Boyd's tactics and Operation Iraqi Freedom (illuminating background on Iraq strategy)

In January in this space I wrote a book review of Robert Coram's excellent biography, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed History, the story of the late Air Force Col. John Boyd, the maverick (vast understatement) self-taught military thinker who in the 1980s completely revolutionized American military doctrine, strategy and tactics.

In a tour-de-force briefing called Patterns of Conflict that contained some 180 PowerPoint slides and which took two days to present, Boyd laid out a completely new theory of modern warfare, shorthanded as "4th generation warfare" or just 4GW. At the heart of this theory was what Boyd called the "OODA Loop," a four-step decision-making process that breaks down into the cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.

I'm going to over-simply the OODA Loop a bit, but basically what the theory says is this: each "side" or each battlespace commander (at whatever level, from Grand Vizier down to squad leader) takes a look at the situation in front of him, orients himself to that situation (this orientation phase is quite complex, but its details are irrelevant here), decides what to do, and then makes his move. The opponent on the other side does the same thing. In general, whichever side works its way through the OODA Loop (also now called a "decision cycle") first usually wins. And if you can figure out what the other side is going to do, anticipate it, and react to it in time, you've "gotten inside his decision cycle."

In addition to the OODA Loop, Boyd came up with or emphasized three additional concepts he mined from previous military thinkers and practitioners. First, there were psychological operations. Boyd believed that a good many battles in history had been "won" before they ever began because one side's commander had done something to break his enemy's morale and fighting spirit before the first shot was ever fired.

Second, Boyd came up with something called "maneuver theory," which synthesized elements such as the tactics of Mongol horsemen, Napoleon's armies and German Blitzkrieg tactics of World War II.

Third, Boyd was the first military thinker whose ideas incorporated the use of time itself as an important (or even in Boyd's thinking, crucial) element of warfare. The OODA Loop is a time-dependent cycle, and in a curious way the reliance on psychological operations to break the enemy's will is time-related, either because it breaks the enemy "before time even starts" at H-Hour, and because of the amount of time you spend breaking down the enemy's spirit is time-dependent. Maneuver theory itself depends on moving and acting faster than the enemy can react; fluid and fast-moving tactics disrupt the enemy's ability to run through its own OODA Loop.

One of Boyd's early adherents, according to Coram's book, was a Wyoming congressman named Dick Cheney, who is now vice president of the United States and who during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was secretary of defense. According to Coram, Cheney was unhappy with the Army's very conventional plan to attack Iraqi forces holding Kuwait. In January Coram was interviewed by Brian Lamb on the C-SPAN show Booknotes. Here's a piece of that transcript:

Coram: When Cheney became secretary of defense, he was rare in that he knew more about strategy than most of his generals did. He called Boyd out of retirement in the early days of the Gulf war, and from him got an updating, if you will. And it was Boyd's strategy, not [Gen. Norman] Schwarzkopf's, that led to our swift and decisive victory in the Gulf war.

The vice president, Cheney, gave me about 30 minutes to talk about Boyd [during Coram's research for the book]. And on television, he seems very reserved and controlled, but when he talked to me about John Boyd, he was enthusiastic, and I could tell he had great respect for this man.

Lamb: What part of the Gulf War in 1991 plan did John Boyd have some responsibility for?

Coram: All of it. The multiple thrust, the feints, the ambiguity, the Marine feint, the ...

It is now 12 years later, Gulf War II is history, and we've had 600 embedded reporters covering what seems to be (but really isn't) every aspect of the war (all except the strategic and tactical planning and behind-the-scenes negotiation phases, plus the secret Special Forces operations/"black ops"/CIA/NSA stuff, which in my view taken together constitutes about 95 percent of the war to date). We've had 'round-the-clock "24/7" coverage of the war, innumerable press conferences from the Pentagon, from Gen. Tommy Franks' HQ in Doha, Qatar, and from the battlefield itself. I've seen or heard 2,000 reporters ask 10,000 question, some of which have been intelligent and some of which have been dumb, a few of them astonishingly so.

I've heard a hundred pundits, commentators and experts opine endlessly. We've even had Geraldo Rivera doodling maps in the sand so everybody including enemy artillery spotters has a pretty good idea of what's going on. (Memo to Rivera: Here, Geraldo, embed THIS, will ya? What an @#$#@%!&*%$#) And for comic relief we've even had that wonderfully zany Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed Al Sayaf popping peyote buttons as he explains the content of those transmissions from the planet Etaoinshrdlu he's been receiving inside his aluminum-foil-lined burnoose. Kinda miss that whimsical ol' spinmeister now that it's all over.

In all that time, in all that glut of information, I've yet to hear any coherent explanation of U.S. fighting doctrine, strategy, or tactics, especially with any reference whatsoever to the man who very clearly (to my mind) laid out that doctrine and those tactics, just as he did in Gulf War I. That would be John Boyd.

With two teeny, tiny exceptions. Last week the Navy League sponsored its annual Sea-Air-Space Exposition at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. On April 16, Army Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed the exposition's luncheon gathering (I didn't go, but I heard it that evening on C-SPAN radio driving home from Pax). In the course of his talk Myers mentioned how we had gotten "inside Iraq's decision cycle." That's Army-speak for the OODA Loop. And he mentioned "maneuver warfare."

The next day, April 17, the luncheon speaker was Adm. Vern Clark, the CNO himself. In his talk I actually heard him say the "O" words, "OODA Loop."

Not only do I think it is quite clear John Boyd's theories and tactics "designed" the conduct of GWII, I also think a great deal of the criticism of the war's tactics, especially in its early days, stemmed from the fact that few people understood Boyd's (and the Pentagon's) doctrine, and nobody bothered to explain it after it was over, when it would do no harm to say, "Look, this is what we did and why we did it."

The most famous point of contention occurred when critics (some "armchair" critics and some former and current Army generals) blasted Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for "not sending enough troops" to Iraq. Close behind was all the brou-ha-ha over the ballyhooed "Shock and Awe" campaign that never happened.

Boyd's theories spend a good deal of time talking about using psychological weapons ?"psy-ops" in the modern parlance ? to break the enemy's morale even before the battle begins. In retrospect it now seems reasonably clear that all the pre-war talk about launching a Shock-and-Awe campaign that would bomb Baghdad "back to the Stone Age" (to use a Vietnam-ism) using 5,000 Tomahawk missiles and "smart-bombs" was pure psy-ops.

Then, on the first few days of the war, when that Shock-and-Awe obliteration failed to take place, what we really saw was pretty precise pinpoint targeting and careful bombing of selected targets. But there was no Shock-and-Awe as we seemingly promised. We didn't wipe Baghdad off the map, which is pretty much what we had threatened to do.

This raises several troubling questions. Were Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld et al. "lying" when they threatened Shock-and-Awe. In retrospect, it seems clear that whole Shock-and-Awe campaign was designed to scare the you-know-what out of the Iraqis (as well it should have). And to really "sell" that idea, the more people criticized Bush for behaving as an out-of-control Texas gunslinger who had no intentions of sincerely negotiating with Iraq, the better the psy-op campaign got.

Of course, there was no way Bush (or Rumsfeld, or anyone else) could stand up in front of a press conference and say, "Yes, we're really bluffing. We're only going to selectively bomb specific targets, and here, we've already got a list of those targets. But please don't tell the Iraqis."

So when is an administration simply "lying," in the conventional sense of the word, and when is it conducting a (legitimate) psy-ops disinformation campaign? Even now, the administration can't admit that's exactly what it did, because to admit it was disinforming Iraq it tacitly acknowledges was also "lying" (or "not being candid," or whatever euphemism you want to use) to the American people.

Be that as it may, having launched the Shock-and-Awe campaign, and having "failed" to deliver it, there was something like disappoint that we didn't willy-nilly slaughter thousands of civilians from the air, a la Dresden, Coventry and Hiroshima. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

Shock-and-Awe was clearly perceived after the fact as a bluff, but when the Iraqis failed to surrender by the thousands, as they did in GWI, the bluff was perceived to have "failed." We didn't really scare the crap out of them after all (so it was said).

But did we or didn't we? How do we know? What are "the metrics," as the military now likes to ask? Not only that, how do you measure a negative? What steps did Saddam take (or not take) based upon what particular belief? Maybe we did in fact scare them out of Baghdad after all; most of them had boogied by the time we got there. So did Shock-and-Awe work or not? I submit we still don't know.

I also submit the question is irrelevant. If it didn't work, it doesn't mean it shouldn't have been attempted. To criticize a plan or a concept implies that there was some alternative that would have worked "better" (however you measure that). Scaring the crap out of the Iraqis with the Shock-and-Awe Rope-a-dope bluff may or may not have worked ... but what was Psy-Ops Plan B? Family counseling with Doctor Phil?

If Boyd's tactics have one central idea, it is rapid movement, fluid maneuvering which bypasses enemy strongpoints and doesn't stop to wait for supplies to arrive. And this isn't even original with Boyd; this idea has been around for hundreds of years. Yet even now, there were retired Army generals criticizing the drive to Baghdad because "we didn't have enough troops" and we over-extended our supply lines, and left strong pockets of resistance, notably Basra, in the rear. Fellas, read the manual.

The notion that we "don't have enough troops" has also been around for a few hundred years, most notably since Abraham Lincoln had to "borrow" Gen. George MacClellan's army because MacClellan was too reluctant to use it until he "had enough troops" to outnumber the enemy. Parts of the Army and Air Force are still fighting the "bigger/heavier/more" battle against the forces of Boyd's/Rumsfeld's "less/faster/lighter" crowd, and we saw it in full flower several weeks ago. Every time Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs talk about "transitioning" and "restructuring" the military, they're talking about adopting John Boyd's theories.

All that talk about "we should have sent in the 4th Infantry (armored) Division" was just the Old School failing to understand how the OODA Loop works, as they always have. The whole point of rapid mobility and maneuverability is to be able to go to Iraq, observe the situation, make a decision and act, not to sit in Arlington and draw up a plan even the critics agree "won't survive first contact with the enemy."

None of which can be explained in a press conference a few hours before D-Day and H-Hour.

Boyd was the first military thinker whose ideas incorporated the use of time itself as an important (or even in Boyd's thinking, crucial) element of warfare.

On arriving late to a battle Napoleon was quoted as saying to his on-scene commander, "There isn't enough time to win this battle, but there's time to win another." He also said something about his pocketwatch being his most important tool, or something like that.

According to Bob Woodward's book, "The Commanders," Schwarzkopf was "playing" the DC warplanners when he gave them his initial battle plan (Hey-diddle-diddle, Up-the-middle). He expected that it would be rejected and that he would therefore get the extra troops he was asking for.

Extremely interesting, and well written, but Swanson fell victim to the same confusion about "shock and awe" that has afflicted the reporting on the campaign.

Shock and Awe is a land warfare doctrine that, essentially, encompasses Boyd's designs. It simply involves the application of force that is so intense and rapid that the enemy either is paralyzed and therefore incapable of reacting (shock) or is so fearful of the consequences of reacting that he fails to do so. (awe) The doctrine was applied quite extensively during the final part of the 3ID's move on Baghdad.

Somehow, the media picked up the phrase "Shock and Awe" and attached it to leaks about the opening air campaign. Then, having created an unrealistic expectation, they were able to file stories deriding the failure to achieve it. It was sort of the classic case of a media-created issue. Mostly what DOD did was, simply, not correct their mis-impression.

We had "shock and awe"... significant amounts of it... in the land war, which is where the doctrine is intended to be applied.

Good find, though.

This "Shock and Awe" thing was also done to great affect in Panama when the U.S. forces got arrested Noriega. So the concept wasn't new. OTOH, the Panamanian operation was run by a Special Forces general.

I once saw a recapitulation of the Panamanian invasion on a TV program hosted by Bill Lind. One of the little tidbits that was revealed was that after Noriega went-to-ground at the Papal Nuncio, a SF Major went helicoptering around to some of the more remote Panamanian Defense Force bases accepting surrenders. He eventually obtained over a dozen surrenders in this manner -- all without firing a shot. Basically, he flew in to meet with each commander. That Major must have had a major-league "pair" to pull that off.

Well, I think your notion that "Shock and Awe" is "only" a land war tactic (and that I was thereby "confused" about it) is a bit narrow/tunnel vision. I think (and so interpreted) Boyd's work as potentially being larger than that. Yes, Rumsfeld did say that the tomahawk/bomb attack was only part of a larger pattern of shock-and-awe. And yes, 3rd Inf. did use a great deal of shock-and-awe during its campaign. However, I suggest you guys are a bit too critical and fail to realize journalists (or anyone else writing an analysis) must necessarily keep things relatively simplified. My larger point was that Rumsfeld et al promised one thing, but delivered something else--and that those who failed to understand that this was basically a form of psy-ops, mind****ing, were consequently disappointed. And I was interested in the problem of a public official (the entire administration) saying one thing but doing something substantially different--(in this case, for perfectly valid Boydian "psy-ops").
I would define Shock and awe not only as the application of force (as yoiu suggest), but also the THREAT of such application, the treat being so massive or self-evident that you achieve Boyd's "break-their-spirit" objective.
I actually think the treat aspect worked pretty well, though there's no evidence one way or another, until we begin detailed interrogation of what the other side was thinking and perceiving (and we won't know that for a while yet). And in any event, what I really wanted to see was some public discussion of all this doctrine, use of boyd's tactics/ideas, etc. So far, the only thing I've found is this specific chat--and not much discussion of Boydian stuff even here.
I think your defining "shock-and-awe" narrowly to "only" land warfare doctrine just makes it the same old "shock" tactics of the Blitzkrieg, the April 1918 German counter-attack, and some Napoleonics. If that's so, then Boyd has "only" re-stated earlier work. But I think he did more--and it seems (from the "we're bogged down and under-manned" critics, a lot of the ground guys (don't know if you are one, or not) still don't understand it/him.
your larger criticism of the media reporting "leaks" (didn't seem like "leaks" to me--seemed like press conferences) that created false expectations, and then knocking down those expectations, is very accurate, though. however, that's the stuff I'm now referring to as part of the psych disinformation war.
i'd be interested to know if you agree or disagree with my observation that the US clearly gave the impression it was going to bomb the crap out of baghdad.
my problem is this: to me, Baghdad really did seem to be "shocked" virtually from the beginning in how it reacted (actually, failed to react). if you agree with that premise, how then to explain it? how to explain the failure (if that's the right word) to use chemical weapons? (was it fear of consequences?).
my other problem is this: how does "shock-and-awe" (or any other psch. warfare) apply to people who are essentially irrational/fanatical? it seems to me S&A/Psywar necessarily applies only to people who are more or less rational and paying attention. but can you psych out a wacko, or if so, do you use the same tools as you'd use with somebody more-or-less rational? I dunno, but I'm inclined to doubt it.
your thoughts?

but can you psych out a wacko, or if so, do you use the same tools as you'd use with somebody more-or-less rational?

I think it's a matter of levels. Eventually the situation becomes sufficiently overwhelming that it provokes the flight response in even the most deluded human being. But I agree that it's easier to psych-out those who have a firmer grip on the "actions/consequences" paradigm.

I'm not sure I said that "shock and awe" was exclusively a land warfare theory, and I know I didn't say YOU were confused. I believe I indicated that the author of the article had adopted the media's use of "shock and awe" as a term for bombing campaigns. The most widly circulated use of the term that I'm familiar with is in some military publications that address land warfare issues. The first reference I saw to its use regarding the Baghdad aerial campaign was in a news story quoting a leak from "an informed Pentagon source" or some such. You'd have to reconstruct its evolution from that point, but my recollection is that Rumsfeld's role was more along the line of refusing to confirm or deny than it was in touting some specific number of bombs that were going to be dropped.

The sense I have is that our psy-ops was more focussed on making sure they had no idea what the heck we were actually going to do than it was on attempting to intimidate an essentially unintimidatable psychotic. We kept having leaks that purported to be the "real battle plan", with each one having completely different specifics. About the only thing that was confirmed consistently was that there'd be a period of bombing before the land war started. :-)

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