The Iraqi threat: real or imagined?, 80-page IISS dossier details Iraqi capabilities

War, sanctions and UN weapons inspections have reversed and retarded - but not eliminated - Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and long-range missile capacities, the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes in yesterday's report.

The 80-page dossier, drawn mainly from the experience of UN weapons inspectors, provides as much ammunition for opponents of a military attack on the country as for those advocating one. John Chipman, IISS director, said yesterday the dossier "does not attempt to make a case, either way, as to whether Saddam Hussein's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] arsenal is a casus belli per se".

But his underlying message was clear: "The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this singular aim."

Dr Chipman's reference in interviews to the suggestion that Iraq could assemble a nuclear weapon within months if it obtained fissile material was seized on by the media. What the report actually says is: "There is a nuclear wildcard. If, somehow, Iraq were able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from foreign sources, it could probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, probably in a matter of months."

The dossier says Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons. It would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build production facilities for such material.

Iraq, it says, could take a number of measures to hide a 1,000-machine centrifuge plant from surveillance but it would be difficult to acquire foreign materials, equipment and components for such a plant without detection.

The dossier says: "Assuming that 1998 [the year UN inspectors left Iraq] is the starting point, most experts do not believe that Iraq could have completed a facility for the production of nuclear weapons-usable nuclear material in only a few years."

Iraq's current interest in radiological weapons is unknown. It could divert civil-use radioisotopes or seek to obtain foreign material for a crude device.

Iraq probably retained substantial growth media and biological weapons agents - perhaps thousands of litres of anthrax - from pre-1991 stocks.

It is capable of resuming biological weapons agent production on short notice - weeks - from existing civilian facilities and could have produced thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents since 1998. Actual stocks are unknown.

The country's production of viral agents and possession of smallpox are unknown. "Aside from conventional military munitions, delivery of BW [biological weapons] by individuals or small groups acting as commandos or terrorists remains a plausible threat that is very difficult to defend against."

Refurbished L-29 trainer aircraft could operate as weapons-carrying unmanned aerial vehicles with a range of 375 miles. In theory, these could be more effective in delivering biological (and chemical) weapons than missiles which would destroy the agents on impact.

The Gulf war devastated Iraq's primary chemical weapons production and a large portion of its munitions. However, Iraq probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard gas and precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin/ cyclosarin and perhaps VX nerve gas from pre-1991 stocks.

It is capable of resuming chemical weapons production on short notice - months - from existing civilian facilities and it could have produced hundreds of tonnes of mustard gas and nerve agents since 1998. Actual stocks are unknown.

"Iraq's current CW [chemical weapons] capability does not appear to pose a decisive threat against opposing military forces who would be protected against CW attack ... [and] ... are unlikely to cause mass casualties."

Iraq probably retained a small force of 406-mile range al-Hussein missiles, perhaps around a dozen. These could be "politically significant", the dossier says, "especially if armed with chemical or biological weapons which could reach cities in Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran". Iraq does not possess facilities to produce long-range missiles, and it would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to construct them.

Iraq may have produced some al-Samoud missiles, with ranges up to 125 miles. It is capable of manufacturing rudimentary chemical and biological weapons warheads, but development of more advanced designs is unknown.

Iraq is capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, including artillery shells, rockets and aerial bombs. It could have a few thousand chemical weapons tactical munitions. It is capable of delivering biological weapons with simple airborne wet spray devices.

The military has a small stock of modern strike aircraft - MiG-23 and Mirage F1 - with 469-mile combat radius; some ground attack aircraft (Su22, Su24, Su25); helicopters, possible unmanned aerial vehicles based on the L-29 trainer. Iraq could also use special forces or terrorists to conduct attacks.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is a London-based company with charitable status and an annual turnover of £4m.

It has strong US links and raises money from a wide range of international bodies, corporate and individual membership fees, and publications, notably its authoritative Military Balance and Strategic Survey annual reports.

It receives grants from mainly US bodies, including the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation and Smith Richardson Foundation. It has also received grants from Germany's Volkswagen Foundation and is drawing up an "armed conflict database" with the Department for International Development. It also receives funding from governments for international conferences and research projects. Individuals from ministries of defence and foreign affairs (including Britain's) are seconded to the institute.

Its council members include Carl Bildt, former UN high representative in the Balkans, and Lord Guthrie, former chief of defence staff. Head of its Washington office is Colonel Terence Taylor, former member of the UN weapons inspection team in Iraq. Gary Samore, who edited yesterday's report, was a special assistant to President Bill Clinton and worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the US.

September 9th - Iraq WMD Dossier Statement

Statement by IISS Director John Chipman

Welcome to the Launch of a special publication by the IISS: ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment’, An IISS Strategic Dossier.

As all of you know well, the IISS has for over 40 years annually published The Military Balance. This is the only reliable, publicly available inventory of the world’s armed forces, rebel groups and organised non-state armed groups. We have drawn on this experience in analysing material gathered from many different sources in compiling this Dossier.
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Quite simply, the UN weapons inspection program was a failure. Saddam was more determined than Clinton. Saddam's stubborn streak reveals that he desires power' the power to conquer, the power to spread fear, the power to destroy on a mass scale. There is only one recourse remaining. We dare not procrastinate. A couple weeks ago, experts thought he was two years away. Yesterday, we hear he is only months away. People underestimated Saddam. Three reasons:

1. He is spurred from fear of Bush right now to speed up his program.

2. Clinton proliferated technology more broadly to our enemies, China and North Korea. These enemies are much less concerned about Iraq than we are.

3. Clinton failed Russia and the world by sending greedy, self serving Harvard lawyers to help Russia become a free enterprise nation. After being plundered by these Harvard professors, Russia became cynical. And IMHO, that cynicism has helped keep the Russian mob remain as powerful as it was during communism. Thus, Russian technology still might be easilly available to Iraq. Not to mention, Clinton had a coffee clutch with the Plutonium Mobster of Russia. If that doesn't have anything to do with Iraq, I'd be surprised.

Underestimating Saddam is dangerous. Momentum taken into account, I predict that he will continue to surprise us with how closely he is getting to nuclear capability. It is getting too close.

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