War games rigged? General says Millennium Challenge 02 ‘was almost entirely scripted’

ping

Sounds more like the Marines got a butt whippin' from the Army and the General didn't like it.

Blah, blah, blah. He kicked your collective butts.

Learn.

well stated remarks!

"Some of the best Generals I ever saw were the ones that walked up to you and waved away your position of attention and salute "F__K all that shit, son! How's things going here? What kind of problems you boys having? You getting this mission accomplished?" They get a lot of bullcrap 'suck-up' answers but they also get a few little gems that let them know what the real sit-rep is."

Just as an alternative perspective, I would consider that one of the worst actions a high ranking officer could make, and I would understand the top NCOs telepathic glare.If the top brass wanted the "unvarnished truth", as I saw it, he always asked me (enlisted rank) well out of earshot of anyone else.There were a couple of Birds and Stars I knew, who could have pulled off a military coup in the USAF, they were THAT respected and beloved.

None of them gained that degree of loyalty by pitting brass against stripes.Since I worked primarily with the brass, I learned early on, the overly friendly Ranking Officer was not automatically the leader I would trust and follow with pride.In the military world, the rules are different for a reason.All know the rules, and all who care about the mission learn how to get around them, if they think the top brass is getting a load of BS fed to them.IMHO.

Good post.

IMHO, the truly good leaders are not necessarily the informal ones. In my experience, the good ones are the ones that respect the troops and honor their skill and experience. The good ones chart the strategy for the war and let the captains and NCO's run the battle. (strategy vs tactics). Sadly, some of the big guys never learn to let go of being a captain.

Some of the worst leadership I have experienced are those that micro-manage (act the captain) or second guess, themselves or others. The absolute worst are those that blame others for their failure. Not a way to inspire loyalty and motivate for success because whining is unbecoming and unmanly.

Now, those weak-links are valuable, in their own way. They can teach how NOT to lead and how not to motivate and how not to win a war.

Just as an alternative perspective, I would consider that one of the worst actions a high ranking officer could make,

I think a lot depends on the officer; on the man himself. Some work better by keeping aloof. Some are comfortable right in there elbow to elbow with the Joes. Some do it all by the books and there's nothing wrong with that approach either- at least it gets done the way it's supposed to even if their isn't a lot of inspiring leadership involved. Some are good managers- others are good "doers" who inspire by example. They've all got their uses and some are good, some are bad- but I don't think you can try to get 'em all to fit the same mould. Some officers are "chummy" to the point where other officers think it's inappropriate even if it is in the man's nature but others are worse because they "want to be chummy" when it's not their nature and they wind up faking it and the men know it. But then again some officers don't make any attempts to hide their contempt for their underlings and that's not too nice either.

I think overall, I prefer an officer who is comfortable with himself and runs his ship the way he sees fit. Nothing worse than having an officer out there in front of the formation who you can literally feel is uncomfortable with his position and is putting on an "act of leadership".

Thanks.

Your experience with Internal Look was to validate an existing war plan. It was based on known doctrine, capabilities (both sides) and threat models. It was also set in the present day (and was eventually executed 8 months later).

Millenium Challenge was to experiment and determine the effectiveness of new concepts and capabilities (some not yet in existence) set in the future. If these can't be given a thorough workout, we may buy into a flawed future model and pay for it in blood. If Internal Look determined OPLAN 10-02 to be flawed there was immediate potential danger. If MC02 was determined to be flawed, we could recock safely and try again in 18 months. Big difference in how you construct and execute.

Frankly, Van Riper did not do anything really unique. He sought to match our future capabilities with current capabilities available to "potential" enemies. He did not invent a new way to use the Intenet to disrupt America. He did not invent a new Dr. Evil-type laser to start shooting down satellites. He used sailboats combined with the always present media to effectively neutralize the US Navy. To call him a tactician is a bit disingenuous. Van Riper is a strategist of the first order. This was never about battalions and squadrons. This was grand strategy and he poked holes in our concept too easily, even with some necessary (for game management purposes) constraints.

What the big hullabaloo is over is that GEN Kernan said that the exercise would be free play and the OPFOR would be allowed to win. Unfortunately, the no-nothing media (Sean Naylor is not a member of this club. He knows what he writes about) afflicted with incurable mil-illiteracy would have a hissy fit if we "lost" an exercise this big.

>>Your experience with Internal Look was to validate an existing war plan. It was based on known doctrine, capabilities (both sides) and threat models. It was also set in the present day (and was eventually executed 8 months later). <<

Yes. The reason I introduced IL to the discussion was to make the point that we exercise and make things difficult, not easy—as proved by the comparison of IL with the real-live Gulf War.
(“Another thing, exercises are notoriously more difficult than the real mission, as we challenge our capabilities. This means that when the war starts we find we win faster and save more lives—on both sides. For example, in May of ’90 I participated in a joint exercise at Ft Bragg. It was a computer exercise where Iraq invades Kuwait and goes into Saudi. Sound familiar? Anyway, we won that exercise but we took a heck of a lot more casualties than in the real war.”)

>>Millennium Challenge was to experiment and determine the effectiveness of new concepts and capabilities (some not yet in existence) set in the future. If these can't be given a thorough workout, we may buy into a flawed future model and pay for it in blood.<<

Of course. And that supports my contention that Van Riper was upset that his initial “wins” were adjusted to ensure the game went forward. He wanted the game decalred "over."

>>If Internal Look determined OPLAN 10-02 to be flawed there was immediate potential danger. If MC02 was determined to be flawed, we could recock safely and try again in 18 months. Big difference in how you construct and execute.<<

Follow, but if you call the game in the first few days, what of all the other aspects/technology/capability that require investigation and exercise? So, in your opinion, we recock and start over in 18 months, fight for another day or so until we find a weakness and “lose” and stop the game, recock, and try again in another 18 months. We will never get “there” if we do it that way.

Merely because one phase may not work as effectively as we wish, this doesn’t mean ALL subsequent phases are worthless. We have to exercise and strategize every aspect that we can, and you know as well as I, the “hot wash” and the after-action reports will not be smoke screens, no way. However, if the game was declared over during the first few days without exporting all the other aspects then, yes, all heck would break loose, as that is not an effective way to do business.

>>Frankly, Van Riper did not do anything really unique. He sought to match our future capabilities with current capabilities available to "potential" enemies.<<

Correct, in a way.

>>He did not invent a new way to use the Internet to disrupt America. He did not invent a new Dr. Evil-type laser to start shooting down satellites. He used sailboats combined with the always-present media to effectively neutralize the US Navy.<<

Right, and thus doing a tactical/operational job of exposing learning points. Is that then a reason to declare him “winner” and cancel the rest of the exercise? No.

>> To call him a tactician is a bit disingenuous. Van Riper is a strategist of the first order.<<

No it is not. That is debatable.

>>This was never about battalions and squadrons. This was grand strategy and he poked holes in our concept too easily, even with some necessary (for game management purposes) constraints.<<

His actions were tactical and he did his job to expose weaknesses. Learning points made, adjustments made, thinking caps on, etc. Now, time to move on with the exercise. Of course, his initial “win” was never repeated at scale during later aspects of the exercise.

>>What the big hullabaloo is over is that GEN Kernan said that the exercise would be free play and the OPFOR would be allowed to win.<<

During exercises, BIG exercises you are no doubt aware that games are re-set all the time and ROE adjusted—to test and validate and experiment with all aspects/technologies and capabilities. That, my humble soldier, is what my sources tell me Van Riper was upset about. Just when the Blue forces took it on the chin in during round one, the game was adjusted to move it forward in an effort to test the next phase, next technology, next doctrine--and that upset Van Riper.

Just because an initial phase might lose doesn’t mean you write-off the rest of the game. Adjustments must be made to ensure it is carried on to discover all sorts of things.

Van Riper was upset because in his mind he “won” early and the game continued on. An OPFOR win to him meant the game would be over—it was not—and that made him upset. His ego was leading his mouth on this one.

>>Unfortunately, the no-nothing media (Sean Naylor is not a member of this club. He knows what he writes about) afflicted with incurable mil-illiteracy would have a hissy fit if we "lost" an exercise this big.<<

With you on the “no nothing” media.

Thanks for your thoughts.

Yes, it is disturbing. From my experience, the OPFOR almost always won. I think you learn more from your defeats than just going in and having the OPFOR put up a show of resistance and then roll over and play dead. It was always amusing in Hohenfels/CMTC to see the carefully laid plans of the Colonel go tits up within 15 minutes of the start of the battle.

Anyone else see Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper's resemblance to Gunny Highway in "Heartbreak Ridge"?

After all, rank means never having to say "I was wrong"...

Why am I scared that these pencil-pushing General Wanna-be's are all KLINTON-ERA appointees and sycophants? Am I the only one?

Of course. And that supports my contention that Van Riper was upset that his initial “wins” were adjusted to ensure the game went forward. He wanted the game decalred "over."

OK, we have then in the article THESE paragraphs...this reply is long, but I need it to make my point.

Exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue, and on several occasions directed the Opposing Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue. It even ordered him to reveal the location of Red units, he said.

“We were directed … to move air defenses so that the Army and Marine units could successfully land,” he said. “We were simply directed to turn [the air-defense systems] off or move them. … So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be.”

Retired Ambassador Robert Oakley, who participated in the experiment as Red civilian leader, said Van Riper was outthinking the Blue Force from the first day of the exercise.

...Van Riper said this approach ran counter to his notion of how an experiment should function. “You don’t come to a conclusion beforehand and then work your way to that conclusion. You see how the thing plays out,” he said.

and then we come to the REAL issue...

Van Riper said he became so frustrated during the game that he quit his position as Opposing Force commander halfway through.

He did so, he said, to avoid presenting one of his Opposing Force subordinates with a moral dilemma. That subordinate was retired Army Col. George Utter, a full-time Joint Forces Command employee who, as the Opposing Force chief of staff, was responsible for taking Van Riper’s commands and making them happen in the simulation.

But several days into the exercise, Van Riper realized his orders weren’t being followed.

“I was giving him directions on how I thought the OPFOR ought to perform, and those directions were being countermanded by the exercise director,” Van Riper said. The exercise director was Air Force Brig. Gen. Jim Smith, Utter’s real-life boss at Joint Forces Command.

Matters came to a head July 29. “That morning I’d given my guidance for what was to happen, and I found that [Utter] had assembled the staff and was giving them a different set [of instructions] based on the exercise director’s instructions to him.”

To save Utter from having to choose between following the orders of his commander in the war game and obeying those of Smith, Van Riper stepped down as the Opposing Force commander. However, the retired Marine, who was participating in the exercise on a contract with defense giant TRW, stayed on at the war game as an adviser.

OK, now in your view, Van Riper thought he'd won and wanted the game to end...yet here we see that what he wanted was to have HIS ORDERS FOLLOWED, not COUNTERMANDED by the BLUE TEAM or the Big Brass that wanted Blue Team's tactics to win, not simply be evaluated.

Care to show where Van Riper was wrong, and wanted the whole thing to end?

You have your sources and I have mine.

As I said in my first posting on this matter, a lot is not being reported.

Make up your own mind.

Thank you for serving Freedom and for the time you put in this response. Freegards....

Thank you for serving Freedom and for the time you put in your response. Freegards....

Van Riper might be driving the Joint Chiefs nuts, but he is valuable. And his opinion should be heard out. Freegards....

Thanks. (I like the missive on your profile page)

I heard an interview with this General about an earlier wargame he conducted. His first strike was a low orbit detonation of nukes causing an EMP. He knocked out US early warning, global navigation and communication. so much for his failure at national/theater level command.

Thank you for your observation.

Any strategic thinker knows that by introducing nukes the fundamental nature of the entire exercise would be changed beyond its scope.

His tactical/operational-level decision to use WMD threw the entire exercise into the realm of irrelevance; as such a move would certainly provoke a nuclear response by the United States--game over. Why exercise any further.

If his WMD use were left to stand, there would have been no reason to continue the multi-phase exercise cycle. Why bother? His action in this regard reminds me of what we used to do in NATO exercises, basically we would fight for three-days and then something drastic (WMD) would be introduced and the war game would be over. Same thing here. If the general wanted to use nukes, then why even hold an exercise at all?

The nuke scenarios are played out and strategized at all levels, to be sure, but the only level that counts is the NCA-level. If the general wanted to play war games with the NCA he should have said so, and not try to wreck an exercise that was designed to test conventional/un-conventional (but not WMD) protocols.

If the exercise were to test our nuclear capability, fine, then his move would have been permitted to stand. However, it was not. He was there to challenge the Blue forces, NOT start a nuclear war.

The general was out of line on this one, and was angry over being taken to task for stepping into an area (WMD) that changed the entire fundamental nature and ROE of the exercise.

We exercise to test ALL aspects of our strategy, tactics, hardware and initiative. Using WMD does not permit that to happen at all.

The general was wrong. His tactical thinking did not take into account the strategic implications of his actions.

‘Nuff said on the subject.

Points have been expressed on all sides. Time for thinking people to make up their own mind.

Have a great day!

Bump