As far as the Saddam-sympathizers, I'm reminded of a little quatrain, author unknown:
No one's safe when freedom fails,
And good men rot in filthy jails
And those who cried, "Appease! Appease!"
Are hanged by those they wished to please.
Posted on 09/09/2002 9:00:04 AM PDT by Republican_Strategist
Nope, it won't save them. That tactic has never worked. Appeasing a potential conquerer has never been a smart thing to do.
Sorry about taking your comment out of context: I thought you were talking about the term WMD as used in the context of Saddam's dirty toys.
As far as the Saddam-sympathizers, I'm reminded of a little quatrain, author unknown:
No one's safe when freedom fails,
And good men rot in filthy jails
And those who cried, "Appease! Appease!"
Are hanged by those they wished to please.
How very, VERY true.
Yes. The International Institute for Strategic Studes is a very reliable think-tank organization, centered in Great Britain. The organization is very well known and respected in the political science realm, specifically for the foreign policy/international relations buff and junkies.
That's interesting...Navy called them NBC, in the 70's anyway.
From the above link: Iraq
Baghdad's goal of becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile relations with many of its neighbors are the key drivers behind Iraq's ballistic missile program. Iraq has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop missiles, and the IC believes it has retained a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles, launchers, and Scud-specific production equipment and support apparatus. For the next several years at least, Iraq?s ballistic missile initiatives probably will focus on reconstituting its pre-Gulf war capabilities to threaten regional targets and probably will not advance beyond MRBM systems.
Ballistic Missile Programs
Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq had several programs to extend the range of the Scud
SRBM and became experienced working with liquid-propellant technology. Since the Gulf war, despite UN resolutions limiting the range of Iraq?s missiles to 150 km, Baghdad has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop longer range missile systems.
* A military parade in December 2000 showcased Al Samoud missiles on new transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). The liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably will be deployed soon.
* The IC assesses that Iraq retains a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles, launchers, and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads.
We cannot project with confidence how long UN-related sanctions and prohibitions will remain in place. They plausibly will constrain Iraq during the entire period of this Estimate. Scenarios that would weaken the prohibitions several years from now also are conceivable, allowing Iraq to reconstitute its missile infrastructure and begin developing long-range missiles before the end of the decade. The discussion that follows addresses developments that could and are likely to occur should UN prohibitions be significantly weakened in the future.
Iraq is likely to use its experience with Scud technology to resume production of the pre-Gulf war 650-km-range Al Hussein, the 900-km-range Al Abbas, or other Scud variants, and it could explore clustering and staging options to reach more distant targets. Iraq could resume Scud-variant production - with foreign assistance - quickly after UN prohibitions ended.
* With substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad could flight-test a domestic MRBM by mid-decade. This possibility presumes rapid erosion of UN prohibitions and Baghdad's willingness to risk detection of developmental steps, such as static engine testing, earlier. An MRBM flight test is likely by 2010. An imported MRBM could be flight-tested within months of acquisition.
For the first several years after relief from UN prohibitions, Iraq probably will strive to reestablish its SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf war numbers, continue developing and deploying solid-propellant systems, and pursue MRBMs to keep pace with its neighbors. Once its regional security concerns are being addressed, Iraq may pursue a first-generation ICBM/SLV.
Although Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long-range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV, such a missile almost certainly would fail. Iraq is unlikely to make such an attempt. After observing North Korean missile developments the past few years, Iraq would be more likely to pursue a three-stage TD-2 approach to an SLV or ICBM, which would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United States. Some postulations for potential Iraqi ICBM/SLV concepts and timelines from the beginning of UN prohibition relief include:
* If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North Korea, it could have a launch capability within a year or two of a purchase.
* It could develop and test a TD-1-type system within a few years.
* If it acquired No Dongs from North Korea, it could test an ICBM within a few years of acquisition by clustering and staging the No Dongs?similar to the clustering of Scuds for the Al Abid SLV.
* If Iraq bought TD-2 engines, it could test an ICBM within about five years of the acquisition.
* Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong-2-type system within about ten years of a decision to do so.
Most agencies believe that Iraq is unlikely to test before 2015 any ICBMs that would threaten the United States, even if UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced in the next few years. Some believe that if prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years, Iraq would be likely to test an ICBM probably masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before 2010. In this view, foreign assistance would affect the timing and the capability of the missile.
WMD Payload Options
Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for missile delivery in 1990, but coalition bombing and IAEA and UNSCOM activities significantly set back the effort. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would take several years to produce enough fissile material to make a weapon. Iraq has admitted to having biological and chemical weapons programs before the Gulf war and maintains those programs.
Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance is key to Iraqi efforts to develop quickly longer range missiles. Iraq relied on extensive foreign assistance before the Gulf war and will continue to seek foreign assistance to expand its current capabilities.
End excerpt (other nations and their capabilities are also listed at the above link)
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.