First of all, I am no anarchist. You will note however, that the market is killing Andersen, if you didn't notice. It eventually took a dim view of Enron too. That's accountability. Compare that to government where there is virtually none. Indeed, when problems get bigger, budgets go up.
There are regulations that I still think proper (particularly in the anti-trust area), but it is worth a look to determine how to make them unnecessary. That is what an intelligent Congress would do.
Instead, people would then need to invest in verification services of the verifier. The cost of verification becaomes significant enough, and an obvious place to cut corners for those who wish to take risks, that verification becomes non-existant.
You neglect to note that the verification companies in my system are subject for civil penalties and are insured to cover errors or the unforseen. Between that and competitive forces to deliver verification services at minimal cost, the system motivates investment in new technology to reduce those costs and improve reliability similar to any other business.
And that is without even getting into how the government would be able to enforce contracts under such a system. How would they verify compliance with anything?
They don't. The only time the government would step in is if there is failure to satisfy a civil judgment upon failure to satisfy a contract, similar to any other contract in this country. Under Article I, Section 8, the Feds don't own property legally, do they?
As I said, I am not an anarchist. Try reading the first chapter to understand why there is no demarcation between regulation and ownership and what the consequences are.
First of all, I am no anarchist.Didn't say you were. What I did say was that the thesis proposes something very similar to what anarchist solutions sound like.
You will note however, that the market is killing Andersen, if you didn't notice. It eventually took a dim view of Enron too. That's accountability.That is accountability to a degree. It is not complete accountability, and will probably never will be. Some people made themselves very wealthy in the whole ordeal. The companies died or may die, but they made off like bandits. And plenty of people lost and lost big. That is probably inevitable that any system will have moments like that, but let's apply it to environmental solutions. Imagine that Andersen's environmental verification branch, and it suffered from the same corruption that Andersen is paying for now. The market responds and Andersen dies.
Who does the cleanup?
If people die due to the mess, who goes to jail?
Compare that to government where there is virtually none. Indeed, when problems get bigger, budgets go up.There is accountability to the people. Do the people make bad decisions with alarming regularity? Yes. Can the construction of government that we have chosen be improved to make it even more accountable and less prone to abuse? Yes. Would we be better off without it? No.
There are regulations that I still think proper (particularly in the anti-trust area), but it is worth a look to determine how to make them unnecessary. That is what an intelligent Congress would do.An interesting side discussion could easily arise from that comment- how to ensure an intelligent Congress.
You neglect to note that the verification companies in my system are subject for civil penalties and are insured to cover errors or the unforseen.And how would the penalities be measured? By the assistance of other verification companies to provide the correct information? And once the companies are dead, then what?
So the insurance companies would pay to ensure they are getting good information so that their coverage is not a bad risk. But who verifies the insurance companies? And what happens when one of them cuts corners and doesn't pay for good verification, or pays for it and gets gyped? What prevents sham insurance companies from being set up? What happens if the insurance companies can't cover cleanup, or punitive damages, or just plan regular damages?
Eventually, the same problems end up as in our current system. Only with less deterrence because there doesn't appear to be hooks into the criminal system.
They don't. The only time the government would step in is if there is failure to satisfy a civil judgment upon failure to satisfy a contract, similar to any other contract in this country.So I take company X to court because they dumped crap on my property. They show up with all the lawyers in the world and documents from a verification service that they have paid off to say that there is no way the chemicals came from company X. I can't get a civil judgement, and I am stuck with the cleanup costs and/or the exposure risk.
As I said, I am not an anarchist.As I said, I didn't say you are. I said you have crafted a thesis that has marked similarities to anarchist proposals, and suffers from many if not all of the same weaknesses, not the least of is that it wouldn't work (IMO).
I believe that federal environmental regualtions should be limited to air pollutants that traverse state borders and interstate waterway pollution.
I believe all other forms of environmental regulations should be up to the individual states. That way, each state could craft a system best suited to that state's economy and that state's peoples' tastes. Heck, some states might even choose your model. We would see competition of ideas, and the best solutions evolving from trial and error.