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However, this was not a war that was won or lost with infantry but a war that was won with Sea Power.

Sea power played its part, but it wasn’t the sole reason or in fact the determining reason behind the British success. All three forces played their part, add to that the political will from Maggie Thatcher and her cabinet which also proved an overwhelming factor in the war, and it was something the Argentinians hadn’t counted on. The RN provided the means to get to the South Atlantic and move around, limited air defence, point defence during the landings and Naval artillery support. The infantry endeavours are well documented, but they dealt the final blow to Argentine aspirations not the RN. Some have indicated that the RAF role was subservient to the Navy/Marines and Army, most forget that RAF Nimrods were flying ASW mission throughout - hastily armed with Sidewinders no less! Also Vulcan Bombers flew from the UK to attack Stanley Airport, although these Black Buck missions were not successful the political message was clear - the Argentine mainland was in range. The RAF also flew special forces HALO missions before the arrival of the main task force.

If any of the armed or political forces lacked the ability to overcome the challenges to adapt and move forward the war would have been lost for sure. Compared to the US, then and now in fact, the military resources available to British are limited, flexibility and professionalism being the key. And outside the US, then and now, which other country would have or does have the will and ability to undertake this kind of operation? In my view not many if any.

The Royal Navy’s fast attack submarines prevented the Argentinians from transporting the kind of heavy equipment that might have made a difference in their land defenses.

What kind of heavy equipment? Heavy Tanks would have bogged down as soon as they were outside the Port Stanley perimeter. Unlike the British the Argies had 155mm artillery and Pucarra ground attack aircraft in the Islands. All other equipment could be flown in by C130, and by some accounts that’s what they were doing up to the very end of the conflict. But like Iraq, the Argentines chose to defend a position when they should have moved forward on the unprepared troops on the beaches, then if necessary, fall back to a fixed position defence around Stanley. HMS Conqueror sinking the Belgrano was a severe blow to the Argentine Navy, but it wasn’t a fatal blow. Political and military commitment was as much to blame for the recall to port of the Argentine Navy as the presence of Royal Navy submarines. The Argentine surface fleet was considered to be a dire threat to the task force and their diesel subs even more so, but they never committed. The constant hunt for the subs did, by some accounts, contribute to the decline in the local whale population.

The Royal Navy 1982

With the adherence to being “a good NATO partner”, shrinking Empire, reduced global commitments and reduced defence spending, successive British governments did gut the Royal Navy and its capabilities. The Invincible Class aircraft carriers were, in fact, designated Through Deck Cruisers a political expedient that was supposed to sound the death nell of RN Carriers and the Fleet Air Arm. Surprisingly it was the RAF that saved the FAA, had the RAF not chosen the Harrier the RN’s budget alone wouldn’t have stretched to the development of the Sea Harrier and FAA fixed wing aircraft would have been consigned to history.

As part of the NATO alliance, the RN surface role was to provide ASW capability, between Greenland/Iceland and Iceland/UK, to stop Soviet subs from leaking into the Atlantic to attack US and Canadian troop ships and carrier groups. The RN carriers were primarily designed as command ships capable of deploying a large number ASW helicopters, Sea Harriers were only intended to offer a limited defence ability against Soviet aircraft. Air defence elements would have been supplied from land based aircraft from Scotland and US carriers, point defence would be from Frigates and Destroyers which would also deploy ASW helicopters.

The Royal Navy went to a war with an ability to fight the Soviets but without the air cover from land based and US carrier aircraft. The RN paid in the Falklands for being a good NATO partner, but to apply U.S. Navy carrier battle doctrine was never applicable. The choices were stark; relinquish the right to the Falklands and and the rights of its people, and subsequently send a message to every tin-pot dictator that Britain would no longer protect its sovereign rights; wait until the right ships and forces could be massed through alliances, building or acquisition; or plan as well as you can, send the best you got, and as a last resort improvise.

I know it may seem strange that Britain could send its armed forces to a war with less than perfect equipment, out numbered and so far away that in the event of something going wrong you would have little chance of getting out alive. Well, its been going on for centuries we like to call it tradition. The proofs out there Agincourt, Spanish Amarda, Battle of Britain . . .

And, although its taken far too long, things are set to change for the RN. New Type 45 Air defence destroyers, 2 new 60,000 ton carriers with JSF to replace the Harrier. It’s all here:

http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk

Sea power played its part, but it wasn’t the sole reason or in fact the determining reason behind the British success. All three forces played their part, ........

However, as Spain, Napoleon and Hitler found out, the mightiest army in Western Europe is absolutely impotent against an island nation that controls the sea around it. Sea power not so much determines if the war is won or lost but whether the Land Battle of Britain ever takes place at all.

Compared to the US, then and now in fact, the military resources available to British are limited, flexibility and professionalism being the key. And outside the US, then and now, which other country would have or does have the will and ability to undertake this kind of operation? In my view not many if any..... The Royal Navy went to a war with an ability to fight the Soviets but without the air cover from land based and US carrier aircraft. The RN paid in the Falklands for being a good NATO partner,.....

That is exactly my point.

I see by your profile page that you are British. My point is not to criticize Britain for not being a good military partner to the U.S. A more loyal ally we Americans will never have.

My point is that, to it's own detriment, Britain has paid too much attention to NATO's needs without taking into account Britannia's needs. Just as sometimes the U.S. has a vital interest that does not involve NATO or Britain, Britain might have a vital interest that does not involve the U.S. or NATO.

....but to apply U.S. Navy carrier battle doctrine was never applicable.

But my point is that it should have been applicable.

I know it may seem strange that Britain could send its armed forces to a war with less than perfect equipment, out numbered and so far away that in the event of something going wrong you would have little chance of getting out alive. Well, its been going on for centuries we like to call it tradition. The proofs out there Agincourt, Spanish Amarda, Battle of Britain . . .

To get back to the should have been applicable......

The tradition of waiting to the last minute to prepare for war was also passed down to the U.S. In World War One, American aviation was so primitive that U.S. fighter squadrons flew French Nieuports and SPADS. (One, the 25th Aero Squadron, flew British S.E.5a's but never saw combat.)

However, the lead time in technology was much different in the old days. In World War One, a new generation of air superiority fighter could be designed and produced every few months. Now, designing a modern weapons system takes years or decades. If purchased from the U.S., training still takes years.

Therefore, the American tradition of being caught flat-footed when war broke out ended with World War Two. Modern technolgy no longer allows such a luxury.

The White Paper that cancelled the Queen Elizabeth class carrier in the 1960's doomed HMS Sheffield in the 1980's.

It is true that only the U.S. can put a decent carrier into battle. Once the French figure out how to keep the Charles de Gaulle's propellor from falling off, they may also be able to do likewise.

My point is that, if any other nation besides the U.S. should have at least one modern CVA or CVN, that nation should be Great Britain.....not France.

If Great Britain had had a single modern CVA or CVN at the Falkland, even the Charles de Gaulle, (assuming you Brits found a way to keep it's propellor from falling off) the Royal Navy should not have lost a single ship to Argentinian aircraft.

What kind of heavy equipment? Heavy Tanks would have bogged down.....

During the war, the Argentinian Air Force fighter bombers were forced to take off from Argentinian bases, re-fuel in the air to top off their tanks and then fly their combat sorties with very limited air time over the British fleet. With unlimited heavy sea lift capability the control of the sea lanes gives, construction battalions could have turned the Falklands into an unsinkable aircraft carrier. More beans and bullets may have greatly strengthened the number of the land defenders but, with the Argentinian conscript army, the value of that is debatable.

French CVN Charles de Gaulle (Propellor not included)

And, although its taken far too long, things are set to change for the RN. New Type 45 Air defence destroyers, 2 new 60,000 ton carriers with JSF to replace the Harrier. It’s all here: http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk

Future Royal Navy Carriers

Very nice. I hope you did not sub-contract out the propulsion system to the French. ;-)

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Great analysis !

Kudos for mentioning Agincourt, the Spanish Armada, and the Battle of Britain ...

That's the "fundamental" why behind the reason the great language in the 20-21st centuries is "English"

"Coggeshall" in Essex ...

Patton-at-Bastogne

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