finding of necessity. Since necessity and compensation are determined at the same time, and the agency has no right to possession absent a finding of necessity, a property owner need not relinquish possession until final resolution of the compensation issue.20
In contrast, under the "quick-take" provisions of Act 29521 and Act 87,22 the condemnor is authorized to take possession of the property prior to a final determination of compensation. This statutory scheme is authorized by a 1963 constitutional provision enabling the condemning authority to take property after "securing" the amount of just compensation.23
Historically, governmental power to obtain possession of property prior to a final adjudication of compensation has prompted relatively little judicial concern, ostensibly because immediate possession was rarely required by governmental agencies.24 However, the modern requirements of our industrialized society have prompted a number of proposals for massive urban renewal. The success of such large-scale projects often hinges upon the availability of expedited condemnation procedures that permit the condemning authority to take immediate possession of condemned property.25 These concerns presumably led to the enactment of Public Act 87 of 1980.
III. POSSESSION PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC ACT 87 OF 1980
Under the Michigan "quick-take" acts,26 the condemnor may enter upon property to make an appraisal.27 The agency must then "submit" to the owner "a good faith offer" to acquire the property for "an amount which it believes to be just compensation for the property."28 Implicit in the good faith offer procedure is an attempt by the agency to "negotiate" with the owner.29 If "negotiation" fails, a complaint may be filed. Upon filing the complaint, the condemnor must deposit the amount it estimates to be just compensation for the property interest with a bank, trust company, escrow agent, or a state, municipal or county treasurer.30 The condemnee then may challenge the necessity of the project by filing a motion asking that necessity be reviewed.31 The court is bound by the public agency's determination of public necessity absent "a showing of fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion.32 If the condemnee fails to challenge the necessity of the project within the prescribed time, the right to have the decision reviewed is waived.33 After the conclusion of the necessity review, ". . . the court shall determine the method for surrender of the property."34 If the trial court's determination of necessity is appealed, the court may still require surrender prior to the appellate decision upon a showing of "reasonable need" by the agency.35
If interim possession is granted, the court may require the agency to file an indemnity bond "in an amount determined by the court as necessary to adequately secure just compensation to the owner . . ."36 The condemnee may recover damages sustained as the result of an immediate possession only if necessity is successfully challenged after possession is granted.37
Administrative agencies have construed Act 87 to mean that the condemnee is a month-to-month tenant who may be evicted upon the same notice that would be required in a landlord-tenant relationship. When using federal funds, the condemnor is required to give a ninety-day notice to vacate.38
IV. CONFLICT OF POSSESSION PROVISION WITH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although Michigan's "quick-take" statute requires the condemning authority to place in escrow the amount it estimates to be just compensation for the condemned property, the authority may obtain possession of the property without a prior judicial assessment of the adequacy of this amount. In the following section we will examine three lines of authority bearing on the constitutionality of Michigan's "quick-take" statute.
A. Historical Development of Procedural Due Process In Eminent Domain Proceedings
The fifth amendment provides that private property shall not be "taken for public use, without just compensation."39 In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co.,40 the condemnee Indian tribe argued that the just compensation clause required the government to pay compensation before taking possession of condemned property. The Supreme Court rejected this contention: "[The fifth amendment] does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is disturbed.41 The Court then held that the "adequate provision" requirement had been satisfied in that case by a procedure providing for a deposit in court by the condemning authority of "double the amount awarded by three disinterested referees" prior to taking possession.42
The Cherokee Nation holding was modified to some extent five years later in Sweet v. Rechel.43 In Sweet, the Supreme Court held that the "adequate provision" requirement was satisfied where the statute under which property was condemned by a municipal corporation
... or a general statute, recognizes the absolute right of the owner, upon his property being taken, to just or reasonable compensation therefor, and makes provision, in the event of the disagreement of the parties, for the ascertainment, by suit, without unreasonable delay or risk to the owner, of the compensation to which under the constitution he is entitled, and to a judgment in his favor, enforceable against such corporation in some effective mode, so that the owner can certainly obtain the amount of such compensation.44
The Court went on to hold that the provision for compensation in Sweet was "certain and adequate," since the condemnee "became from the moment the property was taken absolutely entitled to reasonable compensation, the amount to be ascertained without undue delay, in the mode prescribed, and its payment to be assured, if necessary, by decree against the city, which could effectively be enforced.45 The Sweet Court appeared to abandon any requirement of a security deposit; rather, "effective enforcement" of a subsequent decree was sufficient.46
A number of subsequent cases, although often employing somewhat different language, appear nevertheless to adhere to the "adequate provision" standard. The first of these cases, Fort St. Union Depot Co.47 merely reaffirmed this approach.. In Williams v. Parker,48 the Court placed some emphasis on the fact that the defendant condemning authority (the City of Boston) was unquestionably a "solvent debtor" in holding that "adequate provision had been made.49 The "adequate provision" standard was restated in Crozier v. Fried, Drupp Akteingesellschaft,50 but this time the Court formulated a two-part test. First, the condemning authority must provide adequate means for a reasonably just and prompt determination and payment of the compensation. Secondly, there must be "an assumption on the part of government of the duty to make prompt payment of the ascertained compensation--that is, by the pledge, either expressly or by necessary implication, of the public good faith to that end.51 In Bragg v. Weaver52 the Court held that due process required "adequate provision . . . for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay."53 Four years later, in Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence,54 the Court stated that "the requirement of just compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge."55
The final case in this line of authority was Bailey v. Anderson56 in which the Supreme Court announced,
[I]t has long been settled that due process does not require the condemnation of land to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning authority, provided only that the owner have opportunity, in the course of the condemnation proceedings, to be heard and to offer evidence as to the value of the land taken.57
It is unclear whether the Court in Bailey was formulating a new, broader due process standard, or merely restating prior holdings. The Bailey test seems to require only that the condemnee be provided an opportunity to be, heard "in the course of the condemnation proceedings."58 However, since the Court cited Bragg and Joslin in support of its position, it is quite possible that the Court still intended to require either an adequate provision for definite compensation and payment without unreasonable delay;59 or "reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment," and "adequate provision for enforcing the pledge."60 For more than 25 years, the Bailey standard remained undisturbed. Recent developments, however, have thrown into doubt the vitality of Bailey and its predecessors.
B. Modern Trends in Procedural Due Process
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a person is generally entitled to an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," in connection with any deprivation of property by the state.61 In certain situations, the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause requires a hearing prior to the deprivation;62 in other areas, the Court has held that a subsequent hearing is sufficient.63
In Fuentes v. Shevin,64 the Court held that the due process clause ordinarily requires a hearing prior to any deprivation of property by the state.65 Fuentes involved a challenge to the validity of two state replevin procedures under which a seller could obtain possession of property sold under a conditional sales contract after seizure from the buyer, without affording the buyer an opportunity to be beard prior to the seizure.66 The Court defined the issue as "whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize the property in the possession of a person upon the application of another."67 The Court's answer was an emphatic yes: "If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose.... it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented."68
The Fuentes holding was undercut two years later. by Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,69 in which the Court upheld a Louisiana sequestration procedure remarkably similar to the replevin procedures struck down in Fuentes.70 Indeed, at least four members of the Court suggested that Fuentes had been sub silentio overruled.71
Less than a year after the Mitchell decision, the Supreme Court, in North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem,72 made it clear that Fuentes remained a viable precedent.73 The Court held that a Georgia prejudgment garnishment procedure failed to measure up to the due process standards set forth in Fuentes.74 The Court distinguished Mitchell, stating that "[t]he Georgia garnishment statute [had] none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana statute" upheld in Mitchell75 The Court relied on four factors to support its finding of unconstitutionality. First, the writ of garnishment was issued on the affidavit of the creditor's attorney. Personal knowledge of the facts was not required.76 Second, the affidavit contained only conclusory allegations.77 Third, the writ was issued without participation by a judge.78 Fourth, a provision providing an early hearing where the creditor is required to demonstrate probable cause for the garnishment was not available.79
Although it is uncertain whether the Court would treat the presence or absence of any single saving characteristic as dispositive, it appears likely that the "early hearing" and "participation by a judicial officer" factors are the most significant.80 In explaining the vulnerability of the Georgia statute under Fuentes, the Court did not refer to the "lack of personal knowledge" or "conclusory allegations" factors: "Here, a bank account ... was impounded ... without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a judicial officer."81
Under the assumption that judicial participation and the opportunity for an early hearing are the "core" factors relied upon in North Georgia Finishing, a further question remains as to whether the presence or absence of either of these factors is conclusive in determining the validity of a particular procedure under the due process clause. In interpreting North Georgia Finishing, most courts have assumed that the absence of either factor compels a finding of unconstitutionality.82 Although there are suggestions in the North Georgia Finishing concurring and dissenting opinions that judicial supervision is not an absolute requirement,83 the case law has not favored this position.84
Two additional due process requirements have been recognized by the courts in applying Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing: a requirement that a creditor seeking an ex parte writ of attachment post a bond to indemnify the debtor against damages resulting from a wrongful taking and a requirement that the debtor be permitted to dissolve the writ by posting a bond.85 These factors were not at issue in North Georgia Finishing since the procedure struck down by the Court provided these protections. However, the Mitchell Court appeared to rely to some extent on the bond requirement86 in holding that the Louisiana sequestration procedure "effected a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests" of debtor and creditor.87
In summary, Fuentes, Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing made it clear that a person was entitled to a hearing prior to or shortly after any state-sponsored deprivation of property. Since Sweet and its progeny seemed to contradict this more recent line of authority, courts were soon forced to resolve the conflict.
C. Effect of Fuentes/Mitchell/North Georgia Finishing on Due Process In Eminent Domain Proceedings
The due process requirements developed in Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing resulted in the invalidation of many procedures held valid under prior case law. After the Fuentes decision, it was unclear whether "quick-take" condemnation proceedings, permitting government seizure of property without a prior hearing, would still pass constitutional muster.
Joiner v. City of Dallas88 made it clear that a prior hearing is not constitutionally required in eminent domain proceedings. In Joiner, the plaintiff landowners sought an injunction against condemnation proceedings on the ground, inter alia, that the Texas condemnation statute permitting acquisition of the property based on the right of and necessity for condemnation, or of the amount of compensation to be paid, constituted a denial of due process of law.89 Plaintiffs argued that such a condemnation scheme violated "modern" standards of due process developed in Mitchell and Fuentes.90 Although the judges found the argument "interesting," they felt that the issue was squarely controlled, by the Sweet/Bragg/Bailey91 line of authority.92
Despite the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Joiner decision, there are three reasons why the Court could hold that the due process clause requires, if not a pre-seizure hearing, a prompt post-seizure hearing on the "public purpose" and "just compensation" issues.
First, the Joiner affirmance came down six weeks before the North Georgia Finishing decision. Prior to the North Georgia Finishing decision, it had been widely assumed that Mitchell had overruled the Fuentes "pre-seizure hearing" requirement.93 Viewed in that context, a summary affirmance is not surprising, since the Joiner plaintiffs' due process claims would have seemed much less substantial prior to North Georgia Finishing.
Secondly, the Texas condemnation scheme upheld in Joiner did afford landowners an opportunity to obtain a hearing on the propriety of condemnation prior to losing possession by filing a collateral injunctive action in district court.94 In this proceeding, the district court could determine all matters in dispute between the parties including the compensation issue.95 Therefore, the Supreme Court's summary affirmance is consistent with the proposition that an opportunity to obtain a pre-seizure or prompt post-seizure hearing is constitutionally required in condemnation proceedings, since the Texas scheme actually provided such an opportunity.96
Finally, the condemnation scheme upheld in Joiner provided landowners with a hearing, before a panel of Special Commissioners, to present evidence on the compensation issue, prior to losing possession.97 Either party had the right to appeal the panel's award.98 During the, pendency of the appeal, the condemnor could take possession of the property upon payment. to the landowner or into the court registry of an amount equal to the panel's award.99 Therefore, the Joiner rationale, may not require constitutional approval of condemnation proceedings providing landowners with no hearing of any kind on the compensation issue prior to losing possession.
Less than a year after Joiner, the First Circuit faced very similar issues in Vazza v. Campbell.100 In Vazza, the plaintiff landowner attacked the validity of the Massachusetts eminent domain statutes under the "just compensation" and "due process" clauses101 The Massachusetts "quick take" statute permitted the state to take possession of condemned property prior to an adjudication of damages, and provided,for a pro tanto payment to the landowner of "a reasonable amount which [an appropriate board of officers] is willing to pay."102 Plaintiff argued that the Massachusetts procedure did not provide landowners with a meaningful opportunity to show that the pro tanto payment was not "reasonable," and that this amounted to a denial of due process.103 Citing the possibility of a long delay before final determination of damages, "the inadequacy of legal interest in an inflationary period, the possibility of lost special damages and ... hardship on dispossessed homeowners," plaintiff argued that the procedure "render[ed] illusory the objective of fair compensation.104
The Vazza court, relying primarily on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Joiner, rejected these arguments, stating that it found the Joiner opinion "comprehensive," "thoughtful," and, "persuasive."105 Citing Sweet and Bragg, the court indicated that it would "continue to measure eminent domain proceedings against ... [the standard of those cases] rather than against the procedural requirements of such cases as Fuentes.106
Similar to the decision in Joiner, the Vazza holding supports the proposition that the due process clause requires a prompt post-seizure hearing in eminent domain proceedings. First, in Vazza the plaintiff apparently claimed that due process entitled landowners to a pre-seizure hearing and not merely a prompt post-seizure hearing.107 Secondly, the Massachusetts scheme actually permitted a landowner to obtain an expedited hearing on damages, providing him with "as prompt a determination as the judicial process affords."108 In addition, the Vazza court considered it likely that extraordinary relief would be available "in a case where an egregiously low pro tanto offer is demonstrated to cause substantial and irreparable injury. . ."109
A federal district court's determination that the Sweet/Bragg/Bailey due process standards had been implicity overruled by Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing was reversed by the Third Circuit in Virgin Islands v. 19.623 Acres of Land.110 Although conceding that "it may be contended that there is considerable persuasiveness to the rationale utilized by the district court, the court felt that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Joiner required its rejection."111 The Virgin Islands court addressed only the question of whether landowners are entitled to a pre-seizure hearing on the necessity of a taking. Therefore, the Virgin Islands case is germane to present inquiry only as it provides support for the continued viability of Sweet, Bragg, and Bailey.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MICHIGAN "QUICK-TAKE" STATUTES
There are three different approaches that could be employed in attacking the constitutionality of the Michigan "quick-take" statutes. First, it can be argued that the statutes fail to measure up to the Sweet/Bragg/Bailey standards.112 Second, it can be argued that Sweet, Bragg, and Bailey have been modified or overruled by Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing,113 and that the Michigan statutes are invalid under the "modern" due process standards developed in those cases. Finally, one could argue that Sweet and its progeny should be overruled and that the Michigan statutes should be struck down for denial of due process under the Fuentes/Mitchell/North Georgia Finishing standards.
Turning to the first approach, the Bragg standard requires "adequate provision ... for certain payment ... without unreasonable delay."114 The Joslin standard requires a "reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment.115 Neither Bragg nor Joslin appear to have been overruled by Bailey v. Anderson, since the Bailey Court cited those cases in support of its holding.116 Therefore, it can be argued that crowded dockets prevent the present Michigan court system from providing "reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment," thus denying landowners due process of law. Under this rationale, Michigan would be required to provide "quick-take" condemnees with an expedited hearing on damages as does Massachusetts."117 In the event that such a provision did not substantially speed up the "ascertainment" process, e.g., if the courts were flooded with thousands of requests for expedited bearings due to a massive urban renewal project, Michigan would be required to provide "quick-take" condemnees with an immediate preliminary hearing for the purpose of reviewing the adequacy of the amount of "estimated compensation" deposited by the condemning authority.
Advancing to the second theory, the Joiner panel held that Sweet, Bragg, and Bailey had not been overruled by Fuentes and Mitchell by finding the Fuentes/Mitchell standards not applicable to the condemnation of property.118 The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Joiner may have reflected the Court's view that the Fuentes "pre-seizure hearing" requirement had been overruled by Mitchell,119 a view repudiated six weeks later in North Georgia Finishing. North Georgia Finishing established that even where a state is permitted,to seize property without a prior hearing, it must provide an "early hearing" at which it must demonstrate "at least probable cause."120
Under this rationale, shortly after a "quick-take" seizure, Michigan would have to provide a preliminary hearing at which it would be required to demonstrate "at least probable cause" that the amount deposited, as "estimated compensation" approximated the actual market value of the condemned property. In support of its conclusion that due process standards developed in "creditors' rights cases" are not applicable to the condemnation of property,121 the Joiner panel cited differences in the origins of the methods of appropriation,122 in the nature of the parties,123 and in the purpose of the appropriation.124
It may be conceded that these arguments have some force in determining whether landowners are entitled to a Fuentes/Mitchell "prompt post-seizure hearing" on the "necessity" and "public use" issues. However, the panel's distinctions are hardly relevant to our present inquiry: whether landowners must be provided with such a hearing on the "just compensation" issue.125 The first of the above two distinctions--origins and nature of power--involve the necessity for judicial supervision of relationships "frequently aris[ing] through unequal bargaining powers and creat[ing] thereby the potential for abuse of the judicial process. . . .126 With respect to the compensation issue, surely the bargaining positions of the state of Michigan and individual landowners are grossly unequal. A "quick-take" condemnee has virtually no power to prevent the seizure of his property, and if he receives a substantially inadequate compensation offer, it may be many years before he receives just compensation. Without an opportunity to contest the adequacy of the "estimated compensation" deposited by the state, landowners will often be unable to obtain sufficient financing to continue their businesses or to obtain replacement housing in a rising market. Moreover, unlike a debtor who can obtain damages for wrongful attachment, a Michigan "quick-take" condemnee has no statutory remedy for damages incurred as a result of a grossly inadequate deposit of "estimates compensation."127 Although the Michigan "quick-take" statute requires that the offer of "estimated compensation" be made in "good faith,"128 judicial reluctance to find that any offer--no matter how inadequate--was not made in good faith has effectively foreclosed the existence of a remedy. Under these circumstances it is clear that judicial supervision is necessary to prevent irreparable harm flowing from unequal bargaining power.
The third distinction set forth above--the nature of the parties requires the characterization of creditors as "interested parties" and the state as a "totally disinterested" party.129 This may be an accurate description with respect to the "public use" issue, since it may be argued that absent corruption, a state would not wish to condemn property except for public use. However, the state is unquestionably an interested party with respect to the compensation issue, since it must aggressively seek to minimize the burden on its taxpayers. Consequently, judicial supervision is necessary to prevent a state, whether acting in good faith or not, from employing the "quick-take" procedure in an inequitable manner by forcing landowners to accept inadequate compensation for their property.
The fourth distinction cited by the Joiner panel--purpose of appropriation--reflects a belief that private interests are entitled to less judicial protection than public interests.130 With respect to the "public use" issue, this is a circular argument, since the very issue to be decided is whether a particular appropriation is for the use of the general public or merely for the benefit of private interests. This argument also fails when addressed to the compensation issue, since the purpose of the just compensation clause is to prevent the imposition of undue private sacrifice for the benefit of the public. Thus, the Joiner panel's fourth argument sweeps too broadly; uncompensated "takings" cannot be sanctioned merely because they benefit the public. This analysis suggests that the Fuentes/Mitchell/North Georgia Finishing standards should be applied to the determination of compensation in Michigan's "quick-take" condemnation proceedings.
The third constitutional attack contends that Sweet should be expressly overruled in light of Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing. It is not necessary to contend that Sweet, Bragg, and Bailey were incorrectly decided. Rather, it should be argued that changed conditions make it unwise to continue to adhere to the constitutional doctrines expounded in those cases. These decisions rested on two fundamental assumptions: the court system was capable of affording most condemnees a prompt resolution of the compensation issue; and state and municipalities were extremely unlikely to become insolvent.131
It is difficult to say whether the Sweet Court would have reached the same decision against the background of court congestion and long delays confronted by present-day litigants.132 In any event, there are at least three formidable reasons why the Supreme Court should modify the Sweet standards. First of all, under the "quick-take" statutes, a state can obtain possession of condemned property, but need not make full payment until many years later, at the conclusion of litigation. Thus, the state has every incentive to make inadequate offers of just compensation and to protract litigation as long as possible, because the legal rate of interest is considerably lower than the rate the state would have to pay on the open market. Secondly, since court congestion and the "quick-take" statutes effectively permit a state to obtain possession of property for many years prior to payment of compensation, the state has little incentive to enact remedial measures to ease the burden on the court system as a whole. Consequently, the availability of "quick-take" condemnation, absent a procedure to review the adequacy of the "estimated compensation" deposited by the state, may be an important cause of legislative failure to provide adequate relief for court congestion.
Finally, the Sweet doctrine may be founded on the premise that states and municipalities are extremely unlikely to become insolvent.133 Although this may have been a safe assumption in 1905, it is undoubtedly an unsound proposition today. Clearly, under the just compensation clause, the possibility of a considerable delay in receiving compensation cannot be equated with the prospect that a landowner may never receive compensation at all. Although it is impractical to require an immediate ascertainment of damages, a landowner's interests cannot be sufficiently protected without a preliminary hearing to assess the adequacy of the compensation offered by the state. Such a hearing would not guarantee that a landowner would eventually receive full compensation, because the reviewing court could only attempt a reasonable approximation of damages. In the event a municipality became insolvent, a landowner would probably receive less than the fair market value of the seized property to the extent that its value exceeded the deposit of estimated compensation. Without any hearing, however, a landowner could eventually receive much less.134
If such a preliminary review were available, a landowner who preferred not to gamble on a municipality's solvency would have the option of accepting a compensation offer that represented at least a fair approximation of the value of his land. In contrast, without such a preliminary review mechanism, a landowner may be faced with the dilemma of accepting an egregiously low offer of compensation or gambling on the insolvency of the state. It is difficult to conclude that the Sweet Court would have held that such a scheme satisfied the fifth amendment requirement of "just compensation."
Although it may be argued that the majority of municipalities are in little danger of insolvency, it also seems probable that cities with declining tax bases are more likely to employ "quick-take" procedures in last ditch efforts to revitalize decaying urban areas. If so, it would appear that "quick-take" condemnees are more likely to harbor legitimate concerns about the solvency of condemning authorities.
One further point should be made in regard to the solvency of condemning authorities. Municipalities must incorporate anticipated liabilities from "quick-take" condemnations in their budget forecasts. Absent a procedure to review the adequacy of compensation offers, a municipality may seriously underestimate the liability it will face after a final adjudication of just compensation. Thus, the employment of "quick-take" condemnation procedures may in and of itself, lead to the eventual insolvency of a municipality.
Since changed conditions have undermined the premises of Sweet and its progeny, the "adequate provision", doctrine should be overruled entirely or modified to require a pre-or post-seizure hearing to determine whether a condemnor's offer of estimated compensation represents a reasonable approximation of the actual market value of the property.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
In Michigan, the condemning agency is required to make a "good faith offer" to the landowner prior to instituting condemnation proceedings.135 The purpose of the "good faith offer" requirement is to effectively limit a condemnor's opportunity to offer the landowner substantially less than the fair market value of his property. The landowner is purportedly protected against unreasonably low offers by the statutory requirement that the "good faith offer" be for an amount not less than the condemnor's appraisal, if it has a secured one.136 A challenge to an unreasonably low offer would necessarily take the form of a pre-seizure attack upon the condemnor's "good faith."
The court has the power to fix the time and terms for the surrender of possession of the property.137 Under such power the judiciary has the inherent power to order the deposit of an increment to the estimated compensation prior to mandating surrender of possession.138 Employment of this framework would eliminate many unconstitutional flaws in the quick-take framework. However, the fundamental difficulty with the Michigan "good faith offer" procedure has been the liberal construction given to the term "good faith" by the state judiciary. The courts have recently manifested a willingness to conclude that any offer, no matter how insubstantial, was made in good faith.139 In Kalamazoo Road Commission v. Dosca, the trial court felt that a one dollar offer for a partial taking was made in "good faith" even though recognizing that it was "bordering on the ridiculous." The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the trial court properly found no error, fraud, or abuse of discretion by the condemnor, since the offer was made "on the basis of an appraisal obtained.140 The Dosca case may mark a change in the attitude of the state judiciary and a divergence from earlier logic. For instance, the Michigan Supreme Court in 1928 dismissed a condemnation action upon determining that the condemnor's offer was so disproportionate to the market value of the property as to be merely formal, thereby constituting a failure of the condemnor to make a bona fide effort to purchase prior to condemning.141 The Michigan Supreme Court ruled as a matter of law that a merely formal or colorable offer is insufficient to meet the standard of good faith.142 New York has held that the condemnor has the affirmative burden to show it acted in good faith.143
Though the concept of "good faith" in condemnation proceedings seems to necessarily require something more than a unilateral belief on the part of the condemning agency, trial courts have seemed willing to impose upon the government only a subjective standard. Trial courts have displayed a tendency to determine the issue in terms only of "honesty of intention," while eliminating the generally accepted second half of the good faith" test, i.e., knowledge of facts which ought to put a reasonable man on notice that he should seek further inquiry.144 This judicial interpretation suggests that a landowner is under some obligation to demonstrate fraud or "bad faith," in order to show a lack of good faith. This distinction may be at odds with some "quick-take" statutes, in that the issue of fraud comes into play only with respect to challenges to the taking proper, whereas the issue of good faith arises with respect to compensation questions.145 Had the legislature desired to use the standard propounded by trial courts, it could easily have required the condemnor only to make a "non-fraudulent offer" prior to filing its declaration of taking. The plain language of the statute implies a higher standard of care or responsibility from the condemning agency and an objective determination of its "good faith." Continued reliance upon ex parte belief as fulfilling the "good faith offer" requirement without a pre-seizure hearing could lead to a pro forma substantiation of compensation offers by "affidavits of sincerity."
In instances where an immediate transfer of possession is necessary to further the public interest, a prompt post-seizure hearing on the adequacy of the state's offer of compensation would appear to be constitutionally permissible. This alternative may represent the most reasonable reconciliation of the conflicting interests of the state and the individual. To further confuse the determination of "good faith," especially in "post-seizure settings, courts have not developed a consistent form of relief in situations where the condemnor's offer has not been up to "par." Some courts have employed dismissal of the action as a remedy,146 while other courts have suggested that permitting condemnors to amend and increase their offer is the proper approach.147 The more reasonable alternative would be to permit liberal amendment of the compensation offer, as the landowner attacking "good faith" is more concerned with valuation than presenting a total challenge to the taking itself.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Michigan's "quick-take" statute permits the state to obtain possession of condemned property prior to a final adjudication of just compensation. Although the state is required to make a good faith offer of compensation to the landowner before taking possession, there is no provision for judicial review of the adequacy of the state's offer. Consequently, in the event that the actual value of condemned property greatly exceeds the state's offer, it may be many years before a landowner can obtain suitable substitute property due to inability to obtain sufficient financing until a final determination of damages.
A line of authority nearly a century old permits, under the due process clause, the seizure of condemned property prior to a final adjudication of just compensation. However, more recent cases have cast considerable doubt on the vitality of the earlier holdings and suggest that the state must provide a prompt post-seizure hearing on the compensation issue. Although lower courts in attempting to reconcile the two lines of authority have concluded that the earlier cases remain viable precedents, these courts have not addressed the necessity of a prompt post-seizure hearing.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the legislature and judiciary will recognize the need to achieve a more satisfactory reconciliation of the public and private interests at stake.
Alan T. Ackerman, Partner, Ackerman and Ackerman, Detroit, Michigan; Former Chairman, Condemnation Law and Procedure Committee, State Bat of Michigan; J.D. Univeristy of Michigan; M.L.I.R., B.A. Michigan State University.
Noah Yanich, Law Clerk, Honorable Richard Maher, Michigan Court of Appeals; Associate, Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, Detroit, Michigan; J.D. University of Michigan; B.S. Fordham University.
You sure have alot to learn about personal property rights and what it means to be an "American", (life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, et al.) and have the God given rights to be left alone. That land is their land. Not the land of some tyrant. Better the "official" be popped and his reign of treasonous thinking and behavior be wiped out than these folks lose their property.
Get real, poser.
Better to die like a man upon your feet than lick the boots of your tormentor. I'm wondering if you'd have let the Redcoats occupy your home in 1776. It's a good thing we didn't have your types at Lexington.
You comparing a town via democratic process deciding to lose a dozen homes, gaining a huge commerical base, and greatly reducing property taxes for the remaining residents--with the Revolutionary War??? These are the woman's fellow citizens who have decided this, not some outside Redcoats; not the EPA, not the FBI. C'mon already.
She should have gotten a seat on the Council, or bribed (or blackmailed) someone to alter the development plans. That is how things really work in America. It does one no good to remain naive about it.
I know of someone who took photos of the Town Board's President cavorting with an 20-year old girl (who wasn't his wife). He even got some "money shots" through a window carelessly left open. The Board had been screwing him again and again on development plans, permits, taxes, etc. Once he let the President know about the photos, those problems remarkably disappeared. All governments are tyrannies, very often composed by people with low moral character and prone to blackmail. All Americans should take advantage of this when the opportunity presents itself.
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