Columbia Was Beyond Any Help, Officials Say

New York Times ^ | 2/03/03 | KENNETH CHANG

[kattracks]

OUSTON, Feb. 3 — Even if flight controllers had known for certain that protective heat tiles on the underside of the space shuttle had sustained severe damage at launching, little or nothing could have been done to address the problem, NASA officials say.

Virtually since the hour Columbia went down, the space agency has been peppered with possible options for repairing the damage or getting the crew down safely. But in each case, officials here and at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida say, the proposed solution would not have worked.

The simplest would have been to abort the mission the moment the damage was discovered. In case of an engine malfunction or other serious problem at launching, a space shuttle can jettison its solid rocket boosters and the external fuel tank, shut down its own engines and glide back down, either returning to the Kennedy Space Center or an emergency landing site in Spain or Morocco.

But no one even knew that a piece of insulation from the external tank had hit the orbiter until a frame-by-frame review of videotape of the launching was undertaken the next day. By then, Columbia was already in orbit, and re-entry would have posed the same danger that it did 16 days later.

Four other possibilities have been discussed at briefings or in interviews since the loss of Columbia, and rejected one by one by NASA officials.

First, repairing the damaged tiles. The crew had no tools for such a repair. At a news conference on Sunday, Ron D. Dittemore, the shuttle program manager, said that early in the shuttle program, NASA considered developing a tile repair kit, but that "we just didn't believe it was feasible at the time." He added that a crew member climbing along the underside of the shuttle could cause even more damage to the tiles.

Another idea, widely circulated on the Internet in the last few days, was that the shuttle could have docked with the International Space Station once the damage was discovered. But without the external fuel tank, dropped as usual after launching, Columbia had no fuel for its main engines and thus no way it could propel itself to the station, which circles the earth on a different orbit at a higher altitude.

"We have nowhere near the fuel needed to get there," said Bruce Buckingham, a spokesman at the Kennedy Space Center.

Another shuttle, Atlantis, was scheduled for launching on March 1 to carry supplies and a new crew to the space station, and it is possible to imagine a Hollywood-type series of events in which NASA rushed Atlantis to the launching pad, sent it up with a minimal crew of two, had it rendezvous with Columbia in space and brought everyone down safely.

But Atlantis is still in its hangar, and to rush it to launching would have required NASA to circumvent most of its safety measures. "It takes about three weeks, at our best effort, to prepare the shuttle for launch once we're at the pad," Mr. Buckingham said, "and we're not even at the pad." Further, Columbia had enough oxygen, supplies and fuel (for its thrusters only) to remain in orbit for only five more days, said Patrick Ryan, a spokesman at the Johnson Space Center here.

Finally, there is the notion that Columbia's re-entry might have been altered in some way to protect its damaged area. But Mr. Dittemore said the shuttle's descent path was already designed to keep temperatures as low as possible. "Because I'm reusing this vehicle over and over again, so I'm trying to send it through an environment that minimizes the wear and tear on the structure and the tile," he said at his news conference on Sunday.

Today he added that he did not know of a way for the shuttle to re-enter so that most of the heat would be absorbed by tiles that were not damaged, on its right wing. "I'm not aware of any other scenarios, any other techniques, that would have allowed me to favor one wing over the other," he said.

Even if that had been possible, it would probably have damaged the shuttle beyond repair and made it impossible to land, requiring the crew to parachute out at high speed and at high altitude. He said there was no way managers could have gotten information about the damaged tiles that would have warranted so drastic a move.

Gene Kranz, the flight director who orchestrated the rescue of astronauts aboard the crippled Apollo 13 in 1970, said that from what he knew about the suspected tile damage, there was probably nothing that could have been done to save the flight. "The options," he said in a telephone interview, "were just nonexistent."

[bvw]

"As safe as NASCAR"

Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object ...

[JoeA]

The article mentions four possible scenarios for saving the astronauts:

• Reparing the tiles - not possible in space.
• Docking with the ISS. Orbits don't align.
• Revise the reentry to accomodate the tile damage. Not technically possible.
• Launch the Atlantis with minimal crew to retrieve the astronauts.

NASA claims "It takes about three weeks, at our best effort, to prepare the shuttle for launch once we're at the pad," Mr. Buckingham said, "and we're not even at the pad." Further, Columbia had enough oxygen, supplies and fuel (for its thrusters only) to remain in orbit for only five more days, said Patrick Ryan, a spokesman at the Johnson Space Center here.

Let's see, three weeks to launch the Atlantis. Columbia had enough oxygen, supplies and fuel for five more days. It was in orbit for 16 days. In my math, sixteen + five equals twenty one. That's three weeks. Three weeks to launch the Atalantis. Sounds like it could have been done.

The assumption of course, is that NASA knew the severity of the problem, whihc is by no means certain, or even likely. But the argument that a rescue mission using Atlantis wasn't possible is pure bull.

[supercat]

such a shield would not be "reusable".

Naturally. Hopefully the price wouldn't be too expensive. BTW, how many missions are the tiles good for?

The issue is not the TPS fragility.

What sort of impact can the tiles withstand? It would seem to me that there is a significant risk of the shuttle being hit by a small piece of space junk during a mission. Having the tiles be somewhat protected until re-entry would seem like a good idea. Perhaps they're generally strong enough without, but if they're brittle I was thinking a slightly less brittle layer on top might help prevent damage.

[Ciexyz]

It's 2003....there should always be options.

Sadly, I agree.

[supercat]

When the Apollo 13 system failure occurred, they had no backup plan at all either. Of course, back then people were pretty resourceful, plan or no plan.

[Chad Fairbanks]

This was the ONE shuttle not ISS-compatable...

[Coto]

Even if the Tiles are magically protected....

...it still leaves many moving parts that have, according to the Roger's Commission, a "Critical Rating" of 1. Meaning that if any one of those parts fail, during Launch - On Orbit - or Rentry, loss of Vehicle / Crew is probable.

[bvw]

To paraphrase Sen. William Smith, the committee chairman of the government inquest into the Titanic disaster, "How do you trained, professional mariners and seamen manage to keep doing this sort of thing?"

Not only doing "that sort of thing" but celebrating the doing of it, a vain and glorious Endeavour. Nature and Nature's God, however, take a colder and truer read of things.

It's not that we shouldn't build big ships -- we must! It's that we'll never have a sea full of USS Titanics, because reality isn't quite affine to that vanity. So the sooner we cotton to reality -- to safety, surety and put "risk" in a well-circumscribed place -- the sooner we all move on from many sadnesses.

It is a great and true of the US culture that we ARE indeed fond of preserving life and put great stock in it.

[bvw]

one in fifty

That's optimistic, unfortunately.

[TLBSHOW]

Q What did you find out about the Don Nelson contact with the White House?

MR. FLEISCHER: It appears that that letter was dealt with at the staff level.

Q How high up did it go?

MR. FLEISCHER: To Mr. Marburger.

Q And never conveyed to the President?

MR. FLEISCHER: No, as you -- the letter came in, was referred to Mr. Marburger. Mr. Marburger -- as you know, his staff received the technical briefing from NASA. and Mr. Marburger responded on behalf of the President. Dr. Marburger, I should say.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203-15.html

[altair]

That was what I remember reading. I will try to remember the source.

[Texasforever]

As an engineer and budding "whistleblower" I am stating, as fact, that within the next 12 months there will be at least one catastrophic aviation disaster unless all aircraft are immediately grounded.. Please bookmark this post so you can refer to it later.

[bonesmccoy]

the Soyuz vehicle has enough fuel to deorbit from ISS but not enough for multiple orbital plane changes in a "ferry" mode.

It is a nice thought, but the system is not built to handle this type of activity.

[TLBSHOW]

NOW DO YOU THINK THIS MAN WAS SOMEONE THAT SHOULD OF TAKEN CARE OF THAT LETTER?

While many scientists have praised Mr. Bush's selection, most have said
the key to Mr. Marburger's effectiveness will be not his scientific
expertise but his ability to get the president's ear.


Mr. Marburger has gained plaudits for his management of Brookhaven, a facility in Upton, N.Y., that conducts basic and applied research for the U.S. Department of Energy. He was president of Stony Brook from 1980 to 1994.

Rep. Sherwood L. Boehlert, chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Science, testified at the hearing in support of Mr.
Marburger. "He is an excellent manager, someone who inspires confidence,
someone who is a natural leader, someone who is able to rally people around him while still being self-deprecating," Mr. Boehlert said. He added that Mr. Marburger would need those qualities to work with "the
turf-conscious R&D agencies" and the White House Office of Management and
Budget.

http://www.phenix.bnl.gov/WWW/lists/phenix-news-l/msg01246.html

[capitan_refugio]

Okay, if you know on day two you have big problem, you jettison and leave the Space lab in orbit. How much weight do you save? 6%? 10%?

Then, can you reconfigure you re-entry to minimize stress on the vehicle? Rather than the yaw maneuvers to bleed off speed which seem to differentially heat and stress the wings, were there other options that could have been programmed?

How close did they get to emerging from the maximum heating on the tiles (and probable fatal weakening on the wing)? Was there a re-entry path that would have subjected the orbiter to longer time but lower temperatures, or greater temperatures for a shorter time?

I'm glad that someone with your vast experience is chiming in on this thread.

[TLBSHOW]

To be fair they did more than just study spiders.

[Texasforever]

IT WAS AN ACCIDENT! Look up the deaths of test pilots. For crying out loud the only reason we have a space program is the fact that normal people can accept that the risk is outweighed by the benefit and that there is a certain rare breed of human that is willing to knowingly take those risks. When 7 people get in a tube strapped to the equivalent of a very unstable small nuke and the slightest miscalculation is more than likely fatal then it is a bloody miracle that we get any of them back alive. If your attitude had prevailed in the beginning the closest we would have been to space would still be in the movies. I don’t think you have any concept of just how PERFECT each and every launch, orbit and re-entry has to be for getting anyone back alive. Space travel is NOT ROUTINE and it will take a century for it to become so.

[SteveH]

Why not automate as many of the shuttle flights as possible.

It is not clear that there is much to be gained from measuring short term human exposure to space flight any more with all the data that has been amassed to date.

Shuttle flights are more dangerous than straight multistage style flights since there aren't any tiles.

We have had drone technology since at least 1944-- automated B17s (Aphrodite) overstuffed with explosives, piloted by remote control.

We might consider automating the shuttles and tool up for USA-Soyuzes or Apollos again. (I have heard that there are practicality issues with recovering Apollo technology, skills and mfg capability?)

I guess in the past that relying on Russian vehicles exclusively for human space transportation would have been politically unattractive and would have posed difficult cross-organizational and cross-cultural management issues.

Losing an unmanned shuttle would have been a lot easier to take than losing a manned shuttle.

Ripping out life support systems from shuttles would save weight and permit larger equipment/fuel payloads.

If this idea was considered and rejected in the past, it might still be worth re-considering in the present circumstances (with new environmental restrictions, the fall of the iron curtain, etc.).