The Civil War is an interesting application of this theory. Lincoln realized early on that the Southerner's ability to field an army was their COG. That's why he was so apt to fire commanders who were less than aggressive. Meade's failure to pursue the Army of Northern VA after Gettysburg was an example of a commander that failed to recognize the Southern cause was doomed without a viable army. Lee perceived the Norhern COG was their sense of security. That's why the operations around the capital.
With Sherman and Grant, you had 2 commanders who appreciated the role the Rebel Army played in continuing the resistance. Sherman went after the means to resupply it. Grant went after it specifically. Against Grant, it was only a matter of time.
The Cold War is another interesting example I can think of. It took years for an administration to realize that the Soviet's COG was not necessarily their Military arsenal but their means to field it. Reagan's firm stand put the Soviets in a vicious circle where they could not economically keep up.
I think the Gulf War II will not be limited in that the objective properly defined will be the elimination of the Iraqi Ba'athi regime. What is Hussein's COG? I think it's the terror he holds over his own people. Once he is perceived as powerless (The key word is perception) you may have a critical bulk of the Iraqi people and Army who percieve it will be better to put their chips with the US led coalition than Sadaam's institution of terror.
Exactly!