May 28, 2003 07:01 PM ET
By Jeff Franks
HOUSTON (Reuters) - A subtle cultural change at NASA that shifted emphasis away from safety likely contributed to the Feb. 1 destruction of shuttle Columbia, which fell apart over Texas minutes before the end of its 16-day mission, investigators said Wednesday.
In their final news conference in Houston before moving to Washington to write their findings on the tragedy that killed seven astronauts, members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board said they would highlight a number of problems at the U.S. space agency. They include safety impediments within its culture.
In NASA's earliest days, the agency was known for its macho "right stuff" attitude that put a premium on daring and risk. However, that was replaced by a widespread safety consciousness after the shuttle Challenger exploded after takeoff in 1986.
Over time, as dozens of post-Challenger shuttle missions were conducted successfully, safety apparently moved off center stage, the board chairman, retired U.S. Navy admiral Hal Gehman, told reporters.
"Some people have characterized it as a change in posture from one in which you had to prove that it was safe to fly to one in which you have to prove it was unsafe to fly," he said. "In other words, the people who had doubts about anything were essentially outside the circle and had to work their way in rather than the doubters being inside the circle."
"There is ample reason for us to be concerned and to look at it very, very carefully," he said.
It was in that context that flight managers downplayed the seriousness of insulating foam that flew from the shuttles' external fuel tanks and banged into the orbiters on several flights, including Columbia as it lifted off from Florida on Jan. 16.
NASA engineers viewed the foam as a maintenance issue, not a safety risk and did little to address it, board member Major General Kenneth Hess said.
"There is a kind of a lack of appreciation for the total risk involved," he said.
The leading theory for the shuttle disaster is that foam struck the edge of the shuttle's left wing, which damaged its heat shield and led to the orbiter frame heating up and falling apart as Columbia reentered the earth's atmosphere.
The shattered shuttle fell in thousands of pieces over a broad swath of Texas and Louisiana.
The board members also said there appeared to be deficiencies in preflight preparations that were attributable in part to the need for more safety inspectors.
Gehman said the investigation board, which has compiled two tractor-trailers full of documents, would move to Washington this weekend where it will work on what he promised would be a "very, very thick" report on the demise of Columbia.
He said the board hopes to complete the report before the U.S. Congress summer recess starting July 25.
-- Reuters.
WASHINGTON -- Lawmakers on Capitol Hill will have access to secret testimony heard by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), sources tell SPACE.com.
Discussions between congressional staffers and the board are continuing on the mechanics of meeting both the needs of Congress to conduct thorough oversight of federal agencies and the board’s pledge to protect the identities of key witnesses who provided important information.
CAIB chairman Harold Gehman, a retired Navy Adm., said the board granted privacy not so much to ensure truthfulness, but to encourage witnesses to volunteer information they might otherwise hold back.
"It cannot be done any other way in our opinion," he told lawmakers concerned about the practice, promising that the end result will be "a better product."
Gehman told reporters after a hearing before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee in Washington that the board has promised anonymity to some 200 individuals who have given testimony to the accident investigation board.
While the board intends to honor its agreements with those individuals within the fullest extent of the law, Gehman said he also believes a solution can be reached that will allow lawmakers to exercise their full oversight responsibilities without making the sworn statements public.
Some lawmakers took exception with the idea of privileged testimony in the first place.
"It’s not going to be credible with the American people unless it is made public. Secrecy may be policy in military investigations, but NASA is a civilian agency," said U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., who flew aboard Columbia in 1986.
According to congressional sources, accommodations will be made whereby a limited number of congressional staffers will be permitted controlled access to the complete witness statements.
A staffer assigned to one of the Congressional oversight committees with responsibility for NASA said this week that the details are still be worked out.
Past experience such as when members of Congress need access to classified military information, suggests appropriate staffers will be able to examine the statements, for example, in a central location with controlled access but not be allowed to make copies of the documents.
The option of holding privileged testimony was made possible by putting all CAIB members on the federal payroll, a move that also raised eyebrows and prompted some to question the independence of the five civilian board members who are now being paid with a NASA check.
"NASA does not pay our salaries, you pay our salaries," Gehman told lawmakers, many of whom had voted earlier this year to add $50 million to NASA’s 2003 budget to defray the cost of the Columbia accident investigation.
"NASA keeps the books for me but I spend that money, so somehow suggesting that members of this board are influenced by the book, by the way the records are kept, I find to be somewhat naïve," Gehman said.
For the record, Gehman is being paid an annual rate of $142,500 for chairing the board. His check comes from the Office of Personnel and Management.
Seven of the board members were already on the federal payroll when they were assigned to the CAIB.
The remaining five board members -- four professors and one retired business executive -- are now receiving checks issued by NASA. Their annual rate of pay is $134,000.
John Logsdon of George Washington University and Sally Ride of the University of California at San Diego are on unpaid leave from their employers. Douglas Osheroff of Stanford University is not. A spokesman for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology did not return a call asking about Sheila Widnall's employment status.
Jim Banke, Senior Producer in the Cape Canaveral Bureau, contributed to this report. -- space.com
"There is a kind of a lack of appreciation for the total risk involved," he said.
From outside of the space program, I still find this statement extremely difficult to believe.
In my opinion, risk analysis is fairly routine and has been a stable practice since at least the early '60s.
Engineers do not normally drop the risk analysis ball, in my experience.
But IMHO bean counters do-- and often.
The only ways in which engineers could drop the ball IMHO is if they had severe pressure from management, or else a complete changing of the guard, so to speak, a mass replacement of experienced personnel by green college hires with no training.
I would be skeptical of any outside review coming to the conclusion that engineers were at fault without a lot of supporting details.
IIRC, the early NASA reports also fingered the engineers.
But quality (reliability, safety) is not a bottom-up issue! Without management support, safety is *non-existent*. Management support is *not* outsourcing the safety department or relocating it from one end of the country to another without adequate encouragement of personnel to move.
My impression remains that the accident and the subsequent investigations are an indirect expression of the political will of the public that the current rate of accidents is within acceptable limits. Unfortunately for those whose job it is to fly those things!
[Rant off]