CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY [It’s Not What We Thought]

Naval War College ^ | January 2003 | Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army

[VaBthang4]

Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the director of national security affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981 and was commissioned as an armor officer. He has since served as assistant professor of European history at West Point; as squadron operations officer of 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; at the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; and as a speechwriter for the chief of staff of the Army. He earned master’s and doctoral degrees in history at Princeton University and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He is the author of After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (2001), as well as of numerous articles.

Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1

[VaBthang4]

[Centurion2000]

pretty kewl ... thanks.

[spokeshave]

Lanchester point of concentration

[Asclepius]

This article will offer alternative translations of select passages that come closer to Clausewitz?s original sense:

This article would make more sense if our enemies were all balanced on highwires. Or if they were ducks, i.e. poorly armed ducks with balance issues.

[spetznaz]

Great article. Thanks VaB!

[Dominic Harr]

The entire CoG concept seems to break down when facing a diffuse threat, dealing in an asymmetrical conflict.

I, personally, had always thought that the 'center of gravity' concept meant, 'lynchpin' or 'keystone', in other words, the enemy's 'center of gravity' is that place in which a single blow would most damage their ability to wage war. The 'primary target', so to speak.

The marines have it closest to right, I think, in that they are focused on striking a blow at the enemy's weakness. The weakness that would cause the most havoc if defeated is the enemy's 'CoG'.

CoG is a combination of 'vulnerability' and 'value to the enemy', in other words.

[Credo]

Some observations on COG application in US Military History:

The Civil War is an interesting application of this theory. Lincoln realized early on that the Southerner's ability to field an army was their COG. That's why he was so apt to fire commanders who were less than aggressive. Meade's failure to pursue the Army of Northern VA after Gettysburg was an example of a commander that failed to recognize the Southern cause was doomed without a viable army. Lee perceived the Norhern COG was their sense of security. That's why the operations around the capital.

With Sherman and Grant, you had 2 commanders who appreciated the role the Rebel Army played in continuing the resistance. Sherman went after the means to resupply it. Grant went after it specifically. Against Grant, it was only a matter of time.

The Cold War is another interesting example I can think of. It took years for an administration to realize that the Soviet's COG was not necessarily their Military arsenal but their means to field it. Reagan's firm stand put the Soviets in a vicious circle where they could not economically keep up.

I think the Gulf War II will not be limited in that the objective properly defined will be the elimination of the Iraqi Ba'athi regime. What is Hussein's COG? I think it's the terror he holds over his own people. Once he is perceived as powerless (The key word is perception) you may have a critical bulk of the Iraqi people and Army who percieve it will be better to put their chips with the US led coalition than Sadaam's institution of terror.

[ginle]

Dubious.

Clauswitz's 'Centre of Gravity' concept was primarily concerned with strategic issues, like when faced with a strong oponent and it's allie which do you attack first, not tactical issues.

And to an extent Clauswitz was a 'political' military thinker, "war is just policy by other means", so when looking at the current war against terrorism, I don't think he would take too many seconds to point out that the political problems that fuel the terrorists hatred and make make the recruitment on new terrorists easy, as being the 'Centre of Gravity' of the situation.

Just to sling in a favourite saying of mine, which actually comes from Chess, "You don't get good tactics from bad strategy."

[patton]

I disagree - I think the CoG is Saudi money.

[ginle]

Good answer patton, but I would still ask the question 'why do the Saudis fund terrorism ?' and if you wanted to stop them doing it by techinical means (policing) would you suceed ?

[patton]

The Saudis fund terrorism to get the terrorists out of Saudi Arabia - they would much prefer their home-grown radicals concentrate on a Medrassas in Iraq than overthrough the House of Saud.

I the CoG is Saudi money, then the Critical Vulnerability the West's tolerance for the Hause of Saud.

[ginle]

What really ticks me off about this article is having had the misfortune to watch watch my local politicians at work first hand, the only conclusion that could come to is that they don't have a 'strategic' braincell in their heads, they seem relish getting involved in fruitless tactical melees.

Consequently I am rather loath to allow a perfectly good strategic concept be turned into a tactical one, the idea being that if it is out there as a 'strategic concept' perhaps one day the average politician might actually have a 'strategic thought'. Perhaps. Maybe.

[ginle]

Mmmmm, I do have to agree that shuting off the terorists access to funds would really cramp their style quite a lot.

[Poohbah]

I, personally, had always thought that the 'center of gravity' concept meant, 'lynchpin' or 'keystone', in other words, the enemy's 'center of gravity' is that place in which a single blow would most damage their ability to wage war. The 'primary target', so to speak.

Centers of gravity are less single things than constellations of things that support an enemy's ability to wage war. Sometimes they work as you describe; other times, they are not anything you can strike at (for many possible reasons.

[Lessismore]

Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, and Frederick the Great each had their centers of gravity in their respective armies. Had their armies been destroyed, these men would have been remembered as failures. In states with many factions vying for power, the center of gravity lies mainly in the capital; in small states supported by a more powerful one, it lies in the army of the stronger state; in alliances, it lies in the unity formed by common interests; in popular uprisings, it lies in the persons of the principal leaders and in public opinion. The blow must be directed against these things.

In the case of Islamic terrorism, it lies in the ability of religious fundamentalists to recruit young men and maintain their loyalty, even to committing suicide for the cause.

[Redleg Duke]

Interesting post. If you havd a ping list, please put me on it! Thanks.

[flyer182]

What the Marines teach is that at each level of warfare there is one Center of Gravity/key strength. Critical vulnerablities/key weakness are many and are dependent upon physical/moral/mental factors. CV's are the pathways to destroying a CoG.

[PsyOp]

Clauswitz Quoted
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/672976/posts