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1 posted on 02/01/2003 5:50:13 PM PST by hope
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To: hope
Videotape showed a large piece of something coming off the orbiter immediately prior to its mid-air breakup

Gimme a break

2 posted on 02/01/2003 5:51:55 PM PST by eclectic
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To: hope
Using the term "major systems failure" is kind of a "No s**t, Sherlock!" comment. I think even those of us who are not rocket scientists figured that one out.
3 posted on 02/01/2003 5:54:43 PM PST by NoControllingLegalAuthority
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Info on STS 107 from SpaceRef.com

STS-107 Launch of Space Shuttle Columbia for Spacehab NASA, SPACEHAB, and members of the STARS Academy have been preparing for the STS-107 mission for over two years. Scheduled for launch on July 19, 2002, this research mission of sixteen days is sure to be an exciting event. With the debut of SPACEHAB’s Research Double Module on this flight, over 100 experiments are expected to take place onboard the U.S. Space Shuttle Columbia. The flight inclination for this mission is 39 degrees and the flight altitude is 150 nautical miles. This mission will be launched from the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida from launch pad 39B. Seven talented astronauts will be flying this critical research mission. They include Mission Commander Rick Husband, Pilot William "Willie" McCool, Payload Commander Michael Anderson, Mission Specialist 1 Kalpana Chawla, Mission Specialist 2 David Brown, Mission Specialist 3 Laurel Clark, and Payload Specialist 1 Ilan Ramon. For the STARS Academy locker, Anderson, Chawla, and Ramon are the assigned crew. As the 111th shuttle mission and Columbia’s 28th flight, this shuttle just celebrated the 20th anniversary of its maiden voyage. Columbia returned to service, fresh from a year and a half of maintenance and upgrades that have made it better than ever. More than 100 modifications and improvements have been made to make Columbia ready for flight on STS-107. Highlights include a “glass cockpit” with nine full-color, flat-panel displays, reduced power needs, old wire removal, and a user-friendly interface.

Columbia's launch for July was scrubbed:****

June 24, 2002 Ed Campion Headquarters, Washington (Phone: 202/358-1694) James Hartsfield Johnson Space Center, Houston (Phone: 281/483-5111) Bruce Buckingham Kennedy Space Center, Fla. (Phone: 321/867-2468) Release: #H02-117 NASA MANAGERS DELAY STS-107 LAUNCH NASA managers today temporarily suspended launch preparations for Space Shuttle Columbia until they have a better understanding of several small cracks found in metal liners used to direct the flow inside main propulsion-system propellant lines on other orbiters in the fleet. Columbia's launch on STS-107, previously planned for July 19, will be delayed a few weeks to allow inspections of its flow liners as part of an intensive analysis that is under way. Recent inspections of Space Shuttle Atlantis and Space Shuttle Discovery found cracks, measuring one-tenth to three-tenths of an inch, in one flow liner on each of those vehicles. Some of the cracks were not identifiable using standard visual inspections and were only discovered using more intensive inspection techniques. "These cracks may pose a safety concern and we have teams at work investigating all aspects of the situation," said Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore. "This is a very complex issue and it is early in the analysis. Right now there are more questions than answers. Our immediate interests are to inspect the hardware to identify cracks that exist, understand what has caused them and quantify the risk. I am confident the team will fully resolve this issue, but it may take some time. Until we have a better understanding, we will not move forward with the launch of STS-107." The impact of the investigation on other upcoming space shuttle launches has not been determined.

4 posted on 02/01/2003 5:56:39 PM PST by Light Speed
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To: hope
Reads like the breakup occured right where the math says it should have, at the point of maximum heat/stress.
5 posted on 02/01/2003 5:56:41 PM PST by NativeNewYorker (Freepin' Jew Boy)
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To: hope
well, duh.
6 posted on 02/01/2003 6:03:21 PM PST by billorites
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To: hope
"Videotape showed a large piece of something coming off the orbiter immediately prior to its mid-air breakup over Texas Saturday morning."

It's the tail!

In many of the close-up frames you can see the orbiter and tail clearly depicted. The tail has broken off and is tumbling away to the lower-R. Approx. 2/5ths through there is a very good quality frame which clearly depicts the 3 main engines of the orbiter and shows the black rudder markings of the tail as it tumbles away from the shuttle! The shuttle is facing south, with it's left side being the leading edge along it's flight path. This accuratley correlates with the thermal telemetry data.

It's my opion that the tail broke off 1/3-up during a southerly S braking manuever with the broken piece taking the full length of rudder with it. Descending sideways to the slipstream the orbiter was doomed.

8 posted on 02/01/2003 6:12:49 PM PST by Justa
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To: hope
" 'Major Systems Failure' Indicated "

Like maybe the heat shield system (ceramic tiles)?

1979

Learning to Take the Heat: Insulation for the Space Shuttle

The year 1979 was the planned launch year for the first shuttle prototype vehicle, Columbia. During that year, the vehicle shed some 40% of its "critical" ceramic thermal insulation in a flight riding piggy-back on a Boeing 747 from California to Cape Kennedy.

The environment of that flight was very benign compared to the mission ascent and reentry phases that the space vehicle would have to face. During reentry through the earth's atmosphere, dramatically high temperatures develop over the surface of the shuttle, ranging from 2300° F over large areas of the underbody to 2600° F on the nose and wing leading edges.

The failure of the shuttle tiles created a crisis period for the space program that lasted a full two years while solutions to the problem were pursued. UW engineering professor James Mueller and his research collaborators, along with undergraduate and graduate students, played a key role in the final solution to the tile problem, developing superior insulation material as well as methods of its attachment to the shuttle.

Mueller, who headed the division of ceramic engineering in the Department of Material Sciences of the UW College of Engineering, had been working for several years with his faculty colleagues on ceramic heat exchangers, and had expanded the activity to a multidisciplinary research program in high- temperature ceramics (see NASA Program in Ceramic Research).

In early design studies, NASA had determined that the thermal insulation for the all-aluminum shuttle should be made of silica--a ceramic material. Silica insulation for critical high-temperature use is constructed from very pure and fine silica fibers sintered togetherbonded at high temperature, creating over a million temperature-welded joints per 1 cubic inch of material. The sintered silica is shaped into 6-inch by 6-inch by 3.5-inch blocks, covered with a black silica glass coating, and attached to the shuttle surface by a nylon felt pad, approximately one quarter inch thick, known as the strain isolation pad (SIP).

This pad isolates the brittle and weak silica block from the aluminum surface, which expands much more than the fragile tile, thereby causing the tile to crack and fail if attached directly. The tile base is glued to the felt pad (SIP) with a rubber bond, and the same "glue" is used to attach the SIP to the aluminum surface. The 1979 failure of the thermal shield was the loss of many of the "critical" tiles-- some 5,000 tiles (of a total of 28,000 on the shuttle)--so critical that loss of even one would make reentry non-survivable.

When the tile failure occurred, NASA created a "crisis" committee--in this case a committee of 12 scientists and engineers from outside NASA--to investigate the cause of the tile surface failure and to propose "fixes." Mueller and UW professor of aeronautics and astronautics John Bollard were appointed to that committee, Mueller because of his background in ceramics and involvement in the choice of the fibrous tile, and Bollard because of his background in aeroelasticity and structural mechanics.

This committee met bi-weekly for the next two years, conducting research, preparing analytical models, and proposing test protocols to NASA. In the early days of the committee, Mueller and Bollard proposed an expansion of the ceramics design group activities to include assessment of tile failure mechanisms and studies of engineering remedies. NASA not only funded the expansion but also provided equipment and supplies to facilitate the effort, which involved about a dozen faculty and some 20 students at any one time. Mueller and Bollard managed the program while maintaining "a grueling pace" of crisis committee meetings, inspections of the shuttle tiles on the Columbia, inspection of tests, installations, and histories of tile manufacturing, analysis, and installation.

The two-year, sometimes frenetic research at the UW led to two very significant successes, says Bollard. First of all, the researchers discovered the fundamental initial cause of tile attachment failure and the resulting mechanics of detachment of the tiles from the SIP. Furthermore, they developed engineering solutions for the problem that were subsequently adopted in practice: first of all, strengthening the tile material itself, and secondly, toughening the base of the tile to provide stronger load paths from the tile bottom surface through the SIP to the surface of the vehicle.

"This effort required many hours of research and testing of alternative and then optimal systems," says Bollard. "All who participated, faculty and students alike, were highly motivated and worked steadily and well beyond normal hours to help solve this pressing national problem. The pressures were at times enormous but the real-world environment provided, in retrospect, a marvelous and rewarding period for all of us, especially the students. In fact, we were very proud that it was an undergraduate student, Richard Pfaff, from Forks, Washington, who, by a very simple but very inventive experiment, guided the program to the realization and proof of the initial causes of the tile bond failures."

The success of this "crisis" program at the UW resulted in special commendation from the Washington State Legislature and the Governor of Washington, from NASA, and from the UW. The success of the "crisis" committee of 12 was recognized by NASA with citations to its members and a Group Achievement Award to Mueller and Bollard.

At the first flight of the refurbished space shuttle Columbia on April 21, 1981, Mueller and Bollard were participants in the flight readiness decision-making process, right up to the time of lift-off. After that historic event, the UW ceramics design-group activity continued for several years--during the first five shuttle missionsto carry out research on improved tile materials and attachment systems, with NASA support. In addition to Mueller and Bollard, participating UW faculty included Raymond Taggart, Ashley Emery, Albert Kobayashi, and Howard Merchant, from mechanical engineering; Billy Hartz, from civil engineering; and William D. Scott, Alan D. Miller, and O. J. ("Whit") Whittemore from the ceramics division of material sciences.

From: http://www.washington.edu/research/pathbreakers/1979b.html
13 posted on 02/01/2003 6:38:20 PM PST by _Jim
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To: hope
I am sorry for the loss of our nation,and for the families of those that died today.

That said, I am waiting for the whistle blower.
22 posted on 02/01/2003 6:52:39 PM PST by MonroeDNA (What's the frequency, Kenneth?)
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To: hope

Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster Archive ^

27 posted on 02/01/2003 6:59:36 PM PST by petuniasevan (RIP Columbia crew - you were the "right stuff")
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To: hope
QUESTION:

Is the adhesive used to 'glue' the heat tiles to the shuttle surface strong enough that the tiles would never come unglued (or have any tiles ever come off)? And if a tile were to come off during re-entry in a critical place such as underbelly or nose, would the heat penetrate and destroy the shuttle?

ANSWER, from Bob Speece on August 10, 1999:

The adhesive used to bond Space Shuttle tiles is RTV-560.

This RTV is specially processed in that surface preparations, material mix and handling are controlled to yield the optimum product.

The RTV strength is 250 psi (1723.7 N/m2) in shear and 400 psi (2757.9 N/m2) tensile at room temperature.

On STS-2, we had a hypergolic spill that resulted in multiple tiles coming loose at the launch Pad, these were repaired and the Shuttle subsequently launched.

On STS-4, we applied too much waterproofing material to upper surface tiles and tiles came off during the mission.

Our greatest concern with tiles is damage, this is due to their fragility (they are silica glass).

On mission STS-27R, we suffered much tile damage and in the area of the L-band antenna a tile was so severely damaged that the L-band antenna cover was heat-damaged and had to be replaced.

The tile system protects critical areas on the Shuttle such that if a "burn-through" occurs the results could be catastrophic.

We control the design of the Shuttle and ground systems to eliminate or reduce the effects of damaging debris. The Debris team, of which I am a member, performs routine tasks and inspections that work to protect the Shuttle from damaging debris.

This team performs an intense post-launch film review that looks for damage to the vehicle from debris. If damage is known, the Shuttle flight crew can take measures to reduce the effects of this damage, for example, a more benign attitude for reentry that will reduce atmospheric heat effects.

Our most heat critical areas are those protected by black tiles, these offer the greatest protection against high heat and are normally of increased thickness.

The Shuttle system uses both high and low heat protection tiles, flexible reusable surface insulation, and re-enforced carbon-carbon heat shields to protect flight surfaces.

From: http://ltp.arc.nasa.gov/space/ask/landing/Space_Shuttle_tile_failure.txt
29 posted on 02/01/2003 7:06:13 PM PST by _Jim
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To: hope
THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM

The thermal protection system consists of various materials applied externally to the outer structural skin of the orbiter to maintain the skin within acceptable temperatures, primarily during the entry phase of the mission. The orbiter's outer structural skin is constructed primarily of aluminum and graphite epoxy.

During entry, the TPS materials protect the orbiter outer skin from temperatures above 350 F. In addition, they are reusable for 100 missions with refurbishment and maintenance. These materials perform in temperature ranges from minus 250 F in the cold soak of space to entry temperatures that reach nearly 3,000 F. The TPS also sustains the forces induced by deflections of the orbiter airframe as it responds to the various external environments. Because the thermal protection system is installed on the outside of the orbiter skin, it establishes the aerodynamics over the vehicle in addition to acting as the heat sink.

Orbiter interior temperatures also are controlled by internal insulation, heaters and purging techniques in the various phases of the mission.

The TPS is a passive system consisting of materials selected for stability at high temperatures and weight efficiency. These materials are as follows:

1. Reinforced carbon-carbon is used on the wing leading edges; the nose cap, including an area immediately aft of the nose cap on the lower surface (chine panel); and the immediate area around the forward orbiter/external tank structural attachment. RCC protects areas where temperatures exceed 2,300 F during entry.

2. Black high-temperature reusable surface insulation tiles are used in areas on the upper forward fuselage, including around the forward fuselage windows; the entire underside of the vehicle where RCC is not used; portions of the orbital maneuvering system and reaction control system pods; the leading and trailing edges of the vertical stabilizer; wing glove areas; elevon trailing edges; adjacent to the RCC on the upper wing surface; the base heat shield; the interface with wing leading edge RCC; and the upper body flap surface.

The HRSI tiles protect areas where temperatures are below 2,300 F. These tiles have a black surface coating necessary for entry emittance [radiative cooling].

3. Black tiles called fibrous refractory composite insulation were developed later in the thermal protection system program. FRCI tiles replace some of the HRSI tiles in selected areas of the orbiter.

4. Low-temperature reusable surface insulation white tiles are used in selected areas of the forward, mid-, and aft fuselages; vertical tail; upper wing; and OMS/RCS pods.

These tiles protect areas where temperatures are below 1,200 F. These tiles have a white surface coating to provide better thermal characteristics on orbit.

5. After the initial delivery of Columbia from Rockwell International's Palmdale assembly facility, an advanced flexible reusable surface insulation was developed. This material consists of sewn composite quilted fabric insulation batting between two layers of white fabric that are sewn together to form a quilted blanket.

AFRSI was used on Discovery and Atlantis to replace the vast majority of the LRSI tiles. Following its seventh flight, Columbia also was modified to replace most of the LRSI tiles with AFRSI. The AFRSI blankets provide improved producibility and durability, reduced fabrication and installation time and costs, and a weight reduction over that of the LRSI tiles.

The AFRSI blankets protect areas where temperatures are below 1,200 F.

6. White blankets made of coated Nomex felt reusable surface insulation are used on the upper payload bay doors, portions of the midfuselage and aft fuselage sides, portions of the upper wing surface and a portion of the OMS/RCS pods. The FRSI blankets protect areas where temperatures are below 700 F.

7. Additional materials are used in other special areas. These materials are thermal panes for the windows; metal for the forward reaction control system fairings and elevon seal panels on the upper wing to elevon interface; a combination of white- and black-pigmented silica cloth for thermal barriers and gap fillers around operable penetrations, such as main and nose landing gear doors, egress and ingress flight crew side hatch, umbilical doors, elevon cove, forward RCS, RCS thrusters, midfuselage vent doors, payload bay doors, rudder/speed brake, OMS/RCS pods and gaps between TPS tiles in high differential pressure areas; and room-temperature vulcanizing material for the thick aluminum T-0 umbilicals on the sides of the orbiter aft fuselage.

More, including descriptions of each material type at:

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts_sys.html

40 posted on 02/01/2003 7:36:57 PM PST by _Jim
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To: hope
After something like this happens, the media inevitably latch on something as the probable cause and talk incessantly about it as if it were settled fact. And then in the subsequent investigation, it becomes clearly evident that the cause was actually something completely different.

People have always been worried about those tiles -- they are clearly the "weakest link" in the whole system (and this is not just my opinion -- you can find plenty of articles by people more knowledgeable than me saying the same thing). There have been several close calls in the past, perhaps it was just inevitable that eventually, the right number of tiles would come off in the right places at the right time to combine and cause a catastrophe, and that just might be what happened today.

47 posted on 02/01/2003 7:48:12 PM PST by Stefan Stackhouse
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To: hope
An article on WorldnetDAily quotes an Italian Astronaut/Scientist (Completed Shuttle Missions) has stated he thought that the shuttle re-entered at too steep a re-entry angle which creates too much speed, friction, and heat. All of which caused the structural integrity of teh shuttle to fail. I think he may be on to something.
50 posted on 02/01/2003 7:53:49 PM PST by semaj
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To: hope; Light Speed
"Recent inspections of Space Shuttle Atlantis and Space Shuttle Discovery found cracks, measuring one-tenth to three-tenths of an inch, in one flow liner on each of those vehicles. Some of the cracks were not identifiable using standard visual inspections and were only discovered using more intensive inspection techniques. "These cracks may pose a safety concern and we have teams at work investigating all aspects of the situation," said Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore. "This is a very complex issue and it is early in the analysis. Right now there are more questions than answers. Our immediate interests are to inspect the hardware to identify cracks that exist, understand what has caused them and quantify the risk. I am confident the team will fully resolve this issue, but it may take some time. Until we have a better understanding, we will not move forward with the launch of STS-107." The impact of the investigation on other upcoming space shuttle launches has not been determined." - - June 24, 2002

This is some very interesting information.
I'm thinking we may not see a shuttle launch for awhile.

52 posted on 02/01/2003 7:56:52 PM PST by Lancey Howard
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To: hope
Another possibility for the failure (not the Orbiter traveling sideways) is that there may have been a seal failure in the left landing gear doors. I'm not sure if these doors are double sealed but a leak here could raise temperatures sufficiently to initiate a structural failure in the wing and would account for the last warnings to the crew about the left tire temperature/pressure(?).

The bad part about this scenario is that it opens the door(?) to possibilities for sabatoge/terrorism. I would assume that NASA was quite aware of these possibilities and would have take precautions. The landing gear doors would have been closed and sealed from before launch so they could have been tested for pressure but maybe not for a thermal integrity.
84 posted on 02/01/2003 8:54:52 PM PST by NJJ
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To: hope
A senior government official says

Bullsplatter what official goofball would say anything conclusivly without investigation?

More apeasment[sp] of the masses through SPIN !

93 posted on 02/01/2003 9:23:49 PM PST by ATOMIC_PUNK (The Fellowship of Conservatives)
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To: hope

Robert G. Melton

received his B.S. in physics (cum laude) from Wake Forest University in 1976, his M.S. in Physics (1979) and Ph.D. in Engineering Physics (1982) from the University of Virginia. He joined the Department of Aerospace Engineering at Penn State as an Assistant Professor in 1981, and became Associate Professor in 1987. Professor Melton has taught undergraduate courses in orbital mechanics and attitude control, spacecraft design, space science and technology that is intended for non-technical audiences; his graduate courses include astrodynamics, aerospace vehicle dynamics and control, and advanced spacecraft dynamics. His professional research includes work in celestial mechanics, non-Keplerian astrodynamics, trajectory optimization, and optimum station keeping for space-base interferometry, and satellite attitude dynamics and control. Beginning in 2003, he will assist in supervising undergraduate student involvement in the operational control of the Swift gamma-ray burst detector spacecraft. Presently, he is an associate editor of the Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics

94 posted on 02/01/2003 9:28:47 PM PST by ATOMIC_PUNK (The Fellowship of Conservatives)
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To: hope
"(CNSNews.com) - A senior government official says NASA's data shows a "major systems failure," CBS News reported Saturday afternoon.

As the Russians say, "Gee, No Krapski?"

141 posted on 02/02/2003 5:41:08 AM PST by albee
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To: hope
Someone please help me out here. Could the shuttle crew have known something was wrong, and wouldn't there have been any communication with Mission Control? How could they not have known something was wrong before the shuttle broke apart, did it really happen that fast?
153 posted on 02/02/2003 11:21:12 AM PST by dfwgator
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