[Stefan Stackhouse]

The more complex a system is, the more things there are that can go wrong. Given that in the space program, "things that can go wrong" include massive amounts of highly explosive propellants, the deadly vacuum of space, and fierce re-entry temps, it really is amazing that we have had as few catastrophic failures as we have. Nevertheless, we have not been able to drive the probabilities down to zero, and probably never will. In the case of the shuttle program, we have had two catastrophic failures now in around hundred flights (suggesting a catstrophic failure rate probability of approximately 1:50), and have now lost 40% of our five-vehicle fleet.

A smaller spacecraft that was only tasked for transporting people and not cargo would mean a lot less complexity throughout. A smaller spacecraft would mean smaller rockets, and it would mean fewer tiles. We don't fly airliners that carry maybe a dozen pasengers plus several tons of FedEx parcels -- why should we think that what doesn't make sense for routine terrestrial air transport should make sense for what is supposed to become routine space transport?

[Jim Noble]

>>we have had two catastrophic failures now in around hundred flights (suggesting a catstrophic failure rate probability o!��5{��������50), and have now lost 40% of our five-vehicle fleet<<

And what is the engineering and production plan to deal with a loss rate of 1:50 flights?

The mission concepts of STS presumed a loss rate of 1:100,000 flights, not 1:50. There are no plans to produce a new orbiter every fifty flights-there are no plans to produce orbiters at all.

And there is no engineering program for a replacement.

Fly 'em until they're all gone, then leave space to the Chinese.

Is that really the plan?