The sniper, risk and public reaction - The logic of irrational fear

The Economist ^ | 10.17.02

[wallcrawlr]

The reaction to the sniper reveals a lot about Americans' perception of risk

THE suburbs of the nation's capital are locked down. The Washington Area Girls Soccer League went on with its 2001 tournament despite the September 11th attacks. This year's event was cancelled because of the sniper who has killed nine people in the Washington area. Hundreds of schools have been operating under a “code blue”, which prohibits all outdoor activity. Autumnal trips to pumpkin patches have been cancelled. And for those who dare to venture out of their homes, traffic dragnets designed to trap the killer's white van cause hours of delay.

Contrast that with the reaction to September 11th. Then George Bush went on television urging the country to start spending again, to travel again and, in so far as possible, not to let daily life be disrupted. What accounts for the difference?

There are two and a half “logical” explanations. First, the nature of the events themselves. The enormity of September 11th put it in a category of its own. It was perceived as a one-off event, even though al-Qaeda is continuing its war. The sniper's attacks are much more obviously part of a series; indeed, he is constantly compared to other serial murderers.

Second, the political and legal concerns of the relevant authorities differ. Last year Mr Bush needed to reassure America that “terrorists would not win”. For school superintendents, the small risk of having a child shot far outweighs the passing inconvenience of cancelled events. They also run the risk of being sued.

The half-logical explanation concerns the scale of the sniper-murders. The nine murders took place in five counties with a total population of 3.1m. Over the course of the two weeks the sniper has been at work, there was a one-in-344,000 chance of being killed by him. That figure is tiny, but it equates on an annualised basis to a theoretical murder rate of 7.5 for every 100,000 people. That compares with a murder rate of 3.4 for those counties in 2000 (the last year for which all figures are available). And three-quarters of the area's “ordinary” murders took place in one county, Prince George's. The annual rate for the other four counties is only 1.4. In theory, the risk for their inhabitants has been raised several times by the sniper.

This is mathematically logical—but it is also bogus. The sniper cannot continue at the same rate; he has already had to slow down, and he was nearly caught at his last murder. He will surely either stop or be caught.

So it is fair to say both that people are understandably alarmed, and that they are still exaggerating the risk. Why? Experts seem to agree that Americans find it harder than most people to evaluate risks accurately. Lawsuits, labels on coffee cups (“Warning: the beverage you are about to enjoy is extremely hot”), even political pronouncements all often suggest it is possible to avoid danger altogether.

Beyond that, there are a number of specific reasons why potential victims in any country would find it difficult to evaluate the risk from the sniper. People generally exaggerate spectacular but low-probability risks, such as murder or natural disaster, just as they underestimate more common risks, such as accidents in the home.

In this case, adds Kip Viscusi, an economist at the Harvard Law School, Americans face a new sort of risk—and people do not know how to evaluate something they have never seen before. There has never been a serial killer like the sniper. Other serial murderers have preyed on particular groups—often young women or boys. The sniper has killed randomly at a distance. This means no one in the Washington area can give any reason why he or she should not be the next victim.

Because the risk is new, it is also uncertain. As Mr Viscusi points out, people tend to overestimate unknown risks. Economists call this “risk-ambiguity aversion”. And in this case the main source of information for Washingtonians is the blanket, sometimes hysterical coverage from television and newspapers, which tends to exaggerate the perceived risk further. Everyone knows the number of murders. Few know how many people live in the affected area, or the murder rate.

Lastly, the sniper-killings share some peculiarities with other risks that are also exaggerated. One of the victims was a child—and parents dramatically overestimate any uncommon threat to their children's lives (such as the risk of kidnapping by a stranger). Similarly, the sniper represents an “involuntary” risk, not one you run willingly for a benefit (such as driving too fast to get somewhere). People worry less about voluntary risks.

Worst of all, the risk is hard to mitigate. You cannot easily lessen it by changing behaviour—like wearing a seat belt. The only way to remove yourself from the sniper's mercy is not to go out at all. But that brings out another unusual side to this case. On the roads, the more people drive carefully, the lower your own risk. Here, if more people stay home, your risk actually rises marginally. If, say, the sniper chooses a commercial parking lot and only half the usual number of customers are there, your chances of being a victim double.

In such bizarre circumstances, fear can easily seem exaggerated. But it is hardly irrational to be scared and perplexed.

[thedugal]

If, say, the sniper chooses a commercial parking lot and only half the usual number of customers are there, your chances of being a victim double.

Newage Math. If you normally go to the store once every day and stand in the parking lot for approximately 4 minutes per trip, but now because of the snipings you only go to the store once every 2 days and only spend 2 minutes in the parking lot then your risk decreases 4 fold.