Posted on 03/27/2003 8:13:56 PM PST by Destro
Is Iraq's strategy inspired by that which caused the greatest defeat in British military history?
Khalil Pasha (1864-1923) was placed at the head of the Turkish Sixth Army during World War One, based in Mesopotamia.
Simultaneously military governor of Baghdad (and all territory south-west of Aleppo), Khalil's policy during the extended Anglo-Indian advance of 1915 appeared simple: he consistently permitted his field commanders to retreat under fire.
This approach was reversed at the Battle of Ctesiphon (after an initial withdrawal by the Turks) with a counter-attack launched at the retreating British force under Sir Charles Townshend.
After successfully conducting the conclusion of the siege of Kut, when Townshend finally surrendered unconditionally on 30 April 1916, Khalil was inclined to support a more aggressive policy, proposing a Turkish sweep into Persia.
Considered an honoured guest by his Turkish captors Sir Charles Townshend was treated with lavish hospitality; meanwhile his 10,000 troops were largely subjected to barbaric treatment (including homosexual rape). A remarkable two-thirds of this group died while being marched into captivity.
Mesopotamia
A long, drawn-out campaign in appalling conditions that was initially about protecting British oil interests, but later gave rise to visions of glittering prizes in the capture of Baghdad.
Why here?
Mesopotamia was part of the Turkish Ottoman empire. Germany had for many years before the war assiduously developed Turkey as an ally, which it saw as an important part of the Drang nach Osten (The Thrust towards the East: Germany wanted new lands, new markets, lebensraum). The Turkish army was led by German 'advisors', as was much of its trade and commerce.
Britain relied heavily on Gulf oil to keep its Navy at sea. It determined very quickly on the outbreak of the war with Germany to protect its interests by occupying the oilfields and pipeline near Basra. Later, after an early string of cheap successes, British eyes fell on Baghdad. Victory over the Turks was believed by some to be a less costly way towards defeat of Germany than the painful battering at the Western Front. They began a series of attempts to move north along the rivers to the ancient city. Pushed by Germany - which also tried to encourage a Jihad (Muslim Holy War) against the British forces - Turkey was to strongly resist the British incursion.
What happened?
It was the Indian Army, which included a number of British units (initially of the Regular Army but soon joined by Territorials), that supplied the 'British' fighting forces ordered to Mesopotamia. This army had been under-invested for decades, and it showed in the quality of equipment and in training. Guns, shells, small arms and ammunition - of which there was never enough - were often literally museum pieces or considered not good enough for the Western Front and other areas. The Army command also failed to realise the difficulties of supplying an army that moved further upstream from the Gulf. There were never enough shallow-draught boats, nor enough mules or camels, to adequately supply the fighting forces that were to be up to 500 miles away from port.
Like Gallipoli, conditions in Mesopotamia defy description. Extremes of temperature (120 degrees F was common); arid desert and regular flooding; flies, mosquitoes and other vermin: all led to appalling levels of sickness and death through disease. Under these incredible conditions, units fell short of officers and men, and all too often the reinforcements were half-trained and ill-equipped. Medical arrangements were quite shocking, with wounded men spending up to two weeks on boats before reaching any kind of hospital.
The early successes in the river delta were misleading; more and more troops were sent to the Mesopotamia theatre, for operations towards Baghdad which stretched the supply lines to the limit. There was a serious difference of opinion between London, India and the Commander of the force, regarding the role of the army. The fomer saw it as defensive; the latter two as offensive with a view to capturing Baghad. The campaign was muddled: the attitudes and complacency disastrous. The advance plodded on, until a resounding defeat in November 1915 in front of Ctesiphon led to headlong retreat to Kut-al-Amara. The army in Kut became surrounded and besieged; eventually 9,000 (3,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops) surrendered five months later - the greatest defeat and loss in British military history up to that point.
Following the fall of Kut, the British ordered Major-General Stanley Maude to take command of the British army in Mesopotamia. He introduced new methods, which culminated in a decisive defeat of the Turks in February 1917, and the capture of Baghdad in March 1917. On this day, the Berlin-Baghdad railway was captured, and German schemes for Turkey were finished.
British forces (and Russians, advancing from the north and east) closed in on the Turks throughout the autumn of 1917, and into the Spring of 1918. Despite making great advances, however, and the additional pressure coming from the north-west, where British forces in Palestine defeated the Turks, no decisive victory was gained.
An armistice was signed by the Turks in Mesopotamia on 1st November 1918.
Landscape for battle
Mesopotamia is an ancient land, through which run the great Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. At the southern end, this is a complex river delta. The two rivers meet at Qurna, 40 miles north of Basra, where they come together to form the Shatt-al-Arab, which flows into the Persian Gulf. The land is for the most part desert, and is very flat. The rivers flood the plains to a great extent, when the winter snows in the northern mountains thaw. The small towns and villages that existed along the river banks in 1914 were generally constructed several feet above water level. There is virtually no water in this land, except that from the rivers. There were no roads, so all transport had to be by boat along the rivers. The major centre of population was Baghdad, almost 570 miles upstream from the Gulf.
For centuries before the Great War, this land had been part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Lying along its eastern border was Persia, generally friendly to the British. The Arab Sheiks of Kuwait and Muhammerah also supported Britain; the Arab tribes of coastal Mesopotamia often changed sides.
Today the land where the British forces were active in 1914-1918 lies in Iraq.
Yup. I agree.
Goin' out on a little limb here, but I'm thinking this all ends before it gets to that point. We've already had lots of fleeting stories about surreptitious surrnder negotiations. The Iraqis -- the smart ones -- have to realize the goodies they get by surrender are astonishingly huge compared to the -- err, nothing -- they get out of interminable, wearying battle.
Here's a question: Why doesn't Saddam simply pull all of his Republican Guard troops back into Baghdad?
Rommel maybe, Montgomery No, Gen Patton was the man who kicked Rommel's butt,
Ok, gotcha. I'm beginning to think that Saddam believes that he really will win. That's probably a good thing because when he realizes that he is doomed to swing from a lamppost, he's going to cut loose the chem/bio weapons on our troops and/or his own people.
They are men without a future.
True that. BUT, my thinking was along the lines of going into Baghdad itself. It was the luring of the Germans into the city itself and into the maze of buildings that was the worst part. House-to-house urband combat is very difficult. It doesn't matter whether or not Iraqi forces have two double armored columns double flanking your own forces. Its irrelevant in a city of millions if you can't persuade civilians to rebel and you can't harm them either because of political fallout. All I can say is that I hope our troops have studied their urban warfare field manuals with care. I mean a LOT of care. With no experience or plenty of it, it is a TOUGH job no matter how many years you can spend learning about it at Fort Benning. Flat desert with air support is one thing. Mazes of city streets are another. I guess it depends on the objective.
Dang it! The Iraqi snowdrifts will kick our butts come July!
Seriously - all this c$^p about not being able to fight in the summer is stupid. Anyone ever heard of NTC at Ft Irwin (think very close to Death Valley). We practice there in hot weather regularly. Does it suck? Yes. Would it suck worse to be an Iraqi fighting then? Damn right!
Some folks need to figure out - the US military isn't a Spring/Fall seasonal unit. Maybe the Euro-weenies' have militaries that don't practice for combat except when it is 75 & Sunny, but the US military can do the job 12 months a year.
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