Bush Administration Plan to Invade Iraq Dubious at Best

Bush Administration Plan to Invade Iraq Dubious at Best
First of Three Parts
by David T. Pyne

August 16, 2002

Recent news reports indicate that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in an unprecedented move, has locked out the Joint Chiefs of Staff from further planning for the planned US invasion of Iraq. This action was reportedly taken due to recent leaks by some of our highest-ranking general officers of US war plans, who remain wary of fighting another war against Iraq this time without provocation or justification. While our top generals are not convinced that war with Iraq is a prudent course of action, those of our top policymakers who have never fought in a war are leading the charge to invade Iraq. The only combat veteran among them, Secretary of State Colin Powell has been wisely urging that caution be exercised by the President in getting the US into another war with Iraq and informing the President of all of the undesirable consequences that would likely result from such an unprovoked unilateral US invasion of Iraq.

According to polls, two thirds of the American people would support another US invasion of Iraq. Too many Americans dismiss the Iraqi military machine after the seemingly easy victory of 1991 during Operation Desert Storm achieved at the cost of only a few hundred US soldiers killed in action. Over the past few months, the news reports have been blaring with headlines announcing the Administration's secret plans to invade Iraq. Such planning has ranged from a full-scale 250,000 man invasion which would come closest to ensuring victory though at a potentially high cost in casualties during the war and ensuing occupation to one which would involve as few as 50,000 airborne and special operations troops. This contingency plan is based on the likely erroneous presumption that effective organized and well-armed opposition to Saddam exists and would take action if only the US 82nd Airborne Division were only to appear outside Baghdad to support it.

This last plan would likely result in total disaster for the US forces participating in it. The reason is that even after the destruction wrought upon it by the US armed forces during Operation Desert Storm, Iraq retains a large Army consisting of 424,000 men in 23 divisions including 2200 main-battle tanks, 3700 other assorted armored vehicles, 2400 major artillery weapons and up to 300 operational combat aircraft. It also has another 120,000 men in its internal security forces, which could be expected to defend Saddam from capture. After recent upgrades with help from the Communist China, North Korea and Yugoslavia, Iraq now boasts one of the best air defense systems in the world according to national security experts.

If anyone seriously believes that the nearly 550,000 defenders of Iraq are going to give up the fight at the sight of a mere 20,000 US light infantry troops landing near Baghdad, they are in for a big surprise. While the first US-Iraqi war did prove that much of the Iraqi military lacks the will to fight, it also proved that the tens of thousands of well-trained and well-equipped Republican Guard troops would likely to mount an effective and determined resistance to a US invasion. These Iraqi forces would outnumber US invading troops by over eight to one and could conceivably surround and capture large numbers of US troops before they could safely be extricated and before US reinforcements could be sent in to save them. In short, if the US were to commit the 82nd Airborne to the capture of Baghdad unassisted by heavier armor and artillery formations, it would undoubtedly result in the highest number of combat casualties since the Vietnam War.

Top policymakers in the Administration appear to have forgotten the lesson of Desert Storm which is that large numbers of troops with heavy tanks win wars in their desire to repeat the successes of Afghanistan in which 50,000 US Special Forces troops were able to beat a ragtag and poorly equipped Army of 47,000 Taleban and assorted Al Queda irregulars. A word of warning-Iraq is no Afghanistan. It would take at least 200,000 well supported and well-equipped US ground troops with plenty of tanks and tracked armored vehicles to win another war against Iraq. Anthony H. Cordesman, a former Pentagon official, now a senior fellow and Iraq expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies cautioned, "I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive" of the Iraqi military. "To be careless about this war, to me, would be a disaster."

The grand coalition which former President George HW Bush organized to challenge the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has long since been broken thanks to the polarization of the Arab world with the US-led war on terror and the Israeli war against Palestinian terror. If the US were to invade Iraq, it would likely do so virtually alone without any coalition allies. Even America's closest ally, the UK has voiced opposition to the US plan to invade Iraq. Only Israel would support such a war even though Israeli intelligence publicized the fact that Iraq has no discernable connections to the 9-11 terrorists. However, any Israeli military intervention against Iraq would further anger the entire Arab world against the US and possibly even risk an enlargement of the conflict.

It seems that the Bush Administration has failed to learn from the mistakes of the past and will embark on a course of regime change with the intention to kill or capture Saddam Hussein, which will ensure a no holds bar conflict that is most likely to maximize casualties on both sides. It would be far wiser to come to an accommodation with Saddam whereby he steps down in favor of another more acceptable successor and agrees to go into exile with immunity from prosecution. That would maximize the prospect for another victory at low cost in blood and treasure and might well eliminate the perceived "need" for the US to invade Iraq in the first place. It was recently reported that Hussein was considering formally stepping down from power in a bid to end UN sanctions on his country so such a development is not out of the question. It would be more sensible for the US to restrain itself to fighting one war at a time. An invasion of Iraq would not be prudent before the war in Afghanistan is finished. The Iraq warhawks in the Bush Administration would do well to consider why they have been unable to persuade any of their allies to support their planned unprovoked aggressive war against Iraq. ***

Next up: Part 2--Would another invasion of Iraq be justified?

[[terrorists: no help from Saddam] And you know this how....? ] Common sense.

So. We have a factual event. Stuff actually happened. Czech intelligence has reported contact between the two organizations. Do you have any actual evidence to the contrary? or at least a solid reason to doubt the Czech story? No, of course not. Instead, you just deny the reality of the report altogether because it conflicts with your "common sense", i.e. your mental model of how terrorists behave (anything which contradicts your thoughts or understanding of something, apparently, cannot be real). The terrorists may have had contact with Saddam, but to you, reality doesn't matter, because they "didn't need help" from him (even if they actually did request, get, and use help from him - for example, help in the form of money.) Well, I give in. Your "common sense" trumps reality. I see it all so clearly now. If I want to know whether Person X did Thing Y, I shouldn't look at the evidence and analyze it. I should ask you whether Person X "needed to" do Thing Y, according to your "common sense". That will provide me with the answers. Thank you!

[[why no terrorist would ever discuss their plan in a Prague cafe] Terrorists being such geniuses and all. ] The plan worked.

And with our airport security being so airtight, and with our pilots being so well armed, that makes those terrorists geniuses.

Never raised the issue of rationality.

You are presuming to speculate about and sound off about what a certain group of psycho murderers "would have" done in this or that situation, as if this were something which can be predicted and stated with 100% confidence. This conveniently glosses over the fact that we're still talking about, for the most part, brainwashed unstable murderers. That's what I meant. By doing this you are making way, way too many assumptions about the rationality level of the behavior of people who are, after all, psycho murderers.

However, I have studied terrorist organizations. [....] For example, most analysts believe that only the terrorists that flew the planes actually knew the plan.

And this means that, therefore, the terrorists would simply not have met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague. CZECH INTELLIGENCE SAYS THERE WAS A MEETING. But you know better, because you've "studied terrorist organizations". In reality, CZECH INTELLIGENCE SAYS THERE WAS A MEETING. But you're too smart to look at reality, you prefer to focus on the "common characteristic of terrorist organizations" you've read about in your "studies".

Too bad you don't seem too interested in "studying" WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. For example, CZECH INTELLIGENCE SAYS THERE WAS A MEETING. Why isn't that factoid part of your "studies"? Odd. I guess it's just yet another case where your "common sense" trumps reality. I humbly suggest that you telephone Czech intelligence and calmly explain that they're all liars or delusional - not because you can actually prove them wrong or anything like that, but just because of the fact that you have "studied" terrorist organizations and you know better; terrorists "wouldn't have" done such a thing (even if they actually did, in that place called reality, which oddly enough doesn't seem to figure in to your "studies" too much).

But the administration has been discussing its intention to depose Saddam for quite some time now....

You're making my case for me, thank you very much. You see, Discussing An Intention is a far, far cry from Talking About A Plan For Months!

To say "I'd sure like to go on a Hawaii vacation someday" is to Discuss An Intention. Yes, Bush has been doing that.

But it's only when you explain how you will do it - that you will save X dollars per month, that you will ask your boss for vacation time between Dates Y and Z, that you plan to fly on such-and-such Airline, that you make plans to call this or that travel agency or real estate agent about accomodations... that's what I would call Talking About A Plan.

The problem here is that Bush hasn't even come close to doing the latter, yet you and certain other people are so eager to voice your anti-war opinions that you jump the gun and pretend that he has. I'll ask again, if he's Talked About His Plan so much, then what the heck is it? Can you tell me any details whatsoever about their plan? No.

So how is it that you, and others, can magically divine enough details about the "plan" that you can actually criticize it, and call it (to use the author's word) "dubious", for crying out loud? Can you explain this to me? Because it still makes no sense whatsoever.

I'll try to say it briefly and more pointedly: Just where the hell do you get off criticizing a "plan" that you don't know jack squat about?

Implicit in those statements is the concept that there must be some sort of plan...

Perhaps, but until you know what this "some sort of" plan is, then where the hell do you get off criticizing it? Aren't you embarrassed to do so?

Sheesehhh, what an idoit!

Heh... no, I just can't say it, you're making yourself too much of an easy target.

Iraaq is directly implicated, I have no idea where you get the idea they aren't. Atta met with al ANi in April,2001 in Prague and al Ani reports to Saddam Hussein.

1. October 13, 2001. Based on an apparent leak from the Czech foreign ministry in Prague, Czech newspapers reported that Czech foreign minister Jan Kavan had briefed Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington about a trip Atta had taken to the Czech Republic in April. Kavan said that Czech intelligence had observed Mohamed Atta meeting in Prague with Iraqi Counsel Al-Ani. Since Ani worked as a case officer for Iraqi intelligence, the liaison implied a connection between the hijackers and Iraq.
After the leaked story was confirmed by the State Department, the Wall Street Journal and other newspapers published the story about the liaison.
2. On October 20th, John Tagliabue wrote in the New York Times that Czech officials had denied such a meeting had ever taken place.
3. On October 26th, Stanislav Gross, the Minister of Interior of the Czech Republic, called a press conference to clarify what was known about the meeting. Gross was in a position to do so because the Czech counterintelligence service, the BIS, reported to him, not to Parliament or the President. He explained that Atta had been in the Czech Republic at least twice: on June 2, 2000 and in early April 2001. During his brief June visit, Gross said Atta was not observed by Czech intelligence, but in April, "We can confirm now that during his trip to the Czech Republic, he did have a contact with an officer of the Iraqi intelligence, Mr. Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani."
Since Gross had full access to the records of the BIS, which uses both electronic surveillance and visual surveillance, his confirmation sent shock waves around the world.
4. In Baghdad, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz denied that the meeting had taken place. In case he was proven wrong, however, he said: "Even if such an incident had taken place, it doesn't mean anything. Any diplomat in any mission might meet people in a restaurant here or there and talk to them, which is meaningless. If that person turned out to be something else, that doesn't mean he had a connection with what that person did later."
5. On October 27th, the New York Times published an extraordinary refutation of its October 20th story, co-written by Patrick E. Tyler and John Tagliabue . This piece asserted that, contrary to the prior denial, sources confirmed that the meeting had in fact taken place.
The Times story provided a number of new details, such as a Czech member of parliament, who had been briefed by the Czech intelligence services on this issue, said he “believed the meeting with Atta may have been captured by airport surveillance cameras.” This would imply that the meeting took place at the Prague airport. It also reported that on Friday April 20th, Hynek Kmonicek, the deputy foreign minister of the Czech Republic, had al-Ani expelled from the Czech Republic for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status.
Kmonicek, who was quoted in the Times story, explained Al-Ani’s expulsion was connected to his meeting with Atta. "It's not a common thing for an Iraqi diplomat to meet a student from a neighboring country.” Atta had been a student in Hamburg. If al-Ani’s expulsion proceeded from his meeting with Atta, then clearly Czech intelligence had identified Atta some four months before the September 11th attack.
The New York Times did not, however, rely solely on Czech sources to publish such a corrective story. Tyler and Tagliabue also confirmed the story with US ‘law enforcement officials’ and the White House. By that time, the FBI had pieced together Atta’s movements from INS files, car rental records, vehicles, airlines reservations data and other documents. These files showed Atta’s entries into the US when he used his passport, when he rented and returned vehicles, and some flights he had booked.
The story stated “Federal law-enforcement officials said the Prague meeting fits into Atta's itinerary this way: On April 4 he was in Virginia Beach. He flew to the Czech Republic on April 8 and met with the Iraqi intelligence officer, who was identified as Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. By April 11, Atta was back in Florida renting a car.”
The New York Times also said “A senior Bush administration official Friday night indicated the Czech decision to go public with the information about the meeting took Washington by surprise. “As for the meeting itself, the official said, "We are not sure we know exactly the full meaning of this, but we have known about it for some time." So presumably the President had known that one of the September 11 hijackers was observed by the Czech intelligence contacting an Iraqi official in Prague in April 2001.
6. In November, Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman added another element to the story. He said that when Czech intelligence determined Atta had contacted Al-Ani, it raised the “hypothesis” that the purpose of the meeting might be to discuss an attack on the Prague the headquarters for U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
This hypothesis was based on information provided by Jabir Salim in December 1998. Salim, like Al-Ani, had been the Iraq Consul in Prague, and had defected. When debriefed by western intelligence services, he revealed that Iraq had been planning a car bombing of Radio Free Europe. So when al-Ani took Salim’s place at the Iraq Embassy, Czech intelligence assumed that he might be continuing that mission, which accounted for the surveillance on al-Ani.
Although the hypothesis about the Radio Free Europe target proved wrong on September 11th, it raised another potentially embarrassing intelligence concern: Did the Czechs pass on information about the al-Ani encounter, and the reasons for his expulsion, to other intelligence services prior to September 11th?
Heightened security at Radio Free Europe and the Al-Ani expulsion that April were highly visible moves. Since Radio Free Europe, was a prime US target in the Czech Republic, the Czechs had reason to explain the security precautions to US intelligence. After all, the US they had capabilities for surveillance unavailable to the Czech intelligence. Since al-Ani’s predecessor, Salim, was being handled by the British intelligence service, the Czechs also had reason to brief the British on al-Ani expulsion, if only to get Salim’s views.
7. In December, 2001, Czech newspapers reported that President Havel saying “it was only 70 percent certain” that the identification of Atta was accurate. Havel, who was not privy to BIS reporting, subsequently explained the “70 percent” figure was his personal assessment based on his past experience.
8. On December 17th, Gross, in response to these questions, re-confirmed the meeting. The AP reported: “Interior Minister Stanislav Gross, responding to the report, said he stood by his original statement that Atta and Al-Ani met at least once in Prague and said it was based on a reputable account from BIS, the Czech counterintelligence agency.”
9. On May 1st, 2002, the status of the case changed radically when first Newsweek and then the Washington Post declared the meeting a fictoid. Walter Pincus in the Washington Post (based on a story a few days earlier by Michael Isikoff in Newsweek) stated “There is no evidence that the alleged leader of the Sept. 11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, met in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, a finding that eliminates a once-suggested link between the terrorist attacks and the government of President Saddam Hussein, according to a senior administration official.”
Without giving a further source, Pincus explained that false reports that such a meeting had taken place were based not on BIS surveillance but a claim by “a Middle East informant” after September 11th that “he had seen the hijacker five months earlier meeting with al-Ani.” Pincus thus dates the identification as Atta to after the September 11th attack (which is inconsistent with the deputy foreign minister’s assertion that he had ordered al-Ani expelled in April 2001 because of his inappropriate contact with Atta.)
According to the anonymous “senior administration official,” Pincus writes “the Czechs said they were no longer certain that Atta was the person who met al-Ani.”
The same “senior administration official” was also quoted as saying that FBI and CIA analysts concluded that "there was no evidence Atta left or returned to the U.S." at the time he was supposed to be in Prague. (Neither the FBI, the New York Times nor anyone else had claimed that there was evidence Atta had used his own passport to travel to the Czech Republic in April 2001. The assumption was that, if Atta was in Prague in April, he traveled there under a false identity.)
Neither Pincus nor Isikoff identified the deep-throated “senior administration official,” nor specified which “Czechs,” according to this anonymous source, doubted the identification of Atta.
10. Czech intelligence responds. In, fact there never was a retraction, or even modification, from the relevant officials in and supervising the Czech intelligence service. On December 17th, 2001 Gabriela Bartikova, the spokeswomen for the Minister of the Interior, had said "Minister Gross had the information from BIS, and BIS guarantees the information, So we stick by that information." On May 3rd, 2

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