First of all, I am no anarchist.Didn't say you were. What I did say was that the thesis proposes something very similar to what anarchist solutions sound like.
You will note however, that the market is killing Andersen, if you didn't notice. It eventually took a dim view of Enron too. That's accountability.That is accountability to a degree. It is not complete accountability, and will probably never will be. Some people made themselves very wealthy in the whole ordeal. The companies died or may die, but they made off like bandits. And plenty of people lost and lost big. That is probably inevitable that any system will have moments like that, but let's apply it to environmental solutions. Imagine that Andersen's environmental verification branch, and it suffered from the same corruption that Andersen is paying for now. The market responds and Andersen dies.
Who does the cleanup?
If people die due to the mess, who goes to jail?
Compare that to government where there is virtually none. Indeed, when problems get bigger, budgets go up.There is accountability to the people. Do the people make bad decisions with alarming regularity? Yes. Can the construction of government that we have chosen be improved to make it even more accountable and less prone to abuse? Yes. Would we be better off without it? No.
There are regulations that I still think proper (particularly in the anti-trust area), but it is worth a look to determine how to make them unnecessary. That is what an intelligent Congress would do.An interesting side discussion could easily arise from that comment- how to ensure an intelligent Congress.
You neglect to note that the verification companies in my system are subject for civil penalties and are insured to cover errors or the unforseen.And how would the penalities be measured? By the assistance of other verification companies to provide the correct information? And once the companies are dead, then what?
So the insurance companies would pay to ensure they are getting good information so that their coverage is not a bad risk. But who verifies the insurance companies? And what happens when one of them cuts corners and doesn't pay for good verification, or pays for it and gets gyped? What prevents sham insurance companies from being set up? What happens if the insurance companies can't cover cleanup, or punitive damages, or just plan regular damages?
Eventually, the same problems end up as in our current system. Only with less deterrence because there doesn't appear to be hooks into the criminal system.
They don't. The only time the government would step in is if there is failure to satisfy a civil judgment upon failure to satisfy a contract, similar to any other contract in this country.So I take company X to court because they dumped crap on my property. They show up with all the lawyers in the world and documents from a verification service that they have paid off to say that there is no way the chemicals came from company X. I can't get a civil judgement, and I am stuck with the cleanup costs and/or the exposure risk.
As I said, I am not an anarchist.As I said, I didn't say you are. I said you have crafted a thesis that has marked similarities to anarchist proposals, and suffers from many if not all of the same weaknesses, not the least of is that it wouldn't work (IMO).
It is the system we have. There are all sorts of laws that went through Congress and are too complex for voters. That's the problem with democratic control of land, and why the founders of this nation were against it (read Chapter 1). The integration of issues among Congressmen means that there will likely NEVER be traceable accountability for politicians. So you discount my system?
Some people made themselves very wealthy in the whole ordeal. The companies died or may die, but they made off like bandits.
Indeed they did and I hope that they are criminally prosecuted. Perhaps you should tell us why they won’t be?
And plenty of people lost and lost big. That is probably inevitable that any system will have moments like that, but let's apply it to environmental solutions. Imagine that Andersen's environmental verification branch, and it suffered from the same corruption that Andersen is paying for now. The market responds and Andersen dies.
Who does the cleanup?
Their insurer.
If people die due to the mess, who goes to jail?
First, this is a hypocritical argument. No one at Ford went to jail for Pinto gas tanks. No one at Firestone went to jail for bad tires. So all that regulation by the DOT failed, and I can tell you why. They built and tested the vehicles to DOT spec and because of that the liability falls upon the customer. Sir, I call that a subsidy, and that IS how the existing system works.
It is interesting that you brought up Andersen and Enron, because they exemplify the problems of political regulation. Both bought favorable regulatory treatment out of the Clinton SEC. You see, there is no accountability because the people were handed the liability and the risk by the power of government.
There is accountability to the people.
I would dispute that. Bubba walked.
Do the people make bad decisions with alarming regularity? Yes. Can the construction of government that we have chosen be improved to make it even more accountable and less prone to abuse? Yes. Would we be better off without it? No.
Where did I say that we should do without it? Perhaps you should read the book.
An interesting side discussion could easily arise from that comment- how to ensure an intelligent Congress.
I have a couple of ideas on that one, and they are relatively minor tweaks to the Constitution.
And how would the penalities be measured? By the assistance of other verification companies to provide the correct information? And once the companies are dead, then what?
Read the book. I cover that in great detail because the pricing system is tied to it directly.
So the insurance companies would pay to ensure they are getting good information so that their coverage is not a bad risk. But who verifies the insurance companies?
Their auditors do. Just like they do now. Imprecise information means that the rates have to go up to cover uncertainty. That motivates improving measurements and developing methods to reduce risk. That motivates developing an array of processes and tools to do the job at lower risk and increases the economic value of mitigating assets.
And what happens when one of them cuts corners and doesn't pay for good verification, or pays for it and gets gyped?
Getting gypped is the customer's problem. It is a competitive market. People do develop reputations. If they don’t do good verification, then there will be a problem and somebody sues. I know you don’t think that is deterministic enough for you, but I think UL does a pretty good job, for example, as does the IEEE, UPC, and numerous others in the existing certification market. They are certainly more reliable than the SEC.
What prevents sham insurance companies from being set up?
What prevents that now? Who audits their books? Gimme a break. You are effectively arguing for total socialism because control is equivalent to ownership. Does that work? Look at the California power crisis. The shortage was totally manufactured over 20 years to produce these precise conditions by environmental lawyers who now run both State government and some of the bigger power companies. Socialism doesn’t work because it is too much temptation to corruption. Environmental regulatory corruption in this country costs us TRILLIONS of dollars and now threatens the very survival of this nation. You simply don’t see that cost because you are too trusting of government and haven’t read the case for my assertion. I can back it up.
What happens if the insurance companies can't cover cleanup, or punitive damages, or just plan regular damages? Eventually, the same problems end up as in our current system. Only with less deterrence because there doesn't appear to be hooks into the criminal system.
Why should I design hooks when they already exist?
So I take company X to court because they dumped crap on my property. They show up with all the lawyers in the world and documents from a verification service that they have paid off to say that there is no way the chemicals came from company X. I can't get a civil judgement, and I am stuck with the cleanup costs and/or the exposure risk.
That’s criminal fraud. Ever heard of a district attorney? If you have no confidence in that, then you have no confidence in our existing system of justice and I would question why you would then defend it. The alternative we have is that the administrative branch writes thousands of conflicting rules that fail to cover specifics, enforces them preferentially, profits from fine money, and adjudicates disputes, effectively a corrupt police state. In answer to your question, however, you haven’t asked how the certification business even got there and how they got their insurance (because you haven’t read the book).
I would add that the critical hole in the existing system is that the agency has NO MOTIVE to succeed, analogous to the welfare state. The worse it gets the bigger the budget, and I will tell you that there are some VERY serious environmental problems out there and the EPA and environmentalists are prime movers in having made them worse (the big beneficiaries will be chemical companies and ag producers abroad, as planned). The corruption is systemic from graft to inspectors, to paying lobbyists for favorable rules, and preferential trade regulations, not to mention corrupt judges. As it is now, major corporations are using environmental law to destroy their competitors and make bigger profits from overseas investments. The corruption is so rampant that its scale boggles the mind.
As I said, I didn't say you are. I said you have crafted a thesis that has marked similarities to anarchist proposals, and suffers from many if not all of the same weaknesses, not the least of is that it wouldn't work (IMO).
Read the book. If you don’t know what process validation is, then you can’t understand anything would I say about how the system works here.
Finally, I would add that the implementation of the system design is incremental. I don’t propose a wholesale replacement of the existing regulatory architecture. We would only do so where we can PROVE that we offer a better product than a civic agency at managing a particular asset. That will exert an immediate tempering influence that should improve the performance of the agency immediately.
I appreciate the courtesy of your tenor but you are far too trusting of the existing system and apparently relatively unaware of its major environmental failings (many of which have yet to fully manifest). BTW, that "use of non-point water pollution to control land use" scam being implemented individually in the 50 states was born at the IUCN in Gland, Switzerland under aegis of the UN per the Agenda21. It doesn't get any more centralized than that. The coordination of the states is through NGOs and enforced by suit. What you are proposing ends up being exactly that. Sorry.