Guests of honor at the upcoming Crow feast.
The biggest argument is that Saddam would not let inspectors have unrestricted access, within the terms of the agreement, to his sites and materials. He was hiding something, and everybody knows it. With his stalling, he probably managed to get much of it out of the country, but I'd bet the large underground compounds that have been discovered (and are still being investigated - by robots, because they're booby-trapped) are going to turn up some interesting stuff.
Bush/Blair et al. would not have lied about or exaggerated this because the risk would have been just too great. The stuff is out there, I'm sure we'll find it or track it to wherever it was sent.
And as for adopting the worst case scenario, what's wrong with that? In dealing with an unstable dictator who could take out a large part of his region upon a mere whim, going for the worst case seems, to me, to be the most prudent thing to do.
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Well, if at least some of the intelligence is ambiguous, then shoudn't the President, in interpreting the intelligence, be assuming the worst (and reacting accordingly) rather than hoping for the best? When the consequences of error -- of understimating the threat posed by WMDs in the hands of terrorists supplied by Saddam's regime (including Saddam's regime itself, which was a terrorist organization in its own right) -- include another 9/11 (or worse), shouldn't the margin of error be very small? Shouldn't the President err on the side of protecting national security rather than leaving it at greater risk? Why doesn't this article ask this rather obvious question, which would put this entire issue in its proper perspective?
Prior to the war, I had no doubt that WMDs would be found - in fact, I fully expected them to get utilized during the war itself. At the very least, I would not imagine that intelligence would be fabricated that could be so easily disproven. The fact of the matter, however, is that the prewar WMD thesis is strictly defunct. There's simply no way to pretend otherwise at this juncture.. (Whether there will be genuine political ramifications is another question altogether, and I'm doubtful there would be for various reasons.)
Whatever the case, here's a concise summary of the prewar thesis as described elsewhere:
Saddam Hussein had extensive, active, advanced, clandestine chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. UN inspectors couldn't find WMDs because they were inept, or corrupt, or because Saddam played the shell game so masterfully. US intelligence pinpointed dozens of high-value target sites, hundreds of intermediate-value sites and thousands of low-value sites. Chemical and perhaps biological weapons were deployed to commanders in the field, who had orders to use them against invading Coalition forces. Special Forces teams were dropping in to secure and neutralize high-value sites in advance of the ground assault, with high-tech analytic Mobile Exploitation Teams (MET's) close on their heels.
Anyone who would claim that this was not the public impression created in the buildup to war is a dissembler, IMHO; anyone who can now seriously suggest that anything remotely resembling that scenario could have been the case needs to check in with their nearest reality, ASAP...
These were the allegations as I distinctly recall them: 15,000 to 30,000 chemical munitions; thousands of tons of weaponized chemical arms; hundreds of gallons of biological agents; a reconstituted nuclear program with procurement of uranium & missile cores; a fleet of remote-guided WMD drones; dozens of mobile biochem laboratories; dozens of Scud missile delivery systems.
Where is all this extensive panoply of prohibited, unconventional armament? Where are all the scientists & engineers & military personnel & just random facility workers that put them together and maintained them? Where are the research & production facilities themselves? Did all this just vanish into the desert? Somewhere? Somehow?
If you want my personal opinion, our intelligence services - and by extension Bush and Blair - were misled by the Iraqi opposition groups. I remarked several times prior the war that these were the people least credible in their claims about the Ba'athist regime and Iraqi sentiments. They had a vested interest in encouraging the war which would see them returned into the locus of power in Iraq and they played their cards to the hilt. Evidently, they found a receptive audience willing to accept whatever casus belli they fortuitously provided.
Trumped up 'intelligence' from Iraqi dissidents is what the evidence at this juncture mainly points toward and that the Iraqis had indeed abandoned their WMD programs appears the inescapable conclusion, in my view. I have no problem if I'm eventually proven incorrect in this assessment. We shall see. This issue needs to get confronted on FR sooner or later because it's not going to just go away...
Remember...
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WMD mean never having to say you're sorry.