Behind the Headlines: NK Intercept of Spy Plane Reveals Careful Planning, Allied Mistakes

Self | 3/4/03 | Self

[Spook86]

North Korea's recent intercept of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft was a carefully planned operation that brought four of its MiG fighters dangerously close to the American aircraft. However, the incident also highlighted proceedural errors that allowed the MiGs to close within 100 feet of the RC-135. The reverberations from this incident will be felt throughout the intelligence community and likely prompt a major review of RC-135 employment tactics.

Officially, the U.S. has acknowledged that NK fighters closed to within 50 feet of the reconniassance aircraft as it flew over the Sea of Japan last weekend. The Pentagon also revealed that the RC-135 in question was not a Rivet Joint platform that performs signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection against targeted countries. Instead, the RC-135 intercepted last weekend was a Cobra Ball variant, specially configured to monitor ballistic missile tests. According to unclassified sources, there are only a handful of these aircraft in existence. Based at Eielson AFB, Alaska, Cobra Ball deploys when a missile test appears imminent. The presence of Cobra Ball over the Sea of Japan last weekend indicates that North Korea's threatened test of a Tapeodong-2 missile may soon become a reality. It seems unlikely that the aircraft was conducting a training mission in the area, given recent tnesions between the U.S. and North Korea, and the restrictive ROE (rules of engagement) that govern RC-135 ops against that country.

As the RC-135 waited for a possible missile test, North Korean fighters did something they haven't done in more than 30 years--closing to within a few yards of a U.S. reconniassance aircraft. This is remarkable, for several reasons. First, the aircraft involved in the incident (MiG-23s and MiG-29s) typically don't respond to our recce flights over the Sea of Japan. These fighters--the best NK has in its inventory--are normally based near Pyongyang, on the western side of the Korean Peninsula. Their ability to close rapidly on the RC-135 suggests they were deployed to a base on the eastern coast, in preparation for the intercept.

It's also unusual for NK pilots to intercept a target more than 150 miles off their coast. Steeped in Soviet-style tactics, NK pilots require extensive assistance from ground controllers in finding their targets. That means lots of radio traffic and/or datalink signals between air and ground, normally detected by U.S. intelligence assets. Those signals, coupled with radar tracking, provide a "heads up" about NK intentions, and provide a warning for RC-135 crews.

Clearly, something went wrong last weekend. Four NK MiGs were able to navigate their way to the RC-135 and the crew didn't have sufficent time to retrograde from their orbit. That's a key point, because (as noted previously) RC-135 ROE for Korean missions are extremely stringent. At any sign of hostile intent, crews are supposed to terminate their mission and retrograde to "safe" airspace. The Pentagon hasn't revealed how the NK pilots managed this feat, but I'm guessing a "comm out" launch from an east coast base in the DPRK, followed by a high-speed run to the target.

Needless to say, there are a lot of red faces about this incident on the American side. In defense of the Cobra Ball crew, it should be noted that their aircraft does not have the same SIGNIT suite as Rivet Joint, and it is not geared toward detecting/monitoring tactical fighter activity. However, platforms like Cobra Ball are supported by other intel assets that provide flight following and tactical warning of emerging threats. Clearly, that warning was lacking over the Sea of Japan.

One final note: the U.S., at one time, maintained fighters on alert in Korea for the purpose of protecting reconnaissance aircraft. However, this mission was discontinued in the late 1990s, due to the "decreased" threat from North Korea. South Korean fighters still pull air defense alert on the peninsula, and that begs another question: why weren't ROKAF F-16s or F-4s scrambled in defense of Cobra Ball.

The post-mortem on this incident has already begun, and steps will be taken to prevent something like this from happening again. Beyond the headlines, the NK Air Force pulled off a daring intercept last weekend, an intercept based on extensive planning and precise execution. It was a carefully calibrated move, designed to rachet up tensions a bit more, and remind Washington that the crisis in Korea has not been resolved. The incident also underscores that Pyongyang is prepared to raise tensions again, by testing a Tapeodong-2 missile in the near future. That likely scenario will mean another call for Cobra Ball--and the potential for another incident over the Sea of Japan.

[Steel Wolf]

Perhaps they weren't North Korean pilots in the seats of those fighters; maybe Chinese pilots are getting some training...

Chinese pilots don't lack opportunities to intercept U.S. recon planes. This has Kim Jong Il's fingerprints all over it. It was a high level, coordinated effort to escalate the tensions in the area, something China has no interest in. They want the status quo, not conflict.

[spodefly]

Thanks for the insight. This perspective is something that we would not get from the mainstream press. Glad FR has people knowledgable about the inside scoop.

[tesshu]

My guess was that the provocation of the RC-135 was not the goal. Most likely they were hopeing that a SK or a US fighter would get in the mix and there would be some shooting. This could be spun into an act of war and moved attention away from Irag. Makes you wonder why NK is increasing their activity and rhetoric the closer we get to invading Iraq.....

[John H K]

One of the more futile arguments on FR is trying to convince people that the PRC doesn't micromanage and control all evil in the world down to the smallest detail.

Of course, back in the 60s, we thought that about the Soviet Union; at the same time the Soviets and the Chinese were involved in large-scale land combat with each other over border disputes, ironically.

For whatever reason it makes people feel better to believe all evil has a single controller, though.

[Steel Wolf]

You'd have to ask Spook86 for sure, but I'd assume that they were in and out before any U.S. or ROK fighters could have made it on the scene. A 150 mile dash to a slow moving transport plane and back could probably happen before any friendly fighters could be scrambled and sent to intercept.

They wouldn't want to wait for any fighters anyway. Hitting the RC-135 would be an easy kill, and they could fly home and claim they were provoked by an intrusion into their airspace. A U.S. or ROK fighter attack would probably leave the North Koreans sans four Migs.

[swarthyguy]

Excellent. Considered submitting it for publication?

[finnman69]

RC-135 Cobra Ball

[CyberAnt]

Thanks for the info - but I can bet there will NOT be any more "allied mistakes" ...??

[Spook86]

An interesting sidelight on this...during my days in Korea, the recce "defense" mission was initially handled by F-15s based at Osan AB, about 35 miles south of Seoul. The F-15s were actually deployed from Kadena AB on Okinawa. The Eagle drivers didn't particularly like the alert mission and they complained until it was reassigned to the 8th FW at Kunsan AB. The 8th (better known as The Wolfpack) flew Block 40 F-16Cs in those days. The only problem was location. Kunsan is located 180 NM south of the DMZ. That's a long way if you're trying to intercept a NK MiG before it can knock down an RC-135 over the Sea of Japan. In fact, some of us at Kunsan had misgivings about the mission for that very reason. Still, the 8th soldiered on with the alert mission until it was eliminated in the late 1990s (or so I was told). The "best" way to defend RC-135s of the SOJ is with F-15s from Osan, or ROKAF F-16s from a base in the northern part of that country. I'll bet you a dollar someone in Korea is sitting that mission today.....

[CyberAnt]

I have a second and third question ...??

What is your assessment of this little "incident" being a dry run to take down the aircraft - the same as the one in China - except they knew this aircraft was not the exact same kind ...??

But ... did they have to get a visual to be able to tell the difference ...??

[Spook86]

To answer your question, yes, it could have been a dry run, especially since NK hasn't conducted one of these in quite a while. BTW, it's no accident that the intercept was conducted by MiG-23s and MiG-29s; not only are these the best fighters in the DPRK inventory, they're also flown by the most experienced pilots. And, not surprisingly, it's very rare for the MiG-23s and MiG-29s to operate together--another indication that this was not your typical intercept....

[wretchard]

The fact the NKs could pull this off so smoothly should give us some pause in our assuptions of their capabilities and intentions.

This type of activity is an operational staple of the North Koreans. Back in the 1960s they shot down an EC-121, killing 31. They seized the USN intelligence ship Pueblo(seizing a Navy ship doesn't happen very often). Back in the mid-1970s, a bunch of North Korean guards in the truce village suddenly attacked unarmed US troops with axes. They've got guys there who think of nothing else all day long.

This incident shows the dangers inherent in a defensive posture. It allows the enemy the choice of time and place of attack, and he will choose the most favorable circumstances, making even defended targets vulnerable. Remember the Marine barracks in Beirut; Khafji; the Cole, the Khobar Towers; the WTC.

I personally do not believe that providing recon flights off Korea with better radar warning or fighter cover would be possible, or work in all cases. It might be better to deniably intercept Nokor Migs or coastal boats training for similar missions, so that they vanish without a trace, without a Mayday.

[Tommyjo]

China doesn't operate either MiG-29s or MiG-23s.

[Taxman]

If the account I read is correct, one of the MIGS "locked up" the -135 with it's (the Mig's) fire control radar, which, if I recall the ROE, is considered an act of war.

The -135 does not have any offensive or defensive capability, and had the North Korean Communist pilot mashed his button, the -135 and crew would be history.

Need a serious rethink here, as you noted. Fighter escort with "white ones" on the rails?

[CyberAnt]

Third Question: Did they have to get visual (50 ft away) in order to find out if this type of plane was the same as the one that went down in China ...??

Or ... do they have equipment which could tell the difference without the visual ...??

[Spook86]

The NKs might be able to determine the variant by a couple of things. First, the flight profile. Cobra Ball, as I recall, operates a slightly different track than Rivet Joint, which (typically) maintains a racetrack-style orbit while collecting. These differences should be discernable on radar. There might also be slight difference in ELINT emissions from each aircraft, reflecting the different sensor suites onboard. One more thing: at altitude, you don't really need to get within 50 feet to discern a Ball from Rivet Joint. Ball is the only aircraft in the world with its right side and wing painted black, to reduce glare that could affect its onboard telescopes....

[CyberAnt]

Great info - thanks. I was trying to give N.K. the benefit of the doubt - but your explanations remove that.