No SAM Capable of Hitting SHuttle

S-300V SA-12A GLADIATOR and SA-12B GIANT HQ-18 The S-300V (SA-12) low-to-high Altitude, tactical surface to air missile system also has anti-ballistic missile capabilities. The HQ-18 reportedly the designation of a Chinese copy of the Russian S300V, though the details of this program remain rather conjectural. In early 1996 Russia astounded the United States Army by marketing the Russian SA-12 surface-to-air missile system in the UAE in direct competition with the United States Army's Patriot system. Rosvooruzheniye offered the UAE the highest-quality Russian strategic air defense system, the SA-12 Gladiator, as an alternative to the Patriot at half the cost. The offer also included forgiveness of some of Russia's debt to the UAE. The S-300V consists of:

9M82 SA-12b GIANT missile 9M83 SA-12a GLADIATOR missile 9A82 SA-12b GIANT TELAR 9A93 SA-12a GLADIATOR TELAR 9A84 GIANT Launcher/Loader Vehicle (LLV) 9A85 GLADIATOR Launcher/Loader Vehicle (LLV) 9S15 BILL BOARD Surveillance Radar system 9S19 HIGH SCREEN Sector Radar system 9S32 GRILL PAN Guidance Radar system 9S457 Command Station

The 9M83 SA-12a GLADIATOR is a dual-role anti-missile and anti-aircraft missile with a maximum range between 75 and 90 km.

The 9M82 SA-12b GIANT missile, configured primarily for the ATBM role, is a longer range system [maximum range between 100 and 200 km] with a longer fuselage with larger solid-fuel motor. The 9A82 SA-12b GIANT and 9A93 SA-12a GLADIATOR TELAR vehicles are similar, though the 9A83-1 carries four 9M83 SA-12a GLADIATOR missiles, whereas the 9A82 carries only two 9M82 SA-12b GIANT missiles. The configuration of the vehicles command radar is also different. On the 9A83-1 the radar is mounted on a folding mast providing 360º coverage in azimuth and full hemispheric coverage in elevation. The radar on the 9M82 TELAR is mounted in a semi-fixed position over the cab, providing 90º coverage on either side in azimuth and 110º in elevation. The TELARs are not capable of autonomous engagements, requiring the support of the GRILL PAN radar.

The 9S457-1 Command Post Vehicle is the command and control vehicle for the SA-12 system, which is supported by the BILL BOARD A surveillance radar and the HIGH SCREEN sector radar. The CPV and its associated radars can detect up to 200 targets, track as many as 70 targets and designate 24 of the targets to the brigade's four GRILL PAN radar systems for engagement by the SA-12a and SA-12b TELARs.

The BILL BOARD A radar provides general surveillance, with the antenna rotating every 6-12 seconds. The radar, which can detect up to 200 targets, provides target coverage of 0-55º in elevation and 10-250 km in range with an accuracy is 30-35 min of arc in azimuth and 250 m in range. and.

The HIGH SCREEN sector radar supporst the ATBM role, providing surveillance of anticipated azimuths of threat missiles. The radar is switches to a tracking mode when high speed targets are detected, automatically transmiting the trajectory parameters to the Command Post Vehicle. The CPV prioritizes the threat and instructs the HIGH SCREEN radar to track specific missiles, with the maximum being 16 simultaneous targets.

The GRILL PAN radar system controls the battery's launcher vehicles (TELARs and LLVs). It can simultaneously track up to 12 targets and control up to six missiles against these targets The radar can acquire targets with a radar cross-section of 2m2 at a range of 150 km in manual mode and 140 km in automatic mode. The GRILL PAN tracks targets assigned to it by the CP while simultaneously maintaining a horizon search for new targets.

The LLVs (9A85 GLADIATOR and 9A83 GLADIATOR) resemble normal TELARs, but with a loading crane rather than command radars. While the primary role of the LLV is to replenish the TELARs, they can also erecting and launch missiles if needed, though they are dependent on the use of command radars from neighboring TELARs.

SA-12a Range, (km) 6-75 km Altitude, (m) 25 km Basic load on vehicle 4 missiles on launcher Detection range, km Reaction time, sec Speed 1.7 km./sec Reload time Warhead 150 kg, HE Command guidance Combined, inertial with semi-active self-guidance Radar(s) GRILL PAN missile guidance radar, BILL BOARD surveillance radar, HIGH SCREEN sector scan radar Emplace/displace time (min) 5 Support vehicles TELAR, Transloader, command post Chassis Variations of the MT-T chassis are used for the launch vehicle, loader-launcher vehicle, missile guidance station, command post vehicle, and the radars.

SA-12b Range, (km) 13-100 km Altitude, (m) 1-30 km Basic load on vehicle 2 missiles on launcher Detection range, km Reaction time, sec Speed 2.4 km./sec. Reload time Warhead 150 kg, HE Command guidance Combined, inertial with semi-active self-guidance Radar(s) GRILL PAN missile guidance radar, BILL BOARD surveillance radar, HIGH SCREEN sector scan radar Emplace/displace time (min) 5 Support vehicles TELAR, Transloader, command post Chassis Variations of the MT-T chassis are used for the launch vehicle, loader-launcher vehicle, missile guidance station, command post vehicle, and the radars.

At the moment of disintegration, the shuttle was flying considerably higher than any aircraft of any military on earth is capable of flying. It should be quite obvious that nobody would design an anti-air missile capable of hitting an object flying that high.

An ABM? Just possibly. But the US and Israel are probably the only nations with that capability, and obviously neither would have any motive in doing such a thing.

If anyone wants to look at any type of "terrorism" or "act of war" scenario, I suggest looking at sabotage, as that is the only thing that appears to be even remotely possible. It is also quite incredible, as it would require an agent not only infiltrating to the extent of being part of the ground crew, but also of causing damage to the exterior tiles of the shuttle just before launch -- unobserved, in the midst of lots of other ground crew, observation cameras, and very high security in place just to prevent such a thing. If such an action could be successfully be pulled off, it would far exceed James Bond's wildest dreams.

Don't forget about the possibility of intereference with things such as the reentry burn, the positioning for reentry and the moves to slow down the craft out over the Pacific. The PRC have apparently been pursuing microsatellites, space mines (small and attachable) as well as other means of attacking Western space craft and satellites. None of them involve missiles in the traditional sense, from what I am led to believe.

>The PRC are apparently fascinated with such concepts.

Let's say this is true.
The Feds won't destabalize
global politics

by admitting it.
But they almost certainly
would retaliate.

What should we watch for?
What do you guys think is next?
What's next visibly?

"Just a question....are one of these capable of hitting a target like the Shuttle upon re-entry ?"

Absolutely not. However there are anti-sat weapons launched from an F15 that could do the job. Testing was done on them in the early 90's, I don't know what the more recent status of them is.

Also, one of the shuttle flights way back when was damaged by space junk. It was some where around flight STS-29 or there abouts. It was determined that a fleck of paint left over from an Appolo mission had impacted the shuttle windshield at 18,000 mph and cracked it. The investigation concluded that thousands of similiar small objects left in space could cause a space shuttle mission failure.

This, and a hypothetical ground based laser are about the only thing that could touch it; from:

http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/space_flight/sf14.htm

A unique USAF space vehicle is the ASAT (Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile). Unlike the other vehicles on display here, this device can be used to destroy orbiting satellites that threaten the U.S. The Vought ASAT was designed and developed in response to a 1977 Air Force requirement for a small air-launched missile that was capable of intercepting and destroying enemy satellites in low earth orbit. The missile consists of a modified Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) first stage, a Thiokol Altair III second stage, and a Vought miniature homing vehicle (MHV). The ASAT is launched from an F-15 aircraft that is in a steep climb. At high altitudes, this gives the ASAT's rocket a useful initial velocity to allow it to reach its target in orbit. After the first stage separates, the second stage propels the MHV into space on a collision course with the target satellite. The MHV destroys the target by ramming it at high speed. Initial flight test began in 1983. The first successful test interception and destruction of a satellite in space occurred on September 13, 1985. The ASAT is 17 feet 9 1/2 inches long, 20 inches in diameter, and weighs about 2,600 lbs.

I'm not saying that is what happened....but the press keeps repeating that NO SAM could have hit the shuttle.

Is that really the case ?

With present missile technology, yes. But could we be seeing the straw man argument here? I can envision three more plausible ways terrorists could have brought down Columbia. In order of likelihood:

1. A hack on the re-entry software. The entire series of re-entry movements is progammed. If the control software is hacked to roll a little too far during each S-turn, who's to know?
2. Sabotage of the tiles, thrusters or other critical re-entry hardware. Thousands of workers swarm over each Shuttle during the layover between flights. Bear in mind that the Apollo 13 accident was caused by a worker at Beech Aviation, a subcontractor, dropping an oxygen tank he was carrying and then not informing supervisors for fear of his job. This was purely an accident, but look at the possibilities for sabotage.
3. Interference with shuttle-ground commmunications, perhaps in conjunction with (1) or (2).

#3 wouldn't have had this effect.

#2 Is what I thought at first, but I believe the shuttle software is tested before upload each mission, and run real-time during a mission in a simulator. This would have been picked up before it caused NASA to do an Arian 5 re-enactment.

I'm thinking it is #4 Enviroterrorists ban Freon causing NASA to use an foam insulation with inferior mechanical or adhesive properties.

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