He said astronauts would have been ''standing out in the hallways to volunteer.''
We don't want any of these manly heroics. We've got to keep these antics squashed in favor of the impersonal "hands off" approach. It's the impersonal "hands off" approach that makes "markets" the thing of beauty that they are, after all.
NASA never gave 'em a chance. Christ, what a price we pay for some mistakes -- indolence, indifference, etc.
Kindest Regards
May 28, 2003 07:01 PM ET
By Jeff Franks
HOUSTON (Reuters) - A subtle cultural change at NASA that shifted emphasis away from safety likely contributed to the Feb. 1 destruction of shuttle Columbia, which fell apart over Texas minutes before the end of its 16-day mission, investigators said Wednesday.
In their final news conference in Houston before moving to Washington to write their findings on the tragedy that killed seven astronauts, members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board said they would highlight a number of problems at the U.S. space agency. They include safety impediments within its culture.
In NASA's earliest days, the agency was known for its macho "right stuff" attitude that put a premium on daring and risk. However, that was replaced by a widespread safety consciousness after the shuttle Challenger exploded after takeoff in 1986.
Over time, as dozens of post-Challenger shuttle missions were conducted successfully, safety apparently moved off center stage, the board chairman, retired U.S. Navy admiral Hal Gehman, told reporters.
"Some people have characterized it as a change in posture from one in which you had to prove that it was safe to fly to one in which you have to prove it was unsafe to fly," he said. "In other words, the people who had doubts about anything were essentially outside the circle and had to work their way in rather than the doubters being inside the circle."
"There is ample reason for us to be concerned and to look at it very, very carefully," he said.
It was in that context that flight managers downplayed the seriousness of insulating foam that flew from the shuttles' external fuel tanks and banged into the orbiters on several flights, including Columbia as it lifted off from Florida on Jan. 16.
NASA engineers viewed the foam as a maintenance issue, not a safety risk and did little to address it, board member Major General Kenneth Hess said.
"There is a kind of a lack of appreciation for the total risk involved," he said.
The leading theory for the shuttle disaster is that foam struck the edge of the shuttle's left wing, which damaged its heat shield and led to the orbiter frame heating up and falling apart as Columbia reentered the earth's atmosphere.
The shattered shuttle fell in thousands of pieces over a broad swath of Texas and Louisiana.
The board members also said there appeared to be deficiencies in preflight preparations that were attributable in part to the need for more safety inspectors.
Gehman said the investigation board, which has compiled two tractor-trailers full of documents, would move to Washington this weekend where it will work on what he promised would be a "very, very thick" report on the demise of Columbia.
He said the board hopes to complete the report before the U.S. Congress summer recess starting July 25.
-- Reuters.