The Falkland Islands War: Winning With Infantry

GlobalSecurity ^ | 1991 | Major Vincent R. Leone, Jr., USMC

[Sparta]

TITLE: THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR: WINNING WITH INFANTRY

I. INTRODUCTION: The Falkland Islands War was the first amphibious and naval air war conducted in the missile age. Both sides were equipped with similar high-tech weapons which produced significant ship and aircraft loses. However, in an age of high performance aircraft, missiles, and nuclear submarines, the decisive battles were determined, not by modern weapons, but by infantry closing with and destroying the enemy with rifle and bayonet.

II. GENERAL: On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, located 300 miles off the mainland. The claim to the islands has been in dispute for 150 years. The islands were easily seized since the defense force numbered only 79 British Royal Marines. The British responded by putting together an amphibious task force and landed at Port San Carlos, on 21 May 1982. Lacking air superiority, and helicopter assets, most of the landing force had to go on foot to attack the key mountains to the west of the main Argentinian force in Stanley. After several successful night attacks, through tough terrain and mine fields, the British captured the approaches to Stanley. The Argentinians saw that they could not match the fighting spirit of the British infantry and surrendered on 14 June 1982.

III. CONCLUSION: Old lessons were relearned in the Falkland Islands War. It showed that good training is the best weapon of the infantryman and that supporting arms can be the decisive factor in allowing infantry to accomplish its mission. It is significant that in this age of increased mobility, the ability to move over land by foot became the tactical advantage of the war.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR: WINNING WITH INFANTRY

OUTLINE

Thesis Statement: In an age of electronic warfare, missiles, high performance aircraft, and nuclear submarines, the decisive battles of the Falkland Islands war were determined, not by modern technology, but by infantry closing with and destroying the enemy with rifle and bayonet.

I. Falkland Islands War

A. Historical Background

B. Reasons for War

II. Falkland Islands Orientation

A. Population

B. Terrain

C. Weather

III. Military Situation

A. Britain

B. Argentina

IV. Military Operations

A. Pebble Island

B. Goose Green

C. Stanley

V. Lessons Learned

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR: WINNING WITH INFANTRY

The Falkland Islands War was the first amphibious and

naval air war conducted in the missile age. Both sides were

equipped with similar high-tech weapons which produced

significant ship and aircraft loses. However, the weapons

used most looked very familiar from World War II. Rifles,

machine guns, mortars, artillery, and even bayonets were the

weapons of the day. Even modern main battle tanks had no

place in this conflict. The decisive battles of the Falkland

Islands War were determined, not by modern technology, but by

infantry closing with and destroying the enemy with rifle and

bayonet.

The Falkland Islands have a long record of settlement and

disputed claims. They were first discovered by the English

navigator, John Davis, in 1592, and have been occupied at

various times by England, France, Spain, and, Argentina. In

1764, French settlers landed in East Falkland, while in 1765,

Captain John Byron claimed the islands for Great Britain and

left a small party in West Falkland In 1766, the French

settlers under pressure from Spain withdrew. In 1771, Spain

accepted the British claim. The British abandoned the islands

three years latter, but reoccupied them in 1833.

Argentine claims stem from rights inherited from Spain

which asserts to have discovered the islands known to them as

the Islas Malvinas in 1520. They state that the British

withdrawal in 1774 fulfilled a secret oral agreement to

concede Spanish sovereignty over the islands. The Spanish

built houses and fortifications on the islands, but abandoned

them in 1829.

In 1829, the new Republic of Buenos Aires, later to

become Argentina, sent Louis Vernet to the islands to develop

a colony in its name. Two years latter, Vernet seized three

United States sealing vessels which were operating off the

coast of the Falklands. This brought down the corvette USS

Lexington, which bombarded the settlement forcing its

evacuation.

The British however, never renounced their claim and

resumed official occupation in 1833. The colony was

established under naval military rule until 1841, when a

civil administrator was appointed by the British government.

This has been the situation ever since.

The modern dispute goes back to 1965 when the United

Nations General Assembly asked the British and Argentinians

to hold talks to find a peaceful solution to their claims on

the islands. Talks were held every year without success. In

1976, the Argentinians illegally established a scientific

research station on South Thule Island, 900 miles to the east

of the Falklands and part of the Falkland Island Dependency

under British rule. The British made several protests and

both countries recalled their ambassadors. The dispute lapsed

and ties were reestablished in 1980.

The Argentinians however, never forgot about the

Falklands. In a long article in a leading Buenos Aires

newspaper in January 1982, Argentine President Galtieri told

how he promised to possess the Malvinas before 3 January

1983, the 150th anniversary of the British settlement.[3:11]

The British Foreign Office considered the threat as limited.

They felt that the Argentinians had been complaining about

the Falklands for over a century and had never done anything

about it. The theory was that the Argentinians had enough

problems at home with internal dissent and runaway inflation.

War was the last thing they needed. In fact, President

Galtieri felt that he needed a diversion from the problems at

home and an invasion of the Malvinas to enforce their claim

could unite the country. [5:36]

Events leading up to the Argentinian invasion started on

18 March 1982. Constantine Davidoff, a Greek, Argentine scrap

metal merchant, landed on South Georgia Island, located 800

miles east of the Falklands, with a contract to dismember the

old whaling station. They set up camp and raised the

Argentinian flag. The British Antarctic Service scientists on

the island informed the Argentinians that they would have to

leave until permission was granted from the British Base

Commander to land. The scrap metal party departed but left

behind twelve workmen.

When a diplomatic protest was made to the Argentine

Government on 22 March,it was met with indifference. On 24

March, twenty-two Royal Marines were landed to remove the

workers. President Galtieri now felt that he had an incident

which would suffice for invading the Falklands.[5:40]

On the morning of 2 April 1982, the 1060 people of the

Falkland Island's capitol of Stanley were awaken by the sound

of gunfire. An invasion had begun that had been feared

intermittently for 149 years. The first noises came from

Argentinian commandoes who seized an empty marine barracks

under the cover of darkness. At the same time, other

commandoes surrounded Government House where the main marine

defenses were set in.

At dawn, the landing force came ashore. Opposing the

invasion force were seventy-nine Royal Marines. Although

surprised at first, the tough Marines fought back for three

hours killing some Argentinians without loosing a man. In a

hopeless position and fearing a massacre, the Governor

ordered the Marines to surrender. The next day on 3 April,

another Argentinian invasion force appeared at South Georgia

Island. Twenty-two Royal Marines waged a seven-hour battle

killing three Argentinians before surrendering.[3:3]

The Falkland Islands are a British Crown colony which lie

strategically about 300 miles from the entrance to the Strait

of Magellan in the South Atlantic Ocean. The group of islands

include two large islands, East Falkland and West Falkland,

and about 200 other smaller islands. The total area these

islands comprise is 4618 square miles. The capital is Stanley

on the eastern tip of East Falkland.

The population of 1800 is composed mainly of descendents

of early Irish and Scottish settlers, most of which live in

Stanley. The principle occupation of the islanders is sheep

herding conducted by large company owned ranches operated by

resident managers. Almost all food, clothing, and wood is

imported.

The terrain of the islands is rolling and treeless

covered with scanty grasses and scattered large peat bogs.

Camouflage and concealment is difficult. The ground during

the winter is sodden, alternated by tufts of grass and

covered with brackish water. Movement for heavily weighted

down infantrymen is slow and exhausting, especially at night.

On higher ground, the slopes are slippery and rock-runs on

the crests extend for miles, also impeding movement. Some

extremely rugged mountains rise up through the bog. The

highest on East Falkland is Mount Osborne at 2000 feet.

The water table lies a few inches below the surface of

the ground and digging a fighting hole results in a water

filled ditch. Some streams provide drinkable water. The

coastline is jagged and made up of deep fiords of glacial

origin. Movement around the islands by boat is easy. The road

network is poor, with no roads existing beyond Stanley.

Trails connecting the outlying settlements are only passable

in the winter by tracked vehicles. Visibility is outstanding

during good weather due to the lack of air pollution.

The South Atlantic climate during the winter is

challenging. The Falkland has a chilly, damp climate with

temperatures averaging 37 degrees Fahrenheit. Light, drizzly

rains are frequent and occur two out of every three days, all

year. Winds blow continuously and change direction and

intensity. Periods of rain, snow, fog, and sun change

rapidly. The warmth of an out break of sunshine is limited,

giving few opportunities for troops to warm up and dry out.

The British amphibious task force set sail from

Portsmouth Harbor, England on 5 April 1982, three days after

the Argentinian invasion. With the carriers Invincible and

Hermes in the lead, it headed for Ascension Island, located

3340 miles from the Falklands. There the task force would

combat load the hastily embarked gear. The landing force

consisted of 4800 troops made up of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal

Marines. Units included the 40, 42, 45, Commando; Second and

Third Battalions, The Parachute Regiment; detachments of the

Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS)

eight light Scorpion and Scimitar tanks; and eighteen 105mm

light artillery guns. Sea Harrier jets and Sea King, Wessex,

and Chinook helicopters would be in support.

Once in the Atlantic, the carriers were joined by

destroyers, frigates, and support vessels until the fleet

numbered nearly 30 ships. This force would ultimately rise to

over one-hundred ships, forming the largest British armada

since World War II. In addition to war ships, the Navy was

relying heavily on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service. The

education ship Uganda was taken over and rapidly turned into

a 1000 bed hospital ship. The 1600 passenger cruise ship

Canberra became a troop and supply ship. This transition

included erecting two helicopter landing spots over a

swimming pool and one on top of the ward room.

Many desirable assets were omitted due to lack of space.

The most significant of these were Remote Piloted Vehicles

(RPV) and 155mm howitzers. The RPV's would have given a real

time aerial reconnaissance ability. The 155mm guns would have

been useful with their longer range and greater punch.

However, the logistical support to use these guns would have

been unattainable.

Argentina had deployed 9000-11000 troops to the Flaklands

and had almost two months to construct the defenses of the

island. The defenses were oriented around Stanley with the

Argentinians figuring it was the best place for an amphibious

assault. Many Argentinians were conscripts and evidence shows

that although weapons and equipment were plentiful, troops

were poorly trained in using and maintaining it. Fire support

consisted of 155mm and lO5mm howitzers, 105mm recoilless

rifles, and 50 caliber machine guns.

Reports that the Argentinians were ill fed were wrong.

The Argentinians spent considerable time building up

logistics bases using C-130 transports and civilian

airliners. Nightly C-130 logistic flights to Stanley airfield

continued throughout the war.

The Argentinian Air Force was the most professional of

the services. Their bravery was witnessed time and time again

as they made low level passes to bomb amphibious shipping.

Their pilots were trained by the United States and Israel,

and flew A-4 Skyhawks, Pucaras, and the Mirage III.

Several advance force operations were conducted in

preparation for the British amphibious landing. Most of these

missions were enemy reconnaissance and beach surveys

conducted by SAS and SBS teams. There was great concern for

the Argentine ability to oppose the amphibious assault by air

attack due to lack of British air superiority. A substantial

number of planes were believed to be operating from the

airfield on Pebble Island in West Falkland. An eight man SAS

team inserted by canoe verified the presence of several

aircraft and at least one-hundred men. On the night of 14

May, two Sea King helicopters carrying forty-five SAS troops

conducted a raid on the airfield. With the support of naval

gunfire, the SAS troops blew up eleven aircraft and made a

hasty withdrawal without loosing a man.

The landing site chosen for the amphibious assault was at

Port San Carlos, located on the northwestern coast of East

Falkland. The assault started on the morning of 21 May and

initially was unopposed. At approximately 1000, Argentine

aircraft attacked and began to target the destroyers and

frigates, leaving the troop transports and supply ships

untouched. By the end of 22 May, the landing force was ashore

and the force beach head was secure.

The first major offensive action of the war took place on

28 May with 2nd Para's move south from San Carlos to take the

enemy garrison at Goose Green. Due to the sinking of the

Atlantic Conveyor and the loss of three out of four CH-47

Chinook helicopters, 3 Commando Brigade had just enough

helicopter assets for general off-load, which due to air

attack was progressing at a slow rate. 2nd Para would have to

Click here to view image

walk the eighteen miles to Goose Green.

Since artillery batteries of lO5mm guns had no prime

movers, they would also have to rely on the short helicopter

assets to displace guns and ammunition. Three lO5mm guns with

320 rounds each would be lifted to a fire base.[2:237] Naval

gunfire support was to come from a frigate and the battalion

was forced to carry two of eight organic 81mm mortars. The

ammunition would be carried by every man. The battalion

requested support from the eight Scorpion and Scimitar light

tanks but was denied figuring that the tanks would be bogged

down in the maze of rivers and streams. As it turned out,

this was a wrong decision because later exploits showed that

tanks could move about the island.

Company size, battalion objectives were set up and all

attacks were to be non-illuminated supported night attacks.

The battalion crossed the line of departure at 0300. As day

broke, four companies were conducting frontal assaults at

Darwin. During the attack, heavy resistance was met and close

air support [CAS] was urgently requested but the harriers

located at sea, could not take off because of bad weather.

The mortar platoon ran out of ammunition and at 0430 the fire

support ship had to return to the safety of the air umbrella

at San Carlos.

At 0930 the momentum of the attack had been lost. The

Battalion Commander felt it was time to lead from the front.

While personally leading an attack on an enemy trench, he was

hit by fire and fell mortally wounded. He was posthumously

awarded the Victorian Cross, Britain's highest decoration.

Six hours after the battle for Darwin was over, the

battalion started its assault on the final objective of Goose

Green. With little cover, the advancing companies started

taking devastating artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire.

While one company was advancing, a white flag was raised at

an enemy position. When one platoon commander went forward

with a squad, they were fired upon, killing the officer and

two men. The platoon then overran the position, killing all

the enemy.

Artillery was the only fire support that was left but

they were very short of ammunition with only 83 rounds per

gun. Finally at 1500, two harriers arrived on station and

took out the enemy artillery with cluster bombs.[2:24]

As night fell, the battalion had surrounded Goose Green.

It was decided to send two enemy prisoners back to Goose

Green to ask for a surrender or be destroyed by air attack.

The Argentinians agreed and surrendered the next morning. At

a cost of 17 men killed and 35 wounded, 2 Para killed 250

Argentinians and took over 1200 prisoners.[2:251]

With Goose Green secured, 3 Commando Brigade turned its

attention to moving forces toward Stanley where the majority

of the Argentine forces were. A series of mountains lie to

the west of Stanley and were to be assigned as intermediate

objectives for the main attack. Since there still were no

helicopter assets to move the battalions east, the movement

would have to be made on foot.

45 Commando and 3 Para started what was to be known as

the big "yomp" across East Falkland. They marched forty miles

in three days carrying all their personal equipment with

packs weighing up to 110 pounds. This route took them up and

down hills along rocky valleys and through stone runs that

ran for miles. The Para's hiked for 24 hours straight

stopping occasionally. They secured Douglas Settlement and

Teal Inlet to the northwest of Stanley.

While 3 Para and 45 Commando were moving on foot across

East Falkland, a company of 42 Commando used the limited

helicopter assets to fly to Mount Kent, a mountain that

dominated the intermediate objective line of mountains. The

next day, on 1 June, the remainder of 42 Commando was

airlifted to Mount Challenger which also dominated the

approaches to Stanley.

On 29 May, the 5th Infantry Brigade consisting of the 2nd

Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and 1st

Gurka Rifles arrived at San Carlos. This brought the number

of ground forces up to 8000 troops. On 4 June, the commander

of 5 Brigade used a private phone to call from Goose Green to

the farm manager at Fitzroy, 36 miles away, to ascertain the

enemy strength there. When it was found out that the

Argentinians departed he hastily flew a company to secure a

forward position.

On 8 June, it was decided to bring 5 Brigade up to Bluff

Cove. Unfortunately, the ships were caught in daylight during

the ship to shore movement and were attacked by aircraft

leaving the British with 51 killed and 46 injured.[2:281]

With the landing of 5 Brigade, the British now had two

brigades abreast in a line 10 miles west of Stanley.

The plan to attack Stanley was to have 2 Commando Brigade

seize the intermediate objectives of Mount Langdon, Two

Sisters and Mount Harriet. On the night of 11 June, 3 Para

attacked Mount Langdon, 45 Commando attacked Two Sisters and

42 Commando attacked Mount Harriet. The attacks were

conducted at night along routes that had been discovered by

extensive patrolling through the many scattered mine fields.

The Argentinians were in prepared positions with heavy

machine guns and night vision devices. Attacks were conducted

with fixed bayonets and the British infantry routed the enemy

from their positions.

On the night of 13 June, 5 Brigade started their attack

on Mount Tumbledown and Mount William with the Scots Guards.

They too met an entrenched enemy in bunkers dug under the

huge boulders that surrounded the area. The enemy was

supported with mortars and heavy machine guns. At the same

time the Scots were fighting bunker to bunker, 2 Para

attacked Wireless Ridge. With the help of artillery and naval

gunfire fire they attacked and defeated two enemy regiments.

To the south, the Welsh Guards supported by Gurkas advanced

on Mount William. They met little resistance and easily took

their objectives.

With the capture of the all of the high ground to the

west, the British now looked down upon Stanley, their next

objective. However, there was no need to plan the attack for

white flags sprang up around Stanley. The next day, the

British accepted the surrender of over 6000 Argentinians. The

war was over!

Old lessons were relearned in the Falkland Islands War.

It showed that good training is the best weapon of the

infantryman and that supporting arms can be the decisive

factor in allowing infantry to accomplish its mission. It

demonstrated that a well trained army with good morale can

overcome numerically superior forces with poor leadership,

morale, and training. It proved once again that airplanes,

missiles, and ships cannot occupy and control land.

It is significant that in this age of troop movement by

helicopter, armored personnel carrier, and truck, the ability

to move over land by foot became the tactical advantage of

the war. Troops walked to war with a hundred pound pack and

carrying a mortar round. This was an element that the

Argentinians never expected and part of their reasoning for

not attacking the force beachhead. Air superiority was never

achieved by either side and infantry using conventional

tactics won the war. Technology in the shape of computers,

lasers and lock on missiles could not replace the courage of

the infantryman. Victory was achieved by men going in on foot

and prepared to fight.

[JamesWilson]

If you want on or off the Western Civilization Military History ping list,please let me know.

There's a Western Civilization Military History ping list???

Please add my name to that list, Sparta!

[FreedomPoster]

Oops - nomenclature brain fart. L1A1 is indeed the inch pattern FAL the Brits (and other Commonwealth types) used. LAR, light automatic rifle, is the English translation of FAL.

[ijcr]

British historians tend to overestimate British military achievements.

On the contrary...British historians were the fore runners of the likes of Lichtman and Doris Goodwin.

The British Paras are however an awesome fighting force deserving all the credit they can get. The SAS -WERE- legendary.

The British Harrier VTOL fighter was overated. Only a rush shipment of US AIM-9 Sidewinder All Aspect infrared missiles allowed the Brits to suceed against the Argentine high performance Mirage fighters which had to often break off due to limited range over the British fleet.

Spot on the AIM-9 L enabled the Harrier to engage head on targets.Thank you Ronald Reagan.

British warships did not have an equivalent of the US Navy Close In Weapons System (radar guided 20MM rotary cannon) and suffered losses accordingly.</>

No arguement there. Lost a tooth in the PO's mess in Portsmouth just after we returned from the South Atlantic, when I asked a matelot.... "What's the most powerful contraceptive in the world?" "Exocet missile, kills seamen at 40 miles" Touchy, them sailors. I really gnawed his fist though.

Argentine bombs had fuse problems which resulted in many perforated but otherwise undamaged British ships. This was a very tightly held secret during that war.

Some secret...The BBC World Service broadcasted that the Argentinians were bombing too low, not giving the arming device enough time to engage, the next day HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope were sunk.

One you missed...Rapier anti-aircraft missle systems were designed and built for West Germany TOO and had no depression...which is why the Artillery put them on the hilltops.

[spitz]

”overestimate British military achievements”

So, an 8000 mile supply line, an amphibious landing and forced march (Yomp or Tab) over freezing, wet and inhospitable terrain. Then to fight a dug-in, prepared enemy who controls the high ground and, in a lot of instances, out numbers you. And win.

Well I’m fairly impressed!

[First_Salute]

Nice catch.

[Kenny Bunk]

Aye, the Brits did OK. But in many ways, the Argies made it a lot easier. They over-rode their local commanders with some really stupid orders that weakened their defense AND GAVE AWAY THEIR ADVANTAGE ON THE GROUND.

Without command and control SNAFUS on the Argie part, the Brits would have been much more roughly handled. Perhaps they still would have won. But without heavy (make that MASSIVE) US help and Argentine General Staff incompetence, it would have been a good deal uglier than the mess it truly was.

LESSON HERE: You cannot win a war with Lyndon B. Johnson/McNamara-style command and control

[spitz]

Aye, the Brits did OK

You know something? I’ve heard all this before, all the reasons why the British didn’t actually ‘win’ the Falklands war.

Argentine incompetence, conscripts (who hadn’t eaten, slept or were cold), the Argie Navy withdrew to port, bombs didn’t go off, the airforce was at its operational limit, MASSIVE US help, the AIM9 . . . the list goes on no doubt.

Maybe the thread should be about how the US saved the Brits - Again. Or how the Argentines lost the war. I mean it couldn’t actually be that the British were better trained, motivated and competent enough to overcome the enemy and their own challenges.

Credit where credit is due, to those who were there.

[Kenny Bunk]

You are correct.

And it was the guts and drive of Margaret Thatcher who epitomized this incredbile feat of arms conducted 7,000 miles from base.

What also impressed me at the time was the way the Brits adapted their way around setbacks, to give the Argies their well-deserved thrashing.

I am glad we could be of some help.

[Polybius]

There is no question that the British infantry outclassed the Argentinian infantry. However, this was not a war that was won or lost with infantry but a war that was won with Sea Power.

No matter how good your infantry is, the projection of infantry power requires your ability to transport them from Point A to Point B. In this case, Point B was in the enemy’s back yard and Point A was 8,000 miles away.

The Royal Navy’s fast attack submarines prevented the Argentinians from transporting the kind of heavy equipment that might have made a difference in their land defenses. The fate of the General Belgrano made it absolutely clear to the Argentinians that Britannia ruled the waves off the Argentinian coast.

Be that as it may, the conflict was not a showcase for “high-tech” 1980’s naval warfare. Let me explain.

At the time, I was the Medical Officer on a U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser. The C.O. used the opportunity to have discussions with the officers in the Ward Room regarding what tactics would or should be used in the upcoming war.

To tell you the truth, we had a hard time relating to the naval situation as it was totally out of synch with 1980’s U.S. Navy carrier battle doctrine. The situation was, to be blunt, rather primitive. .

During that time period, I had read Dudley Pope’s history of the Battle of Copenhagen and that had gotten me interested in reading the remainder of the Royal Navy’s history during the Napoleonic era. The mental fast forward to the late 20th Century brought into sharp contrast the sorry state the Royal Navy had sunk to in going from total maritime dominance to sustaining major battle damage from a Third World country.

From before Napoleonic times until World War II, the Royal Navy was at the forefront of naval technology. Even in carrier warfare, the armored deck, the angle deck, the steam catapult and the carrier landing guidance system were British innovations. Now, the Royal Navy was totally outclassed in modern naval warfare and resorting to ski jump carriers that, at 20,000 tons, were merely cruisers modified to carry VTOL aircraft.

In the vernacular of the day, the Brits were going to war with “Gary Hart Carriers".

However, even if Santa Claus had given the Brits a decent CVA or CVN as an early Christmas present, a CVA filled with Harriers was not the answer. The CVA itself is just expensive real estate with little combat capabilities. What makes a CVA or CVN a potent weapon is all the defensive components of the carrier battle group and the defensive and offensive aircraft mix of the carrier.

In 1980’s naval warfare with aircraft carrying standoff weapons it was simply not acceptable to allow an enemy aircraft within 100 miles of a U.S. Navy battle group during wartime according to U.S. Navy battle doctrine. E-2 Hawkeye aircraft provided the carrier battle group with long range sensing. The F-14 fighter squadrons provided an air superiority fighter that was more than a match for any enemy aircraft. As a last resort, the “small boys” provided last ditch missile air defense. Most of the resources of a U.S. Navy carrier battle group are devoted to absolute defense of the battle group.

Without “real carriers”, the British were limited to Harriers which are simply not acceptable in modern naval warfare. Without E-2 Hawkeyes guiding air superiority fighters to engage enemy aircraft 100 miles from the fleet, the British fleet was virtually a sitting duck to air attack. Without such air superiority fighters and their forward "eyes", even antiquated Skyhawks were able to fly over the British fleet and drop “dumb bombs” on the British fleet.

Such a sorry state of affairs would not have come to pass if the British Government had not cancelled the Queen Elizabeth class carriers in the 1966 Defense White paper.

At some point, it must be admitted the technology has passed you by and you must upgrade or die. So it was in going from sail to steam to ironclads to Dreadnoughts to battleships to carriers.

Such upgrades are monumentally expensive. However, without them, every tin pot dictator than can afford to buy a few squadrons of antiquated jets will be able to drop dumb bombs on Royal Navy task forces. The British powers-that-be did not admit the need to modernize the Royal Navy’s carrier forces in the 1960’s and way too many Royal Navy ships were therefore unnecessarily lost in the 1980’s at the Falklands.

Pictured below is an artist’s rendition of what the HMS Queen Elizabeth CVA.01 and the HMS Duke Of Edinburgh CVA.02 would have looked like if their construction had not been cancelled. If they had been at the Falklands, the Royal Navy would have been able to fight a modern naval war as it should be fought.

[spitz]

However, this was not a war that was won or lost with infantry but a war that was won with Sea Power.

Sea power played its part, but it wasn’t the sole reason or in fact the determining reason behind the British success. All three forces played their part, add to that the political will from Maggie Thatcher and her cabinet which also proved an overwhelming factor in the war, and it was something the Argentinians hadn’t counted on. The RN provided the means to get to the South Atlantic and move around, limited air defence, point defence during the landings and Naval artillery support. The infantry endeavours are well documented, but they dealt the final blow to Argentine aspirations not the RN. Some have indicated that the RAF role was subservient to the Navy/Marines and Army, most forget that RAF Nimrods were flying ASW mission throughout - hastily armed with Sidewinders no less! Also Vulcan Bombers flew from the UK to attack Stanley Airport, although these Black Buck missions were not successful the political message was clear - the Argentine mainland was in range. The RAF also flew special forces HALO missions before the arrival of the main task force.

If any of the armed or political forces lacked the ability to overcome the challenges to adapt and move forward the war would have been lost for sure. Compared to the US, then and now in fact, the military resources available to British are limited, flexibility and professionalism being the key. And outside the US, then and now, which other country would have or does have the will and ability to undertake this kind of operation? In my view not many if any.

The Royal Navy’s fast attack submarines prevented the Argentinians from transporting the kind of heavy equipment that might have made a difference in their land defenses.

What kind of heavy equipment? Heavy Tanks would have bogged down as soon as they were outside the Port Stanley perimeter. Unlike the British the Argies had 155mm artillery and Pucarra ground attack aircraft in the Islands. All other equipment could be flown in by C130, and by some accounts that’s what they were doing up to the very end of the conflict. But like Iraq, the Argentines chose to defend a position when they should have moved forward on the unprepared troops on the beaches, then if necessary, fall back to a fixed position defence around Stanley. HMS Conqueror sinking the Belgrano was a severe blow to the Argentine Navy, but it wasn’t a fatal blow. Political and military commitment was as much to blame for the recall to port of the Argentine Navy as the presence of Royal Navy submarines. The Argentine surface fleet was considered to be a dire threat to the task force and their diesel subs even more so, but they never committed. The constant hunt for the subs did, by some accounts, contribute to the decline in the local whale population.

The Royal Navy 1982

With the adherence to being “a good NATO partner”, shrinking Empire, reduced global commitments and reduced defence spending, successive British governments did gut the Royal Navy and its capabilities. The Invincible Class aircraft carriers were, in fact, designated Through Deck Cruisers a political expedient that was supposed to sound the death nell of RN Carriers and the Fleet Air Arm. Surprisingly it was the RAF that saved the FAA, had the RAF not chosen the Harrier the RN’s budget alone wouldn’t have stretched to the development of the Sea Harrier and FAA fixed wing aircraft would have been consigned to history.

As part of the NATO alliance, the RN surface role was to provide ASW capability, between Greenland/Iceland and Iceland/UK, to stop Soviet subs from leaking into the Atlantic to attack US and Canadian troop ships and carrier groups. The RN carriers were primarily designed as command ships capable of deploying a large number ASW helicopters, Sea Harriers were only intended to offer a limited defence ability against Soviet aircraft. Air defence elements would have been supplied from land based aircraft from Scotland and US carriers, point defence would be from Frigates and Destroyers which would also deploy ASW helicopters.

The Royal Navy went to a war with an ability to fight the Soviets but without the air cover from land based and US carrier aircraft. The RN paid in the Falklands for being a good NATO partner, but to apply U.S. Navy carrier battle doctrine was never applicable. The choices were stark; relinquish the right to the Falklands and and the rights of its people, and subsequently send a message to every tin-pot dictator that Britain would no longer protect its sovereign rights; wait until the right ships and forces could be massed through alliances, building or acquisition; or plan as well as you can, send the best you got, and as a last resort improvise.

I know it may seem strange that Britain could send its armed forces to a war with less than perfect equipment, out numbered and so far away that in the event of something going wrong you would have little chance of getting out alive. Well, its been going on for centuries we like to call it tradition. The proofs out there Agincourt, Spanish Amarda, Battle of Britain . . .

And, although its taken far too long, things are set to change for the RN. New Type 45 Air defence destroyers, 2 new 60,000 ton carriers with JSF to replace the Harrier. It’s all here:

http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk

[Polybius]

Sea power played its part, but it wasn’t the sole reason or in fact the determining reason behind the British success. All three forces played their part, ........

However, as Spain, Napoleon and Hitler found out, the mightiest army in Western Europe is absolutely impotent against an island nation that controls the sea around it. Sea power not so much determines if the war is won or lost but whether the Land Battle of Britain ever takes place at all.

Compared to the US, then and now in fact, the military resources available to British are limited, flexibility and professionalism being the key. And outside the US, then and now, which other country would have or does have the will and ability to undertake this kind of operation? In my view not many if any..... The Royal Navy went to a war with an ability to fight the Soviets but without the air cover from land based and US carrier aircraft. The RN paid in the Falklands for being a good NATO partner,.....

That is exactly my point.

I see by your profile page that you are British. My point is not to criticize Britain for not being a good military partner to the U.S. A more loyal ally we Americans will never have.

My point is that, to it's own detriment, Britain has paid too much attention to NATO's needs without taking into account Britannia's needs. Just as sometimes the U.S. has a vital interest that does not involve NATO or Britain, Britain might have a vital interest that does not involve the U.S. or NATO.

....but to apply U.S. Navy carrier battle doctrine was never applicable.

But my point is that it should have been applicable.

I know it may seem strange that Britain could send its armed forces to a war with less than perfect equipment, out numbered and so far away that in the event of something going wrong you would have little chance of getting out alive. Well, its been going on for centuries we like to call it tradition. The proofs out there Agincourt, Spanish Amarda, Battle of Britain . . .

To get back to the should have been applicable......

The tradition of waiting to the last minute to prepare for war was also passed down to the U.S. In World War One, American aviation was so primitive that U.S. fighter squadrons flew French Nieuports and SPADS. (One, the 25th Aero Squadron, flew British S.E.5a's but never saw combat.)

However, the lead time in technology was much different in the old days. In World War One, a new generation of air superiority fighter could be designed and produced every few months. Now, designing a modern weapons system takes years or decades. If purchased from the U.S., training still takes years.

Therefore, the American tradition of being caught flat-footed when war broke out ended with World War Two. Modern technolgy no longer allows such a luxury.

The White Paper that cancelled the Queen Elizabeth class carrier in the 1960's doomed HMS Sheffield in the 1980's.

It is true that only the U.S. can put a decent carrier into battle. Once the French figure out how to keep the Charles de Gaulle's propellor from falling off, they may also be able to do likewise.

My point is that, if any other nation besides the U.S. should have at least one modern CVA or CVN, that nation should be Great Britain.....not France.

If Great Britain had had a single modern CVA or CVN at the Falkland, even the Charles de Gaulle, (assuming you Brits found a way to keep it's propellor from falling off) the Royal Navy should not have lost a single ship to Argentinian aircraft.

What kind of heavy equipment? Heavy Tanks would have bogged down.....

During the war, the Argentinian Air Force fighter bombers were forced to take off from Argentinian bases, re-fuel in the air to top off their tanks and then fly their combat sorties with very limited air time over the British fleet. With unlimited heavy sea lift capability the control of the sea lanes gives, construction battalions could have turned the Falklands into an unsinkable aircraft carrier. More beans and bullets may have greatly strengthened the number of the land defenders but, with the Argentinian conscript army, the value of that is debatable.

French CVN Charles de Gaulle (Propellor not included)

[Polybius]

And, although its taken far too long, things are set to change for the RN. New Type 45 Air defence destroyers, 2 new 60,000 ton carriers with JSF to replace the Harrier. It’s all here: http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk

Future Royal Navy Carriers

Very nice. I hope you did not sub-contract out the propulsion system to the French. ;-)

[Warhammer]

Please add me to the list.

[Tommyjo]

No shots were taken head on against any Argentine Mirage. All kills with Sidewinder in the Falklands were rear-hemishphere.

[Patton@Bastogne]

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Great analysis !


Kudos for mentioning Agincourt, the Spanish Armada, and the Battle of Britain ...


That's the "fundamental" why behind the reason the great language in the 20-21st centuries is "English"


"Coggeshall" in Essex ...


Patton-at-Bastogne


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