Stratfor War and Geo-Political Analyais (Don't miss this one!)

Email ^ | Recently | http://www.stratfor.com/

[advocate10]

Iraq, The War, and the next 5 years

An Analysis
 

This is a summary of a SSSB-organised Conference Call with Dr George Freeman,  Chief Intelligence Office of a Geo-Milito-Political Consultancy firm in the US, called Stratfor, which is based in Boston. The call is from earlier this week. The following analysis should not be taken to be the opinion of the summariser, nor the view of SSSB.

Executive Summary

Ø     This is a war which is definitively going to happen.  Ø     It will most likely commence between 27th February and March 2nd.  Ø     It will be over by mid-April.  Ø     Regime change is the objective.  Ø     The US is committed to a major military presence in the area for the foreseeable future.  Ø     The purpose of the war is to position the US in the heart of the region, so as to be able to bring to bear overwhelming pressure on surrounding States, so that they ruthlessly 'deal with'  the Al Quaeda network in their countries ... or else face the US.  Ø     Ultimately, Pakistan is on the US agenda.  Ø     India, as a consequence, is going to become a major US ally.  Ø     China will acquiesce, as will Russia, in return for US recognition of their respective rights to 'deal with' 'insurgency' as they see fit.  Ø     Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia are the biggest losers .... and Iraq.  Ø     The current international landscape is about to fundamentally change ... war will become a permanent feature of the next 5-10 years.     

Prospects for war: Converging with the 20 century mean

  The backdrop of Stratfor's analysis: 
We are re-entering 'normality',  and that the 1990s were a period of abnormality.
That stockmarkets have gone up and down during conflicts [Korea, Vietnam] and that war is neither extraordinary in terms of the 20th century, nor is it inherently bad for markets.
The Iraqi invasion itself is not about Al Quaeda being in Iraq.
Nor is it about oil.
The US is committed to a long-term presence in the region. 

Ø      It is about Iraq being the single-most strategically placed country in the Middle-East ... having at its borders Syria, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Kuwait.

The US rationale

To date, the US has always been an outsider when it has come to dealing with issues in the Middle East, and as direct consequence it has always needed alliances ..... this will change, definitively, when it becomes the dominant and overwhelming military power in the region. The whole dynamic of the Middle East will shift as a consequence.

What is the purpose of the war?

Ø      The purpose is to redefine the geopolitics of the region, in order to be able to bring direct and unavoidable pressure upon countries who are intentionally, or by default, are allowing Al Quaeda to operate.

Ø      The driving logic is to create a new reality: that it is far worse not to co-operate with the US than it is to ignore Al Quaeda within their own countries, for fear of internal problems.

Nevertheless it is a scenario which these countries have recognised is increasingly likely to come to take place.

The opposition from Iran and Saudi Arabia has little to with Iraq, and everything to do with the wider implications of a long-term US presence in the Middle East.

Is it likely to take place?
War is a certainty [according to Stratfor]

Ø      The US administration is absolutely committed to going to war.

Ø      It does not want a UN 'government' in place.

The immediate upshot of war:

Ø      Syria will be surrounded by hostile countries [Turkey, US/Iraq, Israel]

Ø      US naval dominance will provide overwhelming reach.

Ø      Saudi Arabia will be surrounded by Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, US/Iraq, Qatar.

Ø      Iran will be flanked by US-supporting Afghanistan on its East, and in the West by the US/Iraq, Kuwait.

Fighting the war:

There are currently two opposing perceptions of the forthcoming war:

The US perception/assumption: The Iraqi army is incapable of fighting.  As the US command views the situation, the predominant supposition is that the regular Iraqi army collapsed when the US took it on in Kuwait. The assumption in 1991 was that US casualties would be high: the US establishment feels that they over-estimated the Iraqi army. As a result, the theme now is that the Iraqi regular army cannot fight. Stratfor states that this shows a strange schizophrenia , in that the public are encouraged to believe that great sophistication is being shown by the Iraqi subterfuge and deceptions regarding the mobile chemical bio-chemical weapons which are being moved about the country at the moment, whilst little competence is accorded/transferred to the army. 


The Iraqi perception/assumption: Saddam Hussein believes that he will win. This is based on the premise that the US does not want to suffer high casualties, as evidenced in the 1990s by Somalia, Beirut, and the1991 war. Far from being a massive defeat for Iraq, Hussein/Iraq views the Gulf War as, at best, a draw, and at worst as being defeat for the US. Why? Because the perception is that, beside being ejected from Kuwait, when the US met the Iraqi Republican Guard, the US gave up and gave in. Thus, now Iraq believes that just so long as they can inflict high casualties upon the US early on, and then have an urban battle in Baghdad, that the US will revert to type, and that a UN-based ceasefire will come into acceptance.....and that Saddam Hussein and his regime will continue to survive. 

So, we have two very different perceptions of the past, upon which the present is now predicated.

When will War begin?

Ø      Between February 27th and March 2nd.

Why then?

Ø      Because that, for the US, is the optimal period of the phases of the moon.

Ø      The US wishes to commence the attack in darkness. Night darkness favours the US, because Stealth bombers can only be picked up optically, and not by radar. Also, darkness will aid special forces going in under cover.

By when will it end?

Ø      The most likely deadline for the resolution of the war, from the perspective of the US, is mid-April. This is because should Iraq decide to use Chemical weapons against the US, the above-85 degree temperature will render the anti-chemical suits virtually inoperable, with US fighting basically ineffective.

Ø      It cannot wait until mid-autumn because the US currently has six army divisions around Iraq ....the 'family jewels' have now been committed. A force with overwhelming battle-strike potential is now in place. There is no way it will be held there indefinitely. This war will, and has to be, fought to conclusion.

Is there a possible earlier start date?
Ø      Yes: If Iraqi troops in the North and South, near the oilfields, and around Baghdad, were suddenly to be moved, then it is very possible that bombardment would begin.

How will it be fought?

      First: Complete suppression of Iraqi air-defences, using cruise missiles,  Stealth bombers, and heavy strikes against all Iraqi  command centres.

Ø      Simultaneously, ground operations would begin early on.

Ø      From the South the US would advance into the oilfields rapidly, in order to prevent their destruction. The purpose of this is two-fold: to secure the oilfields, for future usage; and to secure the road infrastructure leading up to the region, which will be critical for the successful follow-up of troops and armour.

Ø      Also of paramount importance: of the six bridges which cross the Euphrates river, three must be taken intact by the US, or else critical time will be lost in re-bridging.

The First Military Objective:

Ø      The primary initial objective of the US forces is to seize the afore-mentioned bridges. Special forces will enter first, followed up by heavy armour.

Ø      Stratfor states that success is expected, due to the absolute excellence the US has at this sort of operation.

The Ultimate Military Objective:

Ø      To take Baghdad and effect 'regime change'.

Ø      Easier said than done...

Ø      Taking a major capital is a scale of task hitherto unattempted in US military history, and indeed only attempted successfully on a few occasions worldwide [Berlin by the Soviet Union was successful, but Stalingrad and Leningrad both were too much for Germany].

If Iraq can fight effectively from the outset [contrary to the US assumption, in Stratfor's view] then there is a serious problem.

This will be a key point in the success of the overall campaign.

There are currently four brigades of the Republican Guard in Baghdad. The US has never yet encountered them in battle.

Ø      The key question is: Will the Republican Guard fight?

Ø      The importance of morale on this point, within Iraq, is crucial.

Ø       If the Republican Guard can fight the US to a standstill/standoff, then it will have achieved its aim.

Ø      The reality here is that no-one, not the US, and not even Saddam Hussein, knows the answer to this question for sure.


In purely military terms, there is no question that the US can take Baghdad: the question is, however, at what price?

The US cannot afford to be seen to be targeting civilians - something which was not an issue in either Berlin or Stalingrad in WW2.

Thus the US hope that there may be one of three outcomes in Baghdad:

That the Special Republican Guard decides not to fight.
That there is a coup within the Iraqi military high command and immediate surrender to the US.  This is not something which should be dismissed as a possibility - certainly their loyalty has in the past by no means been assured: viz. the periodic purges of the military elite during the 1990s.
The US manages to win the city without excessive civilian casualties.Take time to      

What does this successful US outcome do for geopolitical alliances in Europe?

Ø      That both Germany and France have made a major miscalculation.

Ø      The assumption that a united European response was not the natural corollary to the US position was wrong.

Ø      Too many European countries do not want a dominant Paris-Berlin coalition, according to Stratfor, for fear of 'generational domination'. Hence the support of the Iberian peninsula, most of Eastern Europe, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Of greater consequence is: What will happen to other states?

Ø      Saudi Arabia will be in difficulties.

Ø      Syria will be under immense pressure in the future.

Ø      Iran will be faced with a far more immediate challenge to its internal structure.

Ø      India will benefit considerably both in terms of business and political relationships.

Ø      Why? Because, ultimately, after Iraq, dealing with Pakistan will the next overriding objective for the US.

The Oil Effect?

Ø      Stratfor assert that this is not about oil...

Ø      There will be a minimal effect on oil prices from the war.

Ø      The Venezuelan effect will have had a bigger impact.

Ø      There are already US contingency plans in play. The worst case situation is already in the price.

Ø      At worst, 1.5mil bpd will be off the market, but not permanently.


Wider implications of the Iraqi war

      War is going to be a permanent backdrop for the next 5-10 years.

Ø      There will be a de facto 'extension of an informal US empire'.

Ø      Markets, will have to learn to live it, and they will do so.

Ø      The Structural impact on the US economy will range between neutral to positive.

Ø      There will be 'considerably more friction between the US and other countries'.

Q &A Session in Conference Call

In 2003/4, post-Iraq, what priorities does the Bush administration have vis-à-vis the wider region?


Ø      The US view is that it cannot do anything about anti-Americanism.

Ø      It will not attempt to win the hearts and minds of people locally.

Ø      It will attempt to 'create a sense of fear and impotence' within the region.

Ø      It will ensure that nation states are more afraid of not cooperating with the US than simply ignoring terrorism within their own countries. 

Ø      This is where the Al Quaeda aspect will enter: the US will exert extremely heavy pressure on suspected countries, forcing them to deal with Al Quaeda effectively.

Ø      ... should cooperation be found wanting, the US will not baulk at launching covert operations and extreme pressure onto non-cooperating countries...

Why take this strategy?

Ø      Because the thinking is that Al Quaeda cannot afford to become a larger organisation, because  - the theory asserts - the larger it becomes, the less secure it becomes.

Ø      Structurally highly-secure growth of Al Quaeda is of greater concern to the US..

Impact/Implications for other countries

North Korea

Ø      North Korea, according to Stratfor, is little more than a side issue. It is merely playing the latest round in a decade-long game where it seeks to gain economic concessions from the US/Japan/South Korea in return for ratcheting down military rhetoric.

Ø      There is a 'qualitative difference' to the Korean threat; it is not likely that the US will get involved.

Russia

Ø      There have already been quiet talks between Washington and Moscow over Chechnya. There will be a change in US policy towards Chechnya, which will be the price of Russian co-operation.

Ø      The Russian administration will be 'very happy' with the new paradigm.

Ø      They do not care excessively about Iraq: they will settle for an increased market share in Oil.

Iran
Ø      Iran will choose to close down internal debate as it steps up its security levels.

Ø      Long-term, it knows it is in danger: the US-Iran issue will be a serious issue for the future.

Ø      There may well be considerable internal change further down the line.

France/Germany
Ø      France is not posturing for commercial reason, as some commentators are suggesting.

Ø      On the contrary, they have made a serious strategic miscalculation, and are now staring at an'abyss' in which they have alienated the US, and have caused considerable resentment within Europe for their current stance.

Ø      The German-French response to the US has as its overall purpose the creation of a European counterweight to US power.
Israel
Ø      The US, whilst 'absolutely committed to the survival of Israel', does not want to involved itself in the resolution of what it regards as an essentially, if not exclusively, internal issue.

Ø      The US would prefer to see a timely and equitable resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict; but the pressure it is likely to exert upon the Israeli administration will more probably focus on encouraging the Israeli administration to coming to an 'accommodation' with Hamas, with Arafat side-lined.

China
Ø      China is 'delighted' with the new situation. Why?

Ø      Pre-9/11 the focus of US strategy had decisively shifted towards worsening US-China relations. Now, the entire focus has shifted away from Asia.

Ø      US needs china diplomatically.

Ø      ... but China is also worried by improved and strengthened [in the medium-term] US-India relations.

Ø      China also has its own internal issues - the price of cooperation with the US will be that the US does not interfere with its internal 'security issues'.

Ø      With poor US-China relations out of the way, there will be a new 'lease of life' towards improved commercial and political relations with the US.

India
Ø      India is going to be one of the main longer term beneficiaries of the new situation

Ø      Why? Because the US has decided that it has to deal with Pakistan's linkages to Al Quaeda, and its non-cooperation, hitherto, in dealing with terror cells which the US allege are being given the official 'blind eye'.

Ø      The US will be keen to develop commercial links to solidify this relationship

Will Nato survive?
Ø      Difficult to say: whilst it is not the remit of this discussion ...

Ø      Nato no longer has its ration d'etre [the Soviet Union]

Ø      The US does not want to involve itself with such a consensus-oriented institution.

Ø      Where consensus is so evidently lacking, the US does not want to reveal military plans and secrets to an essentially un-trusted organisation.

So what will emerge?
Ø      Whilst Nato may continue to exist in name, in effect a series of informal and formal alliances will [and indeed have] emerged in its place

Ø      For example: at the moment the Netherlands is supplying Kuwait with Patriot Missiles. Germany is supplying the Netherlands with these. This sort of accommodation will become the norm, as will a lack of formalisation of such alliances.

What are the key initial lead indicators of the possibility of  military success 7-10 days in?

Ø      Are the six bridges over the Euphrates blown effectively by the Iraqi army?

Ø      If they are intact, then it will be assumed that the regular Iraqi army are ineffective.

Ø      Chemical weapons are most likely to be used in this area of the conflict.

Ø      Within the 1st 96 hrs there should be a good picture emerging of Iraqi morale.

What does Iraq/Hussein  want? Simply to survive through to mid-April?
Ø      Yes: Iraq wants to reach mid-April having inflicted thousands of casualties on the US, in the hope that this will erode US public opinion, forcing Bush to seek a UN ceasefire.

Ø      Iraq wants to make a big impact on the periphery of its borders early on, in order to shore up morale and support in the centre if Iraq, ie in Baghdad.

Is there going to be a major terrorist attack in the US during the next 6 weeks?
Ø      There will 'certainly be attempts'.

Ø      But ... Al Quaeda attacks when least expected: we know too little of their overall reach and capabilities to say anything else definitively.

What about the dangers posed by chemical weapons?
Ø      This is a key issue: one of the main reasons that the public is not being told of the whereabouts of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is because what the US fears most is that Iraq learns how much is known about them, and that as a consequence they move and hide the weapons before the US can react.

Ø      The US will already have covert troops targeting the sites they know of, and will hope to take them out early on.

Ø      It is possible they might be used against Kuwait - it is likely against Turkey, and it is possible against Israel.

The Bigger Picture post-Iraq

Ø      Stratfor assert that the current Iraqi situation should be seen as a 'campaign as part of a protracted wider war' which will last for 5-10 years, and which will, by default ,overwhelmingly dominate the international scene

Who will gain most?

Ø      The high-tech sectors

Ø      China

Ø      Russia

Ø      India

Summariser's Thoughts:

Ø      Whilst I am in no way better qualified than anyone to opine upon this issue, I found the above analysis considerably more in depth than anything that I have come across within the UK media to date. To be sure, it is a hawkish view ... but what if it is also right?

Ø      The implications and potential consequences which are highlighted in this piece in particular have brought attention to China, Russia, and India. These may not be short-term 'beneficiaries -even if such a description were to be appropriate - but it is a thought, all the same. 

Ø      Consideration of the possibility that we may be about to enter a shift in geo-politics so significant that it bears comparison with 1945 and 1989 is also critical for understanding where we are going ... whatever one's views regarding the rights and wrongs therein.

 

[Procyon]

It may be worse than "dirty bomb material".

Yeah but the plutonium can get out sooner and easier.

Plutonium is tricky stuff. Very likely to sputter dirty rather than nuclear chain reaction. In 1945 we tested our plutonium device at Trinity site before dropping one on Nagasaki. Postwar we had one go dirty on us at Bikini and ground zero there had to be paved over and fenced off.

[ggekko]

When is this war going start?

[the gillman@blacklagoon.com]

One problem with Stratfor is they have a few too many lefties. Lefties tend to miscalculate consistently along certain lines.

Iran is a tough guess to make. There seems to be a strong pro-western/democracy movement, but the controlling authorities are utterly ruthless. Maybe with the US close by on either side they will get the nerve to go for it, and may we have the stones to support them.

As to Iraq, may be the war is already started. We're bombing the hell out of certain targets and their tropps have been moving.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

Russia

Ø There have already been quiet talks between Washington and Moscow over Chechnya. There will be a change in US policy towards Chechnya, which will be the price of Russian co-operation.

Ø The Russian administration will be 'very happy' with the new paradigm.

Ø They do not care excessively about Iraq: they will settle for an increased market share in Oil.

A few months ago this analysis would have appeared correct. Now I am not so sure. Straddling the fence between the US/UK axis and the France/Germany axis, it appears that Russia is shifting fairly decisively to the Franco/German side. Why?

The Russians know that the Franco/German axis will never be capable of building up their military to a sufficient level to mount any serious threat against Russia. The combination of overly generous social democratic welfare states and long-term demograph decline assures that "Europe" will never be more than a lightweight counterweight to the US -- unless Russia's resources and military are weighed into the balance. Russia realizes that the Franco/German-centered "Europe" will need Russia far more than the US ever will. Thus, the Russians are moving into a position where they can exercise considerable long-term leverage on "Europe" to advance Russia's own interests.

Russia views an expansive NATO as a threat only as long as the US is a member of NATO. Break up NATO, expel the US from the continent, and replace it with France's vision of a "Europe-only" military alliance, and this would be no threat to the Russia at all. Indeed, there would be no obstacle and considerable advantages to both sides for Russia to join such an alliance. Having a continued US presence along the periphery -- UK, Iceland, Spain -- would not be particularly worrisome to the Russians, and in fact might actually be an advantage in keeping the fickle French shoved into Russia's arms.

Russia is still smarting from the loss of its empire. Long-term, it would like to re-assert hegemony over Eastern Europe. As long as the US is in NATO, this will be difficult to do. However, the French and especially the Germans are also interested in asserting economic hegemony in E. Europe - something that Russia will be unable to do for a long time, and in any case it is not economic influence that Russia is interested in, but rather political and military influence. Thus, the Russians may be coming around to seeing the Germans and the French as potential partners rather than competitors in bring E. Europe back into their orbit. With E. Europe sandwiched between the Franco/German axis on one side and Russia on the other, and with NATO in shambles and the US out, E. Europe will be in no position to mount a long-term resistance against the Franco/Russo/German hegemony.

The Russians do care about economics, though, and they need help. The US has been stingy, and the simple economic fact is that - due to their proximity - "Europe" is in a position to be a better long-term economic partner than is the US. Europe has the markets for Russian resources, and the technology and capital to help the Russian economy develop.

While Russia has its Chechnya problem, and thus shares with the US a strategic interest in combatting radical Islam, Russia also has a long-term strategic interest in reasserting hegemony over Central Asia, and in attempting to gain hegemony over Iran and Turkey (especially if they see the handwriting on the wall and realize that India will probably end up in the US corner). Because more flies are caught with honey than with vinegar, it might not really be in Russia's interests to be seen as a highly visible partner in a US "crusade" against global Islamic extremism. Instead, Russia's interests are in keeping the Chechnya situation bottled up and viewed as purely an internal security affair.

Very long-term, Russia's greatest security threat is China. It is known that China would like to eventually absorb Siberia to provide lebensraum, resources, and brides. Russia may have realized that with its declining population, sick economy, and aging military, China can afford to just patiently wait until the time is right. The Russians have probably guessed that the US is unlikely to commit to fighting a world war and losing uncounted millions of casualties just to keep Siberia out of Chinese hands. Nor are the French and Germans. Thus, their best bet might be to cut a deal with the Chinese now, while they are about as strong as they are ever going to be relative to the Chinese. The Chinese, of course, are delighted to see the US booted out of NATO and a Franco/Russo/German axis emerge as a counterweight to the US. The Chinese know that there is no way that this axis will ever have the capability or willpower to be a real threat against China. They might put up resistance to a Chinese invasion of Siberia, but such an invasion may not be necessary. China can get all the trade they want with the Franco/Russo/German axis. Lebensraum can wait for a few more centuries if necessary. Note, however, that because the Chinese have some strategic interests that conflict with the European axis, this leaves open the possibility that the US could "play the China card" once more.

Conclusion

A Franco/Russo/German axis is forming.

NATO is dead. A new continental European military alliance will eventually develop instead, minus the US, and possibly minus the UK, Spain, Iceland, and a few other countries, but plus Russia.

This arising European alliance is unlikely to be a full counterweight to the US. However, with the inclusion of Russia, it will nevertheless be sufficiently powerful to be a serious concern. This alliance will become one of our principal adversaries.

China will not be part of this new European alliance, but will be on friendly terms with it.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

Iran

Ø Iran will choose to close down internal debate as it steps up its security levels.

Ø Long-term, it knows it is in danger: the US-Iran issue will be a serious issue for the future.

Ø There may well be considerable internal change further down the line.

Russia has a long-term strategic interest in replacing US hegemony in Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan with their own, and extending their own hegemony over Iran. During the bad old atheistic Communist days, this was impossible, but current events are opening up new possibilities for them. We have just seen a potential split opening up between the US and Turkey. As the posted analysis indicates, the US and Pakistan cannot really remain "friends", and the US will certainly eventually have to move against Pakistan. If the Iraq war does happen and the US establishes a long-term presence there (as the article indicates), then this will inflame the whole region, and in particular will make the Iranians feel very threatened. Russia could be waiting for them with open arms. Especially if Russia casts a veto and sides with the Franco/German axis, then Russia will be viewed in a more favorable light. Russia's continuing conflict with Chechnya is a barrier to better relations with Iran, Pakistan, and -- to a lesser extent -- Turkey. On the other hand, establishing a band of cooperative friends from Turkey through Pakistan would go far toward Russia's goal of shutting off the spigot to the Chechen rebels. Iran is the key country in this regard -- if the Russians could cut a deal with the Iranians (say, Russia gives Chechnya some local autonomy and backs off, in return for Iran turning off the spigot to the Chechen rebels), then this could both go far toward solving Russia's Chechnya problem and be the breakthrough toward establishing Russian hegemony over the region.

[Eva]

Ok, a few comments:

The Iraqi perception/assumption: Saddam Hussein believes that he will win. This is based on the premise that the US does not want to suffer high casualties, as evidenced in the 1990s by Somalia, Beirut, and the1991 war. - I have been reading Roosevelt's Secret War and this is exactly the same mistake that Hitler made.

France is not posturing for commercial reason, as some commentators are suggesting. --Of course France's reasons are not purely commercial, but the commercial dealings with Iraq had a political as well as economic basis, to strengthen France and weaken the US.

[Theophilus]

The unrefined plutonium they have in the spent rods is just as dangerous, in terms of a dirty bomb, as refined plutonium. I believe, plutonium is not a good dirty bomb material because it too dangerous to the engineers & deliverers (most poisonous substance known to exist), too radioactive (detectable), too unstable (burns when exposed to air) and finally, because it is a synthetic element, too expensive (worth thousands upon thousands perhaps millions of times it weight in gold, most valuable).

The only value obtained by refining the spent rods is to create a nuke because you need purity to sustain a chain reaction.

[Noumenon]

I believe we are in a world war, like it or not...

True enough. It's amazing how many still tend to think of war in terms of the strategy, tactics and worldview of World War II. Today, it is anything but. Martin Van Creveld's works are highly recommended, if somewhat dry.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

France/Germany

Ø France is not posturing for commercial reason, as some commentators are suggesting.

Ø On the contrary, they have made a serious strategic miscalculation, and are now staring at an'abyss' in which they have alienated the US, and have caused considerable resentment within Europe for their current stance.

Ø The German-French response to the US has as its overall purpose the creation of a European counterweight to US power.

They are indeed pursuing the European counterweight strategy, but this is no miscalculation. The intent of the French for a long time has been to eventually force the breakup of NATO and departure of the US from continental Europe. This was impossible as long as the Christian Democrats were in power in Germany. But with Schroder, and especially Joshka Fischer, now in office, combined with the present crisis and the very controversial and unpopular position on the part of the US, the French have seen an exceptional strategic opportunity, and have decided that now is the time to force the break.

This is so important to the French that they are quite prepared to see substantial numbers of defections among their EU/NATO partners, including Britain and Spain (both of whom have traditionally been French enemies rather than friends, and thus not really viewed all that fondly by Paris).

The real roll of the dice here is that the French and Germans are hoping to bring Russia into their alliance. Doing so will bring them several important benefits:

The Russians still have substantial military assets - enough so that the Franco/Russo/German axis becomes a significant (though still not equal) competitor with the US.

Russia offers substantial oil, gas, mineral, and other resource supplies for the EU, while the EU offers technology and development capital for Russia.

Gaining Russia as an axis partner and giving the US the boot from continental Europe puts the squeeze on the E. European countries. As Chirac said, this will be "a good opprotunity for them to shut up."

Conclusion:

This is no miscalculation. France and Germany know full well what they are doing, and this is a very serious, high-stakes game.

[Paulus Invictus]

Agreed NATO is a dead duck, but so is the UN if the French vetoes the resolution proposed by the Brits/US.

[tm22721]

Capturing Baghdad is akin to 'checkmate' in chess.

Game Over for the terrorists.

BUMP

[12B]

STRATFOR + Afghanistan = No credibility

[cibco]

So... what is your prediction for this one?

[alfa6]

Bump for later Find

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[RightWhale]

Stratfor seems to be like any thinktank: they throw everything they know into a box and shake it up. The results are pretty much random. Much like DEBKA. Groupthink.

Rather than relying on their interpretations, just look at their data. Any single person can do as well as or better than a committee when it comes to predictions.

[Jim Noble]

Eastasia and Eurasia have always been at war with Oceania.

[mhking]

It will most likely commence between 27th February and March 2nd.

OK, now that THAT part is wrong, what next?

[mhking]

I believe we are in a world war, like it or not

Absolutely. In addition, you're right about Korea. DPRK is going to push as far as they can.

[martianagent]

fyi

[sd-joe]

Your analysis to the various posts in this thread sound so spot on, it blows my mind.

You are good. Are you a professional at this.