IRAQ: A Question Of Trust - The CIA's Tenet takes the fall for a flawed claim......

N A T I O N
A Question Of Trust
The CIA's Tenet takes the fall for a flawed claim in the State of the Union, but has Bush's credibility taken an even greater hit?
By

Sunday, Jul. 13, 2003
The State of the Union message is one of America's greatest inventions, conceived by the Founders to force a powerful Chief Executive to report to a public suspicious of kings. Delivered to a joint session of Congress in democracy's biggest cathedral, it is the most important speech a President gives each year, written and rewritten and then polished again. Yet the address George W. Bush gave on Jan. 28 was more consequential than most because he was making a revolutionary case: why a nation that traditionally didn't start fights should wage a pre-emptive war. As Bush noted that night, "Every year, by law and by custom, we meet here to consider the state of the union. This year we gather in this chamber deeply aware of decisive days that lie ahead."

Just how aware was Bush of the accuracy of what he was about to say? Deep in his 5,400-word speech was a single sentence that had already been the subject of considerable internal debate for nearly a year. It was a line that had launched a dozen memos, several diplomatic tugs of war and some mysterious, last-minute pencil editing. The line—"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"—wasn't the Bush team's strongest evidence for the case that Saddam wanted nuclear weapons. It was just the most controversial, since most government experts familiar with the statement believed it to be unsupportable.

Last week the White House finally admitted that Bush should have jettisoned the claim. Designed to end a long-simmering controversy, the admission instead sparked a bewildering four days of changing explanations and unusually nasty finger pointing by the normally disciplined Bush team. That performance raised its own questions, which went to the core of the Administration's credibility: Where else did the U.S. stretch evidence to generate public support for the war? If so many doubted the uranium allegations, who inside the government kept putting those allegations on the table? And did the CIA go far enough to keep the bad intelligence out?

To that last question, at least, the answer was: apparently not. In what looked like a command performance of political sacrifice, the head of the agency that expressed some of the strongest doubts about the charge took responsibility for the President's unsubstantiated claim. "The CIA approved the President's State of the Union address before it was delivered," said CIA Director George Tenet in a statement. "I am responsible for the approval process in my agency. And ... the President had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound. These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President."

Yet the controversy over those 16 words would not have erupted with such force were they not emblematic of larger concerns about Bush's reasoning for going to war in the first place. Making the case against Saddam last year, Bush claimed that Iraq's links to al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) made the country an imminent threat to the region and, eventually, the U.S. He wrapped the evidence in the even more controversial doctrine of pre-emption, saying America could no longer wait for proof of its enemies' intentions before defending itself overseas—it must sometimes strike first, even without all the evidence in hand. Much of the world was appalled by this logic, but Congress and the American public went along. Four months after the war started, at least one piece of key evidence has turned out to be false, the U.S. has yet to find weapons of mass destruction, and American soldiers keep dying in a country that has not greeted its liberators the way the Administration predicted it would. Now the false assertion and the rising casualties are combining to take a toll on Bush's standing with the public.

FOLLOW THE YELLOWCAKE ROAD
How did a story that much of the national-security apparatus regarded as bogus wind up in the most important speech of Bush's term? The evidence suggests that many in the Bush Administration simply wanted to believe it. The tale begins in the early 1980s, when Iraq made two purchases of uranium oxide from Niger totaling more than 300 tons. Known as "yellowcake," uranium oxide is a partially refined ore that, when combined with fluorine and then converted into a gas, can eventually be used to create weapons-grade uranium. No one disputes that Iraq had a nuclear-weapons program in the 1980s, but it was dismantled after the first Gulf War. Then, in the mid-1990s, defectors provided evidence that Saddam was trying to restart the program.

Finally, late in 2001, the Italian government came into possession of evidence suggesting that Iraq was again trying to purchase yellowcake from Niger. Rome's source provided half a dozen letters and other documents alleged to be correspondence between Niger and Iraqi officials negotiating a sale. The Italians' evidence was shared with both Britain and the U.S.

When it got to Washington, the Iraq-Niger uranium report caught the eye of someone important: Vice President Dick Cheney. Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis Libby, told TIME that during one of his regular CIA briefings, "the Vice President asked a question about the implication of the report." Cheney's interest hardly came as a surprise: he has long been known to harbor some of the most hard-line views of Saddam's nuclear ambitions. It was not long before the agency quietly dispatched a veteran U.S. envoy named Joseph Wilson to investigate. Wilson seemed like a wise choice for the mission. He had been a U.S. ambassador to Gabon and had actually been the last American to speak with Saddam before the first Gulf War. Wilson spent eight days sleuthing in Niger, meeting with current and former government officials and businessmen; he came away convinced that the allegations were untrue. Wilson never had access to the Italian documents and never filed a written report, he told TIME. When he returned to Washington in early March, Wilson gave an oral report about his trip to both CIA and State Department officials. On March 9 of last year, the CIA circulated a memo on the yellowcake story that was sent to the White House, summarizing Wilson's assessment. Wilson was not the only official looking into the matter. Nine days earlier, the State Department's intelligence arm had sent a memo directly to Secretary of State Colin Powell that also disputed the Italian intelligence. Greg Thielmann, then a high-ranking official at State's research unit, told TIME that it was not in Niger's self-interest to sell the Iraqis the destabilizing ore. "A whole lot of things told us that the report was bogus," Thielmann said later. "This wasn't highly contested. There weren't strong advocates on the other side. It was done, shot down."

Except that it wasn't. By late summer, at the very moment that the Administration was gearing up to make its case for military mobilization, the yellowcake story took on new life. In September, Tony Blair's government issued a 50-page dossier detailing the case against Saddam, and while much of the evidence in the paper was old, it made the first public claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. At the White House, Ari Fleischer endorsed the British dossier, saying "We agree with their findings."

THE DOUBTS THAT DIDN'T GO AWAY
By now, a gap was opening behind the scenes between what U.S. officials were alleging in public about Iraq's nuclear ambitions and what they were saying in private. After Tenet left a closed hearing on Capitol Hill in September, the nuclear question arose, and a lower-ranking official admitted to the lawmakers that the agency had doubts about the veracity of the evidence. Also in September, the CIA tried to persuade the British government to drop the allegation completely. To this day, London stands by the claim. In October, Tenet personally intervened with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, to remove a line about the African ore in a speech that Bush was giving in Cincinnati, Ohio. Also that month, CIA officials included the Brits' yellowcake story in their classified 90-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons programs. The CIA said it could neither verify the Niger story nor "confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake" from two other African nations. The agency also included the State Department's concerns that the allegations of Iraq's seeking yellowcake were "highly dubious"—though that assessment was printed only as a footnote.

At a time when it was trying to build public support for the war, the Bush Administration did not share these internal doubts about the evidence with the public. In December, for example, the State Department included the Niger claim in its public eight-point rebuttal to the 12,200-page arms declaration that Iraq made to the U.N. two weeks earlier. And a month later, in an op-ed column in the New York Times titled "Why We Know Iraq Is Lying," top Bush aide Rice appeared to repeat the yellowcake claim, saying, "The declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad." Nor did the U.S. pass on what it knew to international monitors. When the International Atomic Energy Agency, a U.N. group, asked the U.S. for data to back up its claim in December, Washington sat tight and said little for six weeks.

The battle between believers and doubters finally came to a head over the State of the Union speech. Weeks of work had gone into the address; speechwriters had produced two dozen drafts. But as the final form was taking shape, the wording of the yellowcake passage went down to the wire. When the time came to decide whether Bush was going to cite the allegation, the CIA objected—and then relented. Two senior Administration officials tell TIME that in a January conversation with a key National Security Council (nsc) official just a few days before the speech, a top cia analyst named Alan Foley objected to including the allegation in the speech. The nsc official in charge of vetting the sections on WMD, Special Assistant to the President Robert Joseph, denied through a spokesman that he said it was O.K. to use the line as long as it was sourced to British intelligence. But another official told TIME, "There was a debate about whether to cite it on our own intelligence. But once the U.K. made it public, we felt comfortable citing what they had learned." And so the line went in. While some argued last week that the fight should have been kicked upstairs to Rice for adjudication, White House officials claim that it never was.

NUCLEAR FALLOUT
But if it was good enough for bush, it wasn't good enough for others. Colin Powell omitted any reference to the uranium when he briefed the U.N. Security Council just eight days later; last week he told reporters that the allegation had not stood "the test of time." Nor did Tenet mention the allegation when he testified before the Senate panel on Feb. 11. "If we were trying to peddle that theory, it would have been in our white paper," an intelligence official told TIME. "It would have been in lots of places where it wasn't. A sentence made it into the President's speech, and it shouldn't have."

Did Bush really need to push the WMD case so hard to convince Americans that Saddam should be ousted? In a TIME poll taken four weeks before coalition forces invaded, 83% of Americans thought war was justified on the grounds that "Saddam Hussein is a dictator who has killed many citizens of his Iraq." That's one claim that has never been contested. In the same TIME poll, however, 72% of Americans thought war was also justified because it "will help eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq."

The unseen threat of a Saddam with WMD was an argument that played to Bush's strengths. As a politician, Bush has always been better at asserting his case than at making it. After 9/11, his sheer certitude—and the faith Americans had in his essential trustworthiness—led Americans to overwhelmingly support him. The yellowcake affair may have already changed that relationship, for as the casualties mount in Iraq, polls suggest that some of that faith is eroding. Which means the next time Bush tells the nation where he wants to go, it may not be so quick to follow.

—With reporting by Massimo Calabresi, Matthew Cooper and Adam Zagorin/Washington, John F. Dickerson with Bush in Africa, J.F.O. McAllister/London and Andrew Purvis/Vienna

"two senior Administration officials"

Sounds similar to Novak's sources, no? Could it be those reports about Rove blabbing to "six reporters" be misplaced by those who didn't get calls? That it wasn't Bushies doing this?

And perhaps when they called Novak...

Then there's the whole issue of Wilson's leaks prior to his NYTimes article - to mostly the Brit press, part of wanting to take down Blair?

"I better file it away"

Not too deep. I think it's the core of the matter.

the "July 13" and "21" articles are one in the same. 13 is the date it was posted on the web (before Novak's article). 21 the issue date on the paper magazine.

As I read it the first subpena was limited to Libby. Cooper probably said "It wasn't him", he wouldn't answer subsequent questions so they gave him another subpena.

This is turning into a story the MSM does not enjoy reporting on.

At some point, they will begin to ignore it -- as if it isn't happening. Judith Miller and Matt Cooper could be sent off to the big house...and all it will earn them is a column inch of agate type on page C-18.

From a CNN interview

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0502/20/rs.01.html

COOPER: Well, first of all, it's not entirely -- I -- without saying, disclosing, what everyone wants to know, I wouldn't be entirely certain about, you know, the motivation of the leakers, who leaked what, when, where, how.

But that said, look, journalism needs to be able to protect its sources in order to be able to function. It's the only way to ferret out information. And we need to be able to do that.

Now, I will readily concede that at times that may not make the life of a prosecutor easier. But that's not my job in society is to make the life of a prosecutor easier. You know, I gave limited testimony to a prosecutor last year after one of my sources absolved me of our promise of confidentiality, and I was happy to do so, and would do it again.

KURTZ: An aide to Vice President Cheney.

COOPER: I would do it again, right. But this time the prosecutors asked for really, basically, every one of my sources and my notebook. That's much harder to comply with.

NBC has said previously that Russert was "not a recipient" of Plame's name. A statement from the network yesterday said "the Special Prosecutor's questions addressed a telephone conversation initiated by Mr. Libby and focused on what Mr. Russert said during that conversation. Mr. Libby had previously told the FBI about the conversation and had formally requested that the conversation be disclosed."
NBC officials said that at the time of the conversation Russert "did not know Ms. Plame's name or that she was a CIA operative" and "he did not provide that information to Mr. Libby." Network representatives would not elaborate on Fitzgerald's interest in learning whether Russert disclosed information to Libby.

From August WashPost last year. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52895-2004Aug9_2.html I remembered that, thought is was just confusion...but maybe not only did Libby not tell - maybe he didn't know! Maybe a reporter told him about Plame's Wilson connection.

The case says less about miller:

Supbpenas "seeking documents and testimony related to conversatins between her and a specified government official "occuring from on or about July 6, 2003 to on or about July 13, 2003,...concerning Valerie Plame Wilson...or concerning Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium."

Presumably that person isn't Libby since long before he released the reporters. Who could it be...and just how did she get involved in this matter...she apparently wrote nothing about Plame

Who could it be...and just how did she get involved in this matter...she apparently wrote nothing about Plame

If she never wrote about Plame, then wouldn't it have to be "concerning Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium"? She was the Times' "beat writer" on WMD, after all.

In order to have a "source", one must first have a story published, I would think. Indeed, to warrant the GJ subpoena, one would've had to have published a story in which one cited a source. I doubt they can subpoena idle gossip.

Would be nice to know what she published in that time frame. But given Miller's beat and his proximity to Plame, may I suggest Alan Foley?

Speaking of George Tenet, he was just quoted in an article I saw on FR a few hours ago from the LA Times- it was on Qadeer Khan.

The article appears to hint at a new line of spin... "We waited to long to round up Qadeer Khan's Network and it's everyone's fault but Carter's... Clinton's, aparently, since he's not mentioned.

Interesting article, though.

COOPER: I would do it again, right. But this time the prosecutors asked for really, basically, every one of my sources and my notebook. That's much harder to comply with.

Things that make you go hmmmm....

For what it's worth, some trivia on Matthew Cooper from a past thread:

To: Howlin A New Jersey native, [Matthew] Cooper is a 1984 graduate of Columbia College in New York City and lives in Washington D.C. with his wife, Mandy Grunwald, and their son. -- http://centerforpolitics.org/programs/nss/text_03_agenda-panel.htm via 25 posted on 05/22/2004 6:49:11 AM PDT by Mo1
To: Howlin The scary-toothed Mandy Grunewald, Hillary chum extraordinaire, could very well have been the person who tipped her husband off. She would have known Wilson's wife's profession...heck, they probably all went to the same cocktail parties. 29 posted on 05/22/2004 7:07:26 AM PDT by Miss Marple

That's very true. Also :

Minutes before the debate [2004 FL debate], Time correspondent Matt Cooper said of the Kerry comeback scenario: "Everyone in this room wants to write it. They're aching to write it. When the polls close up, you'll see more of it."
----- "A Changed Political Landscape, Or an Isolated Peak in the Polls?" By Howard Kurtz, Washington Post Staff Writer , Monday, October 4, 2004; Page C01

Thanks for pinging me. I am very interested in this.

Judith Miller was IN Iraq at one point. I remember that she wrote a long article about the search for WMD that had a lot of detail. It basically took the position (this was early in the post-war time period) that there were WMD's and it was only a matter of time until they were located.

Perhaps she got her information from someone in the CIA.

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