Posted on 10/02/2002 9:31:49 PM PDT by VaBthang4
Force Reconnaissance Missions
1st Force Reconnaissance Platoon operated in support of 15th MEU(SOC) during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (1st Force) Marines of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU(SOC)) were the best-trained, best-equipped Marines fighting in Afghanistan. We had the most experienced small unit commanders and the newest specialized equipment within all of the Department of Defense for conducting combat operations. As the assault element in the maritime special purpose force (MSPF), the platoon gained the confidence of the Marine air-ground task force commander early in the predeployment training cycle. During the course of the deployment the platoon would perform all three of their distinct and separate missions: the deep reconnaissance mission, the direct action mission as a maneuver element, and specialized independent missions as directed.
Before attaching to the 15th MEU(SOC), the platoon trained together for a year and focused primarily on long-range reconnaissance operations according to the unit training plan. The platoon trained in full mission reconnaissance profiles to include the specialized insertion and extraction techniques during deployments to the Joint Readiness Center in Louisiana, as well as Nailand, Bridgeport, China Lake, and Twentynine Palms, CA. Prior to this yearlong unit practical application training, a phase dedicated to schoolhouse training developed the core competencies for 1st Force Marines on an individual basis. Many of these Marines were honor graduates of schools such as combatant dive, basic reconnaissance course, static line jump master, and breacher schools, among others. The Marines comprising 1st Force were generally experienced (50 percent previously deployed as 1st Force) and mature staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and senior NCOs. My platoon’s average age was 28 and average rank was staff sergeant. The average number of specialized schools my Marines had attended was six. I had but one Marine on his first float (more about my “boot” later). We had 7 school trained snipers, 10 rangers, and 20 military free fall school graduates. The entire unit had completed platoon parachute insertions from 25,000 feet with full combat equipment at night. Confidence ran high; all were up to the challenge of facing any enemy. The platoon was ready to fight the moment we left Hawaii in late August 2001. We had perfected the basics, integrating our skills into complex, highly demanding, full mission profiles.
After conducting humanitarian operations in East Timor, prehostility training in Bahrain, shaping operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, and prestaging for the assault into Afghanistan, the force reconnaissance Marines were on the edge of their seats for the opportunity to hunt down the enemy.
Hours after the assault into Afghanistan, the first two teams would leave on the first long-range zone reconnaissance patrol of the 15th MEU(SOC). This patrol was among the most active of the platoon’s actions supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They implanted sensors in two separate areas, called for an armed reconnaissance mission of AH–1W gunships, then maneuvered to within 10 kilometers of enemy armor units that were later engaged by AH–1W gunships. While validating the basics of the unit’s patrolling standing operating procedures, there were a number of lessons reinforced. Our ability to monitor the primary tactical air direction proved the critical communications net time and again. Friendly aircraft relayed information regarding the reconnaissance patrol’s movement through the vast desert, and it was a great benefit that the team leader communicated directly with aircraft overhead. Information was passed regarding contacts in the area and locations and movement of friendly reconnaissance patrols.
Accurate position reporting to aircraft proved challenging. Standard position reporting to aircraft was in latitude/longitude, not grid. The force solution required two global positioning systems (GPSs). Fortunately each Marine was issued a Garmin 12 GPS at 1st Force. One GPS was set for grid while a second was set for latitude/longitude. Accurate 1:50,000 scale maps of Afghanistan were unavailable. The only available grid maps were 1:100,000 scale that were difficult for use in microterrain planning. Aircrews did not have grid maps at all thus creating a seam in air-to-ground coordination.
Employment of ground sensors in the Afghanistan desert was tenuous at best. The sensors proved ineffective in the desert terrain and were unable to sense the vibrations through the loose, powdery desert floor. They failed at the published distance of operational performance. Cold weather pushed in as the weeks passed deeper into winter. High desert regions around the globe routinely experience temperatures well below freezing. Enhanced cold weather gear needs to be included in west coast MEU(SOC) deployments. The flexibility demanded in expeditionary warfare dictates that the Marines need to be prepared to operate in extreme cold requiring individual and team cold weather equipment.
The performance of the M–2120 (SOPHIE), a thermal imaging device, was very impressive in the desert environment of southern Afghanistan. Like the Garmin 12 GPS, the SOPHIE was specialized equipment acquired and utilized only by 1st Force. The SOPHIE, in the hands of reconnaissance Marines, successfully identified man-sized contacts at approximately 2,200 meters under nighttime conditions. Our best night vision goggle’s (PVS–17B, another specialized optic only at 1st Force) performance was limited to approximately 400–500 meters under like conditions. In addition, the PVS–14s could see about 200 meters. SOPHIE permitted low-level light operations that sister Services and coalition forces could not match. On nights when illumination was low or when overcast with low clouds, patrols were only visible with vehicle-mounted infrared or forward looking infrared systems. The standard Javelin thermal sight command launch unit (CLU) ranged approximately 800–1,000 meters during these dark nights. While effective, the CLU simply could not match the SOPHIE range.
The interim fast attack vehicle (IFAV) proved a workhorse in the desert environment. Challenges faced related to sourcing sufficient quantities of proper tires and filters. The spare parts block for IFAVs was still in its infancy. With the stresses on the air bridge into Afghanistan it was difficult to get special items into Camp Rhino. Nonetheless, the IFAV proved itself to be a great patrolling tool and mobility platform, not an armored vehicle. 1st Force has already modified 15 items from our after-action report to improve the vehicle.
Communications electronics proved highly reliable. Superior training and top of the line equipment are credited for this success. The PRC–117F, the PRC–138V2 (automatic link establishment), and PRC–148 were unique to 1st Force and allowed us to communicate across the full spectrum to include joint forces. An augment to the communications equipment suite should include an encrypted, wireless, global satellite phone. This addition would enhance maneuverability, cutting by two the four separate radios on the previously described patrol, as well as the battery demand, also a significant weight and space consideration.
1st Force was the only unit with the special operations forces laser marker (SOFLaM) capability. This capability enabled them to designate and lase a target for destruction by laser guided munitions. Enhancement in the fielding of SOFLaM, or a like capability, would be a great stride toward much greater joint interoperability in ground marking of laser guided munitions. The enemy threat from ground fired, wire guided weapons is approximately 6 kilometers. The capability to laser mark targets beyond this range would be well within SOFLaM capabilities. Utilized in conjunction with the SOPHIE, the reconnaissance teams had a huge advantage over any other forward air controller (FAC).
On 6 December 2001, members of the 15th MEU(SOC) force reconnaissance platoon were assigned the mission of interdicting Highway 1 in order to destroy any Taliban or Al Qaeda forces fleeing from Kandahar to Lashkar-Gar. During the ambush patrol the platoon assaulted a Taliban or Al Qaeda vehicle and became engaged in close quarters combat with approximately seven to nine of the enemy. The platoon destroyed the enemy embarked in the vehicle using small arms fire.
The ambush site was designed to interdict rather than ambush convoys of fleeing enemy between Kandahar and Lashkar-Gar. The ambush patrol consisted of an element of the force reconnaissance platoon as the assault force, supported by elements of the light armored reconnaissance company and combined antiarmor team providing security and support. This was not a typical ambush site. Established rules of engagement (ROE) prohibited application of deadly force until forces entering the ambush site exhibited hostile acts or hostile intent. Another friendly force disadvantage was the terrain. The entire route was located in the middle of an open, desolate desert plateau, very undesirable for an ambush site. Undeterred by these challenges, the teams engaged and destroyed the enemy in a close quarters battle igniting the vehicle loaded with rocket propelled grenades and ammunition. Working with a ground FAC, the force reconnaissance team coordinated a call for close air support that destroyed both the pickup truck that had been ensnared in the roadblock as well as an enemy convoy following this vehicle as the convoy attempted to evade north of the roadblock.
The learning points are many, but these are the highlights. First, train as you will fight. We had conducted live fire vehicle assaults during the special operations training group close quarters battle training package. This was the main reason the force reconnaissance Marines were chosen to “ambush” the enemy. All of the Marines were highly trained gunfighters and performed as they were trained once the rounds began to fly. Second, muscle memory is important. One Marine experienced a type one malfunction. A tap, rap, bang and the Marine was killing the enemy. Only after the gunfight, when questioned by his peers, did he realize he cleared his weapon. Third, the Marines on the line all talk about audio exclusion and giving a nonstandard response (multiple rounds to the enemy’s chest) to each of their targets before immediately moving to head shots on the subsequent targets. The Marines shot what they were conditioned to fire, and the 5.56mm round will not put a man to the ground with two shots to the chest. Fourth, the coordination with the sniper was not adequate. The platoon talked about using a sniper to overwatch their movement. However, no one in the assault element instructed the sniper on his engagement criteria. In fact, no one knew that there was a sniper shooting until after the assault was complete. The coordination must be complete before crossing the line of departure. Fifth, the M4 with optical suite (Aim Point M2, advanced combat optical gunsight, or PVS–17B/C) is a great weapons system for reconnaissance and is used by every coalition special warfare unit that I observed in Afghanistan. (British Special Air Service (SAS), Australian SAS, Germans, SEALs, Air Force combat controller teams/parajumpers and special forces teams are all carrying the M4 with optical suite.) Force reconnaissance needs one simple system for the two separate and distinct missions (long-range reconnaissance and direct action raids). The M4 must have a complete optic suite of gear for each weapon, or we are not progressing toward the future. The use of iron sights will get our Marines killed.
Finally, the ROE were continuously changing. In the beginning a special forces team could engage anyone with weapons, but the ROE changed to only crew-served weapons in vehicles, then only to hostile intent. Each day the Marines were being restricted on whom they could engage. The better equipped and more experienced force reconnaissance Marines were chosen to interdict the vehicles because the ROE via higher than Task Force 58 (TF 58) were changing. Yet, with the original ROE the light armored reconaissance company could have destroyed all of those vehicles without endangering any Marines along a road.
After the gunfight on Highway 1, the platoon returned to Camp Rhino where we sent out two more long-range zone reconnaissance patrols and conducted live fire training. The patrols searched for any enemy personnel infiltrating through the TF 58 area of operation. During the last two long-range reconnaissance patrols, the MSPF was stood up again to conduct raids. However, as in training and in combat, the “word” changed along with the intelligence picture. Yet another opportunity to conduct specialized missions as directed presented itself.
The force reconnaissance platoon (minus/reinforced) with a translator and Army specialist went into a village looking for special items—military operations other than war at its best. Again, the platoon was being used as a maneuver element with myself as the mission commander. The platoon had an entire company as a quick reaction force with the company commander, fire support team, and assault platoon (airborne) riding in helicopters. The platoon was very well supported. The use of 1st Force as a maneuver element conducting special missions or missions as directed would be a recurring theme for the 15th MEU(SOC). One of the biggest learning points is that 1st Force is capable of performing missions that are usually dedicated to a rifle company (minus) or a platoon (reinforced). In addition, a recurring problem during planning and conduct of the mission was the lack of a dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter. The Marine Corps needs to invest in a dedicated CSAR helicopter. The Navy’s HH–60H is outfitted with better navigational equipment and is more modern than anything the Corps is currently flying.
And, as I promised, remember the “boot” corporal? Well, he turned 21 after Christmas, picked up sergeant, won the meritorious sergeant board for the MEU, and was awarded the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine of the Year. Not only were the members of the platoon the best trained and best equipped, but most importantly, they were all exceptional Marines.
There are numerous learning points throughout this article. Take away what will help. However, think about the future and where the Marines as a whole should develop. Why don’t the grunts have hand-held SOPHIEs? Why don’t all Marines have optics on their primary weapons? Why not night vision for each Marine and an optical sight for night engagements? Why doesn’t the Marine Corps have SOFLaMs for the battalion landing teams? Why do we help Marines clear malfunctions on the rifle range or any live fire ranges? Why don’t we expand 1st Force to participate as a full-fledged member of Special Operations Command? Why don’t we demand more money for training so Marines get to conduct live fire training three times a week while on float and conduct live fire and maneuver training at least once a month during workups? Why don’t we bring the major subordinate element going on float to table of organization strength 1 year prior to chopping to the MEU?
Capt Treglia was a platoon commander with 1st Force and is currently assigned to the Special Operations Training Group, I MEF.
I've seen shooters be denied alibis for simple things like not having sufficient CLP on the bolt.
Geroge S. Patton
Why I'm a big fan of 30-06
I never had a problem shooting and never took this route. LOL! I apparantly needed glasses the whole time I was in- when we shot, the 250 meter target and greater always looked like a little green smudge that I could barely see and I still managed to nail 'em most of the time. It was only after I realized that it wasn't just that all the movies in the theaters that were always out of focus but my eyes that I went to the docs and got a prescription. I was amazed at what I could see after that.
At any rate, I never had anybody correct a malfunction for me- that's why that caught my eye.
During WWII there was Marine Ranger Bn, it is a term from the past.
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